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The object of this work is to examine the impact made by the NSDAP upon agriculture in Germany until just before the outbreak of the Second World War. This entails showing how the movement first came to regard the agrarian sector c. 1928 as a fruitful area for vote-collecting, after an early period in the Party's history when the land was virtually neg­lected. How the Hitler movement came to organize all those agricultural interests hostile to the Weimar Republic into one disciplined force is described. In particular, this thesis deals with the way in which the NSDAP won votes from peasants on the one hand, whilst infiltrating into their organizations on the other, seen in the light of existing discontent and economic recession. The part played by agricultural interests in unseating both Brüning and Schleicher is also examined. For the period immediately following Hitler's nomination as Chancellor there are three main themes; the first is the co-ordination of all existing landed corporations, co-operatives, etc. into one unified body to represent the whole of food production and distribution in the Third Reich, a task accomplished by R. Walther Darré on behalf of the NSDAP. Secondly, the six-months sojourn in the office of the Food and Agriculture Minister by Hugenberg is described; his measures to aid the peasants are dealt with, as well as his eventual resignation in June 1933* Thirdly, the legislation introduced by his successor, Darré, in the autumn of 1933 is investigated, with particular reference to those laws designed to guard the peasant farmer against speculation and the free play of market forces: these are described in the framework of National Socialist hostility towards capitalism. The middle section of this thesis deals with the effect of National Socialist economic measures upon the financial position of the agrarian sector; the battle to achieve self-sufficiency is examined, both in regard to its origins and to its degree of success. For the period after 1936 the impact made upon agriculture by the introduction of the Four Year Plan FH discussed, with particular reference to the need for price-stability, and therefore cheap food, in order to realize the defence programme. A subsequent chapter assesses rural migration, in terms of its causes, its actual degree, and influence upon food production. Political relationships are next examined, in particular those ob­taining between the unified agrarian corporation on the one hand, and Party and government, both local and national, on the other. Quarrels with various Gauleiters and with Dr. Ley's DAF are also investigated, as is the internal leadership in Darre's organization, as well as his relation­ship with Hitler, and the question of the corporative state as such. Two chapters are devoted to legislation which produced hereditary entailment of certain peasant holdings after 1933. The historical back­ground to the law is examined, and its reception upon the land. How the judges actually administered it is the subject of the second of these two chapters. Finally there are separate sections dealing with the NSDAP settle­ment programme and the flattery given to the peasants during the Third Reich. This latter section also includes attempts at political indoctrin­ation of the landed population, especially its youth and a description of National Socialist racial measures, and the opposition encountered from religious bodies. A conclusion to the work attempts to pull to­gether all the strands previously narrated in order that NSDAP agrarian policy may be analysed as a coherent whole, set against the existing structure of German society in 1933.

Objective: To standardise emergency response processes to life threatening maternal and fetal situations requiring activation of a category one Caesarean section (C1CS), with the aim of reducing decision to incision (D-I) and decision to delivery (D-D) times. Design: A prospective observational study following the introduction of a streamlined C1CS process. Setting: A tertiary public obstetric hospital Population: All women who had a C1CS process activated over a 14 month period. Methods: Data were collected prospectively on a newly developed C1CSResponse Management Plan with documentation of D-I and D-D times for multiple variables. Main outcome measures: D-I and D-D times. Results: The median D-I was 11 minutes (interquartile range (IR): 7 minutes). 83% (68/82) of calls which proceeded to C1CS had D-I within 15 minutes. The median D-D was 17 minutes (IR: 9 minutes). 76% (62/82) of calls, which proceeded to C1CS, had D-D within 20 minutes and 96% within 30 minutes. Factors which significantly decreased D-I and D-D (p

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