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The process towards Brexit will impact on the entire global trading system and significantly influence the global value chains that rely on ease of trade and investment within a single European market. In light of this process, Australia with its high levels of international economic integration and interdependency of trade and investment to and from the European region, now faces a stark challenge in forging an economic position that best suits its national interests. This paper analyses the possible implications of Brexit on Australia’s economic governance position, with specific regard to the global value chains that rely on ease of trade and investments in the European single market. The exploration relies on empirical analysis that distinguishes between and disaggregates data on Australian trade and investment with the UK and the rest of the European Union. This analysis indicates that it is in Australia’s best interest is to prioritise a preferential partnership with the EU over a new free trade agreement with the UK. However, in order to maximise Australia’s position, the paper argues that, under the present political climate and technical difficulties, a multi-pronged and decoupled approach of concerted unilateralism with the UK and preferential bilateralism with the EU is best placed to enhance Australia’s geo-economic role in Europe in the post-Brexit era.

The paper introduces the formula structure of poly-sequents, allowing the expression of poly-positions: positions with any number of stances, of which bilateralism and trilateralism are special cases. The paper also puts forward the view that s-coherence (strong coherence) of such poly-positions can be defined inferentially, without appealing to their validity under interpretations of the object language.

The aim of this piece is to assess whether and to what extent the European Union can be considered a world leader in stimulating the development of international climate change standards through a variety of international organizations and processes as a way of spurring necessary international cooperation. It will argue that given slow progress towards an effective global response to the climate change challenge through multilateral cooperation, the EU has been trying to develop climate change standards internally or in cooperation with third countries, arguably in order to promote the acceptance of such standards by the competent international organizations, or at least create a critical mass of countries engaging in climate action (minilateralism). The paper will conclude by considering the legitimacy issues arising from this multi-faceted strategy of the EU in promoting international climate change standards.

Following the United States withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017, the remaining states agreed to suspend a number of provisions and conclude the agreement between themselves. The new agreement was renamed the Compressive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and was signed in March 2018. One of the most controversial aspects of the agreement is the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS), which allows investors to bring arbitration claims against contracting states. At the time the agreement was signed, New Zealand agreed to five bilateral ‘side- letters’ with certain member states agreeing to limit the application of the ISDS clause. This paper explores New Zealand’s shift from a bilateral approach to international investment agreements to a multilateral approach, then back to a form of bilateralism within the multilateral CPTPP. The side letters can be characterised as subsequent agreements which modify a multilateral agreement between some of the parties, under art 41 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. While this paper concludes that the mechanism is legally valid, the practical effectiveness is undermined by New Zealand’s overlapping previous agreements, the possibility of treaty shopping and the prospects of further countries acceding to the CPTPP.

The European Union's policy towards its southern periphery in North Africa and the Middle East has sought to promote regional cooperation both between itself and the Arab partner states and, most importantly, among the Arab states. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and later on, the Union for the Mediterranean introduced, after decades of superficial institutionalization of Euro-Mediterranean relations, an element of novelty in the form of the regionalism it promoted and the multilateral setting it was creating. However outstanding at its debut, this experiment of „building” a Mediterranean region, where security and peaceful change would be brought about by the states' willingness to cooperate through multilateral mechanisms has failed. The EU's efforts to create a Mediterranean region have been stymied not only by what can amount to an unrealistic perception regarding intra-Arab dynamics, but also by changes in the substance of the Euro-Mediterranean institutional setting. Namely, the region-building multilateralism of the EMP has been side-lined by the pragmatic bilateralism of the UfM.

Aligned to the axiomatic premise that the Romanian-Soviet bilateral universe has always been marked by a corollary of sensible political topics, topics that have otherwise been, true points of divergence on the official talks between Romania and its Eastern Neighbor, in the present paper we have undertaken the bold engagement to examine the manner in which the Bessarabia problem, has represented such a sensible topic. In other words, the paper aims within an interdisciplinary research attempt, subsumed to an approach from the perspective of the historic semantics and hermeneutics, to highlight the manner in which the Bessarabia question has represented the true touchstone in the Romanian-Soviet bilateral dialogue, thus constituting one of the major historical difficulties that both states, involved in the process raised towards bilateralism, had to manage and implicitly to regulate in the early 90s. In this respect, our analytical horizon focuses particularly on the issue that regards Bessarabia’ s reunification with Romania, an issue that represented in the early 90s the real political challenge of the Romanian-Soviet bilateral dialogue as well as the main point on the Romanian-Soviet divergence map. Meanwhile, beyond the thorough approach regarding the controversial political topic of the Romanian-Soviet bilateral universe, the present research attempt tries to highlight the main causes that have led to the failure of the reunification Odyssey. Thus, in order to reveal the nodal vein of the paper, the present research attempt has a methodology configuration based on a diachronic, interpretive and comparative technique. Integrally, the research paper aims to reveal the manner in which the Bessarabia issue, namely the issue of a disputed territory, has represented since the early 90s, both a problematical political permanency of the Romanian-Soviet bilateral register as well as one of the most dominant, controversial and stringent themes of the Romanian-Soviet/Russian post-communist bilateral agenda.

The paper analyses the shift taking place in multilateral approaches to international trade following the de facto failure of Doha Round negotiations. In this new context all significant participants to international trade either already signed or are negotiating free trade agreements as an operational second best to a real multilateral regulation. The paper presents and analyses the position of European Union which is involved in negotiations covering the Atlantic area, the Euro-Mediterranean area and the Pacific area. Based on this research the authors draw a number of conclusions regarding the chances of conclusion of free trade area agreements and the impact of each of these three areas on the competitivity of European Union in the world economy. At the same time the authors conclude that the current trend towards free trade agreements does not imply a reorientation from multilateralism to bilateralism in the regulation of international trade but an operational solution to the new context determined by the cumulated effects of the failure of Doha Round negotiations and the economic crisis.

The potential of foreign investment to inject a positive and multiplier effect on the receiving economy’s national output is now universally recognised. Most developing countries are unilaterally liberalizing their capital account and actively pursuing foreign capital to finance, primarily, their infrastructure and development projects. In 2015, global FDI flows stood at US$ 1.76 trillion, increasing by more than 5.5 times in the last two decades (US $315 billion in 1995). In rhythm with the forces of globalisation, as capital began to disavow its territorial linkages and started moving freely across borders, concerns regarding the inability of States to establish the legal institutions necessary to offer protection for foreign investments and demands for an international investment protection regime heightened. The scepticism regarding host State’s behaviour was founded on the assumption that, although there is initially a convergence in the interests of the foreign investor and the host State in bringing in investment, post-establishment, the aspirations of the investor and the objectives of the State are fundamentally conflictive. Whereas the investor is forever aiming to maximise its profits and exit the market without suffering a financial loss, the host State, guided by the purpose of keeping the investment steadfast, has an incentive to amend the governing laws or put in place capital controls, if not expropriate the investment without compensation. It was against this background of scepticism regarding hostile host State behaviour that international legal instruments for protection of foreign investment first developed. They were concluded at the bilateral level as a set of rules that would offer a minimum standard of protection to foreign investments. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) containing disciplines on non-discrimination, expropriation, fair and equitable treatment of investors and investments, prohibition of performance requirements and provisions on investor-state dispute settlement system (ISDS) were the first concrete building blocks for an international investment protection regime. It was expected that these scattered fragments of bilateral treaties would eventually pave the way to a multilateral investment agreement. Concerted efforts to initiate negotiations for such an agreement under the WTO framework were made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 1996. However, the path towards multilateralism in international investment law has been fraught with complexities and has eluded the consensus that was visible in other areas of international economic laws (GATT and then WTO for international trade law and the IMF for international monetary law). This paper attempts to identify and evaluate the issues that need to be addressed before moving towards a multilateral agreement, specifically from the perspective of India. This issue has gained emphasis today as the efforts to locate a multilateral investment agreement within the WTO matrix have once again gained traction. In the run up to the 10th WTO Ministerial Conference at Nairobi, certain members proposed “new issues” as an item for consideration at Nairobi. Amongst other issues, the facilitator’s report that was circulated before the Nairobi Ministerial Conference mentioned ‘investment’ as an issue that could be pursued after Nairobi or as a recurring issue. The renewal of attention towards the “Singapore new issues” forms part of a larger narrative to develop multilateral rules on competition, investment, e-commerce, government procurement so as to enhance the participation of micro, small and medium enterprises in regional and global value chains. Even as debates continue regarding the appropriateness of the WTO as a forum for negotiating multilateral investment disciplines on investment and whether multilateral disciplines would actually contribute to enhanced MSME participation in GVCs, it seems pertinent to look at some of the substantive issues surrounding the extant international investment regime so as to assess whether any of these issues can be resolved by progressing from bilateralism to multilateralism. Part II of the paper identifies the issues underlying the multilateralization of the investment regime. The issues are broadly divided into three parts. Issues that pertain to the extant bilateral treaty framework are assimilated under Part IIa. The more fundamental question of whether FDI itself has the natural quality of positively impacting the economy of the host State has been dealt with under Part IIb. Issues that are India-centric, but could very well confront policy makers in other developing countries as they enter the transitory phase and liberalise FDI, are analysed in Part IIc. Part III concludes.

Following a historical commitment to multilateralism, in the last decade the trade policy initiatives of many states in the Asia-Pacific have turned to bilateralism through the negotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs). The corresponding proliferation of regional FTAs has thus far been understood to result from three broad motivations: a desire to advance trade liberalization beyond World Trade Organization (WTO) disciplines; mercantilistic efforts to secure preferential access to key export markets; and/or attempts to use FTAs to secure non-economic political gains. This paper argues that since the middle of the decade a new motive has emerged – the use of FTAs to improve resource security – particularly by import-dependent resource consumers in Northeast Asia. As yet unexamined in the literature, this paper seeks to document and explain this trend. It analyses the recent emergence of resource security concerns as a new FTA motive; the corresponding shifts in the FTA strategies and initiatives...

The purpose of this paper is to warn that, as a new science, semiotics will introduce new problems, new ways of thinking, and new ways of solving all problems. These new characteristics must be discovered by the hard work of trial and error. The first two sections of the paper introduce a new way of looking at the world semiotically. Section 3 details how semiotic structure makes this new woridview possible. Section 4 suggests that this new woridview can lead to a unification of science and phenomenology, while section 5 suggests that this unification of science and phenomenology can provide an analytical continuity between the two, similar to the analytical continuity between algebra and geometry provided by analytical geometry. Section 6 provides several examples of new ways of thinking including my favorite whipping boy-a new golden age of mathematics is coming; it will be a triadic mathematics and it must be developed by us, the semioticists of the 21st century, in order to solve the problems encountered by the new semiotic science. Other examples are also discussed or suggested.

East Asia is steadfastly marching towards regional economic integration through a number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and China is a major driving force behind this movement. This paper analyses China's RTAs and their impact on regionalism in Asia. It addresses the criticisms that China's RTAs are politically but not economically driven, that China's RTAs create the hub‐and‐spoke bilateralism and that China's RTAs are not World Trade Organization consistent. It discusses China's position on East Asian regionalism, pointing out that China wishes East Asia to pursue regionalism on multi‐track and at multi‐speed, that China tends to ‘do easy things first’ with low integration and liberalisation and then gradually move to deeper liberalisation and integration and that China's definition of ‘open regionalism’ does not include outside countries such as the USA and the EU. The paper makes suggestions for improving China's RTAs in the interest of establishing an East Asia free trade agreement.

In the globalizing society, it is inevitable to have good relations with neighboring countries. After WW II, global areas have been formed differently by America. In other words, America had set multilateralism system in Europe, in contrast to bilateralism system in East Asia. So, East Asian countries couldn't communicate and exchange without America for a long time. However, in the Post-Cold War, though this mood was dissolved, it is still difficult to say East Asian countries have good relationship one another. In this paper, I argue that the reason is unsolved problems, the emotional matters among the nations. Unlike Europe, it occurred past problems in East Asia repeatedly and continuously. Then, it makes hard to cooperate the nations. On the basis of Constructivism perspective, this paper takes an example, Korea-Japan relations, which has some unsolved past problems. In Korea-Japan relations, there are many tries and efforts to have a good relation politically and socially. Yet, it comes to nothing whenever past problems happened between two nations. In the political part, we can find it by examining the change of policies toward the nation before and after occurring past problems. Likewise, in the social part, as one of evidences, the change rate of number of tourists coming and going to the countries proves it. Irrational factors can affect relations between nations.

This paper examines and critiques the worldwide mushrooming of preferential trading arrangements and traces its implications for Pakistan. It points out that this development is fundamentally contrary to the principle of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, which was the cornerstone of the post-war multilateral trading system as embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The causes of the rise in bilateral and regional trading arrangements are discussed and it is shown that they pose a real threat to many relatively small economies, including Pakistan. The paper discusses the various preferential trade agreements Pakistan has already signed. It notes that, with the exception of its trade agreement with China, Pakistan has not succeeded in concluding preferential trading arrangements with any of the strategically and systemically more important countries, viz., the US, European Union, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) could potentially be of considerable importance for Pakistan's long-term economic growth, but this potential might not be realized if India and Pakistan fail to overcome their mutual differences. Finally, the paper explores steps that might be taken to promote Pakistan's economic interests in its bilateral relations. It points out that, apart from achieving a measure of macroeconomic stability, Pakistan needs to improve its international competitiveness through productivity improvements and be more strategic in its trading relations. Its market access to leading industrial countries that are entering free trade agreements (FTAs) with Pakistan's competitors is a real threat and remedial actions are required. JEL Classification: F13, P45. Keywords: Trade, Pakistan, growth. Pakistan has entered into a series of bilateral and regional trade agreements in recent years. This is in line with the observed rise in such agreements internationally. The number of special trading arrangements between and among countries is difficult to estimate, but probably now exceeds 1,000. However, barely 400 of the agreements (proposed or signed) have been notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Herrmann 2008). Mongolia is the sole country that has not yet entered into any bilateral or regional agreement. In short, regional or bilateral trading agreements (BTAs) have now become the dominant mode of international commerce, and their importance continues to grow. For example, the European Union at present has trade relations with only six countries that are based on the most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment principle1 (Bhagwati 2008). The rise of bilateralism and regionalism in trade gives rise to a number of questions: - Are such arrangements in conformity with the established multilateral trading system as enshrined in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO articles? - What do these arrangements do to the core principle that drove the post-war multilateral trading system, viz., MFN treatment? - Why have such arrangements mushroomed? Specifically for Pakistan: - What do these developments mean for the country's long-term development and its geopolitical position? This in turn involves answering two supplementary questions: (i) how has Pakistan responded to the general trend of increasing bilateralism? and (ii) are Pakistan's bilateral trading relations driven by some strategic long-term vision of the Pakistan economy? This paper attempts to address these questions in rather broad terms. It consists of four sections. The first section examines the actual GATT/WTO position on regional free trade areas, including whether such measures are steps toward a liberal trading regime or antithetical to it. The issue here is how such arrangements conflict with or undermine established multilateral trade disciplines. This is followed by a discussion of the factors that have resulted in the rise of bilateralism. …

This paper analyses the potential of partnerships of the European Union (EU) with two of the so-called BRIC countries, i.e., Brazil and India. The scope of analysis will be the EU vis-a-vis these two countries, using two types of trade liberalisation: bilateralism/regionalism and multilateralism. The paper argues that the EU's objective of engaging with Brazil and India is to establish peace, security and prosperity in the 21st century. The paper also argues that there remains substantial scope for Brazil and India to make further commitments towards greater liberalisation within the services sectors and within all modes of supply provided in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. It will also be argued that the attitude of Brazil and India to multilateralism and responsibility in global governance is questionable or unclear. Both countries want to become more important players; yet, they seem to lean against 'old' powers (mainly the US) and tend to focus on South-South regionalism.

The paper seeks to analyze the developments between China and Pakistan since the end of Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 to 1971. After the signing of Pakistan¡¯s boundary, air and trade agreements with China, the latter continued its support to Pakistan. Their bilateral relations reached to the climax of cordiality by the exchange official visits of both leaderships and support to each other¡¯s key issues and interests. Pakistan changed its pro-West policy of casting vote in favor of Taiwan and against of China for membership in United Nations. Chinese assistance for Pakistan¡¯s defense sector began and supported the Pakistan¡¯s view regarding the disputed area of Kashmir. However it was Pakistan¡¯s start of good relations with the Soviet Union which created a doubt in China¡¯s mind after the Tashkent Conference. It was natural for China to express her surprise on the new bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Soviet Union and called it superpowers¡¯ conspiracy. The paper concludes that bilateralism in Pakistan¡¯s foreign policy brought China and the US to normalization of relations where Pakistan played a bridge role between the two.

This paper explores how Washington views the burgeoning across-theboard ties between Seoul and Beijing in the midst of the strained alliance relationship with the former. On the basis of poll and interview data, the paper demonstrates (1) average Americans' perceptual bias in favor of Europe and general lack of interest in Asian affairs at large, (2) Americans' (both public and elite) strong antipathy toward China and indifference to Korea, and (3) the potentially adverse impact of such perceptions on the future U.S.-Korea relations within the context of rapidly expanding Sino-Korean bilateralism. In the short run South Korea's strategic choice will be invariably to stick with the U.S.-centered alliance structure and, at the same time, to expand the burgeoning ties with China. South Korea's policy will increasingly resemble hedging. This approach will require much prudence. In the mid-term—by 2030—China's shadow over South Korea will perhaps have eclipsed that of the United States in Asia and, gi...

This paper examines the consequences of the breakdown of talks on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the generalized shift from multilateralism to bilateralism in the Americas for the region’s emerging foreign investment regime. The paper argues that multilateral processes have historically benefited Latin American countries when their interests have diverged from those of the US. In terms of investment, the foreign investment regime advanced by the United States (in bilateral investment treaties) differs significantly from that advanced by subregional powers such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, particularly regarding investment rules on national treatment and performance requirements. This suggests that, in the absence of multilateral negotiations, US norms on investment and development will progressively define the emerging hemispheric investment regime.

This paper reviews recent changes in the geographic pattern of regional trading agreements (RTAs), focusing on examples from the Asia–Pacific area. The general pattern is one of new bilateral agreements combined with a trend towards continentalism. The new trend towards bilateralism can be explained largely by a fear of countries being excluded from their major markets as other countries secure preferential and superior access to these markets. This pattern is creating many intersections between RTAs with consequential multi–tiered preferences and multiple systems of trade rules. Viewed dynamically, however, this pattern may have positive effects on world trade. It mitigates the effects of large continental RTAs and may lead to coalescence or enlargement of RTAs. The paper reviews models which ask the important question as to whether this process will progress all the way to free trade for the world economy.

The Philippines had its own share of colonial past. Just as other Asian and African countries which were under the Western colonizers, the Philippines partook of the momentous event that proposed an alternative to the world order dominated by superpowers—the Bandung Conference. The principles collectively known as Bandung Spirit were embraced by the Philippines and had a clear understanding of its symbolic significance. Yet such understanding of these principles was coupled with compromises on the Philippines relations with the United States. Over the decades, the Philippines had to do a balancing act between its being sovereign, independent state and its recognition of the relevance of its past colonial master—the US. Hence, this raises the question of whether the Philippines is living or leaving the Bandung Spirit. Specifically, this paper assesses whether the Philippines still upholds the same Bandung Spirit in its traditional form or has it given a contemporary understanding of it. The paper argues that the Philippine-US relations remain to be an evident display of US presence in Southeast Asia albeit redefined to blend with the Bandung Spirit.

This paper examines the reasons why Japan has been building a foreign trade policy based on a hub-and-spokes system. It will be argued that trade efficiency and exports promotion are assumptions that need a broader reconsideration through a geo-economics approach. What defines Japan’s pursuit of several bilateral trade agreements is assuring its relative economic hegemony whilst changes in the world balance of power are taking place. As Japan faces an uncertain and unforeseeable future, it needs to strengthen its trade policy to guarantee access to international markets. Japan’s trade policy goes beyond the efficiency scope and it entails a geo-economics elucidation.

Is bilateralism bad? This question was the title of Paul Krugman's provocative paper on regionalism (Krugman, 1991 a), and the pursuit of an answer has spawned the regionalism versus multilateralism debate. The answer to this question turns largely on how one answers the related question posed by Jagdish Bhagwati (Bhagwati, 1991): will regional agreements or more accurately, preferential agreements undermine the multilateral trading system? On one side of the debate are those who argue that preferential agreements can complement existing multilateral efforts to foster greater economic integration among countries, and should therefore be encouraged. On the other side are those who see such agreements as a threat to the multilateral system. But what is 'the multilateral system' that may or may not be threatened by preferential agreements? Much of the literature treats it as a 'black box' synonymous with the goal of 'multilateral free trade', and proceeds to ask whether preferential agreements contribute to or interfere with the attainment of this goal. Introductory references are typically made to the GATT/ WTO, but the analysis is often carried out with little or no reference to the structure of this multilateral institution. In this paper we argue that understanding GATT's structure is vital to the debate over regionalism versus multilateralism. There are three components that together comprise the cornerstones of the GATT system: the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination, which are regularly identified as the 'pillars' of the GATT architecture, and the enforcement mechanisms, which Dam (1970, p. 81) calls the 'heart' of the GATT system. Below we describe how preferential agreements may be expected to interact with the multilateral system in light of each of its three principle components. We approach the question posed at the outset in two parts. We first ask, will preferential agreements undermine a multilateral trading system that is built on the pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination? A remaining question is then, how do preferential agreements affect the enforcement provisions of the GATT? To lay the foundation for an answer to the first question, we describe a framework within which the pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination can themselves be interpreted and understood. From this perspective, we then

The paper develops a dynamic multi-country, multi-commodity model of Schumpeterian growth, trade, and tariffs. The presence of a nontraded final good sector generates differences in long-run growth across countries. Furthermore, if the growth intensity of the nontraded good is lower than the growth intensity of traded goods, then the liberalization of trade raises the long-run growth of all trading partners. The paper also analyzes the implications of multilateral, bilateral and unilateral schemes of trade liberalization for long-run growth and welfare.

This paper considers the effect of exogenous trade bloc enlargement in a multicountry version of the Brander-Spencer export subsidy game. In the single-shot game, it is shown that trade bloc enlargement leads to a reduction in the Nash equilibrium export subsidies and thereby increases the welfare of the exporting countries. Although the welfare of the importing countries decreases, world welfare may increase if the export subsidies are financed by distortionary taxation. When the export subsidy game is infinitely repeated, it is shown that trade bloc enlargement reduces the critical discount factor making it easier to sustain free trade. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

As BRICS advances into its second decade of existence, it transitions from a multilateral alignment to bilateral arrangements among the five members. This ‘bi‐lateralization’ of BRICS expands the ‘menu’ of the BRICS ‘multilateralism a la carte’ by allowing members to limit cooperation when their interests diverge and to benefit from collective action through BRICS when their interests converge. This paper argues that, from the standpoint of countries like Brazil, the India–China border dispute and broader competition in the Indo‐Pacific demonstrate the ‘bi‐lateralization’ of intra‐BRICS relations as they thwart the development of a common narrative on issues like global health, security and trade. Contrarily, the bi‐lateralization of BRICS also gives members more flexibility as they manage various domestic and international challenges, which is crucial for the grouping’s survival. The experience of the BRICS‐led New Development Bank (NDB) illustrates how the five countries can still cooperate as a coalition in pursuit of common objectives such as sustainable development and infrastructure. The lack of robust mechanisms to realize these objectives, however, raises questions about NDB’s capacity to help BRICS to cooperate more like a community.

Even a successful Uruguay Round might capture just one-tenth of the potential global economic benefits from free agricultural trade. With only modest liberalization expected from multilateralism for a decade after the Uruguay Round, the alternatives to realize the large remaining gains from trade are unilateralism (such as revival of "super 301"), bilateralism (such as the voluntary export restraint agreements), and regionalism. One reason for the appeal of regionalism is the lack of promise in the alternatives. The objective of this paper is to appraise the future of regionalism for American agriculture. The paper addresses origins, prospects, advantages, and disadvantages of regionalism. It dispels some myths, and gauges the potential impact of selected regional liberalization on American agriculture. Regionalism is defined here as formation of political groupings or "blocs" of countries for the purpose of promoting intra-regional trade.

Contents: Volume I Acknowledgements Introduction Rohan Kariyawasam PART I WTO, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ANTITRUST 1. Wonki Min (2000), 'Telecommunications Regulations: Institutional Structures and Responsibilities' 2. Yoshiko Kurisaki (1995), 'The Changing Role of Telecommunications in the Economy: Globalisation and Its Impact on National Telecommunications Policy' 3. Rohan Kariyawasam (2007), 'International Telecommunications' 4. Peter L. Smith and Bjoern Wellenius (1999), 'Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Telecommunications' 5. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers and Pierre Larouche (1997), 'Telecommunication Services and the World Trade Organization' 6. Lee Tuthill (1996), 'Users' Rights? The Multilateral Rules on Access to Telecommunications' 7. Lee Tuthill (1997), 'The GATS and New Rules for Regulators' 8. Mark Naftel and Lawrence J. Spiwak (2000), 'The WTO and the Reference Paper: An Ostensible Blueprint for Entry' 9. Markus Fredebeul-Krein and Andreas Freytag (1997), 'Telecommunications and WTO Discipline: An Assessment of the WTO Agreement on Telecommunication Services' 10. Timothy Denton (2002), 'Protocol Interfaces Are the New Bottlenecks: What the Internet Means for Telecom Regulation' 11. Rohan Kariyawasam (2005), 'Defining Dominance for Bits and Bytes: A New "Layering Theory" for Interpreting Significant Market Power?' 12. Sonali Singh (2006), 'The Telmex Dispute at the WTO: Competition Makes a Backdoor Entry' 13. Eleanor M. Fox (2006), 'The WTO's First Antitrust Case - Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition' PART II THE CLASSIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC INTANGIBLES IN THE WTO 14. Peter Hill (1999), 'Tangibles, Intangibles and Services: A New Taxonomy for the Classification of Output' 15. Rohan Kariyawasam (2007), 'The Classification of Electronic Intangibles in the WTO' 16. Claude E. Barfield (2003), 'Electronic Commerce and the Gats Negotiations' 17. Harald Sander (2003), 'Electronic Commerce and Gats Negotiation (Some Comments on a Paper by Claude E. Barfield)' 18. Sacha Wunsch-Vincent (2006), 'The Internet, Cross-Border Trade in Services, and the GATS: Lessons from US-Gambling' 19. Federico Ortino (2006), 'Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US - Gambling: A Critique' 20. Maria Veronica Perez Asinari (2006), 'Internet Gambling and Betting Services: When the GATS' Rules Are Not Applied Due to the Public Morals/Public Order Exception. What Lessons Can Be Learnt?' Name Index Volume II: Acknowledgements Introduction Rohan Kariyawasam PART I WTO AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1. Heinz Hauser and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent (2000/2001), 'A Call for the WTO E-Commerce Initiative' 2. Daniel Piazolo (2001), 'Multilateral and European Responses to E-Commerce' 3. Sacha Wunsch-Vincent (2003), 'The Digital Trade Agenda of the U.S.: Parallel Tracks of Bilateral, Regional and Multinational Liberalization' 4. Michael Hart and Ramesh Chaitoo (1999), 'Electronic Commerce and International Trade Rules' 5. Olivier Cattaneo and Julia Nielson (2002), 'Regulation of Services Traded Electronically' 6. Rosemary Morris (2000), 'Electronic Commerce: A Cluster Approach to the Negotiation of Input Services' PART II INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, BILATERALISM AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 7. Keith E. Maskus (1998), 'The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer' 8. Olivier Cattaneo (2003), 'Intellectual Property Rights in the New Economy: Technological Changes and the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights' 9. Carlos M. Correa (2000), 'Implications of Intellectual Property Rights for the Access to and Use of Information Technologies in Developing Countries' 10. Peter Drahos (2001), 'Bilateralism in Intellectual Property' PART III DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, THE NEW ECONOMY AND THE WTO 11. Sanjeev Dewan, Dale Ganley and Kenneth L. Kraemer (2005), 'Across the Digital Divide: A Cross-Country, Multi-Technology Analysis of the Determinants of IT Penetration' 12. Lars T. Soeftestad and Maung K. Sein (2003), 'ICT and Devolopment: East is East and West is West and the Twain may yet Meet. On the Process of Implementing an ICT-Strategy in the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)' 13. Rohan Kariyawasam (2007), 'Developing Countries and Telecommunications' 14. Peter F. Cowhey and Mikhail M. Kilmenko (2001), 'Implementing Telecommunications Liberalization in Developing Countries after the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services' 15. Arvind Panagariya (2000), 'E-Commerce, WTO and Developing Countries' 16. Catherine L. Mann (2000), 'Electronic Commerce in Developing Countries: Issues for Domestic Policy and WTO Negotiations' 17. David Vivas Eugui (2001), 'Issues on the Relationship Between E-Commerce and Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO: Implications for Developing Countries' Name Index

This paper examines the current wave of US bilateral agreements with respect to their strategic and political value at the plurilateral level. The US government has explicitly recognized its objective of leveraging bilateral agreements in order to influence regional and multilateral negotiations. Although it may be too early to assess the full effectiveness of this US strategy, the paper argues that there are clear signs that the exploitation of bilateral agreements will not independently achieve the goal of strengthening plurilateral patent norms. This finding is supported by an assessment of six potential roads from bilateralism to plurilateralism: chain reaction, pressure for inclusion, coalition building, emulation, legal interpretation, and adherence. The assertion that bilateral trade deals have a great impact on international patent lawmaking, made both by proponents and critics of TRIPs-Plus agreements, is unsubstantiated. The author concludes that the US Government Accountability Office and Congress are justified in questioning whether the negotiation of these bilateral agreements, at least in the realm of IP law, is a wise investment of US Trade Representative's resources.

Given the proliferation and intensification of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the global economy, it is worthwhile to examine some of the key approaches for understanding why states cooperate through trade agreements. Evidence suggests that traditional economic explanations based primarily on welfare gains hold little in the way of explanatory power, especially for understanding larger country involvement in trade agreements with smaller countries. One theory suggests that side-payments to the larger country help explain why larger countries may be involved in such arrangements. Building upon political-economic explanations for economic strategies, this paper presents a three-level model that emphasizes the importance of interests and conditions at the multilateral and regional levels for influencing bilateral initiatives. Through an analysis of the Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, this paper highlights the interconnected nature of state interests at multiple levels, as well as some of the shortcomings of purely economic explanations for understanding why states enter trade agreements.

This paper analyzes the potential of partnerships of the European Union (EU) with Brazil. The scope of analysis will be the EU vis-a-vis Brazil using three types of trade liberalization: unilateralism, bilateralism/regionalism, and multilateralism. The paper argues that the EU's objective of engaging with Brazil is to establish peace, security, and prosperity in the XXI century. The paper also argues that there remains substantial scope for Brazil to make further commitments towards greater liberalization within the services sectors and within all modes of supply provided in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. It will also be argued that the attitude of Brazil to multilateralism and responsibility in global governance is questionable or unclear. Brazil wants to become a more important player; yet, it seems to lean against traditional powers (mainly the U.S.), and tends to focus on South-South regionalism.

French Abstract: Cet ouvrage analyse l’evolution du regime international de brevets depuis l’adoption de l’Accord sur les ADPIC en 1994. Alors que cet accord consacra l’hegemonie americaine sur le regime, la legitimite d’une forte protection des brevets dans les pays en developpement est aujourd’hui contestee, notamment a travers le debat sur l’acces aux medicaments et celui sur la protection de la diversite biologique. Neanmoins, les Etats-Unis maintiennent leur hegemonie et poursuivent leur mouvement d’exportation du droit americain par le biais de traites bilateraux. English Abstract:This paper looks at the evolution of international patent law since the adoption of the TRIPs agreement in 1994. While the US is usually considered as the hegemonic power in the international patent regime, the legitimacy of strong patent protection is increasingly challenged. This papers argues that US manages to keep its hegemonic position and ti diffuse globally its domestic norms by negotiating bilateral agreements.

espanolEn 2001, la entrada de China a la Organizacion Mundial del Comercio represento una gran amenaza para los paises en desarrollo, incluyendo los de regiones como Asia y America Latina y el Caribe. Paises como Mexico mostraron su preocupacion debido al reto que representaba China en cuestiones de competencia; otros, como Chile aprovecharon las ventajas de formar parte de la OMC como un foro multilateral de comercio y comenzaron negociaciones con China para formalizar la cooperacion bilateral. ?Cuales son las principales caracteristicas del bilateralismo? ?Que beneficios puede aportar China como socio comercial en el marco de un TLC? ?Puede el caso de Chile ser tomado en cuenta en el marco de futuros acuerdos comerciales entre China y otros paises? Este articulo tiene el objetivo de responder a dichas preguntas mediante un analisis de los alcances de los tratados comerciales, la integracion de China a la OMC y su red de tratados de libre comercio, y la integracion de China con la region de America Latina y el Caribe con enfasis en su relacion con Chile, al ser el primer pais en el continente en tener un acuerdo con el pais asiatico EnglishIn 2001 China’s entrance to the World Trade Organization represented a major threat to developing countries including those from Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. Countries such as Mexico were worried about its inclusion for China’s competitiveness was a great challenge to face; others such as Chile took advantage of the benefits of being part of the multilateral forum and began negotiations to formalize bilateral cooperation. What are the main characteristics of bilateralism? What benefits can China bring as a trading partner within the framework of an FTA? Can the Chilean case be taken into consideration for other countries to pursue bilateral agreements with China? This paper has the objective of answering those questions through an analysis of the scope of trade agreements, the Chinese integration to the World Trade Organization and its free trade agreements network, and the integration of China with Latin America, with a special focus on its relationship with Chile as the first country in the continent to have an agreement with China.

This paper presents a systematic assessment of transboundary water treaties and their institutional evolution over time. While the majority of treaties tend to remain unchanged, others are renegotiated over time, either gradually by treaty amendment or abruptly by treaty replacement. This study examines the sources of treaty amendment, treaty replacement, and renegotiation. Treaty design features, such as conflict resolution mechanisms and duration mechanisms, make up the set of independent variables. Effects are also measured for a set of control variables including the geographical configuration of a basin, the number of signatories, a history of interstate militarized disputes, water variability, the basin’s climate zone, and past renegotiations. Conflict resolution appears as a significant design feature for determining treaty stability, aided by asymmetrical basin configurations and bilateralism. The absence of conflict resolution is the main trigger for gradual change. The presence of a duration clause and a history of interstate militarized disputes are found to trigger abrupt change. Renegotiations become more likely after the first round of renegotiation, suggesting a temporal effect of path dependence on treaty evolution. This study adds to the work of scholars mapping transboundary basins at risk and provides further arguments to negotiate better and more specific treaties from the start, which include conflict resolution features that enable dialogue and rule modification while avoiding the need for formal treaty renegotiation.

The major challenge for Europe at the turn of the century is the integration of the CEECs and, perhaps unexpectedly, agricultural issues play a major role. The discussion has focused up to now on the impact of enlargement on the CAP. This paper reviews available evidence and critically assesses the agricultural issues in the process of establishing a wider, integrated Europe. The twin objective of transition and integration requires changes of a massive scale, something that is not fully realized in the CEECs. In a pre-accession strategy, the main issue is alignment with the internal market as the most important step towards membership. CEEC agricultural policies should reinforce the emergence of markets and institutions and, here, a new role for the state is required. Finally, the paper claims that integration will be facilitated by reinforcing intra-CEEC cooperation with the creation of a free trade area by expanding the existing CEFTA, instead of the present bilateralism of the Association Agreements.

This paper aims to determine a way how to assess the impact of a strategic partnership on bilateralism and check that impact. In that sense, the strength of strategic partnership influence on bilateralism areas has been probed. In order to check the impact the research has been conducted on the case of the strategic partnership between the Republic of Serbia and six countries. Under those circumstances, different methods have been applied: expert-based evaluation method, DEMATEL (Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory Method) and statistical method. Some data has been collected by a survey questionnaire on 15 specialists, but the main data is accurate data from statistical yearbooks. There are two general results of this research. One of them is the model of the assessment of the strategic partnership impact on bilateralism. The second result is the confirmation of the strategic partnership impact on bilateralism. That impact varies from zero to perfect impact depending on a strategic partner and bilateralism area. The original purpose of the model is to assess bilateralism and the strategic partnership impact. In addition, the model is multipurpose and can be used to assess different relationships in public and private sector. The research results can help to understand cooperation in general and relationship between different areas. This study extends prior researches by examining the comprehensive process of bilateralism scope assessment. On the basis of the research results, implementation of the comprehensive process has been confirmed and improved.

Threats to food security have increased around the world following the increasing threat of climate change over the last few years. Such threats have also become apparent in Southeast Asia. This region is home to 10% of the world's population and is host to the world's largest rice and palm oil exporters. Malaysia and Indonesia play an important role in securing the future supplies of palm oil because these two countries account for 85% of global palm oil production. However, the impact of climate change may cause a food crisis in the future, thus raising the possibility of food losses in the region. This paper is an attempt to revisit the position of Malaysia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia with a particular emphasis on the two countries' role in countering future food crises. It is argued that the current economic relation policies of Malaysia and Indonesia have somewhat neglected the importance of future food security in Southeast Asia. The idea of establishing a council for palm oil producers between the two countries is seen as a ‘game changer'. However, the effect of such an effort is uncertain, and it pays little attention to the need for securing Southeast Asia's future food system. The council needs to commit to moving beyond a ‘revenue driven' rationale. Concerning a regional engagement approach, stronger economic relations between Malaysia and Indonesia can be attributable to a more resilient food system in Southeast Asia. Keywords: Malaysia, Indonesia, palm oil, bilateralism & Southeast Asia

Discrimination is generally conceived of as a feature of protectionism and the source of retaliatory spirals. In this paper, I argue that this perspective on trade discrimination is conceptually and empirically deficient. The extent of discrimination is almost exclusively considered with respect to the form of cooperation, that is, the number of countries that cooperate. This view disregards the fact that the bargaining approach also determines the extent to which a country can discriminate in concession-making. By neglecting the bargaining method, the existing literature tends to underestimate the prevalence of discriminatory treatment in international trade and in periods of liberalization in particular. Furthermore, a case study of the government procurement negotiations at the Uruguay Round shows that discrimination between countries and items may go along with and actually promote liberalization. On the basis of these insights, I make a first step toward a better understanding of discrimination by developing a baseline model explaining liberalization through discrimination., {"references":["Rohlfing, Ingo (2009): Discrimination in International Trade: A Different Perspective. Acta Politica 44 (2): 192-210."]}

This paper analyses the potential of partnerships of the European Union (EU) with two of the so-called BRIC countries, i.e., Brazil and India. The scope of analysis will be the EU vis-a-vis these two countries, using two types of trade liberalisation: bilateralism/regionalism and multilateralism. The paper argues that the EU's objective of engaging with Brazil and India is to establish peace, security and prosperity in the 21st century. The paper also argues that there remains substantial scope for Brazil and India to make further commitments towards greater liberalisation within the services sectors and within all modes of supply provided in the General Agreement on Trade in Services. It will also be argued that the attitude of Brazil and India to multilateralism and responsibility in global governance is questionable or unclear. Both countries want to become more important players; yet, they seem to lean against 'old' powers (mainly the US) and tend to focus on South-South regionalism.

This paper examines the structure of bilateral tourism and identifies five broad categories of factors that may affect the overall size of tourism flows. Such analysis of tourism is important because diplomacy and trade continues to be conducted on a nation-to-nation basis despite a growing shift towards multilateralism in free trade blocks such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Further, Bilateralism is important because countries have reduced abilities to control tourism imports in an era of growing globalization. A framework that may be employed to analyze problems in bilateral tourism flows is also outlined.Les facteurs ayant un effet sur les flux du tourisme bilatéral. Cet article examine la structure du tourisme bilatéral et identifie cinq grandes catégories de facteurs qui peuvent avoir des conséquences sur l’importance globale de ses flux. Une telle analyse du tourisme est importante, parce que la diplomatie et le commerce continuent à être menés entre deux nations à la fois, bien qu’il y ait actuellement une croissance de relations multilatérales avec des blocs de libre-échange tels que l’Union européenne et l’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain. En plus, les accords bilatéraux sont importants, parce que les pays ont des possibilités réduites pour contrôler les importations de tourisme à une époque de mondialisation croissante. On expose aussi les grandes lignes d’un cadre théorique qui pourrait être utilisé pour analyser des problèmes de flux bilatéraux.

Published online: 06 May 2018 What are the consequences and implications of Brexit on the nature and character of Franco-German ‘embedded bilateralism’ in Europe, the relative influence of Berlin and Paris in EU policymaking, and the EU's future trajectory more generally? Brexit brings into sharper relief three basic future scenarios for the EU: (1) German hegemony; (2) the decline of the European project; and (3) a rejuvenated Franco-German tandem at the union's centre – what we call ‘back to the future’. Which of these scenarios prevails will depend on the interaction of Brexit with other developments, most notably (1) the overall strengthening of Germany's relative standing, and (2) France's ability to overcome its economic and societal stasis with serious reforms. Though each of the three scenarios is possible, this paper holds that ‘back to the future’ is the most likely and plausible. Brexit thus might even further accentuate the historically influential Franco-German relationship, not least in union-level policy domains, such as security and defense, in which Britain has hitherto played a significant role.

Japan's policy toward India since 2000 appears to be a sign of new directions in Japan's security policy since its decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is different from the previous policy of exclusive bilateralism centering on the US–Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Japan's recent security partnership with India is part of Japan's long-term effort to support the US-led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. This paper argues that Japan's policy toward India since 2000 has evolved toward becoming fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The critical shift in Tokyo's policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China as a result of the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. They decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit and incorporated India into their new values diplomacy. This shift in Japan's policy toward India, alon...

This paper seeks to identify factors that may lie behind the tendency for parliamentary governments to form primarily from one side of the left-right spectrum and to adopt non-centrist policy positions. Because of measurement limitations as well as the inherent complexity of the processes involved, this exploration is undertaken through simulation experiments. The new software created for these experiments allows the potential impact of a wide variety of factors, including voter and party motivations and distributions, policy space dimensionality, and constraints on government formation, to be assessed. Although the results cannot tell us what fosters non-centrism in the real world, they do reveal some factors that appear to be conducive to that end and thus serve as a guide to further research on this neglected topic.

In response to calls for developing an instrument to measure public diplomacy outcomes, this paper introduces the Relationship Assessment of Diplomatic Interaction Outcome (RADIO) scale. Developed based on the Organisation–Public Relationship Assessment (OPRA) scale in public relations, the RADIO scale measures relationship between a country and its foreign publics as public diplomacy outcome. It classifies relationships into two types: experiential (characterised by direct experiences with a country) and reputational (those without direct experiences). Two macro- dimensions (i.e. interactional bilateralism and power mutuality) and two micro-dimensions (i.e. trust and empathy) are proposed for both relationship types. Relational satisfaction and relational continuance are proposed as micro-dimensions for experiential relationships. Relational attentiveness and relational curiosity are proposed as micro-dimensions for reputational relationships. Implications of the RADIO scale also are discussed.

The paper asks four questions: (1) Is the bilateralism of law and economics praised by Calabresi a form of “reflective equilibrium”? (2) Is Mill’s harm principle compatible with “third-party moral costs”? (3) How are we to distinguish the moral externalities that are to be given weight from those that are not? (4) How are we to adjudicate between welfare and equality, between a larger but less equal pie and a smaller but more equal one? The first question has a positive answer and the second a negative one, whereas the last two do not have straightforward answers if we subscribe to value pluralism.

The paper asks four questions: (1) Is the bilateralism of law and economics praised by Calabresi a form of “reflective equilibrium”? (2) Is Mill’s harm principle compatible with “third-party moral costs”? (3) How are we to distinguish the moral externalities that are to be given weight from those that are not? (4) How are we to adjudicate between welfare and equality, between a larger but less equal pie and a smaller but more equal one? The first question has a positive answer and the second a negative one, whereas the last two do not have straightforward answers if we subscribe to value pluralism.

This paper looks at the TTIP from a trade policy perspective. It argues that while TTIP is an unprecedented bilateral agreement, it does not constitute a Polanyian moment. TTIP is unprecedented in both EU and international trade policy terms because it offers an alternative to WTO multilateralism. Never before has bilateralism offered such a 'best alternative to no agreement' (BATNA) to members of the core decision-making body of the WTO negotiating arm, making TTIP an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer. The anti-TTIP campaign, however, has not been driven either by geopolitical or trade liberalization concerns but by fears about EU bargaining power. By strategically focusing on the potential impact on public policy and safety standards, normative arguments promulgated by opponents to TTIP reflect concerns with perceived threats to the EU status quo, and a willingness to preserve the same. The US is presented (implicitly) as more powerful than the EU, and therefore perceived as able to impose its preferences which are considered too neo-liberal.

Beginning in early 2013, US analysts detected a shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy—a move to increasingly rely on bilateralism as the basis for the state’s international relations. President Islam Karimov’s rejection of Russia’s self-proclaimed role of hegemon in Central Asia has likely contributed to this newfound policy approach that places Tashkent in a position to increase social and economic ties with the region’s emerging powerhouse—China. Although Uzbekistan has expressed consistent interest in establishing closer ties with the US, the withdrawal of US forces from the region diminishes the ability of the US to remain a plausible partner. This new approach to foreign relations will not fully prevent Uzbekistan from participating in the region’s multilateral organizations, but rather it is seen as an attempt to create some spacing between Tashkent and Moscow. This paper argues that active multistate cooperation between Uzbekistan, its Central Asian neighbors, and the region’s superpowers—Russia, China, and the United States—is necessary for the containment of extremism in Afghanistan following the International Security Assistnace Force drawdown in 2016. However, if Uzbekistan abandons multilateralism to the degree that neighboring Turkmenistan has and relies on the neorealist tenet of self-help in addressing political and security threats, the state will inevitably expose itself to Russian meddling. Uzbek cooperation with Vladimir Putin in the areas of economic development and security will continue but will be approached very cautiously due to the alarm resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

This paper seeks to explain the sustenance of great power relations in a world espousing the principles of the collective security system under the United Nations. It shows how the system of veto rights enables the UN sustain an important role for itself, even in the calculations of the great power realism, by providing an interface between their need for balance of power and the desire of the rest of the international community for collective security system. Using the Syrian WMD crisis as a case study, and drawing from the experience of Berlin (1961) and Cuban missile (1962) crises for parallelism, it identifies patterns in the behaviours of US and Russia, the client states and the UN system, to suggest that the latter has acquired the role of seamless interface for great power bilateralism and the multilateralism of the present international system.

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that US power and preferences following World War II led to bilateralism in Asia and multilateralism in Western Europe. It argues that the challenges facing the United States in both regions were similar, as were US policies meant to address them. With some lag, the United States supported the economic recovery of the regional powers it had defeated (Germany and Japan), saw the restoration of regional trade as a prerequisite, sought military bases to assure postwar security, and envisioned rearming its former foes as part of its security strategy. The outcomes in the two regions reflected the preferences and reservations of regional actors. The critical differences between the regions were structural. The existence of middle powers was critical in Europe, the return of colonial powers to Asia precluded regional arrangements in the short term, and geostrategic differences shaped the requisites for regional security.

With World Trade Organization negotiations stagnant, and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) rapidly proliferating, international trade relations are shifting markedly toward bilateralism. The resulting fragmentation in the international trade regime poses serious risks to economic welfare and the coherence of international trade law. Similar challenges have been faced in the international investment regime, which is comprised of a highly fragmented network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). However, scholars have identified several mechanisms that promote harmonization in the international investment regime. Among these are cross-treaty interpretation in dispute settlement and the inclusion of most-favoured nation (MFN) clauses in BITs. This paper assesses the scope for these two mechanisms to emerge in the international trade regime by comparing the legal framework, institutional dynamics, and political economy of the trade and investment regimes. The analysis suggests that cross-treaty interpretation is likely to emerge in the trade regime as PTA dispute settlement activity increases and that greater use of MFN clauses in PTAs is a viable possibility. These developments would mitigate the effects of fragmentation and advance harmonization in the international trade regime.

The paper examines whether bilateral free trade agreements can lead to global free trade. We reconsider the endogenous tariff model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006) who study pairwise stability of free trade networks. We depart from their analysis by adopting the concept of pairwise farsightedly stable networks (Herings et al. 2009, GEB). We show that the complete network (i.e., global free trade) constitutes a pairwise farsightedly stable set. In particular, there is a farsightedly improving path from the empty network (i.e., no free trade agreement in place) to the complete network, which involves link additions only, while farsightedly improving paths from preexisting free trade networks may involve link deletion (i.e., dissolution of some bilateral FTAs). Moreover, we show that pairwise farsightedly stable set of networks is not unique. One implication of our results is that bilateral trade negotiations, if properly channeled, can lead to global free trade, although some bilateral agreements may have to be dissolved first to pave the way towards global free trade.