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Es ist wieder einmal so weit: Bei den Verhandlungen über den neuen Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen für die Europäische Union (EU) werden auch Festlegungen für die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik (GAP) getroffen, den nach wie vor größten Ausgabenblock. Kritiker der GAP verweisen in der Debatte wieder einmal auf deren entwicklungspolitische (Neben-)Wirkungen: Demnach fördern europäische Subventionen durch billige Exporte Armut und Ernährungsunsicherheit in Entwicklungsländern. Aber stimmt dieser Vorwurf? (Autorenreferat)

Once again, we have the same old story: The negotiations on a new financial framework for the European Union (EU) will also influence the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Critics of the CAP are increasingly using its development policy (side) effects in the debate: European subsidies would promote poverty and food insecurity in developing countries through cheap European exports and destroy prospects for those populations, especially for young people in rural areas. But is this accusation justified, and what implication does it have for the future CAP? (author's abstract)

"The upcoming Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and regions are extremely challenging. Conceived as a follow-up to the non-reciprocal trade preferences granted to the ACP since 1975, the aim of the EPAs is sustainable development and poverty reduction through the establishment of a Free Trade Area. Many challenges and opportunities arise from this ambitious trade and development partnership between some of the world's poorest and richest countries. Throughout the negotiations, several stakeholders have expressed concerns about the possible negative effects in ACP countries that risk jeopardizing the developmental impacts of EPAs. The ambition, as well as the uncertainties around EPAs make a results-oriented monitoring of the agreements imperative. This study, commissioned by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, addresses the possible goals of EPA monitoring, drawing conclusions on what broad areas need to be monitored, which principles should be followed and which stakeholders involved. The study then outlines the challenges involved in implementing a results-oriented monitoring system: which steps need to be taken, how best to derive indicators, which characteristics the latter should have and how they may be identified. The study also presents a number of recommendations on how to ensure that monitoring is given due consideration in the EPA legal texts." (author's abstract)

"This paper argues that although there are good reasons why poor countries in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) should support their agricultural sector, applicability of protective policies in the agricultural sectors of SSA is limited by various legal, economic, social, political and administrative reasons. The remaining scope, however, could be used to develop prospective agricultural sub-sectors for growth, poverty alleviation and food security, while protection should be embodied in comprehensive development strategies. These strategies must address the problems of low price transmittance of border measures and high transaction costs (in the largest sense) for agricultural products and particularly the limited supply capacity of small scale producers. Legally, trade policy in the case study country Senegal as well as in many other SSA countries is restricted much more by regional trade agreements than by the World Trade Organization (WTO). This is a formal and political reason why the protective part of such integrated strategies must be defended and implemented at the regional level. Other reasons to plan, negotiate and implement further specific elements of these strategies at the regional level are the lock-in effect of commitments in order to protect them against ad hoc decisions of national politics, as well as economies of scale and scope in supportive policies, in supply and in demand. These specific elements, such as research, standard setting, quality control or strategic public-private partnerships, should be complemented with other more general elements of regional integration which are less sector-specific, e. g. infrastructure, transport, information, finance or regional trade facilitation. In this way, regionally oriented agricultural policies can profit from wider regional integration and at the same time support it. A note of warning is finally expressed that regional solutions have high political and administrative costs and should only be stressed where advantages clearly outweigh these." (author's abstract)

"The EBA-Initative of 2001 has made three notable exceptions to its commitment for tariff and quota free access of least development countries (LDCs) to the EU-market: Sugar, bananas, and rice, for which longer transitions periods have been imposed. Despite the decelerated opening of the EU market for EBA sugar, it is precisely sugar that presently constitutes the highest preferential value for LCDs, at least in the short and medium term and given the present high EU sugar price of more than 600 Euros per ton under the current Sugar Markt Order (SMO), which is more than triple the world market price. The EU itself projected that the EBA exports would attain 3.3 million tons per year in 2013 at a value of almost 2 billion Euros." (excerpt)

Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit den Agrarverhandlungen in der sogenannten Doha-Entwicklungsrunde im Rahmen der WTO, die im November 2001 eingeleitet wird. Ziel der Runde war es ursprünglich, bis Ende 2004 weitreichende Liberalisierungen und eine Präzisierung der Regeln des internationalen Handels zu verabschieden, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Interessen von Entwicklungsländern. Die zentrale Herausforderung in den Agrarverhandlungen ist, Länder mit ganz unterschiedlichen Ausgangssituationen, Problemen, Instrumenten und Zielen für ihre Agrarwirtschaften und Ernährungslage dazu zu bringen, sich auf gemeinsame Spielregeln zu einigen. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht am Beispiel von Tansania und Senegal, welche spezielle Interessenlage in den Least Developed Countries (LDC) südlich der Sahara vorherrscht, welche internationalen Agrarhandelspolitiken diesen Interessen am ehesten dienlich sind und in welche Richtung weitere agrarpolitische Maßnahmen gehen müssen, damit mögliche Impulse aus den Agrarverhandlungen auch tatsächlich zu Entwicklung im Sinne von nachhaltigem Wachstum und Armutsminderung beitragen. Die zentrale Hypothese der Studie lautet, dass mögliche Liberalisierungen der Weltagrarmärkte zwar wichtige Anreize für armutsorientiertes Wachstum in SSA (Sub-Sahara Afrika) bieten können, dass aber die wichtigsten Reformen und Entwicklungsanstrengungen dort selbst stattfinden müssen. Mit den Beispielländern, Tansania und Senegal, werden zwei charakteristische, entgegengesetzte Situationen analysiert: Tansania repräsentiert eine stark agrarisch geprägte Ökonomie mit relativ großem Reichtum an agrarischen Ressourcen. Senegal steht für eine im afrikanischen Kontext schon relativ stark urbanisierte und industrialisierte Volkswirtschaft, die aufgrund mangelnder agrarwirtschaftlicher Dynamik und der Degradierung der natürlichen Ressourcen stark von Agrarimporten abhängig ist. Im ersten Kapitel werden die wichtigsten strittigen Punkte der komplexen Agrarverhandlungen und die wichtigsten Positionen präsentiert. Diese stecken den Ergebnisraum ab, in dem sich die Verhandlungen bewegen. Die Verhandlungssituation der LDC wird besonders berücksichtigt. Im zweiten Kapitel wird thematisiert, dass nicht nur die internationalen, sondern auch die verschiedenen nationalen Interessengruppen in Bezug auf den Agrarsektor und die Doha-Agrarverhandlungen sehr heterogen sind. Aus der Kombination von Verhandlungsthemen und interner Interessenlage wird ein Analyseraster konzipiert. Das dritte Kapitel führt in die Fallstudienländer ein und zeigt die unterschiedlichen agrarökologischen und ökonomischen Ausgangssituationen. Außerdem wird die Interessenlage der wichtigsten internen Akteursgruppen diskutiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden die Verhandlungspositionen der LDC einer kritischen Analyse unterzogen: Im vierten Kapitel stehen die Forderungen an die Verhandlungspartner im Vordergrund, im fünften Kapitel die Forderungen für die internen agrarpolitischen Spielräume. Schließlich werden im sechsten Kapitel Folgerungen für die WTO-Positionen sowie kohärente Handels- und Agrarpolitiken der LDC gezogen und Empfehlungen für eine entsprechende entwicklungspolitische Unterstützung gegeben. (ICG2) Abschätzung der Wirkungen multilateraler Agrarliberalisierungen." [Textauszug]

CAADP is an exciting change process of the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to shape African agricultural policy making and development from within the continent. CAADP covers a wide range of issues from natural resource management through agricultural production and value chains to food security. Its goals, increasing government budgets, donor and private funding, and improving the quality and the outcome of agricultural policies in all African countries, point in the right direction and come at the right time. However, it has to be noted that CAADP has not yet led to a systematic improvement of agricultural policy making – the older CAADP design was not convincing in terms of participation, ownership and use of evidence, and the new, improved design is about to be implemented. Some important elements of the existing CAADP design are still rudimentary, such as peer review or interventions of the pillar network. The overall targets – agricultural growth and poverty alleviation – are still far away from being a reality. Nevertheless, CAADP has shown that it is a learning system, and it has developed into a comprehensive concept. It must now demonstrate that it can implement its agenda. It must develop and institutionalise convincing quality control mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation, and it must coordinate the many tools and actors that it has put into motion. In case CAADP fails, there is a risk that the entire agricultural sector will once again be classified as “too complex to be managed†. Donors are therefore well advised to support it wisely, but the main impetus must come from the African agricultural community, state and non-state actors.