1. A Game Theoretic Approach to Peer Review of Grant Proposals
- Author
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Esra Eren Bayindir, Ismail Saglam, Mehmet Y. Gurdal, TOBB ETU, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economics, TOBB ETÜ, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümü, and Sağlam, İsmail
- Subjects
Operations research ,Computer science ,Turkish ,Process (engineering) ,Comparative statics ,Bayesian probability ,Library and Information Sciences ,050905 science studies ,Outcome (game theory) ,Grant Proposals ,symbols.namesake ,media_common.cataloged_instance ,European union ,media_common ,05 social sciences ,language.human_language ,Bayesian Games ,Computer Science Applications ,Committees ,Nash equilibrium ,language ,symbols ,0509 other social sciences ,050904 information & library sciences - Abstract
This paper studies the grant peer review process employed by the Turkish regional development agencies, which is adapted from a review procedure of the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency of the European Union. To model this process, we consider a Bayesian strategic-form game played by three reviewers who observe both a common and a private score signal about an evaluated project and assign their scores to minimize the sum of their disutilities from the false acceptance and false rejection of the project. We numerically compute the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game and conduct several comparative statics exercises, after calibrating the model parameters accordingly. We also introduce two simpler review processes and compare their performances to that of the calibrated process in terms of outcome statistics, involving pass and fail rates of the evaluated projects, and manipulation statistics, involving the reviewers' manipulation rate and size of scores. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
- Published
- 2019