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What happens when an Australian servicemember misbehaves? When a serving member of the Australian Defence Force engages in poor performance or behavior that contradicts Defence values, but is not criminal, they may be subject to administrative sanctions. These sanctions are intended to motivate a change in behavior or provide grounds for dismissal. However, there has been little examination of how these sanctions are applied, the impact they have on those the organization wishes to retain, or the fairness of the system. This research begins to address these gaps by using descriptive statistics, Kaplan-Meier survival analysis, and Linear Probability Models to understand how sanctions are applied to the Australian Army. We find that there was an increase in the use of sanctions from 2011 to 2020. Soldiers in 2020 were 75% more likely to receive a sanction compared to 2011. Additionally, receiving a sanction early in one's career is linked to a shorter length of service. Our findings also revealed some variability in supervisor decision-making, indicating a lack of consistency in the application of sanctions. Furthermore, we find that there is some correlation between the location where a member is posted and the likelihood of receiving a sanction. In the worst locations, soldiers are 26% more likely to receive a sanction. Major, Australian Army Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Law enforcement in the Military Court System in the settlement of criminal cases committed by TNI soldiers is seen as not yet fully guaranteeing legal protection for the rights of suspects, this is due to the absence of a control agency that oversees the actions of law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties and authorities as is the case in the system. General Court. This condition should not drag on indefinitely, because it will affect the law enforcement process and harm the suspect to fight for his rights to obtain justice which results in human rights violations (TNI soldiers). The purpose of the establishment of the Pretrial Institution is as stated in the Elucidation of Article 80 of the Criminal Procedure Code which states that this article intends to uphold law, justice, and truth through horizontal supervision. Settlement of criminal cases in Indonesia in addition to the Code of Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) which applies to civil society, we also recognize the existence of the Military Criminal Procedure Code which is regulated in Law Number 31 of 1997 concerning Military Courts, namely the law that regulates the procedure for resolving criminal cases. a criminal case committed by a TNI soldier. The Law on Military Courts includes the provisions of the litigation process (Military Criminal Procedure Law) starting from the investigation stage, submission of cases, the examination process at trial to the implementation of decisions. 31 of 1997 does not regulate pretrial. In several cases in the Military Court where a suspect was detained without a warrant for detention or was late in obtaining a warrant for detention, therefore such actions may conflict with the principles applicable in the provisions of criminal law so that they do not respect the position of the suspect as a creature created by God, even the act can lead to human rights violators. Therefore, in the military justice system in Indonesia, pretrial institutions are needed as a form of horizontal external supervision.

Some historians have proposed that common soldiers in various parts of Europe lost a previous judicial independence around 1600 and have linked this development to a contemporary increase in discipline and in control over them. Meanwhile, historians of the Thirty Years War rarely mention military justice at all or depict this war as a time when military justice did not function. In contrast, this article examines the ordinary practice of military law during the Thirty Years War through a close reading of low-level legal paperwork generated by electoral Saxon units. Although military justice was not egalitarian, common soldiers in these units took an active role in the administration of justice, even in the early seventeenth century. The practice of law in early seventeenth-century electoral Saxon military units was similar to pre-existing structures of military justice, but subtly modified.

Narcotics can be categorized into extraordinary crimes. Currently, the circulation of narcotics has targeted almost all circles. Military institutions are also not spared from the circulation of narcotics. The basic question is how to handle narcotics crimes by the Military judiciary and the legal efforts that can be made by the soldiers who are accused. The research method used is socio-legal legal studies: Data sources come from secondary data sources or literature studies, which review data from laws and regulations, readings, and books related to research titles. The settlement of narcotics crimes involving TNI soldiers is carried out by the military judiciary. The component or sub-system of military justice is the same as the general judiciary, namely the existence of Ankum and Papera which are important components in the military justice system, in addition to the Military Police, Oditur, and Military Judges. Soldiers involved in such crimes can also make legal efforts as a form of self-defense. The Military Judiciary has the authority to resolve its cases without interference from other agencies, as whose authority and position are contained in Law No. 31 of 1997

This article explores the limits of family in contemporary South Korea by simultaneously examining the discourses and practices of anti-LGBT protesters and the state alongside an ethnography of queer and HIV/AIDS activism. The author argues that the limits of family in Korea ought to be conceived as a problem with sex incorporating both “substance” and the practice of having sex. He explores these limits of family through a broadening understanding of family law in Korea, focusing on the anti-sodomy clause in the Military Penal Code and mandatory HIV/AIDS testing. The author contends that to broaden the concept of family law to laws such as the anti-sodomy clause and mandatory HIV/AIDS testing demonstrates the intricate and unexplored ways the Korean family is produced through military laws and regulations. This is a recursive process, for the heteronormative expectations of family members are inscribed within military law, rhetorically casting the family as a threatened body that needs protection. However, the normative experience of the family in crisis produces violence against gender and sexual minorities. The author concludes by discussing the dangerous implications of these family laws.

Despite minor amendments to the Royal Navy's Articles of War throughout the eighteenth century, and a major reworking in 1749, both capital and corporal punishments were frequently employed as punishment for minor offences in a system that made England's ‘Bloody Code’ look positively humane. The 1860 Naval Discipline Act provided the first substantive overhaul of the original Articles of War, but historians have generally lamented this act as providing little comprehensive change to the governance of the navy. Using statistical data collected from thousands of courts martial records, this article takes a broad look at trends in naval courts martial, studying how these courts interacted with the legislative changes of the 1860s. Viewing how charges and sentences altered on the global scale, it becomes clear that the ‘arbitrary and cruel punishments’ of the previous century had at last given way to a centralized, formal expression of discipline.

The artcle considers the history of establishing, developing and functioning ofRoyal Military College in the town of Sandhurst (Great Britain), on the base of whichmodern Royal military Academy was created. It tackles the admission process, educationalactivities, and the transformation the institution had undergone throughout the 19 and thefirst half of the 20th centuries. It has been determined that at first the educational processwas more oriented towards civilian disciplines such as mathematics, Latin, German andFrench but in the second half of the 19th century a shift was made towards militaryeducation which was caused by increasing the number of military faculty and addingmilitary disciplines. The "Gentlemen Cadets" of late-nineteenth-century Sandhurst studiedMilitary Engineering, Military Administration, Military Law, Topography, French,German, Military Exercises (Drill, Gymnastics, and Riding), and Tactics. Those whohad passed Board room examinations, were recommended to the Queen for commissions inthe Army. The social significance of the Sandhurst experience notwithstanding, what thecadets learned and what the professors taught them influenced the military mind-set of thegeneration of officers that would lead the British military forces during the wars of the 19thand the 20th centuries. Of particular interest to the faculty at Sandhurst were the two greatestmilitary minds: Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. The tactical principlesemployed by these two innovative and successful battlefield leaders were the foundationof the British tactical doctrine.Although most sports were not a formal part of the curriculum, the principlesembodied in organized physical activity fit in well with the values of the Royalmilitary college. Sport required mental focus and discipline, and forced theparticipants to operate within a given set of rules and parameters. Athletic competitionstressed thought and activity within a certain collection of boundaries, and theworkouts were an entertaining diversion, which had the added benefit of keeping thefuture officers of the army physically fit and, therefore, reinforced the rigid tacticallaws learned in the classroom.

This study aims to: 1) To analyze the application of military criminal law against members of the TNI perpetrators of desertion crimes; 2) To analyze the constraints in the enforcement of miiliter criminal law against members of the TNI perpetrators of desertion crimes. This study uses normative-empirical legal research, while the data analysis used is qualitative approach to primary data and secondary data. where in analyzing / processing data first held organizing of primary data obtained through related legislation and literature. Then the collected data is then discussed, compiled, elaborated, and interpreted, and reviewed the problem so that a conclusion is obtained as a problem solving effort. The results showed that the application of military criminal law against members of the TNI who were proven to commit desertion crimes is the authority of the military judiciary to prosecute him, then the stages in the form of investigations conducted by the Military Police on the orders of the Superior Who Has the Right to Punish (Ankum). furthermore, the investigation file is given to the Military Oditur to be studied, then the military oditur makes an indictment to be delegated to the Military Judiciary, after the judiciary feels sufficient with the files of the Military Oditur, then the military judiciary will prosecute members of the military who are accused of desertion. Furthermore, constraints in law enforcement related to desertion crimes are reviewed from 4 interrelated aspects, namely with regard to legal subtansi, the legal structure itself, facilities or infrastructure, and the community. The settlement of cases in the military judiciary at this time has been well arranged, but it is expected that all who play a role in the process of resolving military cases do all these stages based on Justice and Positive Law. The application of existing regulations must be done consistently and always conducted a review of desertion cases so that from these obstacles can be found solutions and solutions to reduce the quantity of desertion crimes.

The use of cyber-technologies in times of armed conflict poses serious interpretive challenges, such as what type of cyber operations amount to an ‘attack’ for the purposes of Article 49 of Additional Protocol I. The notion of attack is the cornerstone of the law of targeting, a set of rules that includes the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution, aimed at limiting the amount of violence that belligerents can lawfully employ on the battlefield. The rationale of these rules is that of increasing the protection of the dignity of the civilian population, which constitutes the main objective of modern international humanitarian law (IHL). In light of these considerations, my article argues that the prevailing interpretation of the notion of attack in the cyber context is too restrictive and cannot adequately protect the civilian population from cyber operations taking place in armed conflict. Consequently, it argues for a human-dignity based interpretation of the notion of ‘violence’ that underlies the notion of attack in the cyber context, going beyond the mere causation of physical violence to include serious psychological violence and serious economic violence as necessary prerequisites to qualify a cyber operation as an ‘attack’. L’utilisation des cybertechnologies en période de conflit armé soulève d’importantes questions d’interprétation, notamment sur le type de cyberopération qui peut être considérée comme une ‘attaque’ au sens de l’article 49 du protocole additionnel I. La notion d’attaque est la pierre angulaire du droit du ciblage, un ensemble de règles comprenant les principes de distinction, de proportionnalité et de précaution, visant à limiter le degré de violence que des belligérants peuvent légalement utiliser sur le champ de bataille. La raison d’être de ces règles est de renforcer la protection de la dignité de la population civile, qui constitue l’objectif principal du DIH moderne. À la lumière de ces considérations, l’article avance que l’interprétation dominante de la notion d’attaque dans le contexte cybernétique est trop restrictive et ne peut pas protéger efficacement la population civile des cyberopérations lors de conflits armés. Par conséquent, l’article plaide pour une interprétation de la notion de ‘violence’, sous-jacente à la notion d’attaque dans le contexte cybernétique, basée sur la dignité humaine, allant au-delà de la seule violence physique pour inclure la violence psychologique grave et la violence économique grave dans les conditions pour qu’une cyberopération puisse être qualifiée d’ ‘attaque’. Het gebruik van cybertechnologieën in tijden van gewapend conflict stelt ons voor serieuze interpretatieve uitdagingen, zoals de vraag welk type cyberoperaties neerkomen op een 'aanval' in de zin van Art. 49 van het Aanvullend Protocol I. Het begrip aanval is de hoeksteen van het recht van doelbestrijding, een geheel van regels dat de beginselen van onderscheid, evenredigheid en voorzorg omvat, en dat tot doel heeft de hoeveelheid geweld te beperken die oorlogvoerende partijen rechtmatig op het slagveld kunnen aanwenden. De grondgedachte achter deze regels is de bescherming van de waardigheid van de burgerbevolking te vergroten, hetgeen de voornaamste doelstelling van het moderne IHR is. In het licht van deze overwegingen betoogt mijn artikel dat de gangbare interpretatie van het begrip aanval in de cybercontext te restrictief is en de burgerbevolking niet adequaat kan beschermen tegen cyberoperaties die plaatsvinden in een gewapend conflict. Bijgevolg wordt gepleit voor een op menselijke waardigheid gebaseerde interpretatie van het begrip ‘geweld’ dat ten grondslag ligt aan het begrip aanval in de cybercontext, waarbij verder wordt gegaan dan het louter veroorzaken van fysiek geweld en ook ernstig psychologisch geweld en ernstig economisch geweld worden beschouwd als noodzakelijke voorwaarden om een cyberoperatie als een ‘aanval’ te kunnen aanduiden. El uso de tecnologías cibernéticas en tiempos de conflicto armado plantea serios desafíos interpretativos, tales como qué tipo de operaciones cibernéticas equivalen a un ‘ataque’ a los efectos del art. 49 del Protocolo Adicional I. El concepto de ataque es la piedra angular de la ley de selección de objetivos, un conjunto de reglas que incluye los principios de distinción, proporcionalidad y precaución, destinados a limitar la medida de violencia que los beligerantes pueden emplear legalmente en el campo de batalla. La razón fundamental de estas normas es aumentar la protección de la dignidad de la población civil, que constituye el principal objetivo del DIH moderno. A la luz de estas consideraciones, este artículo sostiene que la interpretación predominante del concepto de ataque en el contexto cibernético es demasiado restrictiva y no puede proteger adecuadamente a la población civil frente a las operaciones cibernéticas que tienen lugar en un conflicto armado. En consecuencia, aboga por una interpretación centrada en la dignidad humana del concepto de ‘violencia’ que subyace a la noción de ataque en el contexto cibernético, yendo más allá de la mera causalidad de la violencia física para incluir la violencia psicológica grave y la violencia económica grave como requisitos previos necesarios para calificar una operación cibernética como un ‘ataque’. L'uso di tecnologie informatiche in tempi di conflitto armato pone gravi sfide interpretative, come ad esempio quale tipo di operazioni informatiche equivalgono ad un attacco ai fini dell'Art. 49 del Protocollo Addizionale I. La nozione di attacco è la base della legge di targeting, un insieme di regole che include i principi di distinzione, proporzionalità e precauzione, volte a limitare la quantità di violenza che i belligeranti possono legittimamente impiegare sul campo di battaglia. La logica di queste regole è quella di aumentare la protezione della dignità della popolazione civile, che costituisce l'obiettivo principale del moderno IHL. Alla luce di queste considerazioni, l'articolo sostiene che l'interpretazione prevalente della nozione di attacco nel contesto informatico sia troppo restrittiva e non possa proteggere adeguatamente la popolazione civile dalle operazioni informatiche che si svolgono in conflitti armati. Di conseguenza, sostiene un'interpretazione basata sulla dignità umana della nozione di violenza che sta alla base della nozione di attacco nel contesto informatico, andando oltre l’essere la mera causa di violenza fisica per includere la violenza psicologica grave e la violenza economica grave come prerequisiti necessari per qualificare un'operazione cibernetica come un ‘attacco’. Die Verwendung von Cybertechnologien in Zeiten eines bewaffneten Konflikts stellt uns vor schwere interpretative Herausforderungen, wie die Frage, welche Art von Cyberoperationen einen ‘Angriff’ im Sinne von Art. 49 des Zusatzprotokolls I darstellen. Der Begriff ‘Angriff’ ist der Eckstein der Zielgesetze, einer Sammlung von Regeln, die die Grundsätze der Unterscheidung, Verhältnismäßigkeit und Vorsorge umfassen, welche zum Ziel haben, das Maß von Gewalt, das Krieg führende Staaten rechtmäßig auf dem Schlachtfeld verwenden können, zu beschränken. Der Grundgedanke dieser Regeln besteht darin, den Schutz der Würde der Zivilbevölkerung, der das Hauptziel des modernen internationalen humanitären Rechts ausmacht, zu erhöhen. Angesichts dieser Betrachtungen, argumentiert mein Artikel, dass die gängige Interpretation des Begriffs ‘Angriff’ im Cyber-Kontext zu restriktiv ist und die Zivilbevölkerung nicht adäquat vor der Durchführung von Cyberangriffen in bewaffneten Konflikten schützen kann. Folglich befürwortet der Artikel eine auf Menschenwürde basierte Interpretation des dem Begriff ‘Angriff’ im Cyber-Kontext zugrunde liegenden Begriffs ‘Gewalt’, die über die reine Verursachung physischer Gewalt hinausgeht und auch schwere psychische und wirtschaftliche Gewalt als notwendige Bedingungen umfasst, um eine Cyberoperation als einen ‘Angriff’ zu bezeichnen.

This article confronts what has been described as the ‘ongoing self-defence controversy’ within the international military community over the legitimacy of commanders issuing orders that have the practical effect of restricting soldiers’ use of force in self-defence. Within this controversy, some argue that soldier self-defence is legally sacrosanct, a right that must invariably take precedence over any command-imposed restrictions. This article explores whether there is any legal basis for this view. It finds that there is not, and that such an absolutist approach misconstrues the basic theoretical and legal origins of self-defence. What is more, the article forewarns that reasoning in such absolute terms might actually serve to devalue rather than promote soldiers’ safety by failing to properly account for the longstanding military tradition of commands such as ‘hold fire’ orders, the central importance of these directives to the ordered application of military force and military effectiveness, and the interrelationship of the military and the state’s responsibility for national security. Cet article se penche sur la controverse qui entoure la légitime défense au sein de la communauté militaire internationale, quant à la légitimité du commandement de donner des ordres ayant pour effet, dans la pratique, de restreindre l’emploi de la force des soldats à des fins de légitime défense. Dans le cadre de cette controverse, certains soutiennent que la légitime défense des soldats est sacro-sainte d’un point de vue juridique et que ce droit doit toujours l’emporter sur toute restriction imposée par le commandement. Cet article cherche à déterminer si ce point de vue repose sur un fondement juridique. L’article conclut que non, et qu’une telle approche absolutiste dénature les origines théoriques et juridiques à la base de la légitime défense. Qui plus est, l’article met en garde qu’un raisonnement en de tels termes absolus pourrait en fait nuire à la sécurité des soldats, au lieu de l’améliorer, parce qu’il ne tient pas suffisamment compte de la longue tradition militaire d’ordres tels que «halte au feu», de l’importance de ces directives pour l’application ordonnée de la force militaire et pour l’efficacité militaire, et de l’interaction entre l’armée et la responsabilité de l’État pour la sécurité nationale. Dit artikel gaat in op wat is omschreven als de ‘voortdurende controverse over zelfverdediging’ binnen de internationale militaire gemeenschap over de legitimiteit van commandanten die bevelen uitvaardigen waarbij het gebruik van geweld door soldaten uit zelfverdediging praktisch wordt beperkt. Binnen deze controverse betogen sommigen dat de zelfverdediging van soldaten wettelijk onaantastbaar is, een recht dat altijd voorrang moet hebben op alle beperkingen die door het commando worden opgelegd. Dit artikel gaat na of er een wettelijke basis is voor dit standpunt. De conclusie is dat die er niet is en dat een dergelijke absolutistische benadering de theoretische en juridische grondslagen van zelfverdediging miskent. Bovendien waarschuwt het artikel dat een redenering in dergelijke absolute termen de veiligheid van de soldaten eerder zou kunnen aantasten dan bevorderen, doordat niet naar behoren rekening wordt gehouden met de gevestigde militaire traditie van bevelen zoals ‘staakt het vuren’-bevelen, het centrale belang van deze richtlijnen voor de bevolen toepassing van militair geweld en militaire doeltreffendheid, en de onderlinge relatie tussen het leger en de verantwoordelijkheid van de staat voor de nationale veiligheid. Este artículo aborda lo que se ha venido a llamar la ‘controversia existente en torno a la autodefensa’ dentro de la comunidad militar internacional sobre la legitimidad de los comandantes que emiten órdenes que tienen el efecto práctico de restringir el uso de la fuerza en defensa propia por parte de los soldados. Dentro de esta controversia, algunos argumentan que la autodefensa de los soldados es legalmente sacrosanta, un derecho que invariablemente debe prevalecer sobre cualquier restricción impuesta por el mando. Este artículo explora si existe alguna base legal para este punto de vista. Se llega a la conclusión de que no existe base alguna y que tal enfoque absolutista malinterpreta los orígenes teóricos y legales básicos de la autodefensa. A mayor abundamiento, el artículo advierte que el razonamiento en términos tan absolutos podría servir para devaluar, en lugar de promover, la seguridad de los soldados al no tener en cuenta adecuadamente la tradición militar inmemorial de órdenes como las órdenes de ‘mantener el fuego’, la importancia central de estas directivas para la aplicación ordenada de la fuerza militar y la eficacia militar, y la interrelación de las fuerzas armadas y la responsabilidad del Estado por la seguridad nacional. Questo articolo affronta quella che è stata descritta come la ‘continua controversia di autodifesa’ all'interno della comunità militare internazionale sulla legittimità dei comandanti che emettono ordini che hanno l'effetto pratico di limitare l'uso della forza da parte dei soldati nell'autodifesa. All'interno di questa controversia, alcuni sostengono che l'autodifesa dei soldati sia giuridicamente sacrosanta, un diritto che deve invariabilmente avere la precedenza su qualsiasi restrizione imposta dal comando. Questo articolo esamina se vi sia una base giuridica per questa interpretazione. Trova che non esiste, e che un tale approccio rigido fraintenda le origini teoriche e giuridiche di base di auto­difesa. Inoltre, l'articolo ammonisce che ragionare in termini così assoluti potrebbe effettivamente sminuire piuttosto che promuovere la sicurezza dei soldati, non riuscendo a tenere adeguatamente conto della lunga tradizione militare di comandi come ‘non aprire il fuoco’, dell'importanza centrale di queste direttive per l'ordinata applicazione della forza militare e dell'efficacia militare e l'interrelazione tra la responsabilità militare e quella dello Stato per la sicurezza nazionale. Dieser Artikel befasst sich mit dem, was innerhalb der internationalen Militärgemeinschaft bezeichnet wird als ‘andauernde Selbstverteidigungskontroverse’ (‘ongoing self-defence controversy’) in Bezug auf die Legitimität von Befehlshabern, die Befehle erteilen, wobei die Gewaltanwendung aus Selbstverteidigung durch Soldaten praktisch beschränkt wird. Im Rahmen dieser Kontroverse argumentieren manche, dass die Selbstverteidigung von Soldaten rechtlich als sakrosankt gilt und dass dieses Recht immer vor jeder vom Kommando auferlegten Beschränkung Vorrang haben muss. Dieser Artikel prüft, ob es irgendeine gesetzliche Basis für diese Auffassung gibt. Der Autor stellt fest, dass dies nicht der Fall ist, und dass eine solche absolutistische Sichtweise die theoretischen und gesetzlichen Grundlagen der Selbstverteidigung verkennt. Darüber hinaus erteilt der Artikel eine Warnung, auf diese absolute Weise zu argumentieren könnte eigentlich dazu beitragen, die Sicherheit der Soldaten zu beeinträchtigen statt sie zu fördern, indem der althergebrachten militärischen Tradition von Befehlen, wie ‘Feuer einstellen’, der zentralen Bedeutung dieser Richtlinien für die geordnete Anwendung von Militärgewalt und für die Militäreffizienz sowie der Wechselbeziehung zwischen der Armee und der Verantwortung des Staates für die nationale Sicherheit nicht gebührendermaßen Rechnung getragen wird.

As the world becomes more urbanized and wars are fought in more condensed areas it is important to continue to evaluate the propriety of certain methods of warfare in these new and varied contexts. This article offers that when debates arise over the propriety of using certain weapons systems, an outright or systematic ban of that weapon system should rarely be the outcome. Rather, it is far more appropriate to provide armies with as many tools as possible to bring an armed conflict to a quick and decisive end and to hold those commanders and warfighters accountable to using those tools in accordance with international law, treaties, and norms. To do otherwise would unnecessarily handcuff and endanger those that are doing the fighting. This article presents this argument through the lens of the United States’ policy toward using white phosphorus munitions in urban contexts. The United States, among other militaries, has continued to employ white phosphorus munitions in the face of increased international scrutiny. This article evaluates that policy and concludes that it is both legal and appropriate provided that targeting decisions are made in accordance with traditional law of armed conflict principles and with an eye toward humanitarian imperatives. This conclusion is supported by a survey of relevant international treaties, various states’ practice, and is illustrated by hypothetical anecdotes provided by the author. Dans un monde de plus en plus urbanisé, où des guerres se déroulent dans des régions plus densément peuplées, il est important de continuer à évaluer l’opportunité de certaines méthodes de guerre dans ces contextes nouveaux et variés. Cet article avance que, lorsque l’opportunité d’utiliser certains systèmes d’arme fait débat, cela ne devrait que rarement résulter dans une interdiction totale ou systématique du système d’arme en question. Au contraire, il est bien plus opportun de munir les armées d’autant d’instruments que possible pour mettre un terme aux conflits armés de manière rapide et décisive, et de tenir les commandants et les combattants responsables de l’utilisation de ces instruments, conformément au droit international, aux traités et aux normes. Agir autrement représenterait une entrave et une mise en danger inutiles des combattants sur le terrain. Cet article présente cette argumentation au travers de la politique des États-Unis en matière d’utilisation de munitions au phosphore blanc en milieu urbain. L’armée des États-Unis, parmi d’autres, a continué à utiliser des munitions au phosphore blanc malgré une surveillance internationale accrue. L’article évalue cette politique et conclut qu’elle est à la fois légale et appropriée, à condition que les décisions en matière de ciblage soient prises conformément aux principes consacrés du droit des conflits armés et en gardant à l’esprit les impératifs humanitaires. Cette conclusion est étayée par une étude des traités internationaux pertinents et des pratiques de différents États, et est illustrée par des anecdotes hypothétiques fournies par l’auteur. Aangezien de wereld steeds meer verstedelijkt en oorlogen in compactere gebieden worden uitgevochten, is het belangrijk om te blijven evalueren of bepaalde methoden van oorlogvoering gepast zijn in deze nieuwe en diverse contexten. Dit artikel stelt dat, wanneer er discussie is over de gepastheid van het gebruik van bepaalde wapensystemen, dit zelden zou moeten leiden tot een regelrecht of systematisch verbod van dat wapen­systeem. Integendeel, het is veel beter om legers van zoveel mogelijk middelen te voorzien om een gewapend conflict snel en beslissend te beëindigen en om commandanten en oorlogvoerende partijen verantwoordelijk te houden voor het gebruik van deze middelen overeenkomstig het internationaal recht en de internationale verdragen en normen. Anders zou dat degenen die de strijd voeren, onnodig beknotten en in gevaar brengen. Dit artikel bekijkt dit argument door de lens van het beleid van de Verenigde Staten betreffende het gebruik van witte fosformunitie in stedelijke omgevingen. De Verenigde Staten zijn, net zoals andere legers, doorgegaan met het gebruik van witte fosformunitie ondanks to­egenomen internationaal toezicht. In dit artikel wordt dat beleid geëvalueerd en wordt geconcludeerd dat het zowel wettig als gepast is op voorwaarde dat de beslissingen over de doelbestrijding worden genomen in overeenstemming met de traditionele beginselen van het recht van de gewapende conflicten en met het oog op humanitaire vereisten. Deze conclusie wordt ondersteund door een overzicht van de relevante internationale verdragen en de praktijk van diverse staten, en wordt geïllustreerd aan de hand van hypothetische anekdotes van de auteur. A medida que el mundo se vuelve más urbanizado y las guerras se libran en áreas más concentradas, es importante continuar evaluando la idoneidad de ciertos métodos de guerra en estos nuevos y variados contextos. Este artículo sugiere que cuando surgen debates sobre la conveniencia de usar ciertos sistemas de armas, el resultado raramente debería ser una prohibición total o sistemática de ese sistema de armas. Más bien, es mucho más apropiado proporcionar a los ejércitos tantas herramientas como sea posible para llevar un conflicto armado a un final rápido y decisivo y hacer que esos comandantes y combatientes sean responsables del uso de esas herramientas de conformidad con el derecho, los tratados y las normas internacionales. Hacer lo contrario limitaría innecesariamente y pondría en peligro a quienes están combatiendo. Este artículo presenta este argumento a través de la lente de la política de los Estados Unidos hacia el uso de municiones de fósforo blanco en contextos urbanos. Estados Unidos, entre otros ejércitos, ha seguido empleando municiones de fósforo blanco ante el creciente escrutinio internacional. Este artículo evalúa esa política y concluye que es legal y apropiada siempre que las decisiones de selección de objetivos se tomen de acuerdo con los principios del Derecho tradicional de los conflictos armados y teniendo en cuenta los imperativos humanitarios. Esta conclusión está respaldada por un estudio de los tratados internacionales relevantes, la práctica de varios Estados y está ilustrada por anécdotas hipotéticas proporcionadas por el autor. Man mano che il mondo diventa più urbanizzato e le guerre si combattono in aree più concentrate, è importante continuare a valutare la correttezza di alcuni metodi di guerra in questi nuovi e cambiati contesti. Questo articolo afferma che quando sorgono dibattiti sull’opportunità di usare determinati armamenti, raramente il risultato dovrebbe essere un divieto totale o sistematico di quel sistema d’arma. Piuttosto, è molto più appropriato fornire agli eserciti quanti più strumenti possibili per porre fine in modo rapido e decisivo a un conflitto armato e ritenere quei comandanti e combattenti responsabili dell'uso di quegli strumenti in conformità con il diritto internazionale, i trattati e le norme. Fare altrimenti significherebbe immobilizzare inutilmente e mettere in pericolo coloro che stanno combattendo. Questo articolo presenta l’argomento attraverso l’ottica della politica degli Stati Uniti nei confronti dell'uso delle munizioni al fosforo bianco in contesti urbani. Gli Stati Uniti, tra gli altri eserciti, hanno continuato a impiegare munizioni al fosforo bianco a fronte di un maggior controllo internazionale. Questo articolo valuta tale politica e conclude che è sia legale che appropriata, a condizione che le decisioni a tal fine siano prese in conformità con i principi tradizionali del diritto dei conflitti armati e con attenzione agli imperativi umanitari. Questa conclusione è sostenuta da una revisione dei trattati internazionali pertinenti, dalla pratica di vari Stati, ed è corredata da ipotetici aneddoti forniti dall'autore. Da die Welt immer stärker urbanisiert wird und Kriege in immer stärker verdichteten Zonen geführt werden, ist es wichtig, die Geeignetheit bestimmter Methoden der Kriegsführung in diesen neuen und unterschiedlichen Kontexten weiterhin zu bewerten. Dieser Artikel behauptet, dass sich, wenn sich eine Debatte über die Geeignetheit der Verwendung bestimmter Waffensysteme anspinnt, daraus selten ein absolutes oder systematisches Verbot des betreffenden Waffensystems ergeben soll. Vielmehr ist es angebracht, Armeen mit möglichst vielen Mitteln auszustatten, damit ein bewaffneter Konflikt zu einem raschen und entscheidenden Ausgang gebracht wird, sowie Befehlshaber und Kombattanten hinsichtlich der Verwendung dieser Mittel in Übereinstimmung mit dem Völkerrecht, Verträgen und Normen zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen. Eine andere Vorgehensweise würde denjenigen, die kämpfen, unnötig Zügel anlegen und sie gefährden. Dieser Artikel betrachtet dieses Argument durch die Linse der Politik der Vereinigten Staaten in Bezug auf die Verwendung weißer Phosphormunition in einer städtischen Umgebung. Die Streitkräfte der Vereinigten Staaten haben, wie auch andere Streitkräfte, angesichts zunehmender internationaler Kritik, weiterhin weiße Phosphormunition verwendet. Der Artikel be­wertet diese Politik und schlussfolgert, dass diese sowohl rechtmäßig als geeignet ist, vorausgesetzt, dass die Zielentscheidungen in Übereinstimmung mit den herkömmlichen Grundsätzen des Rechts der bewaffneten Konflikte und unter Berücksichtigung humanitärer Gebote getroffen werden. Diese Schlussfolgerung wird mit einem Überblick über relevante internationale Abkommen und die Praxis verschiedener Staaten untermauert und wird mit hypothetischen Anekdoten vom Autor illustriert.

Several armed conflicts have marked the past two decades in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As a result, the DRC is facing an unprecedented humanitarian disaster with the death of hundreds of thousands of people, the large-scale displacement of civilians and the rape of thousands of women, girls and men. These armed conflicts have led to the metamorphosis of the concept of ‘crime’ with the emergence of new forms of sexual violence, particularly the widespread sexual violence used by armed groups as a tactic of war. In response to this avalanche of sexual violence, the DRC has taken a series of legislative measures. It began with the ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) on 11 April 2002. This was followed by the promulgation of the Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code on 18 November 2002 (MJC and MCC, respectively) criminalizing, inter alia, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In 2006, the Congolese legislator criminalized various forms of sexual crimes as defined by international law in the Military Penal Code. On 31 December 2015, the Congolese authorities promulgated Law No. 15/022, amending and supplementing the Military Penal Code, for the implementation of the Rome Statute. Through this Law, the legislator has included in the Congolese Ordinary Criminal Code rape and other sexual assaults constituting war crimes, and in some circumstances, crimes against humanity. In terms of prosecutions, around 40 cases of rape classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity have been tried by Congolese military courts, and a few other cases are being investigated. This article seeks to assess the progress made by the DRC in prosecuting rape as a war crime and the challenges to such prosecutions. La République démocratique du Congo (RDC) a été marquée par plusieurs conflits armés au cours des deux dernières décennies. Il en résulte que ce pays est confronté à une catastrophe humanitaire sans précédent avec la mort de centaines de milliers de personnes, le déplacement à grande échelle de civils et le viol de milliers de femmes, de filles et d'hommes. Ces conflits armés ont entraîné une métamorphose du concept de ‘crime’ avec l'émergence de nouvelles formes de violence sexuelle, notamment la violence sexuelle généralisée utilisée par les groupes armés comme tactique de guerre. En réponse à cette avalanche de violences sexuelles, la RDC a adopté une série de mesures législatives. La première fut la ratification du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale (Statut de Rome) le 11 avril 2002. Cette ratification fut suivie par la promulgation du Code judiciaire militaire et du Code pénal militaire le 18 novembre 2002 (respectivement le CMJ et le CCM) qui criminalisent, entre autres, les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l'humanité et le génocide. En 2006, le législateur congolais a incriminé dans le Code pénal militaire diverses formes de crimes sexuels tels que définis par le droit international. Le 31 décembre 2015, les autorités congolaises ont promulgué la loi no 15/022, modifiant et complétant le Code pénal militaire, pour la mise en œuvre du Statut de Rome. A travers cette loi, le législateur a inclus dans le Code pénal ordinaire congolais les viols et autres agressions sexuelles constitutifs de crimes de guerre, et dans certaines circonstances, de crimes contre l'humanité. En termes de poursuites, une quarantaine de cas de viols qualifiés de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre l'humanité ont été jugés par les tribunaux militaires congolais, et quelques autres cas sont en cours d'instruction. Cet article vise à évaluer les progrès réalisés par la RDC en matière de poursuites pénales pour viol en tant que crime de guerre et les défis auxquels ces poursuites sont confrontées. Verschillende gewapende conflicten hebben de afgelopen twee decennia hun stempel gedrukt op de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC). Als gevolg daarvan wordt de DRC geconfronteerd met een ongekende humanitaire ramp die gepaard gaat met de dood van honderdduizenden mensen, de grootschalige ontheemding van burgers en de verkrachting van duizenden vrouwen, meisjes en mannen. Die gewapende conflicten hebben geleid tot een metamorfose van het begrip ‘misdaad’ met de opkomst van nieuwe vormen van seksueel geweld, in het bijzonder het wijdverspreide seksuele geweld dat door gewapende groepen als oorlogstactiek wordt gebruikt. Als reactie op die lawine van seksueel geweld heeft de DRC een reeks wetgevende maatregelen genomen. Het begon met de ratificatie van het Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof (Statuut van Rome) op 11 april 2002, gevolgd door de afkondiging van het militair gerechtelijk wetboek en het militair strafwetboek op 18 november 2002. Daarin worden onder meer oorlogsmisdaden, misdaden tegen de mensheid en genocide strafbaar gesteld. In 2006 heeft de Congolese wetgever verschillende vormen van seksuele misdrijven, zoals omschreven in het internationaal recht, strafbaar gesteld in het militair strafwetboek. Op 31 december 2015 hebben de Congolese autoriteiten wet nr. 15/022 tot wijziging en aanvulling van het militair strafwetboek uitgevaardigd, met het oog op de uitvoering van het Statuut van Rome. Met die wet heeft de wetgever verkrachting en andere vormen van seksueel geweld die te beschouwen zijn als oorlogsmisdaden, en in sommige omstandigheden misdaden tegen de mensheid, in het gewone Congolese Wetboek van Strafrecht opgenomen. Wat vervolging betreft, zijn ongeveer 40 gevallen van verkrachting die als oorlogsmisdaden en misdaden tegen de mensheid werden aangemerkt, door de Congolese militaire rechtbanken berecht, en enkele andere gevallen worden momenteel onderzocht. Deze studie heeft tot doel na te gaan welke vooruitgang de DRC heeft geboekt bij de vervolging van verkrachting als oorlogsmisdaad en voor welke uitdagingen dergelijke vervolgingen staan. Varios conflictos armados han dejado huella en las dos décadas pasadas en la República Democrática del Congo (RDC). A resultas de ello, la RDC se está enfrentando a un desastre humanitario sin precedentes con la muerte de cientos de miles de personas, desplazamiento de civiles a gran escala y la violación de miles de mujeres, niñas y hombres. Estos conflictos armados han llevado a la metamorfosis del concepto de ‘crimen’ con la aparición de nuevas formas de violencia sexual, en particular el uso generalizado de la violencia sexual por grupos armados como táctica de guerra. En respuesta a esta avalancha de violencia sexual, la RDC ha adoptado una serie de medidas legislativas. Todo comenzó con la ratificación del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional (Estatuto de Roma) el 11 de abril de 2002. A esto siguió la promulgación del Código Judicial Militar y del Código Penal Militar el 18 de noviembre de 2002 (Código Judicial Militar y Código Penal Militar, respectivamente), penalizando, entre otros, los crímenes contra la humanidad y el genocidio. En 2006, el legislador congoleño introdujo en el Código Penal Militar varias modalidades de crimen sexual tal y como se definen en el Derecho Internacional. El 31 de diciembre de 2015, la autoridades congoleñas promulgaron la Ley Núm. 15/022, reformando y complementando el Código Penal Militar, con objeto de implementar el Estatuto de Roma. A través de esta ley, el legislador ha tipificado en el Código Penal Común la violación y otros ataques sexuales que constituyen crímenes de guerra y, en algunas circunstancias, crímenes contra la humanidad. En términos de procedimientos instruidos, cerca de 40 casos de violación tipificada como crímenes de guerra y crímenes contra la humanidad han sido tramitados por los tribunales militares congoleños, y varios casos más continúan siendo objeto de investigación. Este estudio busca valorar el progreso de la RDC en la persecución de la violación como crimen de guerra y los retos a los que se ha tenido que hacer frente en dicha tarea. Gli ultimi due decenni della Repubblica Democratica del Congo (RDC) sono stati segnati da diversi conflitti armati. Di conseguenza, la RDC sta affrontando un disastro umanitario senza precedenti con la morte di centinaia di migliaia di persone, lo sfollamento di civili su larga scala e lo stupro di migliaia di donne, ragazze e uomini. Questi conflitti armati hanno portato alla metamorfosi del concetto di ‘crimine’ con l'emergere di nuove forme di violenza sessuale, in particolare la diffusa violenza sessuale usata dai gruppi armati come tattica di guerra. In risposta a questa valanga di violenza sessuale, la RDC ha adottato una serie di misure legislative. È iniziato tutto con la ratifica dello Statuto della Corte penale internazionale (Statuto di Roma) l'11 aprile 2002. A ciò è seguita la promulgazione del Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code il 18 novembre 2002 (rispet­tivamente Codice giudiziario militare e Codice penale militare), che hanno criminalizzato, tra l'altro, crimini di guerra, crimini contro l'umanità e genocidio. Nel 2006, il legislatore congolese ha definito come crimini varie forme di reati sessuali così come definito dal diritto internazionale nel Codice Penale Militare. Il 31 dicembre 2015 le autorità congolesi hanno promulgato la Legge n. 15/022, che modifica e integra il Codice Penale Militare, per l'attuazione dello Statuto di Roma. Attraverso questa legge, il legislatore ha incluso nel Codice penale Ordinario congolese lo stupro e altre aggressioni sessuali definiti crimini di guerra e, in alcune circostanze, crimini contro l'umanità. In termini di procedimenti penali, circa 40 casi di stupro classificati come crimini di guerra e crimini contro l'umanità sono stati processati dai tribunali militari congolesi e alcuni altri casi sono oggetto di indagine. Questo studio cerca di valutare i progressi compiuti dalla RDC nel perseguire lo stupro come crimine di guerra e l’impegno in tali procedimenti penali. Mehrere bewaffnete Konflikte haben die vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnte in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo (DRK) geprägt. Als Folge dessen steht die DRK vor einer beispiellosen humanitären Katastrophe mit dem Tod von Hunderttausenden von Menschen, der massiven Vertreibung von Zivilisten und der Vergewaltigung von Tausenden von Frauen, Mädchen und Männern. Diese bewaffneten Konflikte haben zu einer Metamorphose des Begriffs ‘Verbrechen’ mit dem Aufkommen neuer Formen sexueller Gewalt geführt, insbesondere der weit verbreiteten sexuellen Gewalt, die von bewaffneten Gruppen als Kriegstaktik eingesetzt wird. Als Reaktion auf diese Lawine sexueller Gewalt hat die DRK eine Reihe von gesetzlichen Maßnahmen ergriffen. Es begann mit der Ratifizierung des Statuts des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs (Römisches Statut) am 11 April 2002. Es folgte die Verkündung des Militärgerichtsgesetzbuchs und des Militärstrafgesetzbuchs am 18. November 2002, die unter anderem Kriegsverbrechen, Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit und Völkermord unter Strafe stellen. Im Jahr 2006 hat der kongolesische Gesetzgeber im Militärstrafgesetzbuch verschiedene Formen von Sexualverbrechen im Sinne des Völkerrechts unter Strafe gestellt. Am 31. Dezember 2015 haben die kongolesischen Behörden das Gesetz Nr. 15/022 zur Änderung und Ergänzung des Militärstrafgesetzbuchs im Hinblick auf die Umsetzung des Römischen Statuts verkündet. Mit diesem Gesetz hat der Gesetzgeber Vergewaltigung und andere sexuelle Übergriffe, die Kriegsverbrechen und unter gewissen Umständen auch Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit darstellen, in das kongolesische ordentliche Strafgesetzbuch aufgenommen. Was die Strafverfolgung anbelangt, so wurden etwa 40 Fälle von Vergewaltigung, die als Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit eingestuft werden, von kongolesischen Militär­gerichten abgeurteilt, und einige weitere Fälle werden derzeit untersucht. Diese Studie versucht, die Fortschritte der DRK bei der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung von Vergewaltigung als Kriegsverbrechen und die Herausforderungen für solche Verfolgungen zu bewerten.

The article discloses topical issues of state’s military policy formation and implementation with the goal of ensuring law and order as well as administration of justice in the field of defence as components of the general system of ensuring national security in this area. An analysis, which is based on the experience of NATO member states and relevant international standards, provides grounds for the conclusion about the integrated connection and systemic interaction of military policy with law enforcement activities, maintenance of law and order, and administration of justice in the Armed Forces and other military formations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, which is due to the common goal of ensuring military security. Both legal and institutional solution to the problem of development of the military justice system of Ukraine is proposed, in the context of state’s military policy formation and implementation with the definition of the relevant tasks and authority of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine., У статті розкрито актуальні питання формування та реалізації воєнної політики держави в напрямі забезпечення правопорядку, здійснення правосуддя у сфері оборони як складових загальної системи забезпечення національної безпеки в цій сфері. Проведений на основі використання досвіду держав – членів НАТО і відповідних міжнародних стандартів аналіз дає підстави для висновку про органічний зв’язок та системну взаємодію воєнної політики з правоохоронною діяльністю, підтриманням правопорядку, здійсненням правосуддя у Збройних Силах, інших утворених відповідно до законів України військових формуваннях, що зумовлено спільною метою забезпечення воєнної безпеки. Запропоновано нормативно-правове та інституційне розв’язання проблеми створення системи військової юстиції України в контексті формування та реалізації воєнної політики держави з визначенням відповідних завдань і повноважень Міністерства оборони України.

This paper addresses the question of the criminalization of war crimes, which are compared at the international and internal legislative level under military law. Considering current threats to the international legal order and security system, justice and defence sector actors, military lawyers and research fellows in military law are faced with the problems of the concept of responsibility for the most serious crimes in the world. The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 raises the question of the internal legislation validity. The states Parties to International Criminal Court should revise the established conceptual approaches of responsibility for war crimes. The comparative analysis was made of the core and international military law.

A művelettervezés az egyik legösszetettebb katonai vezetői tevékenység, szerteágazó szakterületeket kell összefognia, eredményeiket pedig egy koherens, hatékony és végrehajtható tervvé formálnia. A folyamatban több ponton szükség van jogász szakértelem bevonására, bizonyos esetekben kritikus kérdésekben is. A hadijogász-szakirodalom – tekintettel a jogászok támogató szerepére – talán kicsit takarékosan bánik a tervezési munka folyamán felmerülő feladatok elemzésével. Jelen írás ezen a helyzeten kíván változtatni az egyes módszertanokban foglalt fontosabb feladatok áttekintésével, bizonyos vonatkozásokban pedig javaslatok megfogalmazásával.

Defined as ‘a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures’ cyberspace is created by people for the people. However, this is not always the case. Cyber operations conducted by states may amount to the use of force. The opinions, though, regarding the threshold that must be reached differ, and there are diverse theories on when a cyber operation constitutes the use of force. Furthermore, there are cases of operations that despite not reaching the threshold of use, fall under the definition of threat of force, under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Finally, cyber operations that fail to reach the threshold may still be contrary to international law, constituting a prohibited intervention in the internal affairs of another state. Le cyberespace, défini comme « un domaine caractérisé par l’usage de l’électronique et du spectre électromagnétique pour stocker, modifier et échanger des données via des systèmes en réseaux et les structures physiques qui y sont attachées », est créé par des gens et pour les gens. Ce n’est pourtant pas toujours le cas. Des cyberopérations menées par des États peuvent représenter un emploi de la force. Mais les avis divergent quant au seuil devant être atteint, et les théories pour déterminer quand une cyberopération constitue un emploi de la force sont diverses. En outre, il existe des cas d’opérations qui n’atteignent pas ce seuil, mais qui relèvent pourtant de la définition de menace de la force, au sens de l’article 2(4) de la Charte des Nations unies. Enfin, des cyberopérations n’atteignant pas ce seuil peuvent néanmoins être contraires au droit international, en ce qu’elles constituent une intervention interdite dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre État. Omschreven als ‘een domein dat wordt gekenmerkt door het gebruik van elektronica en het elektromagnetische spectrum om gegevens op te slaan, te wijzigen en uit te wisselen via netwerksystemen en bijbehorende fysieke infrastructuren’ komt cyberspace tot stand door en voor mensen. Dat is echter niet altijd het geval. Cyberoperaties geleid door staten kunnen neerkomen op het gebruik van geweld. Over de drempel die bereikt moet worden lopen de meningen echter uiteen, en er zijn verschillende theorieën om te bepalen wanneer bij een cyberoperatie sprake is van gebruik van geweld. Verder zijn er gevallen van operaties die, ook al wordt de drempel van geweldgebruik niet bereikt, onder de definitie van bedreiging met geweld vallen, zoals bedoeld in artikel 2, lid 4, van het VN-Handvest. Ten slotte kunnen cyberoperaties die de drempel niet bereiken, nog steeds in strijd zijn met het internationaal recht en gelijkstaan aan een verboden interventie in de interne aangelegenheden van een andere staat. Definido como ‘un dominio caracterizado por el uso de la electrónica y el espectro electromagnético para almacenar, modificar e intercambiar datos a través de sistemas en red e infraestructuras físicas asociadas’, el ciberespacio es creado por personas para las personas. Sin embargo, no siempre ocurre así. Las operaciones cibernéticas realizadas por los Estados pueden equivaler al uso de la fuerza. No obstante, las opiniones sobre el umbral que se debe alcanzar difieren, existiendo diversas teorías sobre cuándo una ciber-operación constituye uso de la fuerza. Además, existen casos de operaciones que, a pesar de no alcanzar el umbral de uso propiamente dicho, entran sin embargo dentro de la definición de amenaza de uso de la fuerza, según el artículo 2 (4) de la Carta de la ONU. Finalmente, las operaciones cibernéticas que no alcanzan dicho umbral pueden, no obstante, seguir siendo contrarias al Derecho Internacional, constituyendo una intervención prohibida en los asuntos internos de otro Estado. Definito come ‘un dominio caratterizzato dall'uso dell'elettronica e dello spettro elettromagnetico per memorizzare, modificare e scambiare dati tramite sistemi in rete e infrastrutture fisiche associate’ il cyberspazio è creato dalle persone per le persone. Tuttavia, non è sempre così. Le operazioni cyber condotte dagli Stati possono equivalere all'uso della forza. Le opinioni, tuttavia, per quanto riguarda la soglia che deve essere oltrepassata sono diverse e ci sono differenti teorie su quando un'operazione cyber costituisca uso della forza. Inoltre, ci sono casi di operazioni che, pur non raggiungendo la soglia di utilizzo, rientrano nella definizione di minaccia all’uso della forza, ai sensi dell'articolo 2, paragrafo 4, della Carta delle Nazioni Unite. Infine, le operazioni cibernetiche che non raggiungono la soglia possono tuttavia essere contrarie al diritto internazionale, costituendo un intervento vietato negli affari interni di un altro Stato. Der Cyberspace, der definiert wird als ‘ein Bereich, gekennzeichnet durch den Gebrauch der Elektronik und des elektromagnetischen Spektrums, um Daten über vernetzte Systeme und dazugehörige physische Infrastrukturen zu speichern, zu ändern und auszutauschen’, wird von Menschen für Menschen geschaffen. Dies ist allerdings nicht immer der Fall. Cyberoperationen, die von Staaten durchgeführt werden, können der Anwendung von Gewalt gleichkommen. Allerdings gehen die Meinungen über die zu erreichende Schwelle auseinander, und es gibt verschiedene Theorien zur Frage, wann eine Cyberoperation die Anwendung von Gewalt ausmacht. Außerdem gibt es Fälle von Operationen, die als Androhung von Gewalt im Sinne von Artikel Volume 2 (Issue 4) der Charta der Vereinten Nationen bezeichnet werden können, und dies obwohl die Schwelle der Gewaltanwendung nicht erreicht wird. Schließlich können Cyberoperationen, die die Schwelle nicht erreichen, trotzdem gegen das Völkerrecht verstoßen, und somit ein verbotenes Eingreifen in die inneren Angelegenheiten eines anderen Staates darstellen.

This research attempts to introduce and integrate two relatively foreign concepts to each other; paradigm of restorative justice and military justice system. The aim is simple, namely to explore the extent and under what conditions these two routes of adjudication can function side by side without violating core principles of traditional military justice. This goal implies one important point; not all criminal cases that fall under the jurisdiction of military justice can be resolved using a restorative justice approach. The application of restorative justice in the settlement of traffic accident cases committed by TNI soldiers can only be implemented by reforming the three components of the legal system as stated by Lawrence Friedman, namely legal substance, legal structure and legal culture. Operationally, the application of restorative justice can be carried out in 3 (three) stages, namely investigation, prosecution and trial. However, the application of restorative justice at these three stages is not intended to replace the criminal justice system within the military court, because the restorative justice program is basically complementary and not a substitute for the criminal justice system.

The objective of the article is to show the phenomenon of the internal standardization of the units of the Polish cavalry in the 16th century. The references to this process, during which the diversisty of arms and equipment of soldiers was abandoned, are scarce in descriptive sources and are only reflected in normative acts. The only type of sources which enables to reconstruct the combat potential of units is inspection (rejestry popisowe). Consequently, the process of specialization of units and of formation of different types of cavalry was basically marginalized. In the Crown, as late as the 1530s, cavalry rotas were very diverse. They consisted of lancers, Polish winged hussars (later: hussars) and light cavalry combined in various proportions. This state of affairs is connected with three factors. Firstly, the units of Permanent Defense (obrona potoczna) in their structure referred to Mass Mobilization (pospolite ruszenie). Secondly, provisions of law were not used for standardizing the arms and armor; on the contrary, at least by the 1530s they stimulated the internal diversification. Thirdly, the Crown professional units were internally divided into towarzyszes and pocztowys, which prompted the diversification of armament inside a unit. The text shows the changes which occurred in the 1540s and 1550s, and brought about a situation in 1557, when the rate of standardization was as high as 82.93 %. The transformations were dynamic but were not top-down planned reforms, representing instead a bottom-up initiative of rotmistrzes.

El principal objetivo del artículo será contemplar y analizar escueta y globalmente el proceso de modernización de las Fuerzas Armadas en los últimos decenios del siglo XX, así como poner de relieve la obligada interdependencia entre aquel y el cambiante entorno político-social e internacional. A tal efecto, se prestará atención a los cuatro principales hitos del citado proceso: reorganización de la superestructura española de defensa; reforma de la organización y revisión de las funciones encomendadas a los ejércitos; inserción de España en los organismos defensivos occidentales, y homologación de la justicia militar con la ordinaria. The main objective of the article will be to consider and analyze the process of modernization of the Armed Forces in the last decades of the twentieth century, as well as to highlight the obligatory interdependence between it and the changing political-social and international environment. To this end, attention will be paid to the four main milestones of this process: reorganization of the Spanish defence superstructure; reform of the organization of the armed forces and review of the functions entrusted to them; insertion of Spain into Western defensive alliances, and accommodation of the military justice to the common one.

The article analyzes a number of destructive factors that cause objective difficulties in the examination of the crime scene in the areas of armed conflict, including in the process of investigating war crimes committed by the opposing sides of an armed conflict with the use of missile-artillery and aerial missile-bomb weapons. These difficulties are primarily connected with the committing crimes by representatives of the opposing side of the armed conflict, their obstruction of the activities of military justice bodies, including by mining the area, the use of small arms, mortar and missile-artillery weapons, the presence of significant casualties and destruction, which generally complicates the examination of the scene. The analysis carried out by the author makes it possible to propose scientifically grounded recommendations for the examination of the crime scene in areas of an armed conflict when investigating war crimes committed by the opposing side of an armed conflict using missile-artillery and aerial missile-bomb weapons, which will help to significantly minimize the consequences of these factors and in general, to increase the efficiency of the inspection of the places of incidents in the areas of armed conflict.

Article based on a presentation delivered at the Conference on War in Cities: ‘Searching for practical solutions to the contemporary challenges’, April 2019.

The notion of ‘precautions in attack’ is an important concept in the law of armed conflict. It requires attackers to verify their targets, to ensure that only proportionate strikes are launched, to mitigate the potential for collateral damage in the selection of means and methods of warfare and, where possible, to issue warnings in advance of attacks. The emergence of ‘autonomous weapons’ requires us to review how these precautions might apply in a new era of delegated warfare in which the fulcrum around which the regime revolves – the human combatant – would be replaced by artificial intelligence-powered machines. This paper contends that technology is fast approaching the point at which the use of autonomous weapons will be compatible with the requirements of precaution. The author pushes further than most commentators in demonstrating just how capable the technology is becoming; in explaining how close it is to supplanting humans on the battlefield and in showing the potential for machines to discharge precautionary obligations better than humans in at least some areas. However, the article recognizes that technological innovations are still required before this transition comes to pass and so it also illuminates the way forward by identifying where remaining deficiencies linger.

This article reviews the existing scholarship concerning the applicability of IHL norms to cyberspace, and in particular the Tallinn Manual, which is considered to be the most authoritative restatement of international law applicable in the cyber context. In doing so, it seeks to answer the question of whether purely disruptive (as opposed to physically destructive) cyber operations could be prosecuted as war crimes at the International Criminal Court under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. The Tallinn Manual, being a restatement of lex lata at the time that it was drafted, places a heavy emphasis on physical effects when applying the jus in bello to cyber warfare. If the ICC were to rely on the Tallinn Manual’s conclusions to inform its interpretation of Article 8 in relation to cyber-based war crimes, this could have the effect of excluding disruptive cyber operations from its jurisdiction. This is a cause for concern in a world where militaries and civilian populations alike are becoming increasingly reliant on computer systems and the internet. Disruptive cyber operations can result in devastating consequences even though they do not cause physical damage, and are likely to become more powerful and sophisticated in future as technology develops.

Drafters of international humanitarian law (IHL) treaties clearly envisaged a role for military justice systems in the implementation and enforcement of these treaties. Nevertheless, the adequacy of military jurisdiction over violations of international law is being questioned in certain spheres. In the context of these debates this article considers the domestic rationale for military justice systems and explores the role and limits of military jurisdiction in combating impunity for violations of IHL. In focusing on the need to effectively repress and suppress all violations of IHL, the article addresses the extent to which some sort of military justice may be necessary for the effective enforcement of certain provisions. It also explores the way in which increased scrutiny of the impact of these justice systems on the rights of individuals has led to restrictions on the format and scope of military jurisdiction. Although there are difficulties in internationalising the discussion on military jurisdiction because of differences in domestic legal traditions, the choice of effective IHL enforcement mechanisms, which includes the choice of military or civilian jurisdiction, is key in combating impunity for violations of this body of law and protecting the rights of those involved.

In this article, we show how the U.S. military treats domestic violence and sexual assault as distinct forms of abuse, which has particular consequences for victims of intimate partner sexual violence. We explore how a specific U.S. military branch, the Marine Corps, complicates these issues further by providing services to intimate partner sexual violence victims from two different programs. Analyzing military orders and documents related to Family Advocacy Program and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program, interviews with eight military prosecutors, and the experiences of one military lawyer, we examine program and interactional-level factors that shape victim services, advocacy, and processes. We find that there are program differences in specialized services, coordinated services, and potential breaches of confidentiality related to victim’s cases. We recommend that the Marine Corps recognize the intersections of sexual violence and domestic violence and offer more tailored services to victims of intimate partner sexual violence.

Given that the Geneva Convention of 1929 placed prisoners of war under the laws of the detaining state, Nazi courts martial could sentence prisoners of war for offences that did not exist in the western democracies, such as insults to the Führer, or severely punish them for acts leading only to mild disciplinary sanctions in Britain or America. Moreover, convicted prisoners of war had to experience the singularly brutal German prison system. These asymmetries, which influenced the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war of 1949, challenge the paradigm of reciprocity and symmetry in prisoner of war regimes between Germany and the western countries in World War II.

In June 2019, the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced judgment in the case of R v Stillman, upholding the military justice system’s ability to try serious civil offences. The Stillman decision highlighted one key mechanism of military justice reform: court judgments. This article argues, however, that military legal experts have overlooked Parliamentary debate as a key driver of military reform. By drawing on analysis of Hansard from past decades, this article argues that the Canadian Parliament has historically pushed for radical reform to the military justice system. This reformist consensus continues to shape Parliamentary discussions on military justice in the twenty-first century.

The breakthrough innovation of the Wright brothers in 1903 and subsequent developments of aerial technology created significant opportunities for the military, as a new dimension of warfare became an operational space of combat. Many legal questions arise, including the status of air machines deployed by the freshly formed independent air detachments before the outbreak of World War I. From the operational and legal viewpoint, both state practice and international law experts agreed that in order to receive a status similar to warships under the law of naval warfare, military aircraft should bear distinctive insignia, indicating their military character and nationality. This article’s aim is to present the origins and evolution of the military markings and their legal significance, as a core element of the military aircraft definition. It needs to be emphasized that only aircraft considered as military can perform acts of hostility and exercise the specific rights granted by the law of air warfare. The analysis will refer to practical challenges for maintaining the classical rule of air warfare, such as the exact location of the markings on the aircraft surfaces, low-visibility insignia (as a way to reconcile legal and operational demands) and the question of relevance of the duty to mark military aircraft in the context of unmanned air platforms. L’innovation qui a fait connaître les frères Wright en 1903 ainsi que les développements consécutifs dans la technologie aéronautique ont créé de réelles opportunités pour le secteur militaire, alors qu’une nouvelle dimension de la guerre est devenue un espace opérationnel de combat. Cette évolution fait naître de nombreuses questions juridiques, dont le statut des aéronefs déployés par les détachements aériens indépendants formés peu avant l’éclatement de la Première Guerre mondiale. D’un point de vue opérationnel et légal, la pratique étatique et les experts juridiques internationaux s’accordent sur le fait que les aéronefs militaires devraient avoir des insignes distinctifs indiquant leur caractère militaire et leur nationalité, afin qu’ils se voient attribuer un statut similaire à celui des navires de guerre en vertu du droit de la guerre navale. Cet article a pour but de présenter les origines et l’évolution du marquage militaire ainsi que sa signification juridique, en tant qu’élément essentiel de la définition d’un aéronef militaire. Soulignons le fait que seul un aéronef considéré comme militaire peut mener des actes hostiles et exercer les droits particuliers octroyés en vertu du droit de la guerre aérienne. L’analyse fait référence à des défis d’ordre pratique pour maintenir les règles classiques de la guerre aérienne, telles que l’emplacement exact des marquages sur la surface de l’aéronef, la faible visibilité des insignes (comme moyen de combiner exigences juridiques et opérationnelles) et la question de la pertinence de l’obligation de marquer un aéronef militaire dans le contexte de plateformes aériennes sans équipage. De baanbrekende innovatie van de gebroeders Wright in 1903 en de daaropvolgende ontwikkelingen van de luchtvaarttechnologie creëerden grote mogelijkheden voor de strijdkrachten, aangezien een nieuwe dimensie van oorlogvoering een operationele gevechtsruimte werd. Deze ontwikkeling leidt tot veel juridische vragen, waaronder de status van de luchtvaartuigen die door de net voor het uitbreken van de Eerste Wereldoorlog opgerichte onafhankelijke luchtdetachementen werden ingezet. Vanuit operationeel en juridisch oogpunt waren zowel de statenpraktijk als de internationale juridische experts het erover eens dat militaire luchtvaartuigen onderscheidende insignes moeten dragen die hun militaire karakter en nationaliteit aangeven, om een status te krijgen die gelijkaardig is aan die van oorlogsschepen krachtens het recht van de zeeoorlog. Dit artikel heeft tot doel de oorsprong en de ontwikkeling van de militaire markeringen en hun juridische betekenis voor te stellen als een kernelement van de definitie van militaire luchtvaartuigen. Er moet worden benadrukt dat alleen luchtvaartuigen die als militair worden beschouwd, vijandelijke handelingen kunnen verrichten en de specifieke rechten die door het recht van de luchtoorlog worden verleend, kunnen uitoefenen. De analyse verwijst naar de praktische uitdagingen voor het handhaven van de klassieke regels van de luchtoorlog, zoals de exacte locatie van de markeringen op de vliegtuigoppervlakken, insignes met lage zichtbaarheid (als een manier om juridische en operationele eisen met elkaar in overeenstemming te brengen) en de vraag of de verplichting om militaire luchtvaartuigen te markeren relevant is in de context van onbemande luchtvaartuigen. La revolucionaria innovación de los hermanos Wright en 1903 y subsiguiente evolución de la tecnología aérea dieron paso a oportunidades significativas para los ejércitos, creándose una nueva dimensión de la guerra que se convirtió en un espacio operativo de combate. Esto trajo consigo muchas cuestiones legales, incluido el estatus de los artefactos aéreos desplegados por los recién creados destacamentos aéreos independientes en los prolegómenos de la Primera Guerra Mundial. Desde el punto de vista operativo y legal, tanto los Estados a través de la práctica como los expertos en Derecho Internacional estuvieron de acuerdo en que para acogerse al mismo estatus que los buques de guerra bajo las leyes de la guerra naval, las aeronaves militares debían llevar insignias distintivas, mostrando su carácter militar y nacionalidad. El propósito del artículo es examinar el origen y evolución de estas señales militares y su importancia legal como uno de los elementos principales de la definición de aeronave militar. Debe enfatizarse que solo una aeronave considerada militar puede llevar a cabo actos de hostilidad y ejercer derechos específicos reconocidos por las leyes de la guerra aérea. El análisis aborda los retos prácticos para mantener la vigencia de la regla clásica de la guerra aérea, tal como es el lugar exacto de emplazamiento de las señales exteriores en la superficie de las aeronaves, las insignias de baja visibilidad (como una forma de conciliar las exigencias legales y operativas) y la cuestión de la relevancia del deber de señalar las aeronaves militares en el contexto de las plataformas aéreas no tripuladas. L’innovazione rivoluzionaria dei Fratelli Wright nel 1903 e i successivi sviluppi della tecnologia aerea crearono significative opportunità per i militari, poiché una nuova dimensione di guerra divenne uno spazio operativo di combattimento. Sorgono molte questioni legali, tra cui lo status delle macchine aeree dispiegate dai distaccamenti aerei indipendenti formatisi appena prima dello scoppio della Prima guerra mondiale. Dal punto di vista operativo e legale, sia la pratica degli Stati che gli esperti di diritto internazionale hanno convenuto che, per ricevere uno status simile a quello delle navi da guerra disciplinate della legge della guerra navale, gli aerei militari dovrebbero portare delle insegne distintive che indichino la loro natura militare e la loro nazionalità. L'obiettivo di questo articolo è quello di presentare le origini e l'evoluzione delle marcature militari e il loro significato legale, come elemento centrale della definizione di velivolo militare. Va sottolineato che solo gli aerei considerati militari possono compiere atti di ostilità ed esercitare i diritti specifici concessi dalla legge sulla guerra aerea. L’analisi farà riferimento alle sfide pratiche per il mantenimento delle regole classiche sulla guerra aerea, come l’esatta posizione delle marcature sulla superfice dell’aereo, le insegne a bassa visibilità (come modo per conciliare le esigenze legali ed operative) e la questione della rilevanza del dovere di marcatura dei velivoli militari nel contesto delle piattaforme aeree senza pilota. Die bahnbrechende Innovation der Gebrüder Wright im Jahr 1903 und die nachfolgenden Entwicklungen der Luftfahrttechnologie schufen bedeutende Möglichkeiten für den Militärbereich, da eine neue Dimension der Kriegsführung zu einem operativen Kampfraum wurde. Es stellen sich viele rechtliche Fragen, einschließlich jener des Status der Luft­maschinen, die von den neu gebildeten unabhängigen Luftkommandos vor dem Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs eingesetzt wurden. Aus operativer und rechtlicher Sicht waren sich sowohl die staatliche Praxis als auch die internationalen Rechtsexperten einig, dass Militärflugzeuge Kennzeichen, die auf ihren militärischen Charakter und ihre Nationalität hinweisen, tragen sollten, um einen kriegsschiffähnlichen Status nach dem Recht der Seekriegsführung zu erhalten. Ziel dieses Artikels ist es, die Ursprünge und die Entwicklung der militärischen Kennzeichnungen und ihre rechtliche Bedeutung als Kernelement der Definition von Militärflugzeugen darzustellen. Es muss darauf hingewiesen werden, dass nur Flugzeuge, die als militärisch angesehen werden, feindliche Handlungen durchführen und die durch das Gesetz der Luftkriegsführung gewährten spezifischen Rechte ausüben können. Die Analyse wird sich auf praktische Herausforderungen für die Aufrechterhaltung des klassischen Gesetzes der Luftkriegsführung beziehen, wie die genaue Lage der Kennzeichen auf den Flugzeugoberflächen, Kennzeichen mit geringer Sichtbarkeit (als Mittel, rechtliche und operative Anforderungen miteinander in Einklang zu bringen) und die Frage der Relevanz der Pflicht zur Kennzeichnung militärischer Flugzeuge im Zusammenhang mit unbemannten Luftplattformen.

This article concerns an issue that has become increasingly relevant for international coalition forces participating in joint military operations abroad, viz. the duty to collect, document, record and secure evidence of serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights committed in armed conflicts. The point, simple as it seems, is that respect for justice and international humanitarian law requires that perpetrators of war crimes etc. be brought to justice. Yet prosecution and trial of these crimes cannot succeed without material proof and information that meet the standards for admission into evidence in criminal trials. However, judicial experience from international criminal trials suggests that much of the evidence produced in Court fails to meet this standard – and is therefore dismissed. The article highlights the need to secure evidence of these crimes and proposes five simple basic recommendations for military personnel who come across evidence of serious violations of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts: (1) be familiar with the elements of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression; (2) know the rules of the game regarding collection of evidence, including the duty to respect local norms and authorities and to follow any international rules or agreements, and the duty to comply with obligations to seek authorization for investigation from domestic authorities; (3) be careful in your registration and handling of evidence material; (4) be careful not to hurt yourself or others when you search for evidence; and (5) stay critical and impartial to all material and information you receive from others. Cet article aborde un problème que les forces armées des coalitions internationales rencontrent de plus en plus souvent lorsqu’elles participent à des opérations militaires conjointes à l’étranger: l’obligation de rassembler, de documenter, d’enregistrer et de garantir des preuves de violations graves du droit international humanitaire et des droits de l’homme lors de conflits armés. Aussi simple qu’il paraisse, le principe est le suivant: le respect de la justice et du droit international humanitaire implique que les auteurs de crimes de guerre et autres soient traduits en justice. Toutefois, les poursuites judiciaires et le procès qui s’ensuit ne peuvent aboutir sans preuves matérielles et informations qui répondent aux normes d’admission de la preuve dans les procès au pénal. L’expérience judiciaire de ces procès internationaux suggère néanmoins que bon nombre des preuves présentées au tribunal ne répondent pas à ces normes et sont dès lors rejetées. L’auteur insiste sur le besoin de fournir des preuves de ces crimes et propose cinq recommandations de base pour le personnel militaire qui aurait des preuves de violations graves du droit international humanitaire dans les conflits armés: (1) informez-vous sur les différents éléments qui composent le génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité, les crimes de guerre et les agressions; (2) connaissez les règles relatives au rassemblement de preuves, y compris le devoir de respecter les normes et autorités locales, de suivre les règles et accords internationaux, et de se conformer à l’obligation d’obtenir une autoris­ation des autorités nationales pour mener une enquête; (3) soyez prudents lorsque vous enregistrez et utilisez des éléments de preuve; (4) veillez à ne pas causer de tort aux autres ni à vous-même lorsque vous cherchez des preuves; et (5) restez critique et impartial lorsque vous recevez des informations d’autres personnes. Dit artikel bespreekt een kwestie die van toenemend belang is voor internationale coalitietroepen die deelnemen aan gezamenlijke militaire operaties in het buitenland, nl. de plicht om bewijs van ernstige schendingen van het internationaal humanitair recht (IHR) en van de mensenrechten in gewapende conflicten te verzamelen, te staven, vast te leggen en veilig te stellen. Het punt, hoe eenvoudig ook, is dat het respect voor de rechtspleging en het internationaal humanitair recht vereist dat de daders van oorlogsmisdaden enz. voor het gerecht worden gebracht. Toch kunnen deze misdaden niet succesvol vervolgd en berecht worden zonder materieel bewijs en informatie die voldoen aan de normen om als bewijs in strafprocessen te worden toegelaten. De ervaring uit internationale strafprocessen leert echter dat veel van het bewijsmateriaal dat in de rechtbank wordt aangedragen, niet aan deze norm voldoet – en daarom wordt verworpen. Het artikel benadrukt de noodzaak om het bewijs van deze misdaden veilig te stellen en stelt vijf eenvoudige basisaanbevelingen voor aan militairen die in gewapende conflicten bewijzen van ernstige schendingen van het internationaal humanitair recht aantreffen: (1) wees op de hoogte van de elementen van genocide, misdaden tegen de menselijkheid, oorlogsmisdaden en agressie; (2) ken de regels van het spel met betrekking tot het verzamelen van bewijs, met inbegrip van de plicht om de lokale normen en autoriteiten te respecteren en om alle internationale regels of overeenkomsten te volgen, evenals de plicht om te voldoen aan de verplichting dat aan binnenlandse autoriteiten toestemming moet worden gevraagd om een onderzoek in te stellen; (3) let op bij het registreren en behandelen van bewijsmateriaal; (4) zorg ervoor dat je jezelf of anderen geen schade berokkent wanneer je naar bewijs zoekt; en (5) blijf kritisch en onpartijdig ten opzichte van al het materiaal en de informatie die je van anderen ontvangt. El artículo aborda un problema que con el tiempo ha adquirido una importancia relevante para las fuerzas en coalición que participan en operaciones conjuntas en el exterior, tal cual es el deber de recoger, documentar, registrar y asegurar las pruebas de crímenes graves contra el Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH) y contra los derechos humanos cometidos en los conflictos armados. El asunto, tan simple como parece, es que el respeto por la justicia y el Derecho Internacional Humanitario exige que en definitiva los perpetradores de crímenes de guerra sean llevados ante la justicia. Sin embargo, la acusación y el enjuiciamiento de estos crímenes no pueden prosperar sin una prueba material e información que reúna los requisitos necesarios para ser admitida como prueba de cargo en juicios penales. Al hilo de esto, la experiencia judicial en procedimientos penales internacionales demuestra que muchas de estas pruebas presentadas ante un tribunal no cumplen con estos estándares y, por consiguiente, son rechazadas. El artículo resalta la necesidad de asegurar la prueba de estos crímenes y propone cinco recomendaciones básicas para el personal militar que deba requisar estas pruebas relativas a crímenes graves contra el Derecho Internacional Humanitario en conflictos armados: (1) Familiarizarse con los elementos constitutivos del crimen de genocidio, crímenes contra la humanidad, crímenes de guerra y crimen de agresión; (2) Conocer las reglas del juego relativas a la recogida de pruebas, incluido el deber de respetar las normas y a las autoridades locales y cualquier otra regla o acuerdo internacional, y el deber de cumplir con la obligación de solicitar autorización a las autoridades locales para llevar a cabo investigaciones; (3) Ser diligente en el registro y manejo de las pruebas materiales; (4) Tener cuidado de no dañarse o dañar a otros en la búsqueda de las pruebas; y (5) tener una actitud crítica e imparcial ante las pruebas e información que se reciba de otros. Questo articolo tratta di una questione che è diventata sempre più rilevante per le forze di coalizione internazionali che partecipano ad operazioni militari congiunte all’estero, vale a dire il dovere di raccogliere, documentare, registrare e mettere al sicuro le prove di gravi violazioni al diritto internazionale umanitario (IHL) e dei diritti umani commesse nei conflitti armati. Il punto, semplice come appare, è che il rispetto della giustizia e del diritto internazionale umanitario richiedono che gli autori di crimini di guerra etc. siano assicurati alla giustizia. Però l’azione penale e il processo per tali crimini non possono avere successo senza prove materiali e informazioni che soddisfino gli standard per l’ammissione come prova nei processi penali. Tuttavia, l’esperienza giudiziaria dei tribunali penali internazionali suggerisce che molte delle prove prodotte nei tribunali non soddisfano questi standard e perciò vengono respinte. Questo articolo evidenzia la necessità di garantire prove di questi crimini e propone cinque semplice raccomandazioni di base per il personale militare che si imbatte in prove di serie violazioni al diritto internazionale umanitario nei conflitti armati: (1) Conoscere gli elementi del genocidio, dei crimini contro l’umanità, dei crimini di guerra e dell’aggressione; (2) Conoscere le regole del gioco riguardo la raccolta delle prove, compreso il dovere di rispettare le norme e autorità locali e di seguire qualsiasi regola o accordo internazionale, e il dovere di rispettare gli obblighi di chiedere l’autorizzazione alle indagini alle autorità nazionali; (3) Fare attenzione nella registrazione e gestione del materiale probatorio; (4) Fare attenzione a non fare del male a se stessi od altri nella ricerca delle prove; e (5) Rimanere critici ed imparziali nei confronti di tutto il materiale e delle informazioni ricevute da altri. Dieser Artikel behandelt eine Angelegenheit, die für die Streitkräfte internationaler Koalitionen, die sich an gemeinsamen Militäreinsätzen im Ausland beteiligen, an Relevanz gewinnt, nämlich die Pflicht, Beweismittel schwerer Verletzungen des internationalen humanitären Rechts und internationaler Menschenrechte in bewaffneten Konflikten zu sammeln, zu dokumentieren, aufzuzeichnen und sicherzustellen. Der Kernpunkt, so einfach dieser scheinen mag, besteht darin, dass Respekt vor der Justiz und dem internationalen humanitären Recht erfordert, dass Täter von Kriegsverbrechen, usw. vor Gericht gebracht werden sollen. Dennoch können die Verfolgung und Ahndung dieser Verbrechen ohne materiellen Beweis und Informationen, die den Standards zur Zulassung als Beweismittel in Strafprozessen gerecht werden, nicht gelingen. Die gerichtliche Erfahrung internationaler Strafprozesse weist allerdings darauf hin, dass manche der dem Gericht unter­breiteten Beweise diesen Standards nicht gerecht werden, und somit abgewiesen werden. Der Autor unterstreicht, dass es notwendig ist, Beweise für diese Verbrechen sicher­zustellen, und schlägt fünf einfache Grundempfehlungen für Militärangehörige vor, die auf Beweise schwerer Verletzungen des internationalen humanitären Rechts in bewaffneten Konflikten stoßen: (1) Sorgen Sie dafür, dass Sie die Elemente des Genozids, der Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit, Kriegsverbrechen und Aggressionen kennen; (2) seien Sie mit den Spielregeln hinsichtlich der Sammlung von Beweisen vertraut, und dies einschließlich der Pflicht, örtliche Normen und Autoritäten zu respektieren, irgendwelche internationale Regeln oder Abkommen zu befolgen und die Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen, um die Genehmigung zur Durchführung von Ermittlungen von den Behörden des betreffenden Landes einzuholen; (3) seien Sie vorsichtig bei Ihrer Erfassung von bzw. Ihrem Umgang mit Beweismaterial; (4) sorgen Sie dafür, dass Sie sich selbst oder anderen keinen Schaden zufügen, wenn Sie nach Beweisen suchen; und (5) bleiben Sie kritisch und unvoreingenommen in Bezug auf all das Material und alle Informationen, die Sie von anderen erhalten.

RESUMEN El artículo examina el estado del diálogo convencional en Chile, tomando como referencia tres sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos que consideran igual número de problemas muy sensibles de nuestra transición a la democracia: nos referimos, en primer lugar, a la impugnación de la amnistía a las violaciones de derechos en dictadura; en segundo lugar, a la desmedida extensión de la competencia de los tribunales militares para juzgar civiles; y en tercer lugar, al conflicto mapuche a través de un proceso penal resuelto en lo convencional. Si bien el Estado ha asumido, en general, las obligaciones que le han impuesto las decisiones de la Corte, veremos que no lo ha hecho de manera oportuna, obediente y completa. Además, en lo interno está muy lejos de aplicar el control de convencionalidad en forma plena, es decir, desplazando la norma por la contenida en el pacto. Este es el mayor déficit que existe en el proceso de integración del Estado chileno a la jurisdicción de derechos humanos. ABSTRACT This article examines the state of the conventional dialogue in Chile, taking three sentences of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as a reference by considering also three very sensitive problems of our transitions towards democracy: we refer, in the first place, to the impugnation to the human rights violation, to the excessive extension of the competence of the military courts for processing civilians, and to the Mapuche conflict through a legal process resolved conventionally. While it is true that the State has assumed, in general, the obligations imposed by the decisions of the court, it can be seen that it has not done it in a timely, appropriate and obedient manner. Furthermore, internally it is far from applying conventionality control completely, i.e., displacing the norm by that contained in the pact. This is the greatest deficit in the integration progress of the Chilean State to the Human Rights jurisdiction. RESUMO Este artigo analisa o estado do diálogo convencional no Chile tendo como referencia três sentenças da Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos que consideran o mesmo número de problemas muito sensíveis da nossa transição à democracia: em primeiro lugar, faz-se referência à impugnação da anistia às violações de direitos na ditadura; em segundo, à extensão sem controle da competência dos tribunais militares para julgar civis; em terceiro lugar, ao conflito mapuche por meio de um processo penal resolvido no convencional. Embora o Estado tenha assumido, em geral, as obrigações que as decisões da Comissão lhe impuseram, vemos que não tem sido de maneira oportuna, obediente e completa. Além disso, no interno, está longe de aplicar o controle de convencionalidade de forma plena, isto é, substituindo a norma pela contida no pacto. Esta é a maior deficiência que existe no processo de integração do Estado chileno à jurisdição de Direitos Humanos.

On 12 November 1970, the Bhola Cyclone swept across the southern districts of East Pakistan, killing over 300,000 people. Small islands were swept away and dead bodies of humans and cattle lay strewn across the devastated landscape. Following the news of the destruction, journalists, students, artists, and political workers rushed to the affected area with basic relief supplies, without waiting for the Military Law Administration (MLA) to intervene. The cyclone's occurrence just three weeks prior to the first general elections in Pakistan added a new dimension to the already simmering political crisis. The extensive media coverage of the disaster brought the pitiful state of infrastructural development and lack of governance in East Pakistan under local and global scrutiny. The cyclone and the corresponding issues soon became embroiled within the larger political demand for regional autonomy. The MLA came under attack from sections of East Pakistan's politicians, press, and public, as well as international political actors, for its poor disaster governance. This article uses the Bhola Cyclone of 1970 as the lens to explore the complex interconnections between environmental disasters and a key issue of governance. While the Bhola Cyclone has been a subject of recent discussions, this article uses a disaster-politics analytical framework to understand the disaster's role in the subsequent political turbulence and the emergence of Bangladesh. Ministry of Education (MOE) National Research Foundation (NRF) Published version

A Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság (MKJHT) több mint 20 éve foglalkozik a szélesebb értelemben vett honvédelmi jog fejlesztésével, a szakterületen felmerülő jogtörténeti, jogi kérdések tudományos igényű elemzésével, kutatásával, a honvédelem szempontjából releváns szakmai rendezvények szervezésével, kiadványok és publikációk készítésével, ezek támogatásával.1 2019. november 19-én az MKJHT kezdeményezésére a Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem Hadtudományi és Honvédtisztképző Kar közös szervezésében került sor „A honvédelmi jog és igazgatás aktuális kérdései” című konferencia megrendezésére, melynek keretében az MKJHT tagjai és felkért szakértők vitatták meg többek között a hibrid fenyegetések kezelésének lehetséges aspektusait közjogi, nemzetbiztonsági, rendszertani és komplex biztonsági megközelítésben. A Honvédségi Szemle jelen számának tematikus blokkja a konferencia előadói által ismertetett gondolatokat villantja fel. Az MKJHT elnökeként arra biztatom a Tisztelt Olvasót, hogy a tárgyban folytatódjon a további gondolkodás, amihez fórumként felajánlom a www.hadijog.hu felületét.

The article deals with the substantive aspects of military law as a specific area of regulation of military relations. The main attention is paid to the coverage and generalization of theoretical positions of achievements of scientists and practitioners in this field, as well as a critical analysis of existing methodological approaches and conclusions concerning the identification and justification of the laws of military law. The thesis about the priority of the military and defense component of military law as its main substantive factor, which, in fact, should determine the legal paradigm of the military phenomenon, is put forward and substantiated.

Many publications are devoted to the identification of social conditionality of criminal regulations. However, the science of criminal law does not have any comprehensive research on the social conditionality of establishing criminal responsibility and punishment for military personnel. In this regard, its essence, features and criteria for identification remain practically unknown. The paper reveals the problematic aspects of the concept and meaning of social conditionality of establishing criminal responsibility and punishment for military personnel; the author’s definition is given. Based on the widespread opinion in the theory of criminal law that the mechanism for identifying this social condition consists of criteria that are studied by the legislator at the appropriate stages of the processes of criminalization (decriminalization) and penalization (depenalization) of military socially dangerous acts, the author analyses them in detail. The problem of ways of legal regulation of criminal responsibility and punishment of military personnel is touched upon. It is stated that the peculiarity of the definition of this social conditionality is the resolution by the legislator, among other dilemmas, of the question of the need for normative fixing of a special military or ordinary prohibition and (or) fixing of the corresponding special military regulationsin the general part of the Criminal Law.The author concludes that the identification of social conditionality of the criminal-normative prescription on responsibility and punishment of military personnel is one of the important tasks of modern science of criminal law, which necessitates the development of a unified approach to the structure and content of this process. The establishment of the theoretical and legal essence of this conditionality should be considered as the most important step in this direction. The author offers the following definition. It is the compliance of criminal regulations that establish responsibility and punishment for criminal behavior of military personnel, resulting from the demand of society in the objective need for criminal law protection of military law and order and other public relations that are most important for the individual, society and the state.

The research aims to demonstrate the configuration of the Military Justice of Santa Catarina and its adequacy to the precepts of Law no. 13.491/2017. To this end, it seeks to clarify the historical formation of Military Justice within the scope of the Union and to specify the peculiarities of State Military Courts, in particular, the Santa Catarina State Military Justice. More restrictively, it is intended to demonstrate how the Santa Catarina military justice has adapted to the precepts brought by the new legislation. In the end, it was found that the news of the federal law brought new challenges to the military justice of Santa Catarina, making it reconfigure due to the expansion of the competence to investigate crimes committed in service by state police (military) personnel. The research uses the inductive method, based on bibliographic and documentary research and, as a procedural method, the monographic one.

O presente artigo analisa as competências da Justiça militar, de acordo com o Código Penal Militar, identificando a sua aplicabilidade. Sabe-se que a lei militar é aquela que determina direitos e deveres dos militares, distinguindo-se do Código Penal Comum. Surge a necessidade de refletir sobre o Direito Penal na área militar, verificando quais são os crimes militares e como é realizado o procedimento de investigação e de aplicação da pena, nesses casos. O direito penal militar pode ser entendido como um conjunto de normas que elencam os crimes militares, bem como as penas aplicadas para assegurar o bem estar e a ordem jurídica da instituição. Através de pesquisa bibliográfica, busca-se compreender como a justiça militar atua no Brasil. Com a Lei nº 13.491 de 13 de outubro de 2017, houve a ampliação dos crimes militares. Daí a importância de compreender e estudar a competência da Justiça Militar e o que diz o Código Penal Militar sobre a temática.

The treatment of draft dodgers and miscarriages of justice by Argentine military courts provoked mobilisations by families, communities and the major political parties. An examination of the debates and discussions around these issues reveals a widespread sentiment that rarely questioned neither the right of the armed forces to draft young men nor the legitimacy of the armed forces. By adopting the language of patriotism and civic obligation, individual and community petitioners and politicians who represented them challenged the state's broad claim of power over the bodies of young men from a reformist position. Military justice formed a critical platform through which citizens debated the meaning of citizenship and the place of the armed forces in society.

From August 1994 until February 1995 I served as an Australian Defence Force legal officer with the Australian Medical Support Force which was a component of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda. During this deployment three duties I engaged with still stand out for me 25 years later: investigating the mass grave site at Ntarama, the use of force to defend the mandate and individual self-defence, and detention. This paper, in large part, engages with my reflections of these issues in the context of my military law practice, and academic research and writing. I conclude by making six observations from my experiences in Rwanda.

У статті, з урахуванням історичного аспекту проблеми та міжнародного досвіду, розкрито організаційні та функціональні особливості здійснення судової та правоохоронної діяльності у Збройних Силах України. Підкреслено, що оборонна міць збройних сил визначається не тільки кількістю військовослужбовців, рівнем їх професіоналізму та майстерності, якістю військової техніки. Боєздатність військових частин та з'єднань напряму залежить від стану законності та правопорядку в них. Тому міжнародний досвід свідчить про те, що у більшості розвинутих країн, які мають сучасні збройні сили і які у той же час відомі своїми демократичними традиціями (США, Великобританія, Франція, Канада, Іспанія – всього близько 40) органи військової юстиції успішно діють і виконують завдання по зміцненню військової дисципліни та правопорядку. Постійним Комітетом Ради Європи з прав людини (м. Страсбург) у червні 2003 р. була взагалі визначена потреба органів військової юстиції, а щодо військових судів висловлена думка про те, що їх наявність в країні не суперечить Конвенції про захист прав людини і її основоположних свобод, а також зобов'язанням держав, які підписали цю конвенцію. Зазначено, що військові суди можуть бути визнані незалежними і неупередженими судами. Звертається увага на те, що в Україні, в умовах раніше – антитерористичної операції, а зараз – операції об'єднаних сил, а фактично проведенні реальних бойових дій на певних територіях країни, нажаль, йде процес ліквідації органів військової юстиції. Так, військові суди були ліквідовані ще у 2010 році, й до цього часу не відновлені, хоча це питання вирішувалося на всіх необхідних рівнях органів державної влади, військові прокуратури зараз на межі ліквідації. У наявності лише органи Військової служби правопорядку, але з вельми обмеженими повноваженнями, виключно профілактичної спрямованості. Наведені аргументи на користь подальшого реформування військової юстиції у Збройних Силах України, з формуваннями спеціалізованих судових і правоохоронних органів, а саме, їх тріади у складі: військових судів, військової прокуратури та органів Військової служби правопорядку (у майбутньому – військової поліції). Тільки у такому разі буде реально забезпечений належний рівень законності, правопорядку та військової дисципліни у Збройних Силах України.