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What is to be done when parents disagree about whether to raise their children as vegans? Three positions have recently emerged. Marcus William Hunt has argued that parents should seek a compromise. I have argued that there should be no compromise on animal rights, but there may be room for compromise over some ‘unusual’ sources of non-vegan, but animal-rights-respecting, food. Carlo Alvaro has argued that both Hunt and I are wrong; veganism is like religion, and there should be no compromise on religion, meaning there should be no compromise on veganism. This means that even my minimal-compromise approach should be rejected. This paper critiques Alvaro’s zero-compromise veganism, demonstrating that his case against Hunt’s position is undermotivated, and his case against my position rests upon misunderstandings. If vegans wish to reject Hunt’s pro-compromise position, they should favour a rightist approach, not Alvaro’s zero-compromise approach.

What we could call ‘relational non-interventionism’ holds that we have no general obligation to alleviate animal suffering, and that we do not typically have special obligations to alleviate wild animals’ suffering. Therefore, we do not usually have a duty to intervene in nature to alleviate wild animal suffering. However, there are a range of relationships that we may have with wild animals that do generate special obligations to aid—and the consequences of these obligations can be surprising. In this paper, it is argued that we have special obligations to those animals we have historically welcomed or encouraged into our spaces. This includes many wild animals. One of the consequences of this is that we may sometimes possess obligations to actively prevent rewilding—or even to dewild—for the sake of welcomed animals who thrive in human-controlled spaces.

The prediction of a difficult cholecystectomy has traditionally been based on certain pre-operative clinical and imaging factors. Most of the previous literature reported small patient cohorts and have not used an objective measure of operative difficulty. The aim of this study was to develop a pre-operative score to predict difficult cholecystectomy, as defined by a validated intra-operative difficulty grading scale. Two cohorts from prospectively maintained databases of patients who underwent laparoscopic cholecystectomy were analysed: the CholeS Study (8755 patients) and a single surgeon series (4089 patients). Factors potentially predictive of difficulty were correlated to the Nassar intra-operative difficulty scale. A multivariable binary logistic regression analysis was then used to identify factors that were independently associated with difficult laparoscopic cholecystectomy, defined as operative difficulty grades 3 to 5. The resulting model was then converted to a risk score, and validated on both internal and external datasets. Increasing age and ASA classification, male gender, diagnosis of CBD stone or cholecystitis, thick-walled gallbladders, CBD dilation, use of pre-operative ERCP and non-elective operations were found to be significant independent predictors of difficult cases. A risk score based on these factors returned an area under the ROC curve of 0.789 (95% CI 0.773–0.806, p

The possibility of “clean milk”—dairy produced without the need for cows—has been championed by several charities, companies, and individuals. One can ask how those critical of the contemporary dairy industry, including especially vegans and others sympathetic to animal rights, should respond to this prospect. In this paper, I explore three kinds of challenges that such people may have to clean milk: first, that producing clean milk fails to respect animals; second, that humans should not consume dairy products; and third, that the creation of clean milk would affirm human superiority over cows. None of these challenges, I argue, gives us reason to reject clean milk. I thus conclude that the prospect is one that animal activists should both welcome and embrace.

Recent proposals in political philosophy concerning nonhuman animals as property-holders - by John Hadley and Steve Cooke - have focused on the interests that nonhuman animals have in access to and use of their territories. The possibility that such rights might be grounded on the basis of a Lockean (that is, labour-mixing) account of property has been rejected. In this paper, I explore four criticisms of Lockean property rights for nonhuman animals - concerning self-ownership, initiative, exertion and the sufficiency of protection offered - concluding that Lockean property rights could be extended to nonhuman animals. I then suggest that Lockean property rights actually offer advantages over interest-based accounts: they more clearly ground property, they are potentially broader, and they are considerably stronger.

The philosophical literature may seem to be replete with arguments for vegetarianism based on harm to animals. However, these arguments turn out to be arguments for veganism, not vegetarianism. This chapter explores whether anything can be said for vegetarianism. Some reasons motivating vegetarianism seem to be very personal, and so not the sorts of things that could be the foundation of a moral argument. Meanwhile, though they may hold some weight, arguments about vegetarianism as a “middle way” between veganism and omnivorism are highly contingent. Both of these routes, then, may seem unsatisfying to the vegetarian. Could there be a principled case for vegetarianism? Tzachi Zamir is the one philosopher who has argued at length for vegetarianism over veganism, but a close examination of his arguments show that they are not as compelling as they first seem. A final option remains open: there may be potential for arguments critiquing the eating of animals’ flesh and/or their bodies that are independent of concerns about harms to animals in food production. Such arguments, which have been hinted at in animal ethics, offer a critique of meat consumption, but not, necessarily, of egg and dairy consumption. Perhaps, then, they could form the basis of a principled case for vegetarianism that does not immediately become a case for veganism. The consequences of such an argument, if one can be made, are not simple.

Animal rights positions face the ‘predator problem’: the suggestion that if the rights of nonhuman animals are to be protected, then we are obliged to interfere in natural ecosystems to protect prey from predators. Generally, rather than embracing this conclusion, animal ethicists have rejected it, basing this objection on a number of different arguments. This paper considers but challenges three such arguments, before defending a fourth possibility. Rejected are Peter Singer’s suggestion that interference will lead to more harm than good, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s suggestion that respect for nonhuman sovereignty necessitates non-interference in normal circumstances, and Alasdair Cochrane’s solution based on the claim that predators cannot survive without killing prey. The possibility defended builds upon Tom Regan’s suggestion that predators, as moral patients but not moral agents, cannot violate the rights of their prey, and so the rights of the prey, while they do exist, do not call for intervention. This idea is developed by a consideration of how moral agents can be more or less responsible for a given event, and defended against criticisms offered by thinkers including Alasdair Cochrane and Dale Jamieson.

Interpreters of Robert Nozick’s political philosophy fall into two broad groups concerning his application of the ‘Lockean proviso’. Some read his argument in an undemanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without any ownership are unjust. Others read the argument in a demanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without that particular ownership are unjust. While I argue that the former reading is correct as an interpretive matter, I suggest that this reading is nonetheless highly demanding. In particular, I argue that it is demanding when it is expanded to include the protection of nonhuman animals; if such beings are right bearers, as more and more academics are beginning to suggest, then there is no nonarbitrary reason to exclude them from the protection of the proviso.

OBJECTIVE: Most data on local excisions for rectal cancer are based on retrospective studies. We review the results of a prospective registry of patients eligible for local excision of rectal cancer using a transanal, transsphincteric, or transcoccygeal technique combined with multimodality therapy for lesions penetrating the muscularis propria (T2) or perirectal fat (T3). METHODS: Patients with lesions less than 4 cm in diameter and less than 10 cm from the dentate line, with no evidence of distant metastases or invasion into the perirectal fat, were eligible for local excision. Patients with invasion into the muscularis propria (T2) or greater (T3) received adjuvant chemoradiation therapy. RESULTS: Forty-eight patients have been followed prospectively. Average age is 63 years. Thirty-three patients underwent a transanal excision. Fifteen patients underwent either a transsphincteric or technique excision. There was no perioperative mortality. Pathology revealed 1 Tis, 21 T1, 21 T2, and 5 T3 cancers. Mean follow-up is 40.5 months. Cancerrelated overall mortality was 4 percent. Overall local or distant recurrence rate was 8 percent(4/48). Recurrence appeared to be related to presence of a positive margin or aggressive histology (lymphatic invasion). Local recurrences were treated with salvage therapy. CONCLUSION: Local excision can be used selectively for small rectal cancers, with minimum morbidity. Recurrence rates are low (8 percent). Patients with either a positive margin or lymphatic invasion need to be considered for further therapy, including abdominoperineal resection, even with T1 lesions. Adjuvant chemoradiation appears to be a benefit for all T2 or T3 cancers.

(1993). The Unfinished Journey: America since World War II. Second Edition. History: Reviews of New Books: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 70-70.