Search

Brexit has occasioned a rightward shift in British politics as successive leaders have grappled with the difficulties of negotiating with the European Union and the vicissitudes of politics in the governing Conservative party. Explanations for the hardening of Eurosceptic preferences focus on the demands of ‘taking back control’ and the polarisation of post-referendum politics as key drivers. But they have not explored the ways in which negotiation strategies shaped – rather than reflected – domestic political developments. Drawing on two-level games accounts of ‘synergistic’ bargaining, this article argues both David Cameron and Theresa May sought to leverage Eurosceptic sentiment in their respective negotiations to make it more credible the United Kingdom would walk away if its demands were rejected. While both leaders failed to convey their resolve, they inadvertently strengthened Eurosceptic constituencies back home, contributing to the paucity – and the rejection – of their negotiated agreements.

Many international agreements, from routine trade deals to high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret. However, we have a limited understanding of how secrecy in a negotiation shapes attitudes towards the agreement. Public opinion matters because it informs government decisions about when to conceal or reveal information during a negotiation. In a survey experiment of U.S. adults, I first examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in security and economic agreements. I then randomize government justifications for negotiating in secret: improved success, protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of criticism from domestic and international opponents. I find that respondents are generally averse to secrecy in international negotiations, but there are justifications for its use that they perceive as more legitimate. Secrecy is more permissible when negotiations contain sensitive information or when it improves the likelihood that agreements are reached. It is less permissible when governments negotiate in secret to avoid domestic criticism.

This paper compares how European and non-European participants in international environmental negotiations perceive the EU’s role in such negotiations. Three dimensions of the EU’s role (environmental ambition, diplomatic activity and influence) are assessed in three UN-wide environmental forums (the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions on chemicals, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the United Nations Environment Assembly). The paper presents original data collected through an online survey with 659 delegates who participated in the negotiations in the three forums in the period 2018–19. Comparing the ego perception of delegates from the EU with the alter view of delegates from non-EU countries, the paper finds that the ego and alter perceptions of the EU’s ambition, diplomatic activities and influence are largely similar. Both ego and alter see the EU as a highly ambitious, active and influential actor in global environmental negotiations.

Although there has been much interest in British public opinion on Brexit, much less is known about how EU-27 Europeans view the Brexit negotiations. This is surprising, because Brexit confronts the EU-27 with difficult choices. Whereas accommodating the UK carries the risk of encouraging further countriesto leave the EU, an uncompromising negotiation stance increases the economic and social costs of Brexit. Using original survey data from 39,000 respondents in all EU-27 countries collected between the start of the Brexit negotiations and December 2018, this article shows that exposure to the economic risks of Brexit makes respondents more willing to accommodate the UK, whereas a positive opinion of the EU decreases their willingness to compromise. Moreover, many Europeans face an accommodation dilemma that moderates these preferences. Overall, the EU-27 public unsentimentally supports a Brexit negotiation line that safeguards their own interests best.

Article 8 in the Paris Agreement is devoted exclusively to climate change-driven loss and damage. It follows that the planned ���global stocktake��� of the Paris Agreement, which will assess progress toward reaching the Agreement���s goals, should also cover loss and damage. Determining how the assessment for Article 8 should be framed is a question that remains largely unexplored. Doing so is challenging for at least two reasons: the prevailing knowledge gaps in loss and damage research and the contentious nature of inter-governmental negotiations about loss and damage. This article identifies the key framing questions that ought to be answered in the context of Article 8, prior to conducting the ���global stocktake���. Key among these framing questions are critical structural problems, stemming mainly from underrepresentation of Global South worldviews, and from major data gaps and methodological difficulties inherent to assessing progress with managing loss and damage. A ���global stocktake��� of Article 8 provides a window of opportunity for making headway on the inter-governmental debate about loss and damage, and the direction of the research efforts that are needed to inform such debate. This article concludes by reflecting on the stakes that developing countries have in that window of opportunity. Key policy insightsImperfect as its output might be, the first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement can help identify and act upon the key barriers that today prevent us from conducting a comprehensive assessment of progress with regard to the goals of Article 8 on loss and damage.The global stocktake should not shy away from considering loss and damage, and should ideally conduct separate assessments for losses and for damages.Developing country governments can use the global stocktake to raise the profile of climate change-driven loss, which is comparatively under-researched, while promoting a concerted effort to fund high-quality domestic research. Imperfect as its output might be, the first global stocktake under the Paris Agreement can help identify and act upon the key barriers that today prevent us from conducting a comprehensive assessment of progress with regard to the goals of Article 8 on loss and damage. The global stocktake should not shy away from considering loss and damage, and should ideally conduct separate assessments for losses and for damages. Developing country governments can use the global stocktake to raise the profile of climate change-driven loss, which is comparatively under-researched, while promoting a concerted effort to fund high-quality domestic research.

Orientador: Paulo César Souza Manduca Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas Resumo: Este trabalho tem como objetivo explicar um comportamento aparentemente irracional do Brasil e outros países em desenvolvimento nas negociações da OMC em Genebra em 2008. Partimos da constatação de que para alinhar-se com a proposta dos países desenvolvidos, o Brasil necessariamente calculou que o fim do deadlock representaria ganhos maiores que sua manutenção e, dessa forma, afastar-se do G-20 seria um movimento racional, uma vez que o impasse negocial decorre em grande medida da atuação desse bloco. Entretanto, o G-20 sobreviveu à reunião de Genebra, o Brasil ainda integra o bloco e o deadlock não foi superado. Por quê? Nossa hipótese, baseada na obra de Jogos Ocultos de Tsebelis, é que o Brasil e os demais membros do G-20 estão envolvidos em jogos em outras arenas que alteram os payoffs da arena principal. Assumindo os supostos da Teoria dos Jogos, consideramos que comportamentos aparentemente sub-ótimos são na verdade ótimos quando consideramos fatores contextuais e institucionais subjacentes. Nossa conclusão é que para o Brasil, o Pacote Lamy foi uma questão institucional nova que possibilitava sair de instituição redistributiva de consolidação, para uma instituição redistributiva tipo new deal. Entretanto, apesar de o novo jogo apresentar payoffs maiores para o Brasil, o mesmo não pode ser dito para o restante dos membros do G-20. O new deal proposto pelo pacote Lamy alinhou os interesses brasileiros em relação aos da coalizão vencedora anterior, EUA e UE, deixando o restante dos membros do G-20, particularmente a Índia, na oposição. O resultado (inesperado) do realinhamento das forças foi a manutenção do impasse nas negociações. Em relação aos jogos em arenas múltiplas as negociações em Genebra, de 2008, possuem dois jogos ocultos. Primeiro, a apresentação do pacote Lamy representou um fator contextual entre Brasil e G-20, ou um jogo oculto, que alterou os payoffs da coligação, tornando a cooperação menos vantajosa que a deserção. O resultado é o bandwagon do Brasil e o estabelecimento de uma nova coligação. Segundo, o deadlock representa outro jogo oculto, pois impediu que as regras do new deal fossem consolidadas e fez voltar o jogo à estaca zero Abstract: his thesis aims to explain a seemingly irrational behavior of Brazil and other developing countries in the WTO negotiations in Geneva 2008. We start from the realization that to align with the proposal of the developed countries, Brazil necessarily calculated that the end of the deadlock represent greater gains than their maintenance and thus move away from the G-20 would be a rational move, since the bargaining impasse stems largely on the performance of this block. However, the G20 survived the Geneva meeting, Brazil is still part of the block and the deadlock was not overcome. Why? Our hypothesis, based on Tsebelis¿ Nested Games, is that Brazil and other members of the coalition are involved in games in other arenas that alter the payoffs of the main arena. Assuming the assumptions of game theory, we consider that apparently suboptimal behaviors are in facto optimal when we consider contextual and institutional factors underlying. Our conclusion is that for Brazil, the Lamy package was a new institutional settlement which allowed the change from a consolidation type redistributive institution, for a new deal type redistributive institution. However, despite the new game have higher payoffs for Brazil, the same cannot be said for the rest of the G-20 members. The new deal proposed by Lamy package lined Brazilian interests in relation to the previous winning coalition, the US and EU, leaving the rest of the members of the G20, particularly India, in opposition. The (unexpected) result of the realignment of forces was to maintenance of the stalemate in negotiations. In respect of games in multiple arenas in the 2008 negotiations in Geneva, have two nested games. First, Lamy package presentation was a contextual factor between Brazil and the G-20, or a nested game, that changed the payoffs of the coalition, making cooperation less advantageous than desertion. The result is the bandwagon of Brazil and the establishment of a new coalition. Second, the deadlock is another nested game once it has prevented the rules from the new deal to be consolidated, making the game going back to ground zero Doutorado Ciência Política Doutor em Ciência Política

Among national parliaments (NPs) in the EU, the Austrian Nationalrat and the German Bundestag stand out as strong legislatures in EU affairs. Both parliaments have used their rights to great extent in recent EU negotiations on international agreements such as the one with Canada on a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Yet, in the negotiations with the UK their involvement varies. Why is this so? Scholarly work on Brexit so far focused on the European Parliament or the UK parliament, while attention to NPs in the EU27 is scarce. This article fills this void in research by tracing the Austrian and German parliaments’ activities in the Brexit negotiations. Despite similar institutional strength I find that the German Bundestag is more extensively involved, particularly on an informal level, compared to the Austrian Nationalrat. The reason for this is Brexit’s varying saliency in these two countries given their different levels of exposure to the UK’s withdrawal. As saliency of a policy issue is considered a major explanatory factor for why NPs engage in EU affairs, the results of this article confirm this expectation within the realm of EU international negotiations.

Over one hundred governments are currently negotiating a new legally binding instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). The new agreement is to address four broad themes: marine genetic resources (MGRs); area-based management tools (ABMTs), including marine protected areas (MPAs); environmental impact assessments (EIAs); and capacity building and the transfer of marine technology (CB&TT). Although a large corpus of scientific BBNJ literature exists, a comprehensive overview and critical analysis of the academic debate is currently missing. This systematic review seeks to fill this gap by examining the main priority topics and recommendations in a sample of 140 multidisciplinary, geographically diverse publications. As an up-to-date summary and analysis, it is intended for researchers from diverse academic disciplines in the natural and social sciences, policy-makers, and practitioners. It untangles the complex BBNJ negotiations, highlights the policy relevance of existing work, and facilitates links between science, policy, and practice. It presents recommendations made in the literature sample for each of the four package elements of the future treaty and identifies four overarching themes: ocean connectivity, institutional design, the role of science, and digital technology. This paper identifies two important gaps that need to be addressed if we are to conserve marine biodiversity in international waters: the science-policy interfaces and the need for transformative change.

First published: 27 October 2017 Why do governments include parliamentarians in the delegations to international negotiations? Conduct of the diplomatic negotiations is among the most tightly controlled prerogatives of the executive, and executives have been historically dominant in the conduct of foreign policy. This article draws on the participation of members of parliaments in national delegations to the Review Conferences of the Non-Proliferation Treaty over the past 40 years. The emerging patterns show that legitimation through oversight is unlikely to be the reason for participation. Drawing on literature on institutional variation in legislative-executive relations, the data indicate that executives are more interested in co-opting the parliamentarians, in order to make them less opposed to the government's policy. Nuclear Proliferation International History Project

In 2004, the UN General Assembly resolved to establish a working group to consider issues pertaining to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). The group met nine times between 2006 and 2015 before concluding its mandate by recommending the development of an international legally binding instrument on BBNJ under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Based on in-depth interviews with working group participants, this research examines how NGOs contributed to the working group process. Respondents from government delegations highlighted the usefulness of workshops and side events convened by NGOs, and the role of NGOs in bringing experts on technical issues – particularly marine genetic resources and the sharing of benefits – into the BBNJ negotiations. Respondents from both NGOs and government delegations emphasized the importance of fostering personal relationships in order to ensure a steady and constructive information flow. Social media efforts by NGOs were considered by some government representatives to have occasionally hampered open discussion, although they noted that conditions have improved. The lengthy working group process was marked by substantial fluctuation in participation, particularly within government delegations from developing states. Of 1523 individuals who participated in at least one of the working group meetings, only 45 attended more than half of the meetings, and 80% of these were representing NGOs or highly industrialized countries. Respondents felt that this comparatively small number of individuals provided a source of continuity that was crucial for moving the discussions forward.

Analyzing international negotiations among the member states of the European Union raises a number of analytical issues, especially in unusual circumstances such as the Eurozone crisis. Our article discusses these issues in the light of existing theory and informed by the empirical analyses assembled in this special issue. ‘National preferences’ or ideal points of the governments involved are driven by their domestic socio-economic and political conditions and institutions, the dimensionality of the negotiations, and strategic considerations. We then discuss how national preferences, states’ bargaining power, the strategic and institutional bargaining context, and the bargaining dynamics jointly influence the bargaining outcome. Examples from European negotiations in the context of the Eurozone crisis illustrate both the complexity of the process and the value of serious, theoretically informed, empirical analysis.

Since its inception, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change has been inclined to natural scientific and technocratic perceptions of climate change challenges and policy solutions. Furthermore, states have traditionally been depicted as the main subjects of international climate politics. Only in 2010, concrete references to human rights were incorporated into UN climate agreements. This has a double binding force: First, states thereby re-emphasize the principal validity of those standards that they have acknowledged—qua signature and/or ratification—as guiding their actions: the social and political rights that are captured in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two binding human rights covenants. Second, the incorporation of human rights norms into UN climate agreements officially and formally broadens the normative scope of negotiating and implementing these policies. However, after 2010, states have neither substantiated this engagement nor further built on it argumentatively. In contrast, human rights references are—again—mostly absent from states’ positioning in UNFCCC politics. In this article, we aim at explaining this empirical puzzle. In the first part, we elaborate our theoretical approach and carve out the functional, political and legal linkages between human rights and climate politics. Building upon participatory observation, expert interviews and analysis of primary and secondary documents, this will then be followed by explaining parties’ anew reluctance to further apply a human rights-based approach in climate politics.

Данная статья посвящена Московским переговорам между Советским Союзом, Великобританией и Францией, целью которых было создание союза против нацистской Германии, а также тому, как Великобритания впоследствии представляла их общественности. Первая часть исследования посвящена советской позиции на переговорах и реакции правительств Франции и Великобритании (преимущественно последней) на предложения советской стороны. Советская точка зрения по-новому освещается через призму опубликованных и неопубликованных русскоязычных источников. Во второй части рассматривается попытка британских властей объяснить провал переговоров возложением вины на Советский Союз. Франция выступила против обнародования доклада, поскольку, несмотря на тщательность формулировок, из него следовало, что Советский Союз выступил с конструктивными предложениями, подразумевавшими четкие взаимные обязательства, которые британское правительство не захотело принять. Еще более французскую сторону возмущало то, что в докладе умалчивалось о большей сговорчивости самой Франции., This article is devoted to the Moscow negotiations between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France which purpose was a creation of the union against Nazi Germany and also how Great Britain presented them to the public subsequently. The first part of a research is devoted to the Soviet position at negotiations and reaction of the governments of France and Great Britain (mainly by the last) to the offers of the Soviet side. The Soviet point of view is in a new way shown through a prism of the published and unpublished Russian-speaking sources. In the second part the attempt of the British authorities to explain a failure of negotiations with assignment of fault to the Soviet Union is considered. France has opposed publication of the report as it, despite care of formulations, followed from it that the Soviet Union has made the constructive proposals meaning accurate mutual obligations which the British government didn”t want to accept. Even more resented the French side was due to the fact that in the report it was held back bigger tractability of France itself.

Along with the large middle-income countries Brazil, China, and South Africa, India has been put under increasing pressure to shoulder parts of the mitigation burden and commit to national emission reduction targets. India, however, refers to its limited capacity and widespread poverty. Is India hiding behind its poor? While others examine the distribution of emissions within the country to answer this question, we study domestic policy making for energy subsidies and access to clean energy. Empirical evidence suggests that domestic policy making is at least partially consistent with the pro-poor arguments advanced at the international level. Given their large number and the country's democratic system, the poor do have some weight in Indian politics. However, pro-poor policies end where they do not translate into greater vote shares. Moreover, India's international position ignores the existing complementarities between climate-friendly and pro-poor activities.

Вежновец, В. Н. Международные переговоры: некоторые аспекты подготовки и проведения / В. Н. Вежновец // Вестник Академии МВД Республики Беларусь. - 2017. - № 1. - С. 136 - 140. Анализируются основные этапы организации международного переговорного процесса: подготовки, проведения и завершения международных переговоров. = Analyzes the main stages of organization of the international negotiation process: preparation, conduct and completion of international negotiations.

Global climate negotiations have been characterized by a divide between developed and developing nations – a split which has served as a persistent barrier to international agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. Notable progress in bridging this division was achieved at the 21st Conference of the Parties meeting in Paris through the introduction of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). However, the collective ambition of submitted INDCs falls short of a global 2°C target, requiring an effective ratchet mechanism to review and increase national commitments. Inequitable distribution of additional responsibilities risks re-opening historic divisions between parties. This article presents a flexible ratchet framework which shares mitigation commitments on the basis of per capita equity in line with emerging requirements for a 2°C target. The framework has been designed through convergence between developed and developing nations; developed nation targets are based on an agreed standardized percentage reduction wherever emissions are above per capita equity; developing nations are required to peak emissions at or below per capita equity levels by an agreed convergence date. The proposed framework has the flexibility to be integrated with current INDCs and to evolve in line with shifting estimates of climate sensitivity. Policy relevance The outcome of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) negotiations in Paris offered mixed results in terms of level of ambition and submitted national commitments. A global agreement to keep average global temperature rise below two degrees was maintained; however, current pledged Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are projected to result in an average warming of close to three degrees. The implementation of a global ratchet mechanism to scale-up national commitments will remain key to closing this ambition gap to reach this two degree target. How this upscaling of responsibility is shared between parties will be a defining discussion point within future negotiations. This study presents a standardized, equity-based framework for how this ratchet mechanism can be implemented – a framework designed to be flexible for evolution in line with better understanding of climate sensitivity, and adaptable for integrations with current INDC proposals.

Expectations run high about the cornucopia of riches which are supposed to fow from the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). TTIP is a proposed free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. It aims to build upon the already sweeping scope of the North American Free Trade Agreement concluded two decades earlier and the 2013 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which removes 99 % of tariffs between the EU and Canada.1 Te TTIP negotiations were launched in July 2013 with an initial time frame of completion within two years. It is too early to pass judgment about the benefits of the deal simply because its scope is still being framed as of this writing. However, it's possible to shed light on the most likely sticking points during the negotiations, particularly those seen from the U.S. negotiating side. Likewise, it's not too early to draw up interests and concerns of U.S. business. Both are discussed in this paper. The first section takes stock of the likely scope of negotiations. The second section summarizes the view of business gleaned from a survey of corporate executives. The survey was conducted among members of the Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, an education forum for senior managers of large industrial companies.

accessible en ligne : http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19460171.2012.752970#.UuYnC7RKHQw; International audience; Mainstream literature in international relations understands negotiations in terms of power politics and/or bargaining processes between rival national interests to account for states' negotiating stands. Using definitions and questions initially defined by Thomas Risse, this study of processes at work in the biodiversity regime underlines instead their deliberative dimension and its contribution to positive negotiation outcomes. However, the article also challenges the dominant understanding of deliberation in global environmental politics that focuses on the participation of non-governmental organizations and other interest groups in the 'public space'. Instead it identifies deliberative elements in the negotiation process proper, stressing in particular the importance of the relationships developed between governmental delegations through series of closed meetings of selected participants. This contribution uses for illustration the negotiations leading to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization.

Бородич, А. И. Полномочия представителей государств на международных переговорах / А. И. Бородич // Вестник Академии МВД Республики Беларусь. - 2016. - № 1. - С. 131 - 135. Анализируются нормы права, определяющие представителей и их полномочия на международных переговорах. Предлагаются рекомендации, направленные на совершенствование договорной практики. = Analyzes the rules of law governing representatives and their authority in international negotiations. Makes recommendations aimed at improving the contractual practices.

Вежновец, В. Н. Полномочия представителей международных организаций на заключение международных договоров / В. Н. Вежновец // Вестник Академии МВД Республики Беларусь. - 2016. - № 2. - С. 111 - 114. Раскрывается содержание понятия полномочий представителей международных организаций, анализируются основные положения международных правовых актов и национального законодательства об участниках международного договорного процесса. = The concept of powers of representatives of international organizations, analyzes the main provisions of international legal acts and national legislation of parties to the international Treaty process.

[EN] The Paris Agreement has moved us backward from a world where binding burdensharing agreements like the Kyoto Protocol were the standard, to a world where climate policy is reduced to pledge and review. Nevertheless, this has allowed climate policy to gain new momentum. This paper argues that game theoretical analyses of International Environmental Agreements have not incorporated this change yet, as they were all designed to analyze burden sharing agreements, or agreements where signatories essentially become one player. Despite this fact, some relevant insights from this literature are still relevant to guiding future climate policy in the new context., [FR] L’Accord de Paris nous a déplacé d’un monde où les accords fermes de partage du fardeau, comme pour le Protocole de Kyoto, étaient standards à un monde où la politique climatique se réduit à l’engagement et le réajustement. Cela a néanmoins permis de donner un nouvel élan à la politique climatique. Dans ce papier nous soutenons que les approches en termes de jeux n’ont pas encore intégré ce changement dans la mesure où elles ont été conçues pour analyser les accords sur le partage du fardeau, ou encore les accords où les signataires finissent par ne faire qu’un. Malgré cela, certains éléments marquants de cette littérature conserve toute leur pertinence pour guider la politique climatique future dans ce nouveau contexte.

Firms are key actors interfering with the negotiations of international environmental agreements. However, their ability to engage in collective lobbying via the establishment of business transnational coalitions has received little attention so far. In order to fill this gap, this article conducts a micro–macro analysis of corporate lobbying during the negotiations of two sub-agreements of the Convention on Biological Diversity. In particular, it scrutinises the degree of transnationalisation of two senior business lobby coalitions in these negotiations: the Global Industry Coalition and the International Chamber of Commerce. In contrast to former studies of business lobbying on environmental agreements, the analysis stresses the variety of business interests represented in international negotiations and underlines the bargaining processes taking place inside each transnational business coalition. Transnational business lobby coalitions are found useful for business networking activities, either as tactical tools or as information platforms. Yet corporate lobbying efforts are still conducted predominantly on an individual basis., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The Minamata Convention, which entered into force on 16 August 2017, is a global, legally binding instrument on mercury. The initiative on the Minamata Convention was mainly driven by research showing negative effects on human health and the environment in the Arctic. The Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation on Arctic issues, and its Working Group, AMAP, played an important role in the process leading up to international negotiations on the Minamata Convention. This paper elucidates the evolutionary process in which scientific knowledge, herded by an intergovernmental, regional forum, is involved and forms the basis for a legally binding agreement. The paper provides new insight on multilevel governance of the mercury issue and unravels the role that AMAP has played in this dynamic process.

We discuss a model of gradual coalition formation with positive externalities in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to negotiate multilaterally or sequentially over climate change. We show that the leader may choose a sequential path, and that the choice is determined by the convexity of the TU-game and the free-rider payoffs of the followers. Except in a few clearly defined cases, the outcome of the negotiation process is always the grand coalition, although the process may need some time. This holds for the standard IEA game with heterogeneous players even if the grand coalition is not stable in a multilateral context. We also analyze the role of a facilitating agency. The agency has an incentive to speed up intra-stage negotiations and to extend the period between negotiation stages in a sequential process.

The Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA) embodies the first set of new multilateral rules to have been negotiated under auspices of the WTO, part of a small package of decisions centering on matters of interest to developing countries that was “harvested” from the broader Doha round. This paper analyzes the outcome of the trade facilitation talks, assesses the role of the epistemic community that provided information to negotiators and reflects on the lessons and possible implications of the TFA experience for the prospects for new rule-making and cooperation on regulatory matters in the WTO. The TFA illustrates both the potential and the difficulty of negotiating generally applicable stand-alone agreements in the WTO and demonstrates the importance of issue linkage in achieving cooperation in trade policy matters.

International policy makers are currently exploring methodological matters associated with non-carbon benefits and joint mitigation and adaptation approaches as they relate to REDD+. Although few pilot projects are exploring these issues, emerging evidence shows how these approaches can be implemented on the ground. This analysis draws from the scientific literature on non-carbon benefits and joint mitigation and adaptation, evaluates recent submissions to the SBSTA on these issues, and intends to inform the negotiations on these approaches.

International trade policy analysis has tended to focus on the production side of general equilibrium, with policies such as a tariff or carbon tax affecting international and internal income distributions through a Heckscher-Ohlin nexus of factor intensities and factor endowments. Here I move away from this structure to focus on demand, preferences, and endogenous policy in a trade/environment setting by assuming a high income elasticity of demand for environmental quality. I show how both non-cooperative and cooperative abatement policies in a two-country (rich and poor) setting are affected by non-homotheticity. I examine “issue linking” in international bargaining, in which one country is both large and rich, and hence has both a high tariff and a high abatement effort in a non-cooperative equilibrium. Several cooperative bargaining agreements are computed under alternative assumptions about linking or separating trade and environment negotiations. A final exercise considers “policy leakage”, in which one country has an incentive to reduce its optimal abatement effort when the other country increases its effort. The paper will also introduce many readers to a new solver in GAMS for a class of problems referred to as MPECs: mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints. This problem class has wide applications in economics, including solving for multiple optimal tax rates to provide public goods, redistribute income, internalize externalities, exploit monopoly power in trade and so forth, when the underlying general-equilibrium model is a set of constraints on the optimization problem.

This study aims to analyze international trade agreements and negotiations. For that purpose, two agreements made by the United States are chosen to be analyzed. In the first place, the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) agreement, that was signed by the United States, Canada and Mexico in 1994 in order to create a free trade area. In addition, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will be analyze, an agreement that is still being negotiated between the United States and the European Union, with the aim of increasing trade volumes and unifying procedures. To conclude, the study includes a comparison between both agreements from the point of view of the United States and the reasons why it decides to negotiate in each case Graduado o Graduada en Administración y Dirección de Empresas por la Universidad Pública de Navarra Enpresen Administrazio eta Zuzendaritzan Graduatua Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoan

The European Union played a key role on Kyoto Protocol’s entrance into force, and has been a front runner on the implementation of measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within its territory. However, the slow progress achieved since the Bali Roadmap was agreed (2007) illustrated a worrying trend that was confirmed by what happened at Copenhagen Summit in 2009. The Cancun Summit in 2010 showed how developing countries also had something to say in order to achieve a positive outcome. All these facts seem to indicate that the EU is losing its influence at international negotiations in the area of climate change, which makes sense if we take into account that its participation on total emissions is smaller each day, and that it is time for the biggest polluters to commit on reduction targets and energy efficiency policies. Nevertheless, the positive results that the measures adopted by the EU are giving in terms of emissions reduction and shift towards a low carbon economy could be taken as example by these countries, reinforcing its assessment role in the future.

The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is an exemplar result of global health diplomacy, based on its global reach (binding on all World Health Organization member nations) and its negotiation process. The FCTC negotiations are one of the first examples of various states and non-state entities coming together to create a legally binding tool to govern global health. They have demonstrated that diplomacy, once consigned to interactions among state officials, has witnessed the dilution of its state-centric origins with the inclusion of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the diplomacy process. To engage in the discourse of global health diplomacy, NGO diplomats are immediately presented with two challenges: to convey the interests of larger publics and to contribute to inter-state negotiations in a predominantly state-centric system of governance that are often diluted by pressures from private interests or mercantilist self-interest on the part of the state itself. How do NGOs manage these challenges within the process of global health diplomacy itself? What roles do, and can, they play in achieving new forms of global health diplomacy? This paper addresses these questions through presentation of findings from a study of the roles assumed by one group of non-governmental actors (the Canadian NGOs) in the FCTC negotiations. The findings presented are drawn from a larger grounded theory study. Qualitative data were collected from 34 public documents and 18 in-depth interviews with participants from the Canadian government and Canadian NGOs. This analysis yielded five key activities or roles of the Canadian NGOs during the negotiation of the FCTC: monitoring, lobbying, brokering knowledge, offering technical expertise and fostering inclusion. This discussion begins to address one of the key goals of global health diplomacy, namely 'the challenges facing health diplomacy and how they have been addressed by different groups and at different levels of governance' (Kickbusch et al. 2007a: 972).

Trade and investment in services are inhibited by a range of policy restrictions, but the best offers so far in the Doha negotiations are on average twice as restrictive as actual policy. They will generate no additional market opening. Regulatory concerns help explain the limited progress. This paper develops two proposals to enhance the prospects for both liberalization of services trade and regulatory reform. The first is for governments to create mechanisms ("services knowledge platforms") to bring together regulators, trade officials, and stakeholders to discuss services regulatory reform. Such mechanisms could identify reform priorities and opportunities for utilization of"aid for trade"resources, thereby putting in place the preconditions for future market opening. The second proposal is for a new approach to negotiations in the World Trade Organization, with a critical mass of countries that account for the bulk of services production agreeing to lock-in applied levels of protection and pre-committing to reform of policies affecting foreign direct investment and international movement for individual service providers -- two areas where current policy is most restrictive and potential benefits from liberalization are greatest. If these proposals cannot be fully implemented in the Doha time frame, then any Doha agreement could at least lay the basis for a forward-looking program of international cooperation along the proposed lines.

This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four papers, which relate to environmental policy in the presence of transboundary environmental damage. Paper [I] concerns public policy in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. Each jurisdiction is assumed large in the sense that its government is able to inuence the world-market producer price of the externality-generating good. This gives rise to additional incentives of relevance for national public policy in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. With the uncoordinated equilibrium as the reference case, the welfare eects from coordinated changes in public policy variables are analyzed. Paper [II] analyses welfare eects of coordinated changes in environmental and capital taxation in the presence of transboundary environmental externalities and wage bargaining externalities. In the wage bargaining between rms and labor unions, rms use the threat of moving abroad to moderate wage claims, which means that domestic policy inuences wage formation abroad. The specic framework implies welfare eects of policy coordination that correspond to each of the respective international interaction mentioned above. In paper [III], national governments face political pressure from environmental and industrial lobby groups, while pollution taxes are determined in an international negotiation. It is shown that a general increase in the environmental concern and the weight the governments attach to social welfare both tend to increase the pollution tax. However, allowing for asymmetries between the countries means that a general increase in the environmental concern has the potential to reduce the pollution tax. Paper [IV] studies national environmental policies in an economic federation characterized by decentralized leadership. The federal government sets emission targets for each member country, which are implemented by the national governments. Although all national governments have commitment power vis-à-vis the federal government, one of them also has commitment power vis-à-vis the other member countries. This creates incentives to act strategically toward the federal government, as well as toward other members.

Artykuł poświęcony jest wydarzeniom lat 2005-2015, kiedy to społeczność międzynarodowa uznała, że rozwijany przez Iran program nuklearny może służyć także celom wojskowym i podjęła starania o poddanie tego programu ścisłej kontroli. Szczególnie aktywna była na tym polu dyplomacja Unii Europejskiej i jej trzech najsilniejszych państw: Francji, Niemiec i Wielkiej Brytanii. Wobec sprzeciwu Iranu i przyspieszania jego prac możliwa była albo droga konfrontacji (również militarnej), albo zrekompensowania Irańczykom rezygnacji z aspiracji nuklearnych. W kilkuletnich negocjacjach, zakończonych porozumieniem w lipcu 2015 r., UE potrafiła z jednej strony wywrzeć silną presję polityczno-gospodarczą na Iran, a z drugiej - zaoferować mu korzystne warunki współpracy w badaniach atomowych. The paper discusses the events of 2005-2015, when the international community decided that Iran’s nuclear programme can also serve military purposes, and endeavoured to impose a strict control over this programme. The diplomacy of the European Union was exceptionally active in this area, in particular its three strongest members: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Given the protests of Iran and its accelerated work within the programme, there emerged the option of confrontation (including military conflict) or compensation offered to Iran in return for its abandoning nuclear ambitions. Over several years of negotiations, concluded by an agreement in July 2015, the EU was able to exert a strong politico-economic pressure on Iran on the one hand, and offer it advantageous terms of cooperation in the field of nuclear research on the other.

Agriculture is a special sector both for developed and developing countries. The second chapter provides an overview of the reasons why agriculture is so special. The third chapter analyzes relationships between agriculture, international trade, liberalization of markets and economic development in order to provide explanations to the generous domestic support that developed nations reserve for their agricultural sector. The fourth chapter describes the background framework of agricultural negotiations within the context of WTO Uruguay Round and Doha Round with particular attention to the failure of the 5th Inter-Ministerial Conference in Cancùn and the subsequent developments including the so called ‘July package’ officially issued the 1st August 2004. The fifth chapter analyzes the case of environmental policies related to rural development as a concrete example of policies related to Non Trade Concerns and their effects on international agricultural trade. Finally conclusions are drawn on the current negotiations and the underpinning conflicting interests on agriculture between developed and developing nations.

According to common explanations of war, since war is costly and risky, rational states have incentives to strike a bargain and avoid conflict. War is then the result of private information about capabilities or resolve and incentives to misrepresent this information, or inability to make credible commitments (Fearon 1995). This article presents another rationalist explanation, which does not depend on either of these mechanisms. By modeling warfare as a costly bargaining process, the paper demonstrates that inefficient fighting can occur in equilibrium under very general assumptions favoring peace. Specifically, it is assumed that peace can be supported in equilibrium, and that fighting brings no benefits to either state, only costs. Despite the fact that there exist many agreements that Pareto-dominate the final settlement, states are unable to agree to them and fighting can occur in equilibrium. The equilibrium is driven by the ability of states to impose costs on their opponent, and bear costs. The power to hurt the opponent establishes a range of acceptable settlements, and the existence of such a range makes inefficient equilibria possible. The article suggests that (1) states may fight if they believe that seeking peace means accepting an unpalatable settlement; and (2) a diminished ability to hurt the enemy is a major reason for war termination. Historical examples are provided to illustrate these results.

This Paper analyses what actions could be taken in the context of the WTO Doha negotiations to assist countries to benefit from deeper trade integration. It discusses the policy agenda that confronts many developing countries and identifies a number of focal points that could be used both as targets and as benchmarks to increase the likelihood that WTO negotiations will support development. To achieve these targets a number of negotiating modalities are proposed for both goods and services-related market access issues, as well as rule making in regulatory areas. Throughout the analysis reference is made to the work of J Michael Finger, whose numerous writings in this area have not only greatly influenced the thinking of policymakers and researchers on the interaction between trade policy, economic development and the GATT/WTO trading system, but also provide a model for how to pursue effective policy research.

The results from the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) show that developed countries fulfilled their commitments through varied strategies. However, the Kyoto protocol did not manage to stabilize global GHG concentrations; furthermore its direct impact on domestic emissions reductions is unclear. Nevertheless, the KP has likely paved the way for a low-carbon transition by establishing international standards on emissions monitoring and on emission reductions projects. Yet, domestic policies – especially the EU ETS – are the main driver of emissions reductions and the principal catalyzers of private finance flows. A new, more effective, agreement would therefore need to expand its coverage, and take down the specter of “internationally binding” emission reductions commitments in order to focus on MRV requirements. Similar to Kyoto, a Paris outcome could take the form of a framework agreement setting up requirements and mechanisms with subsequent implementing agreements expected by 2020.

An achievement at the Durban summit (November 28 to December 9, 2011) is the decision to extend the Kyoto Protocol after its first commitment period ends in 2012. This extension essentially allows the continuity of the existing mechanisms and tools: the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation and the registries. Further, for the first time emerging economies, especially China, are willing to discuss emission reduction targets to be implemented in 2020. The summit has also led to implement the Green Fund and make changes to the accounting of forest emissions.

Uluslararası ilişkiler bir manada müzakereler yoluyla yürütülür. Uluslararası başarılı siyasi ya da ekonomik ilişkiler, çoğunlukla başarılı müzakerelerin neticesidir. Uluslararası müzakere, devletler kadar uluslararası faaliyet yürüten şirketlerin de sahip olması gereken en temel yetkinlik alanlarından birisi halini almıştır. Bu makale, esas itibarıyla uluslararası müzakere becerisinin, bir uluslararası ilişkiler yetkinliği olduğuna vurgu yapmaktadır. Bu durumun en belirgin göstergesi de devletler bünyesinde baş müzakereci ismiyle resmi bir unvanının ihdas edilmesi olmuştur. Uluslararası faaliyet icra eden şirketlerde de müzakere işlerini yürütmekle görevli ayrı birimler kurulduğu görülmüştür. Makale, belirtilen gelişmelerin işaret ettiği üzere uluslararası müzakerelerin artan önemi doğrultusunda uluslararası müzakerecilikte başarıyı belirleyen bir unsur olarak müzakere gücü kavramına ayrıca dikkat çekmektedir. Bu vurgu dâhilinde makalede uluslararası müzakerelerde müzakere gücünü oluşturan unsurların bir anlatımı sunulmaktadır. International relations are in a sense conducted through negotiations. International successful political and economic relations are generally outcomes of successful negotiations. International negotiations have become a fundamental competency which states and companies running international business must possess. This article stresses that international negotiation skill is also an international relations skill. The most definite indication of this fact has become the introduction of the official title chief negotiator in state organizations. It has also been shown that companies running international business have also established separate departments for conducting negotiations. In line with the growing importance of international negotiations, this article draws attention to the concept of negotiating power as a factor determining the success in international negotiations. In the framework of this conception, this article offers a presentation of the elements shaping the negotiating power in international negotiations.