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The paper presents the first empirical study of the relation between bank loan volume volatility and bank retail and wholesale liabilities. We argue that since the volume of retail deposits is inflexible, banks facing volatile loan demand tend to fund loans with larger shares of wholesale rather than retail liabilities. We empirically confirm this argument using a unique dataset constructed from the weekly financial reports of 104 large U.S. commercial banks. The high frequency of the data allows us to employ dynamic identification schemes which mitigate reverse causality and selection concerns. Our results imply that the introduction of regulatory limits on wholesale liabilities will increase the exposure of banks to loan demand shocks. Such a regulation will also inhibit the ability of the banking sector to service more volatile loans. This may smooth the lending cycles, but it will also slow recoveries of lending volume after a substantial recession.

In this paper we relate a bank's choice between retail and wholesale liabilities to real economic uncertainty and the resulting volatility of bank loan volumes. We argue that since the volume of retail deposits is slow and costly to adjust to shocks in the volume of bank assets, banks facing more intense uncertainty and more volatile loan demand tend to employ more wholesale liabilities rather than retail deposits. We empirically confirm this argument using a unique dataset constructed from the weekly reports of the 122 largest U.S. commercial banks. The high frequency of the data allows us to employ dynamic identification schemes. Given the evidence presented in this paper we argue that regulatory measures targeting a cap on wholesale funding would limit funding uncertainty but will increase the exposure to asset-side shocks.

By introducing a new measure of the banking systems' size, the paper challenges the existing consensus on severe underdevelopment of the CEE banking sectors. We argue that the existing studies on the size of CEE banking systems exaggerate the real degree of underdevelopment because common measures of the size of the banking system produce downward biased results when applied to transition economies. We compare various measures of the size of the CEE banking sectors with those of several 'old' European Union (EU) member countries which are used as benchmarks. The comparison indicates that indeed the banking sectors in the CEE countries lag behind the most developed financial systems in the EU, but are very close to the levels in the financially less developed EU countries.