Search

Today's highly integrated supply chains are exposed to various types of risks which disrupt the normal flow of goods or services within a supply chain network. Since most of these individual risks are interconnected, a mitigation strategy to tackle one risk may result in the exacerbation of another. Risk dependencies have been modelled using two approaches in the financial insurance literature : (i) random variables, and (ii) copulas. In this dissertation these studies are reviewed and extended. Also, applications for these models for different supply chain network configurations are presented. Then, a Poisson process model for risk propagation is proposed. Unlike the existing models, the transition rate of the proposed model not only expresses the time dependency, but also captures other possible dependencies in the network. Finally, the thesis is summarized and general directions and suggestions for future research on risk dependency and propagation modelling are provided. Master of Science (MSc)

In today's retail environment, there are many consumer packaged goods (CPG) in the same category with various brands and differential products under the same brand. These differential products appear in different dimension sizes, display facing areas, purchasing costs and selling prices which are competing for a limited space in retail store shelves. Product assortment and space allocation of the chosen products to a limited shelf space is becoming more and more important for retailers. In this thesis we critically review the existing literature of shelf space allocation optimization models and solution techniques. We then propose a comprehensive model for shelf space allocation for a product category. Products are allocated to a two-dimensional area of a shelf section where a shelf section consists of multilevel vertical shelves. We account for adjustable shelf heights and product and brand integrity in a shelf section. Unlike the existing optimization models in the literature, we model our demand not only as a function of the space allocated to a product, in terms of the number of display facings, but also as a function of vertical product location in a shelf section and price sensitivity. Stackability of the products is also considered and products can be stacked depending on their package. Our objective is to maximize the retailer's daily gross profit. We numerically show that incorporating price changes and adjustable shelf spaces can have major impacts on the retailers' profit. Finally, we provide directions and suggestions for future research in this growing area of research. Master of Applied Science (MASc)

In this thesis we focus on applications of game theory in supply chain management (SCM). Most significant---and interesting---topics arising in SCM are concerned with the coordination/cooperation and competition among supply chain members. Since the theory of non-cooperative and cooperative games is used for the analysis of situations involving conflict and cooperation, it has become a commonly-used methodological tool in investigating supply chain-related problems. We start with an introduction in Chapter 1. In this chapter, we briefly describe game theory and SCM, and the organizational structure of this thesis. Next, we present a literature review for game theoretical applications in SCM in Chapter 2. This chapter reviews more than 130 papers concerned with supply chain-related game models, which are categorized based on a topical classification scheme. In Chapter 3, we consider a free shipping problem in a B2B setting. We model the problem as a leader-follower game under complete information with a seller as the leader and a buyer as the follower, and compute the Stackelberg solution for this game. In Chapter 4, we analyze the problem of allocating cost savings in a three-level supply chain involving a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. We use concepts from the theory of cooperative games to find allocation schemes for dividing the total cost savings among the three members. Chapter 5 considers game-theoretic models of lead-time reduction in a two-level supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer. In this chapter, we first develop a leader-follower game where the manufacturer determines the components of his lead-time and the retailer decides on her order quantity. This game is solved to find the Stackelberg equilibrium. We also investigate the cooperation between the two members and design a linear side-payment contract for this supply chain. Our thesis ends with a conclusion in Chapter 6. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)