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We offer an overlapping generations equilibrium model of cryptocurrency pricing and confront it to new data on bitcoin transactional benefits and costs. The model emphasizes that the fundamental value of the cryptocurrency is the stream of net transactional benefits it will provide, which depend on its future prices. The link between future and present prices implies that returns can exhibit large volatility unrelated to fundamentals. We construct an index measuring the ease with which bitcoins can be used to purchase goods and services, and we also measure costs incurred by bitcoin owners. Consistent with the model, estimated transactional net benefits explain a statistically significant fraction of bitcoin returns.

Derivatives activity, motivated by risk-sharing, can breed risk taking. Bad news about the risk of the asset underlying the derivative increases the expected liability of a protection seller and undermines her risk prevention incentives. This limits risk-sharing, and may create endogenous counterparty risk and contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers incentives and enhance the ability to share risk. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk-prevention incentives.

We study the dynamics of an innovative industry when agents learn about its strength, i.e., the likelihood that it gets hit by negative shocks. Managers can exert risk-prevention export to mitigate the consequences of such shocks. As time goes by, if no shock occurs, condence improves. This attracts managers to the innovative sector. But, when condence becomes high, less managers exerting low risk-prevention export also enter. This accelerates the growth of the industry, while inducing a decline in risk-prevention. The longer the boom, the stronger the condence, the larger the losses if a shock occurs. While the above dynamics arise in the first best, with asymmetric information there is excessive entry of inefficient managers, earning informational rents at the expense of inneficient managers. This inflates the innovative sector and increases its vulnerability.

The rents agents can extract from principals increase with the magnitude of incentive problems, which the literature usually takes as given. We endogenize it, by allowing agents to choose technologies that are more or less opaque and correspondingly prone to agency problems. In our overlapping generations model, agents compete with their predecessors. We study whether the presence of old- timers earning low rents can keep young managers' rent-seeking in check. With dynamic contracts, long horizons help principals incentivize agents. Hence, old agents are imperfect substitutes for young ones. This mutes down competition between generations, especially if compensation deferral is strong. As a result, young managers can opt for more opaque and complex technologies, and therefore larger rents, than their predecessors. Thus, in equilibrium, complexity and rents rise over time.

We study the reaction of financial markets to aggregate liquidity shocks when traders face cognition limits. While each financial institution recovers from the shock at a random time, the trader representing the institution observes this recovery with a delay reflecting the time it takes to collect and process information about positions, counterparties and risk exposure. Cognition limits lengthen the market price recovery. They also imply that traders who find that their institution has not yet recovered from the shock place market sell orders, and then progressively buy back at relatively low prices, while simultaneously placing limit orders to sell later when the price will have recovered. This generates round trip trades, which raise trading volume. We compare the case where algorithms enable traders to implement this strategy to that where traders can place orders only when they have completed their information processing task.

This paper compares centralized.and fragmented markets, such as floor and telephone markets. Risk-averse agents compete for one market order. In centralized markets, these agents a re market makers or limit order traders. They are assumed to observe th e quotes of their competitors. In fragmented markets they are dealers. They can only assess the positions of their competitors. The author analyzes differences in bidding strategies reflecting differences in market structures. The equilibrium number of dealers is shown to be increasing in the frequency of trades and the volatility of the valu e of the asset: The expected spread is shown to be equal in both marke ts, ceteris paribus. But the spread is more volatile in centralized than in fragmented markets. Copyright 1993 by American Finance Association.

We propose a dynamic competitive equilibrium model of limit order trading, based on the premise that investors cannot monitor markets continuously. We study how limit order markets absorb transient liquidity shocks, which occur when a significant fraction of investors lose their willingness and ability to hold assets. We characterize the equilibrium dynamics of market prices, bid-ask spreads, order submissions and cancelations, as well as the volume and limit order book depth they generate.

We analyse dynamic financial contracting under moral hazard. The ability to rely on future rewards relaxes the tension between incentive and participation constraints, relative to the static case. Managers are incited by the promise of future payments after several successes and the threat of liquidation after several failures. The more severe the moral hazard problem, the greater the liquidation risk. The optimal contract can be implemented by holding cash reserves and by issuing debt and equity. The firm is liquidated when it runs out of cash. Dividends are paid only when accumulated earnings reach a certain threshold. In the continuous time limit of the model, stocks follow a diffusion process, with a stochastic volatility that increases after price drops. In line with empirical findings, performance shocks induce long lasting changes in leverage.

We survey the literature analysing the price formation and trading process, and the consequences of market organization for price discovery and welfare. We develop a united perspective on theoretical, empirical and experimental approaches. We discuss the evidence on transaction costs and the price impact of trades and its analyses in terms of adverse selection, inventory costs and market power. We review the extent to which the associated frictions can be mitigated by such features of market design as the degree of transparency, the use of call auctions, the discreteness of the pricing grid and the regulation of competition between liquidity suppliers or exchanges.

In this Paper we measure psychological traits and show that they significantly affect behaviour and performance in a financial context. Based on the answers of 184 subjects to a psychological questionnaire we measured their degree of overconfidence, ie. the extent to which they overestimate the precision of their information, and self-monitoring, which is a form of social intelligence. The subjects also participated in an experimental financial market under asymmetric information in the spirit of Plott and Sunder (1988). In line with the hypothesis that they suffer from the winner’s curse, overconfident subjects are found to earn relatively low trading profits. In contrast, our finding that high self-monitors earn relatively large trading profits is consistent with the hypothesis that they are relatively good at anticipating the trading motivations of the other traders.

We analyse politically motivated privatization design in a bipartisan environment where politicians lack commitment power. Suppose the median class voters a priori favour redistributive policies. If the privatization programme succeeds in allocating enough shares to these citizens, they become averse to redistributive policies, which would be detrimental to the values of their shareholdings. To induce the median class voters to buy enough shares to shift their political preferences, underpricing is often necessary. The more unequal the society, the poorer the median class, the less willing they are to buy shares, the larger the necessary underpricing. When inequalities are large this leads to voucher privatization. Shifting the preferences of the middle class by privatizing is impossible when strong ex-ante political constraints require large upfront transfers to insiders, reducing the value which may be distributed through the privatization programme, or when social inequality is extreme.

Recent empirical findings suggest that spreads quoted in dealership markets might be uncompetitive. This paper analyzes theoretically if price competition between risk--averse market--makers leaves room for implicit collusive behavior. We compare the spread and risk--sharing efficiency arising in several market structures differing in terms of i) the priority rule followed in case of ties, and ii) the type of schedules market makers may use, namely: general schedules, linear schedules, or limit orders. In general, competitive pricing does not arise in equilibrium, and there is a conflict between risk sharing efficiency and the tightness of the spread. This conflict can be mitigated by an appropriate market structure design. The limit order market is the only market structure in which the competitive equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.

We model underpricing as being endogenous to the wealth loss minimization problem encountered in a stock market flotation. The benefits of reducing underpricing depend on the entrepreneur's participation in the offering, via the secondary shares he sells, as well as the magnitude of the dilution he suffers on his retained shares, which increases in the number of newly issued shares. However, reducing underpricing is costly. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is positive underpricing in equilibrium, as entrepreneurs trade off the costs and benefits of lower underpricing. Using two large data sets of US IPOs, we find support for the comparative statics predictions of our model, in particular those which distinguish our model from existing work. We also find support for the prediction that equilibrium wealth losses are unrelated to the level of underpricing-reduction costs and the quality of underwriter, which indicates that entrepreneurs choose such variables optimally. Non-monetary considerations such as private benefits of control appear not to be taken into account by the entrepreneur. Our empirical results are robust to a number of economic and econometric considerations.