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Philosophy has been a subversive practice since the time of Socrates. Recognizing no authority other than the persuasiveness of dialectics, philosophy designated a thinking beyond the boundaries of the city: an estranging conception, an elsewhere of thought. It is from this critical distance that philosophy derived its political vocation. In the era of global capitalism, however, philosophy has become institutionalized and lost its subversive potential. To this end, philosophy has accepted that it should no longer pose too many questions, especially the ones which are most fundamental, resulting in a dearth of in-depth public questioning, and the slumber of critical reasoning. Hence, philosophy needs to rediscover its political vocation in order to reawaken consciences and to once again embrace that theoretical and practical commitment which never accepts anything without critical reflection. By doing so, it will be possible to restore philosophy to its original role as a guiding light for the community.

In this paper, I explain why I have chosen the expression “metaphysical anti-Semitism” to characterize Heidegger’s position in the Black Notebooks. In this context, the strong connection between the question of being and the “Jewish question” is important. My thesis is that Heidegger ties Judaism to metaphysics with a Gordian knot. His ontological, theological, and political accusations against the Jews do not derive from common racism, but from this knot. After 1945, Heidegger does not change his position and does not recognize Germany’s guilt. Yet, the Black Notebooks open a new perspective on his political thought.

In questo saggio viene esaminato il pensiero politico di Humboldt, di solito preso erroneamente per un liberalismo. Il suo congedo dallo Stato segna una riflessione critica che si interroga non sull'origine, bensě sul fine dello Stato, e ha una dimensione manifestamente an-archica. Privo di fondamento, lo Stato č solo un male temporaneo che puň essere tollerato se si costruisce la «comunitÀ» che Humboldt delinea sul modello della lingua. Perché č nella reciprocitÀ dei parlanti, delineata soprattutto nello studio Sul duale, che si puň trovare una via d'uscita alla opposizione tra universale e individuale. Mentre dischiude lo spazio del dialogo, la lingua indica una comunitÀ che č non meccanica, bensě organica.

In der aktuellen Diskussion um Martin Heideggers "Schwarze Hefte" spielt Donatella Di Cesares Buch "Heidegger, die Juden, die Shoah" eine zentrale Rolle. Es zeigt, dass Heidegger im Kontext einer langen Tradition des Antisemitismus in der Philosophie zu lesen ist, zu der auch Kant, Hegel und Nietzsche gehören. Der Philosoph schreibt dem Judentum eine spezifische Bedeutung in der Geschichte zu. Diese Bedeutung stellt sich als eine Anordnung von Stereotypen dar, die metaphysisch gerechtfertigt werden. Indem Heidegger die "Judenfrage" in sein Denken aufnimmt, fällt er also in ein metaphysisches Denken zurück. Di Cesare spricht deshalb von einem "metaphysischen Antisemitismus". Zuletzt aber bildet die Shoah das Zentrum, auf das Heideggers Äußerungen bezogen werden. Das Buch ist auch ein Beitrag zur Frage nach der Verantwortung der Philosophie für die Vernichtung der Juden in Europa. Die deutsche Ausgabe ist erheblich erweitert und berücksichtigt bereits die „Schwarzen Hefte“ der Jahre 1942 bis 1948.

What is hermeneutics? This question might sound strange in America, in Germany, or in France. In Italy, however, it does not sound quite so strange. In fact just in Italy it is indispensable to ask: what is hermeneutics? The vicissitudes and the misfortunes of hermeneutics in Italy impose this question. The philosophy, which at the end of the nineteen-eighties had achieved such success that Gianni Vattimo was compelled to speak of a new koine, now seems to be the philosophy most open to criticism and hostility, submitted to systematic attacks from many different fronts. How could such a resounding success transform into a failure overnight? I would like to seize upon the occasion of this conference, which aims to assess contemporary Italian philosophy by "reinterpreting the continent," in order to redefine the philosophy that for years and decades was and is synonymous with continental philosophy; that is, I would like to redefine hermeneutics. And I would like to do it in an attempt meant, both here and also in Italy, to return the debate about hermeneutics to the dignity of a philosophical discussion. The question is important not only regarding the space that hermeneutics occupies in the constellation of philosophy today, but also because today we perhaps no longer have the need for new philosophies, but for a more open and thoughtful use of the philosophies we already have. So it seems necessary to reinterpret and redefine hermeneutics even in light of a great confusion that especially in Italy accompanies a widespread aversion. But even beyond the borders of Italy, I would like to ask, if a philosophy were to be a koine, what price would it have to pay, and what is the price that hermeneutics has already paid? Already, I would say: indefiniteness. The very particular history of hermeneutics in Italy is not easily recounted in a few words. The history begins with Vattimo's translation of Truth and Method in 1972-the first complete translation. But already in 1963 Valerio Verra had written one of the first reviews of that work, a review that was also explicitly in agreement with what Gadamer had to say. The spread of Gadamer's work was so widespread in Italy that one could be tempted to consider hermeneutics the result of an internal development rather than something imported. But things are not so simple. Hermeneutics took hold against a complicated, eclectic, and manifold horizon. Hermeneutics was foreign to the Italian tradition, as the unfortunate fate reserved for the 1955 publication of Emilio Betti's General Theory of Interpretation demonstrates. Hermeneutics does find some fertile ground in the humanistic tradition sensitive to Vico's reappraisal of rhetoric. But above all, it finds such fertile ground in existentialism, where Heidegger had already opened the door. Hermeneutics arrived in Italy within the context of a supposedly Heideggerian existentialism. Completely missing-and it is necessary to emphasize it-was phenomenology, which elsewhere has determined a different reception of hermeneutics. In other words, the interest in Gadamer was ignited by an interest in Heidegger, and above all, Gadamer was read through Heidegger. Thus the "urbanization of the Heideggerian province" was understood in Italy in terms of a simplified, popular version of Heidegger. Gadamer would later be perceived as having both the merit of having summarized the work of Heidegger, and the fault of having weakened its fundamental insights. Luigi Pareyson was another key personality in the arrival of hermeneutics in Italy. In his Truth and Interpretation, published in 1971, Pareyson claimed that the originary relation to Being "is necessarily hermeneutic." Truth unfolds in an infinite series of interpretations that, although not relativizing, have no claim to the absoluteness that is reserved only for their inexhaustible source. It is important to emphasize this-because I shall return to itthat Pareyson placed the accent on interpreting, intended as "kindredness" [congenialita] whereas Gadamer placed the accent on understanding, intended as a "being struck by something" [Anstoss]. …

SUMMARYThis paper investigates the nature of Heymann Steinthal's (1823-1899) contribution to the interpretation of Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767-1835) linguistic theory. It advances the argument that in his almost life-long attempts to grasp the 'true' Humboldt behind the idealist, genial, and 'mystical' one Steinthal tries to overcome Humboldt's distinction between the empirical and the theoretical. Following his acquaintance with Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903), Steinthal takes a psycholinguistic approach. Humboldt's 'mystical dualism', a remnant of Kantian philosophy in Steinthal's opinion, was replaced by a Hegelian-Herbartian-type psychologism. In his attempt to complete Humboldt and to dissolve his alleged dualism by having his theoretical stance overcome by his empiricism, Steinthal thought to advance Humboldt's approach sig-nificantiy whereas in the final analysis it meant a metaphysical step backward, as he split what Humboldt kept together: 'inner' and 'outer' aspects of language instead appear in Steinthal's reinterpretation in a dualism whereby the 'inner', intellectual, part gains the upper hand over the 'outer', physical, one. The key concept of 'inner language form' divides Humboldt and Steinthal: whereas it is a delimiting concept in the former, it constitutes a limiting one in the latter, the limit imposed by his very psychologism with which Steinthal sought to get beyond Humboldt.RESUMEDans cet article on examine quelle sorte de contribution Heymann Steinthal (1823-1899) a apporte a l'interpretation de la theorie de Guillaume de Humboldt (1767-1835). On y argumente que, presque toute sa vie durant, en tentant de saisir le 'veritable' Humboldt derriere le genie idealiste et 'mystique', Steinthal s'efforce a surmonter la distinction que fait Humboldt entre l'empirique et le theorique. Apres sa rencontre avec Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903), Steinthal tentera une approche psycholinguistique. Le 'dualisme mystique' de Humboldt, selon Steinthal un reste de philosophie kantienne, sera remplace par un psychologisme de type hegelien-herbartien. Steinthal croyait faire avancer l'approche de Humboldt de facon significative par sa tentative d'en dissoudre le 'dualisme' humboldtien en mettant l'accent sur son empirisme plutot que sur son point de vue theorique. En derniere analyse, il s'agit d'un pas en arriere sur le plan metaphysique, par sa division de cetjue Humboldt avait toujours garde ensemble: les aspects 'interieurs' et 'exterieurs' de la langue sont maintenant unis dans un dualisme ou la partie 'interieure', intellectuelle, prend le dessus sur la partie 'exterieure', physique. Humboldt et Steinthal ne s'entendent pas quant au concept-clef de 'forme langagiere interieure' (innere Sprachform): alors que chez Humboldt il s'agit d'un concept de demarquation, chez Steinthal il s'agit paradoxalement de la demarquation d'un concept, demarquation que rend necessaire son psychologisme.ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDer vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht die Frage nach dem besonderen Beitrag Heymann Steinthals (1823-1899) zur Interpretation der Sprachauffassung Wil-helm von Humboldts (1767-1835). Er argumentiert, daB bei seinem fast le-benslanglichen Bemuhen, den wirklichen hinter dem idealen, 'mystischen' und genialen Humboldt zu erhellen, Steinthal den Versuch unternimmt, Humboldts Gegensatz zwischen Empirie und Theorie zu uberwinden. Dies soil auf dem nach seiner Begegnung mit Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) eingeschlagenen sprachpsychologischen Weg geschehen. Humboldts 'mystischer Dualismus' — fur Steinthal ein Uberrest der kantischen Philosophie — wird aber einfach durch einen herbartisierten Hegelismus ersetzt: In seinem Versuch, Humboldt dialektisch zu vollenden, seinen Dualismus dadurch aufzulosen, daB er die Empirie gegenuber der Theorie die Oberhand gewinnen last, um Humboldt einen guten empirischen Schritt weiterzubringen, fallt Steinthal im Endergebnis einen ganzen metaphyischen Schritt zuruck, indem er das trennt, was Humboldt zusammenhalt, und dabei zu einem substantiellen Dualismus zwischen ÂuBerem und Innerem, ja zu einem Vorrang des Inneren, Geistlichen vor dem AuBeren, Sinnlichen gelangt. Hauptpunkt der uniiberbruckbaren Distanz zwischen Steinthal und Humboldt ist der Begriff der 'inneren Sprachform'. Wah-rend die 'innere Sprachform' bei Humboldt einen Grenzbegriff darstellt, so er-weist sie sich paradoxerweise bei Steinthal als eine Begriffsgrenze, die letzlich der Grenze seines Psychologismus gleichkommt.

This paper focuses on the temporal character of experience of art and describes its different aspects. They have all a paradoxical structure in common which characterizes the disclosure of hermeneutical truth : it creates a hermeneutical identity between the ontical and ontological levels of experience, identity which cannot be understood in its traditional sense : Identity here means mediation of the absolute in a peculiar form and through this peculiar form.