Search

This white paper assesses how cities are modifying transportation impact fees in response to Senate Bill (SB) 743, adopted in 2013 to orient environmental review of transportation impacts of development projects and plans in California to support sustainable development. SB 743 and its implementing guidelines eliminated “level of service” (LOS) standards for automobile traffic delay as an environmental impact to be addressed under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), recommending instead that localities and other lead agencies responsible for CEQA review analyze, and if possible, mitigate impacts on vehicle miles traveled (VMT) instead. As cities proceed to implement SB 743, some are going further than the minimum required to analyze and mitigate for VMT at the development project level. Instead, they are also pursuing “programmatic” approaches, including altering citywide impact fees imposed on developers, to support more systematic analysis and mitigation than is possible at the project level alone. Based on public documents research and interviews with consultants and planners, this paper identifies three basic approaches that cities are taking to design impact fees in conjunction with their policy approaches for addressing SB 743: first, to design impact fee programs that fund VMT-reducing projects, but without employing a VMT “nexus” (the nexus is the basis for identifying impacts to be addressed by the program); second, to employ a VMT nexus for identifying facilities need and cost allocation; and third, to design a fee program that links to systematic CEQA-reviewed VMT analysis in the General Plan and/or other related CEQA-reviewed city wide policy documents. In this latter approach, cities may or may not design their fee program to fund VMT-reducing projects; indeed, this approach may help facilitate a more traditional, LOS-based fee program. This outcome can happen if a city analyzes VMT systematically for the General Plan, and then adopts a “statement of overriding considerations” under CEQA, which allows for development projects to “tier” off the programmatic environmental review so as to avoid the need for conducting cumulative VMT impacts analysis. This approach may facilitate more systematic integration of VMT and LOS analysis at the citywide level, but it does not support SB 743 goals for supporting VMT-reducing projects and programs.View the NCST Project Webpage

This paper examines how local government planning regulations and charges affect the deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. We explore the economic rationale for local government regulation of such infrastructure, which we suggest should be based on managing negative externalities. Using data from Ireland, we find that the observed geographical pattern of impact fees is inconsistent with the economic rationale for them. A simple econometric model of the number of telecoms masts in each country also suggests that the level of impact fees is negatively associated with mast deployment. This paper also examines other regulatory factors that affect the provision of new infrastructure. We find wide regional variation in these regulations but are unableto quantify their impact on infrastructure provision. Such regulatory complexity places extra compliance burdens on private operators, which may in turn distort the level and regional pattern of network investment. We suggest further regional harmonisation of development policy towards telecoms infrastructure to avoid exacerbating regional disparities in rollout of services.

Private lands have an important role in the success of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The current command-andcontrol approach to protecting species on private land has resulted in disincentives to the landowner, which have decreased the ability of the ESA to protect many of our endangered and threatened species. Herein we define and evaluate, from an economic perspective, eight incentive mechanisms, including the status quo, for protecting species on private land. We highlight the strengths and weaknesses and compare and contrast the incentive mechanisms according to a distinct set of biological, landowner, and government criteria. Our discussion indicates that market instruments, such as tradable permits or taxes, which have been successful in controlling air pollution, are not as effective for habitat protection. Alternatively, voluntary incentive mechanisms can be designed such that landowners view habitat as an asset and are willing participants in protecting habitat. The incentive mechanism best suited for conserving habitat in a given region depends on many factors, including government funding, land values, quantity and quality of habitat, and the region's developmental pressure.

With intensification urban development and dwindling public resources, assessing the impacts of a new development (traffic impact analysis) is becoming an important planning tool for transportation engineers, so that the traffic impacts of new developments can be foreseen and effective mitigating measures can be planned using optimal allocation of the available funds. The study establishes a detailed and standardized methodology for traffic impact analysis. Although the procedure was developed for the Indiana Department of Transportation, it can be used by other transportation agencies as well with little or no modification. A new methodology for estimating the percentage of pass-by trips using a license plate survey (instead of the traditional interview survey) is presented. The report also demonstrates how Bayesian statistics can be used to update the national ITE Trip Generation data base with limited local data to derive more reliable local trip generation rates. A status report of traffic impact analysis and impact fees in various state transportation agencies has also been included; a brief discussion on impact fee structure has been incorporated.

This paper explores alternative financing mechanisms to pay for the fixed costs of roads, particularly in cases without rising marginal costs. Mechanisms considered include tolls, gas taxes, and developer payments. The problems with each are discussed. An example looking at problems of temporal and spatial free-riding is presented.