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La ética empresarial está de moda. Códigos éticos, compromiso con nobles causas como el ecologismo o el alivio de la pobreza en el mundo, publicidad enfocada a mostrar los aspectos éticos de la actividad de la empresa. Nuevos negocios con conciencia cí - vica, como Ruck.us, que ayuda a la gente a crear, y a incorporar-se, a movimientos políticos, eludiendo el sistema convencional de partidos políticos, dando por hecho que la única razón por la que en el pasado necesitábamos la democracia representativa era porque los costes de comunicación eran demasiado altos. La con - vicción de las ventajas de ser ético se extiende y las empresas han descu bierto que mejora la imagen cor pora tiva y aumenta los be - neficios. Los medios de comunicación recuerdan a dia rio las con - secuencias de malas conductas empresariales, aunque no está cla - ro si tal notoriedad sirve para refrenarlas. Un panorama similar se observa dentro de la profesión donde eco nomistas como Sen (1977) y Buchanan (1994) apostaron hace tiempo por la inversión social en valores éti cos, ya sean estos trabajo, ahorro o lealtad. Para ellos, esta conducta altruista puede ser manejada como un efecto externo positivo (de consumo), donde cada individuo está haciendo su voluntaria contribución. Ambos autores se apoyan en la tradición utilitarista: la sociedad en su conjunto es taría me-jor si esos valores es tuvieran más ampliamente implantados. La clave de su aceptación por parte de una mayoría de personas está en que no remite a ningún orden de valores que exceda el simple bienestar social. La inversión en valores éticos se encuentra, sin embargo, con el problema de que la Economía no tiene otro modo de acercarse al mundo que no sea en clave de utili dad.

Información económica y difusión de ideas a través de artículos de prensa, son dos actividades que los periodistas tienden a confundir en su actividad. Pero son distintas: es la distancia que media entre formar e informar. En este artículo mostramos cómo combina las dos facetas el periodista español Ramiro de Maeztu, especialmente en sus años ingleses como corresponsal de prensa. En su formación tiene un papel decisivo el economista Luis de Olariaga, que le aporta su consejo sobre lecturas y sus contactos en los medios financieros. Maeztu fue algo más que un intelectual al que gustaba escribir artículos de información económica, sino que puede ser considerado un pionero en la difusión de ideas económicas a través de artículos de prensa, que llegaron a un público de clase media muy amplio.

La política cultural, económica y social del franquismo vino marcada por las características ideológicas del grupo que en cada momento controlaba la agenda del régimen. En un primer periodo (1939-57) esta pugna se establece entre falangistas y el grupo del CSIC/Arbor. En el segundo (1957-75) contenderán para tomar las riendas el grupo falangista y los tecnócratas. Es fácil postular la continuidad de ideas, aunque con personas distintas. Entre los falangistas la realización de su revolución pendiente será la guía de acción. Más problemática es la continuidad del 2º grupo. Es posible identificar vínculos entre los tradicionalistas y la institución religiosa Opus Dei. Pero subsiste la duda sobre la existencia de una estrategia tradicionalista/Opus Dei de control del Estado que se crearía como una plataforma cultural, para más tarde convertirse en proyecto político/económico. The economic and social cultural policy of Franquism was the outcome of the ideological fea-tures of the group that controlled the agenda of the regimen. In the first period (1939-57) the falangist and the traditionalistgroup cohesioned by the CSIC/Arbor. In the second period (1957-75) both groups would contend for control. It’s not difficult to see the continuity of ideas. The falangists would try to put into practice their “unfinished revolution”. But this continuity is least apparent when we come to the traditionalist group. It is possible to identify links between traditionalists and the religious institution Opus Dei. However, it is arguable whether exists or not a traditionalist/Opus Dei strategy of control of Government, through a cultural platform in the first period, that would turn into a political and economic project

The admission of Spain as a member of the European Union was a long process of 24 years. During this time, our country used all kind of tools at its disposal (diplomatic, ecomomic, political) to avoid the fact that Spain was not a democracy but a dictatorial regime. In this article, one particular way of forcing the European Union to accept Spain's application is examined. The idea was to put pressure on the managers of the main European companies working in Spain, in order to ease the political negotiation with their respective countries. Attention is mainly focused on Dutch and Italian firms (and managers) with interests in Spain. There are few studies addressing this peculiar lobbying of countries directed at specific companies. Ways are shown on how to measure the real impact of these economic pressures.

Espana era en 1962 uno de los pocos paises occidentales donde no habia una libertad religiosa real, la religion catolica era la del Estado y se practicaba la simple tolerancia con protestantes y judios. Las discusiones del Concilio Vaticano II (1962-1965) mostraron que este tema seria central en la evolucion posterior. La actitud recelosa de los obispos espanoles fue cambiando a medida que entraban en contacto con sus colegas de todo el mundo. En este articulo analizamos el eco que el Concilio tuvo en Espana y la respuesta tanto de la jerarquia eclesiastica como del gobierno del general Franco

espanolDurante el proceso de integracion de Espana en el Mercado Comun, nuestro pais utilizo diversos medios de presion diplomatica y economica para lograr un acuerdo economico de largo alcance que aliviase la penuria de nuestro pais. A partir de documentacion obtenida en diversos archivos espanoles, el articulo pretende probar la existencia de un conjunto de presiones de tipo economico orientadas a vencer las resistencias de «los Seis» en sus negociaciones con Espana, para alcanzar un acuerdo preferencial. En concreto, centramos nuestro analisis en las empresas (y los directivos) de tres paises (Italia, Belgica y Holanda) con fuertes intereses en nuestro pais. EnglishDuring the process of integration of Spain into the Common Market, our country used various means of diplomatic and economic pressures to achieve a long-term economic agreement that alleviated the shortage of our country. Based on documentation obtained in various Spanish archives, the article seeks to prove the existence of a set of economic pressures aimed at overcoming the resistances of «the Six» in their negotiations with Spain to reach a preferential agreement. Specifically, we focus our analysis on the companies (and managers) of three countries (Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands) with strong interests in our country.

One main result on the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist is that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement. This note provides two examples showing that this proposition does not generalize to an oligopoly with heterogenous firms. In these examples, price discrimination makes competition more favorable to the low cost firm. This induces a cost saving that overcomes the welfare loss associated with price discrimination.

PurposeThe reader of Alfred Marshall writings confronts a variety of businessmen portraits that coexist along his epoch. The purpose of this paper is to describe Marshall's understanding of the capitalist‐owner concept, the way in which access to capital determined the emerging role played by entrepreneurs, the differences between entrepreneurs and managers in order to expose the characteristics that defined managerial activities.Design/methodology/approachA chronological review of Marshall writings revealed that the evolution of his ideas about entrepreneurship is associated to the role played by businessmen as capital owner, risk bearer, innovator, or administrator.FindingsMarshall's analysis is useful to explain: the problem that arises in the firm when property (capital owner) and control (manager) are separated (the principal‐agent relationship); why directors of today's firms are required to embody qualities as administrators (passive superintendents) and innovators (active entrepreneurs); and how to sort out the conflict that occurs in many family firms when the founder (entrepreneur) is unable to cope with the managerial complexities associated to growth (the Marshallian “cycle life” of business and entrepreneurs).Originality/valueSchumpeter is widely regarded in the economic literature as the one that developed the modern vision of businessmen as a risk bearer. We contend that this vision was already described by Marshall, as well as the distinction between the innovator (entrepreneur) and the orderly administrator of business (manager).

This paper presents and discusses the rent‐seeking process that occurred during Franco's regime in Spain (1939‐1975). Once the Civil War (1936‐1939) was over, those who won the war (militiaman, right‐wing factions) took control of the key positions in the new government. That meant the transfer of rents from the budget to veterans of war and their relatives, fuelled by the creation of an increasingly strong and well‐organised interest group. The author takes a public‐choice approach and is inspired by a similar study by R. Holcombe on the American Civil War.

The development of Marshallian thought in the realm of business theory has contributed to the appearance of a new branch of economic theory: Industrial Organization, as pioneered by Stigler. This theory relies, to a large degree, on the idea that a mutually beneficial relationship is produced in the industrial environment between the creation of new information and the organizational improvement of related firms. This symbiosis between knowledge and organization is the driving principle behind the ‘industrial districts’ which Marshall announced a century ago, and is most recently embodied in the contemporary industrial clusters such as Silicon Valley. However, Marshall distances himself from his equilibrium model when dealing with the issues of obtaining and managing information within the firm itself, creating a weak link in his own argument.