Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī (d. 430/1039), one of the leading figures in Hanafite u'ūl al-fiqh, is the first who mentioned the basic and inalienable human rights in the history of jurisprudence. Al-Dabūsī, was the first scholar to introduce the concept of "ahliyya" i.e. the legal and moral capacity of men, as an important issue of u'ūl al-fiqh (the philosophy and methodology of Islamic jurisprudence), as well, he was the first to divide the ahliyya into two categories. This distinction was widely accepted in the Hanafi tradition after him. This tradition acknowledged that the "dhimma", that is, the legal personality in the modern sense, is the basis of the ahliyyat al-wujub, but unlike modern approaches, they have established a firm relationship between the legal/moral capacity of men end the duties of human beings towards the Supreme Creator. Al-Dabūsī determined the reason/intellect as the principle of understanding the divine speech, and he identified the dhimma as the basis for a person to be under legal and moral obligations. After that he stated that human beings are equipped with three basic and inalienable rights, namely 'i'ma (immunity of life and property), liberty and property, in order for reason and dhimma to function. Just as reason and dhimma were bestowed on the human being by God, these three basic rights were also bestowed by Him so that man can fulfill his duty towards humanity. Thus, the theory of basic and inalienable rights was expressed for the first time in world history by the Islamic-Hanafi legal theory. The Latin phrase ius naturale covers both "natural law" -which has an ancient historyand "natural rights" in Western legal history. While objective natural rights/classical natural law tradition is centered on duty and obligation, the concept of subjective natural rights/modern natural law is based on the idea of individual freedom and the sovereignty of the individual. The classical understanding of natural law goes hand in hand with the idea of order of things and the teleological conception of universe. Thus, the universe becomes a purposeful and moral order with all its elements. While some authors argue that modern natural rights are a continuation of classical natural law, others believe that the conception of modern natural rights represents a break with natural law. According to Leo Strauss, this transformation that started with Hobbes and Locke is a fundamental one that requires us to see the two as different doctrines. While Michel Villey started the modern understanding of subjective natural rights with William of Ockham, Brian Tierney started her origins with the works of canon lawyers, who lived during the 12th and 13th centuries, well before William. However, no researcher has established a link between subjective natural rights and the three fundamental rights of al-Dabūsī, who died in the first half of the 11th century. There are approaches that admit the conception of natural human rights is a Western invention, and seek the origins of this understanding in the thought of the 12th and the 13th century medieval Christian law. However, there are also approaches that although admitting that the concept of natural human rights originates from the West, argue that this conception is a modern invention. In the criticism towards the subject-centered conception of modernity, this idea emerges, and in this approach, the understanding of natural human rights is seen as an unacceptable idea as it is perceived as an integral element of subjective individualism. Since rights can only be an issue for individuals who can be conceived as independent individuals, socialist and communitarian thoughts have also seen the natural human rights thought as a characteristic element of liberalism and rejected them. Duties, not rights, are essential for such approaches. Legal positivists, on the other hand, undermined the concept of rights on the grounds that it was loaded with metaphysics. Three basic rights expressed by John Locke (d. 1704) in the Western thought which were the same as the list of al-Dabūsī became in time the core notion of the modern understanding of human rights. John Locke says that in the state of nature before the occurrence of political society, every person has the right to life, liberty and property, equally and inalienably. It seems that the legal-moral capacity (ahliyya) and natural rights theory, which al-Dabūsī expressed for the first time, and which later became the common understanding of Hanafis, was partially secularized and adapted by Locke into his own understanding of liberal rights, whether directly by him or indirectly through medieval lawyers. After him this conception was completely secularized and formed the core of the basic understanding of human rights we know today. Since social and political life is essential in Muslim societies, there is no need for an imaginative state of nature (status naturae) conceived by thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke. The idea of natural rights inspired the great revolutions in the 18th century. In the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, it is stated that all people are created equally and given some inalienable rights by God. In the French Declaration of Human and Citizens' Rights (Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen), thirteen years after this date, the natural rights understanding is accepted as a clear truth in itself, but no reference are made again to the source of these rights, that is, God. The idea of natural rights fell into disarray in the 19th century due to the dominance of legal positivism, but returned to the agenda of Western legal and political thought in the 20th century due to actual necessities that emerged from the two world wars. Still, there is no longer a metaphysical ground on which natural rights are based, so today, natural human rights are in a philosophical crisis of origin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]