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www.bt.no/btmeninger/kronikk/Handelsboikott-i-sikte-274297b.html www.dagsavisen.no/nyemeninger/m%C3%B8re-st-petersburg-aksen-2018-2030-1.1041783

We explore a major European competition decision, the 2012-18 Gazprom case, using a global gas market simulation model. We find that access to LNG markets alone is insufficient to counterbalance Gazprom’s strategic behaviour; central and eastern Europe (CEE) needs to be well interconnected with bidirectional flow capability. ‘Swap deals’ created by the decision facilitate CEE market integration, while limiting Gazprom’s potential market power. Such deals may increase the diversity of contracted gas and number of market players, but do not improve physical supply diversity. In the next five years, swap deals could marginally impact negatively the utilization of strategic assets in CEE, but since Gazprom’s commitments expire by mid-2026, utilization of these strategic assets may fall considerably, especially if Gazprom withholds supplies. As an unintended consequence, CEE markets may disintegrate from the rest of Europe. Avoiding such outcomes will require further gas market reforms, particularly, market design for gas transportation.

This article addresses a neglected question about the effects of dispersed authority in the European Union (EU) on the EU’s ability to manage external contestations. It investigates authority challenges from two major external actors in the energy, and specifically the gas sector, and scrutinizes the management of authority conflicts at local sites in different EU states in the Baltic Sea region. The second Russian transboundary submarine gas infrastructure project Nord Stream 2 (NS2), owned and managed by a whole-owned subsidiary of the Russian state-controlled energy giant Gazprom, serves as an illustrative case study. It reveals how multiple authority conflicts at different sites and levels, and the challenges from both the Russian Federation (Russia) and the United States of America (USA), played out, and why formal adjudication has been a primary tool for the EU and several of its member states to assert their authority and manage contestations at the local, national and EU level.

Разработка «Целевой модели рынка газа» ЕС в рамках Третьего энергетического пакета дала ясное понимание, как должен выглядеть единый рынок газа и каким критериям должны отвечать страны ЕС для его формирования. Главная цель - создать интегрированный энергетический рынок. Данный стратегия смещает акценты на диверсификацию, гибкость, устойчивость, безопасность поставок и созданию конкурентной среды. Поскольку добыча в Северном море снижается из-за истощения месторождений, необходимо привлечь большее количество поставщиков, одновременно стараясь снизить зависимость от Российского газа, который в настоящее время является доминирующим сегментом.

Transnational competition cases pose numerous challenges— from accessing foreign-based evidence to effectively enforcing decisions or judgments in their aftermath. Some of such cases are quite special in that the underlying conduct involves or implicates a foreign State. This article makes an original contribution to the scholarship by filling the existing gap and developing a typology of State’s entanglement in conduct causing competitive harm abroad. It also examines the way in which foreign State’s involvement or implication can be addressed in the adversely affected forum. Moreover, the key broader considerations which need to inform policies and approaches toward such cases are identified and evaluated. It is argued that competitive harm resulting from commercial dealings should be pursued under competition laws regardless of the character of the parties involved, unless there are overriding reasons justifying abstention. States should not enjoy immunity for competitive harm resulting from their commercial dealings. Agencies and courts in the affected fora should strive to clarify this matter. A clear State’s policy on dealing with inbound competitive harm may also make foreign partners more receptive to concerns about policies which facilitate competitive harm which they may be pursuing. http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=WOCO2017018

В данной статье рассматриваются основные вопросы топливно-энергетического комплекса в ЕАЭС, которые затрагивают российские нефтегазовые компании. Было выяснено как влияет нефтяная отрасль в ряде стран-членов ЕАЭС, а именно через долю различные показателей в ВВП рассматриваемых стран. Россия, являясь одним из лидеров по основных экономическим показателям среди стран Союза, предоставляет свои услуги по разработке и развитию нефтегазовой отрасли путем ведения деятельности собственных крупных нефтегазовых компаний.

The value of multinational enterprises (MNEs) as the main players in the global economy is constantly increasing. More and more companies from developing and transition economies are starting to do business beyond their national borders. Not all of them strictly belong to the category of MNEs, as is the case for Russia’s largest companies. This article analyzes the international activities of Russian MNEs. The authors study the place of MNEs in the modern world and examine the transformation of the concept of an MNE in the international practice. They identify the internationally accepted criteria that classify a company as an MNE. They analyze the international activities of the largest Russian companies in the oil and gas sector (Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, Novatek) and their possible classification as MNEs. The article also assesses the influence of the economic and political sanctions on the international activities of Russian MNEs in the oil and gas sector. The methodological basis for the study is the dialectical method of investigating phenomena and processes in the modern world as the most effective way to achieve goals. The authors pay particular attention to the practical application of comparative economic analysis, classification and empirical generalization of original data. The authors came to seven conclusions. First, there is no single approach to defining the essence of MNEs. Second, the indicators that classify a company as an MNE can be divided into qualitative and quantitative criteria. Third, not all the large companies in Russia engaged in expanding into foreign markets can be classified as MNEs by the formal criteria. Fourth, most Russian MNEs have an unstable position in international ratings of MNEs, with the exception of Lukoil. Fifth, the main problems of Russian MNEs include the inefficiency of foreign assets, the lack of experience in managing international holdings and the longstanding crisis of the Russian economy. Sixth, political and economic sanctions severely restrict the business relationship between Russian companies (particularly oil and gas companies) and key international partners, which leads to decreased investment, disrupted implementation of many major projects plans and the decline of companies’ financial performance. Seventh, the current situation should spur Russian companies to adapt their economic policies to the new economic realities, to restore full technological and financial chains via expanding business relationships with companies in developing countries, using private sector resources and government support.

Авторы рассматривают потенциал российско-европейского газового сотрудничества и возможности новой энергетической логистики. Раскрыты предпосылки строительства новых газотранспортных коридоров. На базе системного анализа показаны риски транзита через территорию Украины. Авторы пришли к выводу, что в условиях роста спроса на газ в Европе и снижения собственной добычи в Европе создаются предпосылки для наращивания импорта газа. Однако обеспечить надежность поставок российского газа в условиях высококонкурентной борьбы за европейский газовый рынок возможно только при строительстве альтернативных украинской ГТС газотранспортных маршрутов в западном направлении., The authors consider the potential of Russian-European gas cooperation and the possibilities of new energy logistics. The prerequisites for the construction of new gas transmission corridors are considered. The analysis of transit risks through the territory of Ukraine was carried out. The authors came to the conclusion that in the conditions of the growing demand for gas in Europe and the reduction of own production, in Europe preconditions for increasing gas imports are being created. However, in conditions of a highly competitive struggle for the European gas market, ensuring the reliability of Russian gas supplies is possible only in the construction of alternative Ukrainian gas transportation routes in the west.

Corporate governance has been well known in the last two decades for making the attraction of investors its main objective. During communism, corporate governance was absent from economical life and thus quick steps were taken by former communist countries to adopt corporate governance, Romania and the Russian Federation are two countries that realized the strategy. Eventually after the collapse of the communist bloc both countries have moved in different directions based on internal and external factors. Romania has moved toward the European Union Model, while Russia experimented with building a different model by borrowing parts from Western values and at the same time using traditional values. These perspectives are clearly differentiated in Romanian Petrom OMV and Russia’s Gazprom.

The non-Gazprom gas producers (NGPs) doubled their share of the Russian domestic gas market between 2000 and 2010 and have continued growing since then. For several years especially Novatek expanded. More recently, Rosneft has emerged as a key player, not least through its purchase of TNK-BP. This article begins with an overview of the companies in the Russian gas sector, their resource bases and capacities, and subsequently examines whether differences in field development costs and export market access may make it rational for Gazprom to continue ceding market share to the NGPs. With rising costs of Gazprom's queue of greenfield developments, any delays in Gazprom's investment program may be compensated through increased NGP production. The article argues that the NGPs are ready to fill the gap, may be allowed to do so and are already increasing their market share in an increasingly competitive market. The stage may now be set for a continued gradual transformation of the Russian gas market, in which the interests of Gazprom and the NGPs may be complementary or may be pitted against each other, but those of the Russian Federation are in any case likely to be better fulfilled than in the past.

The article deals with privatization in Russia’s energy sector with a special focus on a recent purchase of the private TNK-BP by the state-owned Rosneft. The author analyses the past, present and future privatization deals related to the Russian oil, gas and power generation industry as compared to accumulated international experience. For instance, the article displays the ways the Norwegian, Brazilian, French and British authorities privatized national strategic energy assets. The study presented in the article also aims to find out key advantages and disadvantages of state or private ownership in the Russian and global energy industry. For example, it sheds light on some considerable achievements of the Russian state-controlled companies in oil production amid a widespread belief that more than a decade-long growth in the Russian oil industry is due only to private firms that were created in the 1990s. Additionally, the state-controlled Norwegian oil and gas firm Statoil that shows strong operational and financial results on the Norwegian Continental Shelf and abroad is also in the spotlight of the current study. In line with the mentioned takeover of TNK-BP the author examines outcomes of the reorganization of RAO UES of Russia (the dismantled Russian electric power monopoly) that was seen as a massive privatization of the national power industry. Moreover, the study presents two groups of interests prevailing in the Russian government and energy business to give an outlook on the Russian energy industry.

The Russian gas sector is characterised by some important evolution even if the State Gazprom Company remains the main gas producer in Russia. These evolutions are principally: a restructuration of Gazprom; big increases in Russian gas prices; introduction of some competition to try to normalize the Gazprom's behaviours. This reform doesn't follow the EU gas restructuration model. This model is based on the unbundling of the vertically gas companies and competitive markets. The initial project (discussed in 2002) of the Russian gas reform was to implement the EU gas model. But in the Russian institutional and economic environment this type of reform seems impossible to implement., Le secteur gazier russe est aujourd'hui l'objet d'évolutions en profondeur même s'il reste dominé par la puissante société Gazprom, détenue par l'Etat. Ces évolutions se caractérisent principalement par une restructuration de Gazprom, des hausses conséquentes de prix et surtout l'introduction de formes concurrentielles qui tendent à normer le comportement de Gazprom. Cette réorganisation ne suit cependant pas le modèle de restructuration des industries gazières mises en œuvre dans l'UE. Ce modèle est principalement basé sur la dé-intégration des monopoles verticalement intégrés et des marchés concurrentiels. Alors que c'était le projet initial (discuté en 2002), ce modèle s'avère de fait dans les conditions institutionnelles et économiques de la Russie impossible à mettre en œuvre.

This study explores the commercial, economic, regulatory and political implications of the Nord Stream 2 project. The plans to add another two pipelines to the Nord Stream facility under the Baltic Sea have created waves within the European Union. Whether it fails or succeeds, the project’s political costs will be high, as it touches on sensitive interests in many quarters. Nord Stream is a commercial venture, but its impacts transcend its commercial and energy ramifications, and differ widely among EU states. Without a question, the project represents a challenge for energy diplomacy both internal and external. Its potentially divisive effects on European energy policy and the Energy Union need to be cushioned and contained. (author's abstract)

The industry has been closely watching to see at what point the market becomes too saturated to support further development. Some final investment decisions that were expected this year have been pushed off to 2018 and beyond. A number of developers with proposals in the permitting queue have announced preliminary offtake agreements with buyers, but firm final agreements have so far been fleeting.

The mathematical formulation of a large-scale equilibrium natural gas simulation model is presented. Although large-scale natural gas models have been developed and used for energy security and policy analysis quite extensively (e.g., Holz (2007), Egging et al. (2008), Holz et al. (2009) and Lise et al. (2008)), this model differs from earlier ones in its detailed representation of the structure and operations of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) gas sector. In particular, the model represents: (i) market power of transit countries, (ii) transmission pipelines in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia, (iii) differentiation among gas production regions in Russia, and (iv) gas trade relations between FSU countries (e.g., Gazprom’s re-exporting of Central Asian gas). To demonstrate the model, a social benefit-cost analysis of the Nord Stream gas pipeline project from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea is provided. It is found that Nord Stream project is profitable for its investors and the project also improves social welfare in all market power scenarios. Also, if transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus) exert substantial market power then the economic value of Nord Stream to its investors and to society improves substantially. We also found that the value of Nord Stream investment is rather sensitive to the degree of downstream competition in European markets and that lack of downstream competition might result in the negative value of the Nord Stream system to Gazprom., transit

We calculate the total cost of building Nord Stream and compare its levelised unit transportation cost with the existing options to transport Russian gas to western Europe. We find that the unit cost of shipping through Nord Stream is clearly lower than using the Ukrainian route and is only slightly above shipping through the Yamal-Europe pipeline. Using a large-scale gas simulation model we find a positive economic value for Nord Stream under various scenarios of demand for Russian gas in Europe. We disaggregate the value of Nord Stream into project economics (cost advantage), strategic value (impact on Ukraine’s transit fee) and security of supply value (insurance against disruption of the Ukrainian transit corridor). The economic fundamentals account for the bulk of Nord Stream’s positive value in all our scenarios., Pipeline

Different hydrocarbon producer sales strategies have widely divergent implications for the value of Gazprom's gas exports to Europe. In particular, hydrocarbon producers have commonly pursued two alternative sales strategies: (i) pure commodity production (border sales) and (ii) integrated supply, trading and marketing (ISTM). The impact of these two strategies on Gazprom's export profits are examined under three sets of scenarios: (a) the possible entry of low-cost producers, (b) oil price dynamics and (c) the future of LTCs (pricing and volume structure). We also analysed how Statoil shifted its sales strategy in light of structural changes in European gas markets and conclude that the company began employing an ISTM strategy when the market in North-west Europe became liquid. Thus, when a market is mature, with an increasing number of buyers, the best sales strategy for a large hydrocarbon producer should be based on flexibility and increasing its use of market trading to maximise the value of its commodity. We conclude that an optimal export strategy for Gazprom should involve both a substantial and increasing portion of uncommitted volumes that can be traded in markets (gas hubs) and, if needed, some form of bilateral forward contract with a minimum take-or-pay level to secure infrastructure finance., Statoil

This thesis examines the rationales behind Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to intervene in Ukraine through the lenses of neoclassical realism and prospect theory. The risk-acceptant decision to employ hybrid warfare in Crimea was fundamentally due to Putin’s loss aversion. Since Putin frames his political decision-making reference point in the realm of losses, his decision sought to prevent the imminent losses of Ukraine’s Russian-oriented government, Russia’s influence in Ukraine, and Putin’s own political power at home. It also sought to somewhat recover from the catastrophic loss of the Soviet Union’s territorial possessions, population, and status. Putin exploited Western leaders’ naiveté and vulnerabilities to prepare a geopolitical landscape wherein Russia could act without incurring excessive costs. Emboldened by Russia’s large financial reserves and backed by Russia’s seemingly irrational threats of cutting off essential European gas supplies and launching nuclear attacks, Putin correctly anticipated a limited economic sanctions response and a negligible military response from the West. Putin’s decision furthered Russia’s interests by acquiring Crimea, the strategically indispensable port of Sevastopol, and vast Black Sea region resources. Such action also thwarted the expansion of Western institutions in Ukraine and incited fervent Russian ethno-nationalism, boosting Putin’s domestic approval ratings to an unprecedented level. http://archive.org/details/analyzingrationa1094548483 Major, United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

to analyze the profitability and the efficiency of these banks, by using the calculation of financial indicators, as well as to identify the alleged tendency of development of banks. Based on the results of above calculation we can determine which bank is more successful in personal or business sector.

Die vorliegende Studie setzt sich mit den kommerziellen, wirtschaftlichen, regulatorischen und politischen Implikationen auseinander, die das Nord-Stream-2-Projekt mit sich bringt. Die Planungen für den Bau eines dritten und vierten Strangs der Nord-Stream-Pipeline durch die Ostsee haben in der Europäischen Union erhebliche Kontroversen ausgelöst. Das Pipeline-Projekt zieht hohe politische Kosten nach sich und das fast unabhängig davon, ob es scheitert oder implementiert wird, denn es berührt die Interessenlagen vieler Akteurinnen und Akteure empfindlich. Nord Stream ist eine kommerzielle Unternehmung, hat aber weit über das Betriebs- und Energiewirtschaftliche hinausreichende Folgen, die sich für die einzelnen EU-Staaten sehr unterschiedlich darstellen. In jedem Fall also bedeutet das Vorhaben eine Herausforderung für die Energiediplomatie nach innen und nach außen. Es geht darum, die möglichen Spaltungseffekte des Projekts für die europäische Energiepolitik und die Energieunion einzudämmen und abzupuffern. (Autorenreferat)

The subject of the bachelor work is gas giant Gazprom. The aim of the work is to improve the analysis of the internal and external environment of the company's management. Gazprom sees its mission in a safe, efficient and balanced supply of natural gas and other energy resources and their products. The strategic goal is to establish Gazprom as a leader among global energy companies by market diversification, security of supply, increase efficiency, the use of scientific and technological capacity. This work consists of an introduction, practical part, conclusion and bibliography. In the first chapter we studied the theoretical aspects of the analysis of external and internal environment of the company. The second Section is devoted to analysis of the external and internal environment of the company Gazprom. In the third chapter, develop recommendations for improving the analysis of the external and internal environment management organization.

Ziel des Projekts ist die Untersuchung verschiedener, realisierbarer (Re)organisationsformen des russischen Gassektors und insbesondere des (a) ungehinderten Zugangs Dritter zum Pipelinenetzwerk im Exportbereich (b) sowie des ungehinderten Zugangs Dritter im innerrussischen Pipelinenetzwerk (c) der vertikalen Separation This paper will examine viable reforms in the Russian gas industry. Strategies include vertical separation and third party access in the context of the liberalization of the Russian economy

We calculate the total cost of building Nord Stream and compare its levelised unit transportation cost with the existing options to transport Russian gas to western Europe. We find that the unit cost of shipping through Nord Stream is clearly lower than using the Ukrainian route and is only slightly above shipping through the Yamal-Europe pipeline. Using a large-scale gas simulation model we find a positive economic value for Nord Stream under various scenarios of demand for Russian gas in Europe. We disaggregate the value of Nord Stream into project economics (cost advantage), strategic value (impact on Ukraine’s transit fee) and security of supply value (insurance against disruption of the Ukrainian transit corridor). The economic fundamentals account for the bulk of Nord Stream’s positive value in all our scenarios.

The mathematical formulation of a large-scale equilibrium natural gas simulation model is presented. Although large-scale natural gas models have been developed and used for energy security and policy analysis quite extensively (e.g., Holz (2007), Egging et al. (2008), Holz et al. (2009) and Lise et al. (2008)), this model differs from earlier ones in its detailed representation of the structure and operations of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) gas sector. In particular, the model represents: (i) market power of transit countries, (ii) transmission pipelines in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia, (iii) differentiation among gas production regions in Russia, and (iv) gas trade relations between FSU countries (e.g., Gazprom’s re-exporting of Central Asian gas). To demonstrate the model, a social benefit-cost analysis of the Nord Stream gas pipeline project from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea is provided. It is found that Nord Stream project is profitable for its investors and the project also improves social welfare in all market power scenarios. Also, if transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus) exert substantial market power then the economic value of Nord Stream to its investors and to society improves substantially. We also found that the value of Nord Stream investment is rather sensitive to the degree of downstream competition in European markets and that lack of downstream competition might result in the negative value of the Nord Stream system to Gazprom.

La Russie au vue de l'importance de ses réserves et de sa production a les moyens de devenir un acteur important du marché mondial du gaz. A ce jour, ses exportations restent limitées à l'Europe et à la CEI mais ses ambitions sont clairement de développer ses exportations vers l'Asie et les les Etats Unis. Gazprom, sa société gazière, est l'instrument de cette stratégie qui s'appuie notamment sur une internationalisation de la compagnie.

Krótka historia ekspansji gospodarczej w Europie Zachodniej Zaledwie dziesięć lat temu przyszłość rosyjskiego giganta zdawała się być niepewna. Przestarzała infrastruktura, setki podczepionych ssących go spółek –córek, czyniły zeń niemal podręcznikowy przykład funkcjonującego w postsocjalistycznym systemie gospodarczym reliktu minionej epoki. Restrukturyzowany i prywatyzowany balansował na granicy upadłości, trwając w nowych realiach właściwie tylko dzięki zachowaniu pozycji monopolisty. Wdrożenie opracowanej z pomocą specjalistów Dresdner Bank strategii rozwoju, niczym dotknięcie magicznej różdżki, jak mogłoby się zdawać, zmieniło niezdarnego kolosa w rynkowego tygrysa i to z gatunku tych największych – syberyjskich. Na początku maja kapitalizacja Gazpromu przekroczyła 300 mld dolarów. Wśród spółek publicznych wyżej oszacowano na świecie jedynie wartość dwóch amerykańskich koncernów Exxon Mobil i General Electric. Jeśli uda się im utrzymać w tej kategorii palmę pierwszeństwa aż do połowy przyszłego roku, będzie to spora niespodzianka: przyszłość należy bowiem do rosyjskiego potentata surowcowego. Piotr Kwiatkiewicz

This thesis explores the causes of Russian foreign policy towards Georgia. It argues that the Russian Federation continues to pursue a policy which weakens the sovereignty of the Caucasus. The main priority of this thesis is to identify why the Russian Federation seems to be pursuing a set of policies that economically and politically weaken the sovereignty of Georgia. Therefore, this thesis examines the forces and factors of Russian domestic politics that drive Russian national interests towards the Caucasus. The analysis focuses on one particular issue-area: the role of the economic elite in shaping Russia's domestic and foreign policies vis-a-vis the state in the electricity sector. In focusing on the energy policies of the Russian Federation, this thesis reveals the negative consequences for Georgia's sovereignty that result from a strong Russian influence in the region. This thesis analyzes how Russian national interests towards Georgia challenge the latter to establish autonomous decisionmaking with regard to its foreign policy and to exercise its own authority through an exclusive competence in internal affairs of the state. In conclusion, this thesis offers policy prescriptions on how Georgia might best preserve its sovereignty with respect to the Russian Federation in terms of energy dependency. http://archive.org/details/russiasnationali109451535 Civilian, Ministry of Defense, Georgia Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

'Durch die Umwandlung der sowjetischen Erdgasindustrie in das Unternehmen 'Gazprom' entstand in Rußland der größte Gaskonzern der Welt. In der russischen Volkswirtschaft nimmt der Gigant eine Ausnahmestellung ein. Er ist verantwortlich für fast ein Viertel der gesamten Steuerzahlungen und erwirtschaftet etwa ein Viertel der russischen Deviseneinnahmen. Auch außerhalb Rußlands ist Gazprom von großer wirtschaftlicher Bedeutung. Der Konzern ist für viele Staaten auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen Sowjetunion der wichtigste Energielieferant und auch auf dem westeuropäischen Gasmarkt ist er der größte Anbieter. Der vorliegende erste Teil des Unternehmensportraits befaßt sich mit der Rolle von Gazprom in der russischen Politik und Wirtschaft. Kernpunkte der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Gazprom und Staat sind dabei die Monopolstellung des Gaskonzerns, die Frage des staatlichen Einflusses auf die Unternehmensführung und die Höhe der von Gazprom zu zahlenden Steuern. Diese politischen Fragen sind eingebettet in den grundlegenden Konflikt um die Rolle von Gazprom in der russischen Volkswirtschaft. Soll das Unternehmen geschützt und von Steuern weitgehend befreit werden als Kompensation dafür, daß es zahlungsunfähige russische Kunden beliefert, oder ist es vielmehr Aufgabe des Staates, marktwirtschaftliche Verhältnisse zu schaffen und die Unternehmen sich selbst zu überlassen? Die Auseinandersetzung um Gazprom ist somit ein zentraler Schauplatz der Diskussion um die Konzeption der russischen Wirtschaftspolitik.' (Textauszug), 'With the transformation of the Soviet gas industry into the single enterprise 'Gazprom' Russia created the world's biggest gas company. The gas giant plays an exceptional rote in the Russian economy. It is responsible for a quarter of all tax payments to the state budget and for a quarter of Russia's foreign currency earnings. Outside Russia, too, Gazprom is of considerable economic relevance. The company is the most important energy supplier for many FSU countries and the biggest supplier in the West European gas market. The first part of the company profile deals with Gazprom's role in Russia's politics and economy. The political conflict surrounding the company concentrates an its monopoly position, an the government's influence on management decisions and an the amount of taxes to be paid by Gazprom. These political questions are closely related to the conflict about Gazprom's role in Russia's economy. Should the company be supported by the state and freed from tax payments because it makes gas deliveries to insolvent customers or is it the tack of the state to create a market economy and leave companies alone? As a result the discussion about Gazprom is at the core of the struggle over the direction of Russia's economic policy.' (extract)

'Durch die Umwandlung der sowjetischen Erdgasindustrie in das Unternehmen 'Gazprom' entstand in Rußland der größte Gaskonzern der Welt. In der russischen Volkswirtschaft nimmt der Gigant eine Ausnahmestellung ein. Er ist verantwortlich für fast ein Viertel der gesamten Steuerzahlungen und erwirtschaftet etwa ein Viertel der russischen Deviseneinnahmen. Auch außerhalb Rußlands ist Gazprom von großer wirtschaftlicher Bedeutung. Der Konzern ist für viele Staaten auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen Sowjetunion der wichtigste Energielieferant und auch auf dem westeuropäischen Erdgasmarkt ist der russische Konzern der größte Anbieter. Der vorliegende zweite Teil des Unternehmensportraits befaßt sich mit der Rolle von Gazprom als Akteur auf internationaler Ebene. Dabei soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, wie Gazprom auf internationaler Ebene versucht, die Interessen des Unternehmens durchzusetzen, welche Mittel eingesetzt werden und welche Möglichkeiten den Unternehmen zur Verfügung stehen. Bei der Untersuchung der Unternehmensaktivitäten des russischen Erdgasmonopolisten Gazprom auf internationaler Ebene werden folgende Schwerpunkte behandelt: die Ausweitung der Exportkapazitäten und die damit einhergehenden Schwierigkeiten, die Nutzung der internationalen Finanzmärkte als Finanzierungsquelle, der Abschluß strategischer Partnerschaften mit ausländischen Unternehmen, die Probleme bei der Kontrolle der Transitpipelines in Osteuropa und die Schwächung der zentralasiatischen Konkurrenz.' (Textauszug) 'With the transformation of the Soviet gas industry into the single enterprise 'Gazprom' Russia created the world's biggest gas company. The gas giant plays an exceptional rote in the Russian economy. It is responsible for a quarter of all tax payments to the state budget and for a quarter of Russia's foreign currency earnings. Outside Russia, too, Gazprom is of considerable economic relevance. The company is the most important energy supplier for many FSU countries and the biggest supplier in the West European gas market. The second part of the company profile deals with Gazprom's role as a global actor, concentrating an the question how Gazprom tries to realise its interests abroad, which means are employed and which factors limit the company's international strategy. Main activities of Gazprom outside Russia include the expansion of export capacities and with that access to international financial markets in order to get the necessary finance, the conclusion of strategic partnerships with foreign companies, the struggle for control over transit pipelines in Eastern Europe and the rivalry with Central Asian gas producers.' (extract)

This article examines the Turkish-EU negotiations for the Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement and the Turkish-EU membership talks to problematize Turkish leaders' tendency to establish linkages between their country's geo-strategic value and the EU accession process. It argues that Turkey's ability to gain strategic leverage depends on the formation of a winning coalition inside the EU in favour of its membership, which among other things, depends on the presence of a joint strategic outlook on the specific issue area. In the case of Nabucco negotiations, short of such consensus, there emerged an anchor credibility dilemma which both prevented linkages between geopolitical position and the accession process, and stalled strategic cooperation in energy security.