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If it continues, deglobalization may lead not to atomization but two overlapping international orders: a liberal one (LIO) led by the United States, and an authoritarian–capitalist one (ACIO) led by China. This equilibrium could emerge because a central purpose of international orders is to preserve the domestic regimes of their Great Power sponsors. The United States and China have markedly different domestic regimes, and so as China continues to grow in power and influence, tension over the content of international order should continue to grow. I borrow from Darwinian evolution the notion of ‘niche construction’: just as organisms alter phenotype selection by manipulating their natural environments, states can alter the ‘selection’ of domestic regimes by shaping their international environments. Modes of international niche construction include foreign regime promotion, interdependence, transnational interaction and multilateral institutions. The liberal democratic niche constructed by the United States and its allies after the Second World War preserved democracy for many decades. Today, China is attempting through various means to build a niche that will eliminate the liberal bias in international institutions and safeguard its own Market-Leninist regime. The resulting ACIO would select for autocracy and hence be partially separate from the LIO, which selects for liberal democracy.

It is very difficult to know how international social linkages affect domestic ideological polarization because we can never observe polarization occurring both with and without international connections. To estimate this missing counterfactual, we employ a new statistical method based on Bayesian item-response theory that permits us to disaggregate polarization after the Arab Uprisings into domestic and transnational components. We collected a dataset of Twitter accounts in Egypt and Tunisia during the critical year of 2013, when the Egyptian military overthrew the Islamist President Mohamed Morsi. We find that the coup increased retweets among Egyptian ideological allies by 50% each day following the coup and decreased cross-ideological retweets by 25%. Tunisian Twitter communities also showed stronger intragroup retweeting although at lower levels than in Egypt. Counter-intuitively, our model shows that the additional polarization in Tunisia after the coup appears to have dampened further polarization among Islamists in Egypt.

The concepts of learning communities, open educational practices and co-created teaching and learning are topics of current debate, particularly since the switch to online learning in 2020/21 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case study uses student feedback to evaluate a new assessment method introduced within an online distance learning Master of Public Health programme. The assessment required students to blog about their motivations for studying public health, submitting their reflections to an open online platform, resulting in the co-creation of a shared, open-learning resource for current and future students. The assessment design was informed by the benefits of open educational practices and co-created teaching and learning, with the overall aim of developing an online learning community that will continue to grow and develop beyond the initial assessment and cohort. Feedback suggests that the open, reflective nature of the assessment had a positive impact on the student learning experience and contributed towards a sense of learning community through enhanced social cohesion within the group.

Sino-Russian security and economic cooperation has broadened and deepened in nonlinear but progressive fashion since the late 1990s. Contra realism, it is not simply American material power that drives this increasing cooperation; US power has at best remained constant. Instead, two conditions combine to deepen Sino-Russian cooperation. First, enduring liberal hegemony, or a combination of material power, prestige, and the ability to set and enforce rules, makes America threatening, under broad conditions, to any authoritarian regime’s domestic power and foreign influence. Hegemony is an interaction of material power and ideas; each augments the other. Second is the steady 20-year movement of Russia’s regime under Vladimir Putin away from liberal democracy. These two conditions make cooperation on either side of the liberal–nonliberal ideological divide increasingly easier than cooperation across it. Several types of qualitative evidence support these claims, including: (1) private and public statements from both Beijing and Moscow on the liberal-democratic threat; (2) specific deepening of bilateral cooperation after the Ukrainian revolution of 2014; (3) efforts by Moscow and Beijing to counter liberal hegemony’s spread in their regions; (4) the tendency for anti-liberal elites in neighboring states to cooperate more with China or Russia. I address realist counter-arguments skeptical of any systematic causal role for ideology. Insofar as America tires of its role as liberal hegemon, or the “China Model” becomes so prestigious as to threaten the Putin regime, the impetus to Sino-Russian cooperation identified here will fade.

The Problem: There is an urgent need for innovative solutions for new and improved treatments and therapies. Often clinical research data is “silo-ed” within an organization, preventing the broader research community from leveraging aggregated information from individuals and studies globally. This isolation of data limits the discoveries possible within a disease preventing the discovery of new scientific links between disease areas. Inconsistent and ambiguous data representation leads to a lack of transparency, traceability and reproducibility, in turn fostering inefficiencies and inaccuracies in research that loses time and increases costs. Simply put Are we being good stewards of our study data? Data Standards and Data Sharing as part of the solution: Describing data consistently using data standards can bring clarity to data that amplifies its value. The T1D Data Standards Project builds on existing CDISC diabetes standards by describing concepts relevant to T1D in the areas of: • Pediatrics and Devices (Released Sep 2020) • Exercise and Nutrition (Due Q2-2021) • Screening, Staging and Monitoring for Pre-Clinical Type 1 Diabetes (Due Q3-2021). The team of CDISC standards experts, T1D experts from CDISC member organizations and T1D subject matter experts from academia and industry followed a consensus-driven process to ensure the final standards are fit for use within the research community, reinforced by the open community review. How data standards help overcome some of the challenges: Publicizing the availability and promoting adoption of consistent standards brings clarity to data, reduces data collection, organization and analysis time, and facilitates interoperability that promotes data re-use and operational efficiencies. When researchers speak the same harmonized language, talking and understanding each other is much easier leading to the sharing of common, understandable data within the research community, thereby promoting scientific and therapeutic advances general confidence in the data. Disclosure R. Baker: None. J. M. Owen: None. Funding The Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust (G-2018PG-T1D069)

List of figures and tables1 Fundamentals in evaluation2 Forms of evaluation3 Players and principles in action4 Conducting an evaluation5 Evaluation utilisation and communication6 Impact evaluation7 Program management and evaluation8 Process evaluation9 Design evaluation10 Evaluation for developmentBibliographyIndex

Europe is besieged from within and without by anti-liberal threats. The rise within Europe of populist-nationalist parties and renewed jihadist attacks interact with pressure from Putin's Russia, Erdogan's Turkey, and actual and aspiring despotisms in Muslim-majority countries. To varying degrees these threats are reactions to the effects of 21st-century liberalism on societies. Liberalism always has been chiefly concerned to safeguard individual autonomy or self-legislation, but the content of autonomy has shifted over two centuries. First-stage liberalism saw the chief threat to autonomy as the state; second-stage, as capital; the third-stage version now ascendant sees traditional norms and institutions as the main menace. Third-stage liberalism in Europe (and elsewhere) distributes power towards ‘symbolic analysts’ and away from those adept at services or manual labour. Thus the anti-liberal backlash: within Europe large numbers of people find themselves less autonomous, in the older senses of the word, and ambivalent about the newer notion of autonomy; while on Europe's periphery many find certain features of liberal societies unappealing and threatening. Defending liberalism will require not only devoting more resources to national security and mitigating the disruptions of economic openness, but revisiting what individual autonomy ought to mean in the 21st-century world.

Development and adoption of global, non-proprietary and platform-independent CDISC standards a) enables traceability from data collection through data analysis, b) improves data quality, c) reduces costs, d) streamlines processes facilitating data sharing, and e) enables reliable and accurate data reuse. CDISC collaborates with type 1 diabetes subject matter experts to lead a unique effort that brings academia and industry together to create T1D clinical data standards in the areas of pediatrics, devices, exercise, and prevention. The T1D team is tasked with developing standards for collection, tabulation, and analysis of the data by building on existing foundational diabetes standards. They will use a multiphase, consensus-driven process, that includes scoping key data concepts commonly used in T1D clinical studies. The Pediatrics and Devices team has identified several data concepts that would benefit from development of data standards: diabetic ketoacidosis, diabetes history, CGM data, insulin management, laboratory tests related to diabetes, and vital signs percentiles for pediatrics. The public review of the standards developed will be launched in Summer 2019. The Prevention and Exercise team has initiated the scoping process to identify the most urgent areas for standards development, which will be followed by modeling. The public review of these standards will commence beginning of 2020. As the project progresses, the T1D community is encouraged to participate in the informational webinars and public review stages, which will enable all-inclusive development and adoption of the resultant data standards. Factors involved in the adoption of clinical data standards within organizations will be discussed. Disclosure J.M. Owen: None. Funding The Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust

Liberalism always has been concerned with the security of the individual against violence and deprivation. Liberal approaches to international security focus on institutions, or collectively held rules, as mediating between material variables and international outcomes. States are arenas of contestation among individuals and groups, and differ according to their institutions. International realms are distinguished by the number, type, and membership of institutions. The realms are linked: liberal democracies construct and maintain liberal international institutions. As the increase of peaceful, wealthy democracies since the Second World War shows, these states have relatively secure citizens and enjoy comparative international success. In the future, the liberal order could be weakened by the ongoing rise of nonliberal China; escalations of transnational terrorism; and alienation from liberalism within the wealthy democracies. Future liberal security scholarship should attend to differences among non-democracies; causal links between domestic and international institutions; and the co-evolution of states and the international environment.

A politicalspringis an abrupt, broad, sustained increase in public dissent in a state that has prohibited it, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Tunisia in early 2011. Some springs produce offspring – clusters of events within neighbouring states (civic unrest, increased state repression, co-option of dissent, revolution) and among those states (intensification of international rivalries, foreign interventions). An English Spring in 1558–9 produced such a cluster in Northwestern Europe. This article addresses the underlying causal mechanism connecting springs and their offspring, rather than the related correlational question (viz. under what conditions a spring is followed by offspring). That mechanism istransnational group polarisation, or the progressive separation of preferences across a population into pro- and anti-government groups. Transnational polarisation along a pro-versus-anti-government axis is an endogenous process triggered by exogenous events, such as violence or public demonstrations that raise the status of, or threat to, one of the groups. It presents powerful actors across states with new threats and opportunities and can help explain how the Tunisian Spring of early 2011 produced throughout the Arab Middle East infectious unrest, serial repressions and reforms, heightened international tensions, and foreign interventions.

Regime promotion constitutes a distinct category of foreign intervention that includes any effort by an intervening state or coalition to create, preserve, or alter political institutions or governments within a target state. Although a common tool of statecraft, regime promotion has received relatively little scholarly attention. We discuss foundational and cutting-edge research that addresses three questions: What causes states or governments to try to change or preserve domestic institutions of other sovereign states? What modes or tools of statecraft do they employ? What are the consequences for the intervening power, the target state, or the international system? We conclude with six recommendations for advancing regime promotion research: (i) expand research beyond its United States and great-power focus to consider how regional actors and small states employ regime promotion; (ii) conduct comparative studies of forcible regime promotions with non-forcible and covert means; (iii) isolate the fundamental motivations—domestic and/or systemic—that propel states to attempt regime promotion despite significant costs and risks; (iv) examine further the role of regime-type in regime promotion; (v) increase research into the consequences of regime promotion by emphasizing long-term efficacy as well as the comparative success of non-democratic interveners and democracy promoters; and (vi) focus additional attention on the relation of regime promotion to international hegemony or hierarchy. Keywords: intervention; regime promotion; regime change; democratization; sovereignty; hegemony; US foreign policy; hierarchy

This chapter discusses meanings of accountability and the effective use of evaluation to meet these accountability meanings in contemporary systems. The ideas presented here complement earlier chapters devoted to key overarching theoretical perspectives (see Bemelmans-Videc in this volume) that have prepared the stage for contributions drawn from practice in different jurisdictions. As such, the discussion relies on recent developments in the relationships between accountability and evaluation in Australia.

Research traditions are essential to social science. While individuals make findings, scholarly communities make progress. When researchers use common methods and shared data to answer mutual quest...

BackgroundThe present study aimed to evaluate and determine the factors that affect short- and long-term outcome following manipulation under anaesthesia (MUA) of patients with adhesive capsulitis.MethodsPatients recruited from January 1999 to January 2010 were retrospectively analyzed and classified as having primary or secondary adhesive capsulitis. All patients were assessed for range of movement (ROM) and Oxford Shoulder Scores (OSS) before and immediately postoperatively, as well as for OSS more than 1 year post MUA.ResultsIn total, 295 patients (315 shoulders) were sequentially recruited, and information was collected at baseline, as well as at a mean follow-up of 28 days and 3.6 years. A significant improvement in OSS and ROM was noted 1 month post MUA ( p ConclusionsThe findings of the present study show that all patient groups had a significantly improved ROM and OSS in the short-term with long-term maintenance of improved OSS.

The Obama administration’s initial ambivalence toward democratic revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 points to a central puzzle in US foreign policy. In some countries, during some periods, America promotes liberal democracy; in other countries and periods, it tolerates or even supports authoritarianism. Why the variation? We focus on discrete decisions by a US President to retain a dictator or instead press for democracy in a client state S. Two conditions must be satisfied for a President to do the latter. (1) An exogenous domestic crisis must threaten S’s authoritarian regime. (2) The US domestic model of free-market liberal democracy must face no credible alternative in S’s region as a route to national development and security. A credible alternative model (e.g. communism or Islamism) threatens US interests by making dissenting elites in S more hostile to US hegemony and more accepting of the hegemony of America’s security rivals; that in turn makes free elections in S riskier for Washington. But when conditions (1) and (2) coincide, a new bargain emerges: S’s elites, now assenting to the US model, pledge to participate in the US-sponsored regional order, and Washington presses S’s regime into democratizing. We test our argument against two cases involving relations between the US and the Philippines, an authoritarian client until 1986. In a 1978 crisis, communism’s high credibility in Southeast Asia forced Jimmy Carter to continue supporting the Marcos dictatorship. In a 1985–86 crisis, communism’s lack of credibility allowed Ronald Reagan to drop Marcos and permit democracy.

Understanding of the biology of bone regeneration has been increasing rapidly, with greater appreciation for the importance of biochemical aspects as well as the mechanical requirements for bone to heal. There are a number of situations where there is difficulty in bone healing such as fracture non-union; or growth such as osteogenesis imperfecta; or a requirement for surplus bone to reconstruct defects such as following surgery for tumour excision or limb lengthening. There is a greater understanding of the complex interplay between osteoblasts and osteoclasts, and the chemical mediators that provide signalling along complex pathways. Although we have known about substances such as Bone Morphogenic Proteins and Growth Hormones for some time, their application in clinical practice is still not widespread, and we need to study them more to understand their role in bone healing. With newer technologies such as stem cells and gene therapy being developed there is the potential for vast improvement in bone regenerative techniques, although we are not at a stage where we can be confident that these techniques will work. In this review article we discuss the basic healing process of bone and how our understanding of this has led to improved techniques as well as the potential for future developments in new technologies.

This chapter considers the sixth and final lesson: Turkey and Iran offer clues as to the future of Islamism and secularism. According to both secularists and Islamists, states that put their principles into practice—set up and keep the right institutions, exemplify their ideology—will outperform those that put the opposing, wrong principles into practice. A good indicator of which ideology will triumph in the Middle East is the relative performance of various state exemplars such as Turkey and Iran. The chapter reviews Western history to highlight the importance of an exemplary country to the outcome of prolonged ideological contests, focusing on the apparent outcome of Dutch secularism, the triumph of liberal conservatism in the 1870s, and the superiority of democratic capitalism in the 1980s. It also looks at states that Muslims think exemplify, for good or ill, Islamism and secularism.

This chapter considers the third lesson for Islamism and secularism: foreign interventions are normal. The United States is known to engage in various military interventions worldwide, including Afghanistan and Iraq, but it is not the only country that uses force to change other countries' domestic regimes or leaders. More than 200 such interventions have been attempted by great powers over the past 500 years. Indeed, Western history shows that such forcible interventions are a normal part of transnational ideological struggles. The chapter examines the dynamics at work in all three historic cases of ideological contests in Europe: the struggle between Catholics and Protestants, the struggle between monarchism and republicanism, and the struggle between communism, fascism, and democracy. It suggests that we should expect more foreign interventions as long as Muslims contend over the best way to order their societies.

This chapter considers the first lesson that can be drawn from three historical Western ideological contests concerning political Islam and secularism today: this is no time to short-sell Islamism. The first contest pitted Catholics and Protestants over which form of Christianity should be established or favored by the state. This dispute raged in Western and Central Europe from roughly 1520 until around the 1690s. The second struggle, which emerged in the 1770s and lasted for a century, occurred in Europe and the Americas and dealt with the issue of whether the best regime was a monarchy or a republic. The third struggle, which arose in the 1910s and endured until the late 1980s, involved communism, liberalism, and fascism. The chapter argues that Westerners discount Islamism because of their own secularist bias and that Islamism is in fact a reaction to secularism.

This chapter considers the fourth lesson: a state may be rational and ideological at the same time. Islamism is the ruling ideology of several countries, led by Saudi Arabia and Iran. In non-Muslim countries such as the United States, the question that often arises is whether Islamist states, or their governments, are rational or fanatical. In truth, a state may appear irrational to outsiders, but may be rationally pursuing goals shaped by its ideology. The chapter looks at three such states: the Palatinate, a German estate in the old Holy Roman Empire; the Soviet Union; and the United States. It concludes with an assessment of the rationality of Islamist states by distinguishing their ends from their means.

This book has examined ideological contests in Western history and what they tell us about Islamism's prolonged struggle with secularism. In conclusion, it offers a few suggestions on what the United States ought to do and not to do in the Middle East and what this means for American foreign policy. It argues that the United States simply cannot decide the contest between Islamism and secularism and so should resort to what political scientist Jonathan Monten calls “exemplarism.” The U.S. government should also remember that, although it cannot resolve the Muslims' ideological contest by force, it can influence how Muslims themselves resolve it. This concluding chapter also considers two things that the United States can do to nudge constitutional democracy: to engage in public diplomacy and to remain the attractive society that it always has been—to be true to itself.

This chapter considers the fifth lesson: the winner may be “none of the above.” In the prolonged contest between Muslim secularism and Islamism, a number of questions arise: Will one ideology and regime type eventually win? If so, what will the winner be? Or might there be no winner? Western history shows that transnational ideological contests such as that between secularism and Islamism can end in one of three ways: victory, transcendence, or convergence. The chapter explains each outcome in greater detail by focusing on the triumph of democratic capitalism in the late twentieth century, the Dutch Republic's creation of a tolerant constitutional regime, and the end of monarchism versus republicanism in the 1870s. It suggests that the signs at present point to convergence, a hybrid regime of Islamists and secularists that Westerners may find counterintuitive but that may just work in many Muslim societies.

The philosophy of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT): Stoic philosophy as rational and cognitive psychotherapy, by Donald Robertson, London, Karnac Books Ltd, 2010, 316 pp., £23 (Sbk.), ISBN 978-1...

Trait anger is a personality construct that refers to stable individual differences in the propensity to experience anger as an emotional state. The objective of this paper is to review relevant empirical studies in order to determine whether the transdiagnostic cognitive processes that have been identified across the DSM-IV Axis I disorders (specifically, selective attention, memory biases, reasoning biases and recurrent negative thinking) are also an underlying characteristic of high trait anger. On the basis of the review it is concluded that, whilst the research base is limited, there is good evidence that high trait anger is associated with selective attention to hostile social cues, the tendency to interpret the behaviour of others as indicating potential hostility and the tendency to ruminate over past anger-provoking experiences. The range of cognitive processes identified in high trait anger is consistent with those identified in the Axis I disorders. It is concluded that these findings provide support for (i) the broad applicability of the transdiagnostic approach as a theoretical framework for understanding a range of psychological conditions, not limited to the Axis I disorders, and (ii) the validity of conceptualising high trait anger as an aspect of personality functioning that is maintained, at least in part, by cognitive processes. Cognitive and motivational factors (specifically, beliefs and goals) that may underlie the hostile information-processing biases and recurrent negative thinking associated with high trait anger are discussed, and consideration is given to the clinical relevance of the findings of the review.

Abstract: This article describes an evaluation that was judged to be unsuccessful from the point of view of key program stakeholders. This was due to the fact that the evaluation did not support program advocates who had much to gain from positive evaluation findings. We argue that, although the knowledge needs of stakeholders must be taken into account, the integrity of evaluation practice, consistent with codes of professional behaviour, should guide the conduct of all aspects of what evaluators do.

16. Reverse mortgage insurance would protect the lender just as conventional mortgage insurance does. However, the nature of the risk is quite different. In the latter case a borrower's death may make the loan a nonperforming one, while in the former the borrower's long life may put the lender at risk. 17. See Jacobs and Weissert, op. cit.; Garnett, Robert, and Guttentag, Jack, "The Reverse-Shared-Appreciation Mortgage," Housing Finance Review, 3(1) (Jan. 1984): 63-84. 18. Another advantage of being married is that a spouse is available to provide informal care in the home if the need arises. 19. Firman, James, "Reforming Community Care for the Elderly and the Disabled," Health Affairs, 11(1) (Spring 1983): 66-82. Frail elderly homeowners in California have taken out reverse mortgage loans for this purpose. See Kenny, Kathleen, and Belling, Bronwyn, "Home Equity Conversion: A Counseling Model," The Gerontologist, to appear.

Political Islam has often been compared to ideological movements of the past such as fascism or Christian theocracy. But are such analogies valid? How should the Western world today respond to the challenges of political Islam? Taking an original approach to answer this question, this book compares Islamism's struggle with secularism to other prolonged ideological clashes in Western history. By examining the past conflicts that have torn Europe and the Americas, the book draws upon six major lessons to demonstrate that much of what we think about political Islam is wrong. The book focuses on the origins and dynamics of twentieth-century struggles among communism, fascism, and liberal democracy; the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century contests between monarchism and republicanism; and the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century wars of religion between Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and others. It then applies principles learned from the successes and mistakes of governments during these conflicts to the contemporary debates embroiling the Middle East. The book concludes that ideological struggles last longer than most people presume; ideologies are not monolithic; foreign interventions are the norm; a state may be both rational and ideological; an ideology wins when states that exemplify it outperform other states across a range of measures; and the ideology that wins may be a surprise. Looking at the history of the Western world itself and the fraught questions over how societies should be ordered, the book upends some of the conventional wisdom about the current upheavals in the Muslim world.