Search

Resumo: O objetivo central deste artigo é propor a inclusão da expertise de um agente prudente no procedimento do equilíbrio reflexivo, adicionando uma disposição para identificar crenças razoáveis que seriam vistas como o ponto de partida do método, o que poderia evitar as críticas de conservadorismo e subjetivismo. Para tanto, inicia-se pela análise das características centrais do método e suas principais fraquezas. Após, investigam-se as características da prudência como uma disposição para identificar os meios adequados para realizar um fim bom. De posse disso, aplica-se a prudência no procedimento, de forma que ele será executado por um agente que bem delibera, identificando crenças morais razoáveis e, depois, deve-se justificá-las com base em sua coerência com os princípios éticos e com as crenças factuais de teorias científicas relevantes. Por fim, defende-se que esse processo deliberativo é consistente com o pluralismo ético e com a democracia, podendo ser tomado como um tipo de conhecimento moral. Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to propose the inclusion of the expertise of a prudent agent in the reflective equilibrium procedure, adding a disposition to identify reasonable beliefs that would be seen as the starting point of the method, which could avoid the criticism of conservatism and subjectivism. To do so, I will begin by analyzing the central characteristics of the method and its main faults. Afterwards, I will investigate the characteristics of prudence as a disposition to identify the adequate means to achieve a good end. With this in mind, I will apply prudence to the procedure, so that it will be carried out by an agent who deliberates well, identifying reasonable moral beliefs and, then, we must justify them based on their consistency with ethical principles and with the factual beliefs of relevant scientific theories. Finally, I will argue that this deliberative process is consistent with ethical pluralism and democracy, and can be taken as a kind of moral knowledge.

The paper analyses the justification of personal integrity in ethical theories in contemporary moral epistemology. In the first chapter we present a theological consideration of the fundamental option that illustrates the complexity of agency of moral knowledge in the epistemic evaluation of a moral act as a specifically human conduct. Then, in the second chapter we briefly describe the inference and the structure of moral knowledge in ethical theories. In the last chapter, we argue why our personal integrity, our own understanding of it in self-estimation is related to the possibility of moral knowledge. We claim that moral knowledge is crucial in development of moral integrity of a person. The speculations on the possibility of their inference and cognitive capacity reflect on the epistemic disposition of the human being as a moral agent. Although ethical theories have offered a scientifically and methodologically precise frame to justify the truthfulness of moral knowledge and judgments, they have not anticipated the important fact of integrity between the intention, free will and practical reason., Predmet rasprave u ovom članku je vezan za problem osobnog integriteta u etičkim teorijama u suvremenoj moralnoj epistemologiji. U prvom dijelu smo predstavili teološko razmatranje temeljenog opredjeljenja koje ilustrira složenost djelovanja moralne spoznaje za epistemičko vrednovanje moralnog čina kao specifičnog ljudskog čina. Stoga smo u drugom opisali u kratkim crtama izvođenje i strukturu moralne spoznaje u etičkim teorijama. U zadnjem dijelu, pokušali smo opravdati postavku o povezanosti opravdanja našeg osobnog integriteta, našeg razumijevanja vlastite pravednosti s etičkim spekulacijama o vjerojatnosti moralne spoznaje.

“Moral Knowledge and the Moral Justification of Action”. The cost of making a decision on the basis of false beliefs varies according to different contexts of action. In some cases, the cost of the error could be very high for the wellbeing of the agents involved, while in others it might be very low. The contrast between these two types of contexts has recently been a focus of attention in epistemology.My aim in this article is to apply to the moral field the analysis of some of the implications from that contrast. In particular, I will defend the thesis that there are cases in which a subject may know fallibly that a course of action is best from a moral point of view. Despite which, however, he may not be justified to act on the basis of that knowledge in the context in which he is situated, given the high cost involved if the judgment was false. Therefore, in such cases, there would be a gap between the concepts of moral knowledge and the moral justification for an action. El costo de tomar una decisión sobre la base de las creencias falsas varía en diferentes contextos de acción. En algunos casos el costo del error podría ser muy alto para el bienestar de los agentes afectados y en otros casos muy bajo. El contraste entre estos dos tipos de contextos ha sido recientemente objeto de atención en la epistemología. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es extender el análisis de algunas de las implicaciones de ese contraste al campo moral. En particular, defenderé la tesis de que existen casos en los que un sujeto puede saber faliblemente que un curso de acción es el mejor desde una perspectiva moral y no estar, sin embargo, justificado a actuar sobre la base de ese conocimiento en el contexto en que se encuentra, dado el elevado costo que tendría que ese juicio fuese falso. Por lo tanto, en esos casos, existiría una brecha entre los conceptos de conocimiento moral y justificación moral de la acción. Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Departamento de Humanidades

In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). In this paper I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. As the practical instincts are closely related to pleasure and passions, which are by nature cognitive, my emphasis will be on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate reasoning when conclusions are not readily available. Acting by will, which is related to moral reasoning, and acting by instincts can lead us to the same moral knowledge independently, but they can also complement each other. To illustrate the two alternative ways to reach moral knowledge, I will discuss the case of happiness, which is the goal of all human moral action for Leibniz.

Conscience used to be a common topic in moral philosophy, but it has retreated into limited domains over the last 150 years or so. Nevertheless, a "folk" conception of conscience persists in ordinary moral discourse and in non-philosophical scholarship. On this view, conscience produces appearances of right and wrong by means of a distinctive kind of experience. Beliefs based on conscience are more like beliefs based on perception than on deliberation. This perceptual model explains why experiences of conscience can be so compelling and persistent, while also explaining why conscience is fallible. But conscience can still supply adequate grounds for rational beliefs about the moral quality of my actions. Conscience produces presentations of right and wrong, and these presentations justify beliefs about their content in ways similar to other commonplace presentations. Though there are limits on what we can know by conscience, its limits do not make it useless, or even inferior to other sources of moral knowledge. This theory of conscience can explain the typical platitudes about conscience’s role in society. Conscience is a way to resist social consensus, even against state coercion. But it is not infallible or decisive. Not every appeal to conscience is legitimate, but a legitimate appeal to conscience does require some degree of deference, even if it does not necessarily require the society to change its policies.

This paper analyzes the central elements of Plato’s conception of moral knowledge in the Crito. In the first place, it studies the characterization of the moral knowledge that Socrates ascribes to himself in the Apology, with the aim of offering a framework for the attribution of moral knowledge to Socrates in the Crito. The next section is devoted to the analysis of the practical principles introduced by Socrates in his response to the offer of flight advanced by his friend Crito. These principles will guide the deliberation on whether such action should be undertaken or not, which will be treated in the fourth section. Finally, in the fifth and last section, I will focus on the dispositional aspects highlighted by the Platonic representation of Socrates and Crito and that are essential in the characterization of moral knowledge as presented in the Crito. Este trabajo analiza los elementos centrales de la concepción platónica del saber moral en el diálogo Critón. En primer lugar, se examina la caracterización del saber moral que Sócrates se atribuye a sí mismo en la Apología, con el objetivo de ofrecer un marco conceptual de referencia en el que situar el saber moral socrático tal y como es presentado en el Critón. El siguiente epígrafe está dedicado al estudio de los principios prácticos introducidos por Sócrates en su respuesta a la propuesta de fuga planteada por su amigo Critón y que habrán de guiar la deliberación sobre si tal acción debe acometerse o no. Dicha deliberación es el objeto de análisis en el cuarto epígrafe. Finalmente, en el quinto y último epígrafe se analizan algunos aspectos disposicionales en los que incide la representación dramática de Sócrates y Critón y que resultan esenciales en la caracterización del saber moral en el Critón.

U ovom tekstu, autor ukazuje na jednu donekle zanemarenu Kantovu metaforu - metaforu "moralnog kompasa". Zamisao "moralnog kompasa" nije ništa drugo nego zamisao samog moralnog zakona kao "kategoričkog imperativa". Autor sugeriše da ova jednostavna metafora ukazuje na dve stvari koja se često zaboravlja u interpretaciji Kantove etike: 1) da Kant smatra da je moralno saznanje dostupno doslovno svakom, i 2) da se put saznanja u moralu razlikuje od puta moralnog saznanja u Kantovoj opštoj epistemologiji. Konačno, autor na primeru "lažnog obećanja" nudi objašnjenje mehanizma delovanja "moralnog kompasa". In this article, the author points to a somewhat neglected Kant's metaphor - a metaphor of the "moral compass." The idea of a "moral compass" is nothing more than the concept of the moral law itself as a "categorical imperative." The author suggests that this simple metaphor points to two things that are often forgotten in the interpretation of Kant's ethics. Firstly, Kant believes that moral knowledge is available literally to everyone. Secondly, the path of acquiring knowledge in morality differs from the path of moral knowledge in Kant's general epistemology. Finally, the author, for example, offers an explanation of the mechanism of "moral compass."

John Calvin holds that the fall radically changed humanity’s moral and epistemic capacities. Recognizing that should lead Christian philosophers to see that philosophical questions require at least two sets of answers: one reflecting our nature and capacities before the fall, and the other reflecting our nature and capacities after the fall. Our prelapsarian knowledge of God, the right, and the good is direct and noninferential, our postlapsarian knowledge of them is mostly indirect, inferential, and filled with moral and epistemic risk. Only revelation can move us beyond fragmentary and indeterminate moral and theological knowledge.

Documents have traditionally been conceptualized as representations of reality. Recently, scholars have been exploring how documents can also construct reality. In this paper, I follow this thread, discussing how documents can supply moral knowledge, showing what people ought to value in the world, thereby guiding action. Specifically, I discuss two works of art depicting Yellowstone National Park: a painting by Thomas Moran, done in the 19th century; and a photograph by Michael Nichols, from the 21st. Both of these works respond to a dualism in the human relationship to the wilderness, dating back at least to the European colonization of America. On one hand, (1) we see the wilderness as a store of commodities to be profited from; and on the other, (2) we see the wilderness as a dangerous, chaotic blur that defies comprehension. In their artworks, both Moran and Nichols seem to reject (1), but they do so in different ways: Moran does so by depicting (2), while Nichols does so by holding up a mirror to (1). By analyzing these works as documents, I explore how art played and continues to play a decisive role in how Americans conceptualize and value the wilderness—perhaps even more than scientific documents.

Aristotelian Ethics enjoyed a conscious revival from the 70’s and its influence extends to the contemporary debate. In recent years, many scholars have been able to capitalize on the moral performance of Aristotle’s philosophy, precisely because of the unique relevance that passions have in their ethical proposal. Many of the apparent aporias of his approaches (such as the cognitive-behavioral characterization of incontinence or the practical syllogism status itself) can be solved by analyzing the epistemological and motivational link between knowledge, passions, and moral action. To this end in this article (being in line with proposals already classic like those of M.C. Nussbaum, or more recent ones such as those of D. Achtenberg) we may try to articulate precisely the way in which the capture or estimation that the passions exert is determinant for the whole of Aristotelian ethics circumscribing us, specifically, to the capture of the idea of the Good. La ética aristotélica gozó de una consciente reactivación a partir de los años 70 y su influencia se prolonga hasta el debate contemporáneo. En los últimos años numerosos estudiosos han sabido capitalizar el rendimiento moral de la filosofía de Aristóteles atendiendo, precisamente, a la singular relevancia que en su propuesta ética adquieren las pasiones. Creemos que muchas de las aparentes aporías de sus planteamientos (tales como la caracterización cognitivo-conductual de la incontinencia o el propio estatuto del silogismo práctico) pueden resolverse a partir del análisis del vínculo epistemológico y motivacional que se establece entre el conocimiento, las pasiones y la acción moral. Para ello, en este artículo, en línea con propuestas ya clásicas como las de M.C. Nussbaum o más recientes como las de D. Achtenberg, trataremos de articular con precisión el modo en que la captación o estimación que ejercen las pasiones es determinante para el conjunto de su ética circunscribiéndonos, específicamente, a la captación de la propia idea del bien.

Moralisches Wissen wird in sozialen Zusammenhangen erlernt. Auch Universitaten als Erfahrungs- und Lernraume spielen hierbei eine Rolle. In diesem Text wird die Grundstruktur moralischen Wissens offengelegt, welche Studierende der Informatik in Deutschland im Hinblick auf ihr technisches Handeln und Technikfolgen teilen. Zwar nehmen die Studierenden Ambivalenzen ihres Handelns wahr, wissen aber nur von einer Moglichkeit, mit ethischen Problemlagen umzugehen. Diese Einsicht mundet in einer Argumentation, die dafur wirbt, den ethischen Kompetenzerwerb zu einem Teil der normalen Praxis an den Universitaten werden zu lassen. Ethisches Handeln muss geubt werden und in solchen Ubungen konnen neue Verfahren der gemeinsamen Verantwortungsubernahme geschaffen werden.

This paper challenges Jerome Stolnitz’s view that art cannot teach us anything but merely offers truisms, which he asserts in his article “On the Cognitive Triviality of Art”. The current inquiry is limited to fiction and explores the relationship between aesthetics and morality and their cognitive and emotional implications. Employing the contemporary debates surrounding the literature, I defend the view that fiction can offer us moral truth beyond truisms through the reader’s interaction with the text as she employs her imaginative, moral and emotional faculties throughout the unique process of reading. Stolnitz’s first worry is that the cognitive value of fiction is superficial, and the “message” of a text hardly qualifies as knowledge. He bases his argument on the case that artistic truth doesn’t exist because there are no experts who could judge the epistemic status of knowledge on arts; hence there is no such thing as artistic knowledge – and without knowledge, art cannot teach us anything. Even if fiction offers certain conceptions which may evoke moral wisdom, they are already stale truisms devoid of cognitive worth. I respond to this criticism by proposing that works of fiction contain a different type of knowledge; the type of know-how rather than know-that which alludes to moral knowledge. Stolnitz’s second worry is that the moral themes contained in fiction can fit in a sentence or two, without us having to bother to read the whole text. My response is that the act of interaction with the text is an indispensable part of enhancing our emotional and moral education which helps us cultivate our moral imagination. Similar to any thought experiment in philosophical arguments, fiction helps us direct our moral attention and evaluate diverse (moral) possibilities. The process of reading allows us to acquire a moral space or distance from which we can formulate moral responses to what happens in the text. Cultivating moral judgment takes time; and it is this time consuming act of reading the text which enables us to critically engage with the text. Learning from fiction entails an internal change we undergo in our being; and the greater the literary work is, the more we can learn from it. Bu çalışma, Jerome Stolnitz’in “On the Cognitive Triviality of Art” / “Sanatın Bilişsel Önemsizliği Üzerine” adlı makalesinde savunduğu sanatın bize herkesçe bilinen basmakalıp önermelerden öte hiç bir şey öğretemeyeceği fikrini eleştirmeyi amaçlar. Bu araştırma kurguyla sınırlıdır ve estetik ile ahlakın ilişkisini ve bunların bilişsel ve duygusal çıkarımlarını inceler. Güncel literatürdeki tartışmalardan da faydalanarak kurgunun bize basmakalıp önermelerin ötesinde ahlaki gerçekler sunabileceğini; bunu da okuyucunun metinle kurduğu etkileşim sürecinde harekete geçirdiği imgesel, ahlaki ve duygusal yetilerini geliştirerek sağladığını savunacağım. Stolnitz’in kurguya yönelik temel eleştirisi kurgunun bilişsel değerinin yüzeyselliği üzerinedir; O’na göre, metnin mesajı bilgisel nitelikte sayılamaz. O’na göre, sanatsal gerçek diye bir şey yoktur çünkü sanatın epistemik statüsünü değerlendirebilecek uzmanlar yoktur; dolayısıyla sanatsal bilgi olarak nitelendirilebilecek bir şey yoktur – ve bilgi yoksa, sanat da bize bir şey öğretemez. Her ne kadar kurgu bize ahlaki bilgeliği anımsatan bir takım kavrayışlar sunsa bile, bunlar da içi boşaltılmış beylik sözlerden ileri gidemez; dolayısıyla bilişsel değerleri yoktur. Bu saptamaya karşılık olarak, kurgusal metinlerde teknik bilgiden ziyade ahlaki yetkinliği çağrıştıran daha farklı bir bilgi türünün bulunduğunu öne süreceğim.

Este trabajo gira en torno al casuismo. Se hace hincapié en su necesidad para la ética biomédica. A través de su carácter analógico, se pone de manifiesto, a su vez, su dependencia de los principios. Sin embargo, ni principios ni casos bastan por sí solos para iluminar completamente las decisiones biomédicas, que presentan un notable componente de incertidumbre. Una decisión no es un objeto preexistente, sino algo que hay que producir, un operable. Aquí se pone de manifiesto que esta realidad no se puede abordar si no es a través de la noción clásica de prudencia, en el sentido de la phrónesis aristotélica. Una vez esbozada ésta en sus líneas generales, dando cuenta de sus aspectos morales e intelectuales, es posible enfocar de nuevo el casuismo con nueva luz, superar las críticas más importantes y comprender que la relación clínica es también una relación jurídica, por lo que el papel del Derecho, y en particular el de la jurisprudencia, se muestra vital. This paper focus on casuistry. First, its necessity for biomedical Ethics is stressed. Showing its analogical character its dependency from principles is also made apparent. Then we appreciate that nor principles neither cases are sufficient by themselves in order to enlighten all the relevant aspects of biomedical decisions, which involve a significant component of uncertainty. A decision is not a preexisting object, but something to produce, an agibilium. This fact cannot be addressed unless through the classical notion of practical wisdom, in the sense of the Aristotelian phronesis. Once it is outlined and given an account of its moral and intellectual aspects, a new approach to casuistry is then made possible. It also becomes possible to overcome its most important criticisms and to understand that clinical relation is also a legal relation. This shows the capital role of Law and particularly of iurisprudentia.