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The Kenyan government has successfully been implementing sector specific and multisectoral projects aligned to the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). For operational readiness and to enhance the effective planning and implementation of Global Health Security Programs (GHSP) at national and subnational level, there is an urgent need for stakeholders' engagement process to seek input in identifying challenges, prioritise activities for field implementation, and identify applied research and development questions, that should be addressed in the next five years.The modified Child Health and Nutrition Research Initiative (CHNRI) method was used to identify global health security related priorities for multisectoral implementation in Kenya. Subject matter experts from human, animal and environmental health sectors at national and subnational level contributed to predefined research questions from a number of sources and activities for consideration for implementation using a One Health approach. Sixty-two experts scored the 193 questions based on five pre-defined criteria: 1) feasibility and answerability; 2) potential for burden reduction; 3) potential for a paradigm shift; 4) potential for translation and implementation; and 5) impact on equity. Data resulting from this process was then analysed in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to determine the research priorities and experts' agreements.Among the priority activities identified for implementation research were; strengthening One Health governance and legal frameworks; integration of ecosystem health into One Health programming; strengthening disease reporting, integrated data collection, information sharing and joint outbreak response; socio-anthropological and gender-based approaches in improving risk and behavioural change communication and community engagement; and one health workforce development. In addition, the potentials to invest in collaborative predictive risk modelling to enhance epidemic intelligence systems, while strengthening the One Health approach in the food safety incident and emergency response plans are feasible.Successful multisectoral implementation of global health security program in Kenya calls for a whole of society approach that will harness community and private sector knowledge to build preparedness and response capacities while targeting neglected and marginalised populations. This research provides a framework that is worth emulating for cost-effective planning and implementation of overarching One Health programs.

African swine fever (ASF) has remained persistent in Tanzania since the early 2000. Between 2020 and 2021, twelve districts in Tanzania were infected with ASF, and ≥ 4,804 pigs reportedly died directly due to the disease with disruption to livelihoods. We conducted semi-quantitative field investigations and rapid risk assessment (RRA) to understand the risk factors and drivers of ASF virus (ASFv) amplification and transmission in smallholder pig farms, and determine the gaps in biosecurity through hazard profiling, focused group discussions and experts’ opinions. Outbreaks were connected by road and aligned along the pig product value chain and reported in the northern, central and southern parts of Tanzania. The patterns of outbreaks and impacts differed among districts, but cases of ASF appeared to be self-limiting following significant mortality of pigs in farms. Movement of infected pigs, movement of contaminated pig products and fomites associated with service providers, vehicles, and equipment, as well as the inadvertent risks associated with movements of animal health practitioners, visitors and scavengers were the riskiest pathways to introduce ASFv into smallholder pig farms. Identified drivers and facilitators of risk of ASFv infection in smallholder pig farms were traders in whole pigs, middlemen, pig farmers, transporters, unauthorized animal health service providers and the traders in pork. All identified pig groups were susceptible to ASFv, particularly among shared adult boars, pregnant and lactating sows and adult female. The risk of ASF for smallholder pig farms in Tanzania remains very high based on a systematic risk classification. Majority of the farms poorly implemented biosecurity and no single farm implemented all the identified biosecurity measures. Risky practices and breach of biosecurity in the pig value chain in Tanzania are profit-driven and are extremely difficult to change. Behavioural change communication must target identified drivers of infections, attitudes and practices.

The degree of One-Healthiness of a system relates to the effectiveness of an institution to operate within the six main dimensions which identify to what extent it complies with One Health concept. This paper evaluates institutional compliance with One Health concept in 14 institutions from eight African countries.We utilised the adapted Network for the Evaluation of One Health (NEOH) tool. The institutions included six national One Health platforms and eight other institutions utilizing One Health approaches. Semi-quantitative evaluation of One Health platforms' competencies in six aspects/dimensions concerning One Health operations and infrastructure:The evaluation revealed that although all aspects of One Health scored above average, systemic organization and working in One Health were the strongest areas where tremendous gains had been made across the evaluated countries. The aspects of planning, sharing, learning, and thinking should be optimized to achieve gains emanating from One Health approaches in Africa. Cultural and social balance, and integrated health approach were the strongest areas under working and thinking respectively. Thinking was particularly challenged in areas of dimensions coverage and balance, while planning was challenged in the areas of capacity for detection, identification, monitoring of infectious diseases; biosafety and quality management; skills through taught and distance-learning programmes; information and communication technologies to support learning and skills through research apprenticeships.We conclude that although One Health has gained momentum in Africa, there still exists room for improvement. The revealed strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and gaps in One Health implementation provide an opportunity for prioritization and refocusing of efforts and resources to strengthen the identified weak areas.

Objectives One Health is transiting from multidisciplinary to transdisciplinary concepts and its viewpoints should move from ‘proxy for zoonoses’, to include other topics (climate change, nutrition and food safety, policy and planning, welfare and well-being, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), vector-borne diseases, toxicosis and pesticides issues) and thematic fields (social sciences, geography and economics). This work was conducted to map the One Health landscape in Africa. Methods An assessment of existing One Health initiatives in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries was conducted among selected stakeholders using a multi-method approach. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to One Health initiatives were identified, and their influence, interest and impacts were semi-quantitatively evaluated using literature reviews, questionnaire survey and statistical analysis. Results One Health Networks and identified initiatives were spatiotemporally spread across SSA and identified stakeholders were classified into four quadrants. It was observed that imbalance in stakeholders' representations led to hesitation in buying-in into One Health approach by stakeholders who are outside the main networks like stakeholders from the policy, budgeting, geography and sometimes, the environment sectors. Conclusion Inclusion of theory of change, monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and tools for standardized evaluation of One Health policies are needed for a sustained future of One Health and future engagements should be outputs- and outcomes-driven and not activity-driven. National roadmaps for One Health implementation and institutionalization are necessary, and proofs of concepts in One Health should be validated and scaled-up. Dependence on external funding is unsustainable and must be addressed in the medium to long-term. Necessary policy and legal instruments to support One Health nationally and sub-nationally should be implemented taking cognizance of contemporary issues like urbanization, endemic poverty and other emerging issues. The utilization of current technologies and One Health approach in addressing the ongoing pandemic of COVID-19 and other emerging diseases are desirable. Finally, One Health implementation should be anticipatory and preemptive, and not reactive in containing disease outbreaks, especially those from the animal sources or the environment before the risk of spillover to human., Highlights • One Health transcends multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary concepts; it’s expanding scope to cover ignored fields; • Mapping the One Health landscape in Africa is desirable for effective monitoring and evaluation, and measurable outcomes; • Development of national roadmaps is necessary for One Health institutionalization and to develop targeted activities; • Anticipatory and not reactive One Health implementation optimizes its benefits at addressing countries’ challenges.

An evaluation of emerging issues in One Health (OH) in Sub-Saharan Africa was undertaken to map the existing OH initiatives in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Desk review, expert opinions survey, limited interviews and wider consultations with selected OH stakeholders were conducted. The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to OH initiatives were identified. OH influence, interest and impacts were evaluated. One Health is transiting from multidisciplinary to transdisciplinary concepts and OH viewpoint should move from ‘proxy for zoonoses’, to include issues of climate change, nutrition and food safety, social sciences, geography, policy and planning, economics, welfare and well-being, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), vector-borne diseases, toxicosis and pesticides issues. While the identified major strengths should be boosted, the weaknesses should be addressed.OH Networks in SSA were spatially and temporally spread across SSA and stakeholders were classified as key, latent, marginal and OH defenders. Imbalance in stakeholders’ representation led to hesitation in buying-in from stakeholders who are outside the main networks. Theory of change, monitoring and evaluation frameworks, and tools to standardized evaluation of OH policies is needed for sustained future of OH and the future OH engagement should be outputs and outcomes-driven and not activity-driven.National roadmap for OH implementation and institutionalization is necessary and proofs of concepts in OH should be verified and scaled-up. Dependence on external funding is unsustainable and must be addressed. Necessary policy and legal instrument to support OH nationally and sub-nationally should be implemented taking cognizance of contemporary issues like urbanization, endemic poverty and other emerging issues. Utilizing current technologies and OH approach to address ongoing pandemic of COVID-19 and other emerging diseases is desirable. Finally, OH implementation should be anticipatory and not reactive to significantly benefit budgeting and contain disease outbreaks in animal sources before the risk of spillover to human can be envisaged.

Rabies is a neglected but preventable zoonotic disease that predominantly affects the most vulnerable populations living in remote rural areas of resource-limited countries. To date, every country on the African mainland is considered endemic for dog-mediated rabies with an estimated 21'500 human rabies deaths occurring each year. In 2018, the United Against Rabies collaboration launched the Global Strategic Plan to end human deaths from dog-mediated rabies by 2030. The epidemiology of rabies from most Western and Central African countries remains poorly defined, making it difficult to assess the overall rabies situation and progress towards the 2030 goal. In this review, we attempt to provide an overview of the current rabies situation in 22 West and Central African countries based on published scientific literature and information obtained from rabies focal points. To this end, information was collected on i) established surveillance, ii) diagnostic capacity, iii) post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) availability and coverage, iv) dog population estimates, v) dog vaccination campaigns, vi) animal and human health communication (One Health), vii) molecular studies, viii) Knowledge, Attitude and Practices (KAP), ix) cost estimates and x) national control strategies. Although rabies is a notifiable disease in the majority of the studied countries, national surveillance systems do not adequately capture the disease. A general lack of rabies diagnostic capacity has an additional negative impact on rabies surveillance and attempts to estimate rabies burden. Recurrent shortages of human rabies vaccine are reported by all of the countries, with vaccine availability usually limited to major urban centers but no country has yet adopted the new WHO-recommended 1-week intradermal vaccination regimen. Most countries carry out subsidized mass dog vaccination campaigns on World Rabies Day. Such activities are indispensable to keep rabies in the public consciousness but are not of the scale and intensity that is required to eliminate rabies from the dog population. Countries will need to scale up the intensity of their campaigns, if they are to progress towards the 2030 goal. But more than half of the countries do not yet have reliable figures on their dog populations. Only two countries reached stage 2 on the Stepwise Approach towards Rabies Elimination ladder - indicating that their national governments have truly prioritized rabies elimination and are thus providing the necessary support and political buy-in required to achieve success. In summary, the sub-region of West and Central Africa seems to be divided into countries which have accepted the challenge to eliminate rabies with governments committed to pushing forward rabies elimination, while other countries have achieved some progress, but elimination efforts remain stuck due to lacking government commitment and financial constraints. The possibility to meet the 2030 goal without international solidarity is low, because more than two-thirds of the countries rank in the low human development group (HDI ≤ 152). Leading countries should act as role models, sharing their experiences and capacities so that no country is left behind. Unified and with international support it is possible to reach the common goal of zero human rabies deaths by 2030.

In May 2016, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus of the subtype A/H5N1 was detected in Cameroon in an industrial poultry farm at Mvog-Betsi, Yaounde (Centre region), with a recorded sudden increase of deaths among chickens, and an overall mortality rate of 75%. The virus spread further and caused new outbreaks in some parts of the country. In total, 21 outbreaks were confirmed from May 2016 to March 2017 (six in the Centre, six in the West, eight in the South and one in the Adamaoua regions). This resulted in an estimated total loss of 138,252 birds (44,451 deaths due to infection and 93,801 stamped out). Only domestic birds (chickens, ducks and geese) were affected in farms as well as in poultry markets. The outbreaks occurred in three waves, the first from May to June 2016, the second in September 2016 and the last wave in March 2017. The topology of the phylogeny based on the haemagglutinin gene segment indicated that the causative H5N1 viruses fall within the genetic clade 2.3.2.1c, within the same group as the A/H5N1 viruses collected in Niger in 2015 and 2016. More importantly, the gene constellation of four representative viruses showed evidence of H5N1/H9N2 intra-clade reassortment. Additional epidemiological and genetic data from affected countries in West Africa are needed to better trace the origin, spread and evolution of A/H5N1 in Cameroon. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS HPAI A/H5N1 was detected in May 2016 in domestic chickens in Yaounde-Cameroon. Twenty-one outbreaks in total were confirmed from May 2016 to March 2017. The causative H5N1 viruses fall within the genetic clade 2.3.2.1c. The viral gene constellation showed evidence of H5N1/H9N2 intra-clade reassortment.