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Norm criticism is a well-spoken topic in the Swedish after-school center, never has the gender and race aspect been so debated as now. In this candidate thesis, norm criticism in the Swedish after-school center, is brought to the surface and put into the perspective of intersectionality through two cases. Their cultural background and normative values will also play a role. Our two cases connected through years of working in the after-school center, will be debated through different contemporary articles, literature and a observation as well to bring focus on norm critical pedagogy. We will work around the questions; how do we use norm critical pedagogy, if we don’t know whose norms to emanate from, and how important are norms really in our daily work as teachers? Do all students get the same treatment, or is there a difference between students with a minority background, and is there a difference between how teachers view, categories and judge them according to their own evaluation and norms? Normkritik är ett ämne som är omtalat i svenska fritidshem, aldrig har genus och rasaspekter varit så omdebatterat som nu. I detta kandidatarbete kommer normkritik i det svenska fritidshemmet att lyftas fram intersektionellt genom två berättelser, kulturella och normativa värden kommer även att spela en roll. Genom två beskrivna händelser, kopplat till år av arbete i fritidshemmet kommer vi att reflektera med hjälp av samtida artiklar, litteratur och en observation samt fokusera på normkritisk pedagogik. Vi kommer att utgå från frågeställningar som; hur använder vi oss av normkritisk pedagogik om vi inte vet vems normer vi utgår ifrån, och hur stor roll spelar egentligen normer i vårt dagliga arbete som lärare i fritidshem? Får alla elever samma bemötande i skolan, eller finns det en skillnad mellan elever från minoritetskulturer och är det skillnad på hur lärare bedömer och kategoriserar dem kopplat till deras egna värderingar och normer? Bedömningsgrad: VG

Den här studien presenterar, tolkar och analyserar Seyla Benhabibs kommunikativa etik samt undersöker vilka implikationer denna får för religionsdialog som praktisk diskurs. Med utgångspunkt från den kommunikativa etikens båda grundläggande principer om universell moralisk respekt och egalitär ömsesidighet samt idén om det radikalt situerade moraliska subjektet arbetar författaren fram ett förslag på normativa utgångspunkter för religionsdialog mellan kristna och muslimer i Sverige. Aspekter av genus och makt kommenteras särskilt. Studien visar på hur den kommunikativa etiken ställer långtgående krav på dialogens förutsättningar, förberedelser likväl som på dess deltagare. Samtidigt framträder en etik som inte väjer för kontroversiella frågor och obehagliga samtal. I studien framhålls dialogens upprätthållande och kontinuitet som det överordnade målet. This study presents, interprets and analyzes Seyla Benhabib's discourse ethics, and investigates its implications for religious dialogue as practical discourse. On the basis of the fundamental principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity, as well as the idea of ​​the situated moral self, the author proposes ten normative starting points for inter-religious dialogue between Christians and Muslims in Sweden. Aspects of gender and power are commented in particular. The study shows how discourse ethics impose far-reaching demands on the conditions of the dialogue, on the preparation of it as well as on its participants. The continuity of dialogue is emphasized as the overall goal.

This essay is based on a story where you get an eye on pedagogue’s different approaches to the pacifier in preschool. A pedagogues approach towards, for example, the pacifier affects how you choose to act and in the story it is seen that pedagogues can have different approaches to how to act against children´s use of pacifiers in preschool. In the reflection section, I discuss pedagogue’s different approaches to the pacifier and how one´s approach is formed. Discourse ethics has taken a large part in the essay as it can be used as a tool in the discussions between pedagogues when they have different approaches. How can different approaches affect the children and how these approaches can work in relation to power is something that is discussed in the essay. I will also analyse more deeply the power perspective to get an insight on such power that may not be so visible in everyday life, but which is found in all meetings between people. I have interviewed pedagogues in preschool to gain a better insight into how collegial relationships in preschool can be affected by different approaches towards the use of pacifiers, and what pedagogues regard as being important to consider when approaches collide. At the end of the reflection I discuss different performances and discourses about the pacifier in order to get an idea of ​​what can affect the approaches of pedagogues, and to show that it is not always easy to choose an approach when you do not know what is the "best" way.

The present study has a threefold aim: First, the theoretical aim is to give a contribution to refinement of the theory of dialogue based feminist ethics, concerning the understanding of judgment and narration within such an ethics. The study also has an empirical aim, defined as to clarify what kind of knowledge, relevant to the moral judgment of an engaged outsider actor, can be received from dialogical interpretation and analysis of a limited selection of critically reflecting life stories. Third, a methodological aim is defined as to develop an approach to interpretation and analysis of reflecting life stories, which renders the storyteller visible as a reflecting moral subject, and makes the story accessible as a source of knowledge for the moral judgment of an engaged outsider actor. The thesis combines philosophical reflection and argumentation, with a narrative-hermeneutic method for interpretation of life stories, relating the two to each other in a hermeneutic process. The theoretical reflection draws on Seyla Benhabibs theory of communicative ethics. A dialogue based model for moral justification and a likewise dialogue based model for political legitimacy are at the heart of this universalistic theory, although in combination with a conception of a narratively and hermeneutically constituted context sensitive moral judgment, based on Hannah Arendt’s concept “enlarged thought”. In the reflection, this model is related to other feminist theorizing within the tradition of dialogue based feminist ethics, as found in the works of Iris M. Young, Georgia Warnke and Shari Stone-Mediatore. The empirical study draws on three critically reflecting life stories from Israeli-Palestinian women activists for a just peace. The methodology for interpretation and analysis that is worked out combines dialogical interpretation as presented in Arthur W. Frank’s socio-narratology with a method for structural analysis derived from Shari Stone-Mediatores theory of storytelling as an expression of political resistance struggle. The results show that some stories drawing on marginalized experiences have a potential­ to stimulate further public debate through their capacity to enable a stereoscopic seeing, elucidating a tension between ideologically structured discourse and non-linguistic experience; implying that narrative-hermeneutic competence should be considered crucial for public debate.

The main question of this thesis is if a practice is right because it is prescribed by an ethical theory, or if an ethical theory is right because it follows from certain practices? I propose the following definitions to illustrate the main alternatives: (1) if a practice is determined by an ethical theory and the ethical theory is not determined by practice, it is possible to speak of a top-down model of ethical thinking. (2) If a theory, conversely, is determined by a practice and the practice is not determined by theory, it can be described as a bottom-up model. (3) If a practice is used in order to determine an ethical theory, which in turn can be used to assess new practical situations in a constantly evolving process, it can be labelled an interaction model. (4) Finally, it is possible that certain practices are the basis of morality, and do not need to be systemized in any ethical theory. The focus of this study is on alternatives (2), (3) and (4) where practice is given due weight and is characterized by a rejection of a strictly theoretical approach to ethics. I address representatives from some of the most influential alternatives such as: (2) Albert R Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin (casuistry), (3) Jürgen Habermas (discourse ethics), Alasdair MacIntyre (virtue ethics), Jonathan Haidt (experimental ethics) and (4) John Dewey, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty (pragmatism). I also discuss how some prominent theologians, such as Stanley Hauerwas (Christian virtue ethics) and James Gustafson (theocentric ethics), deal with similar questions. The purpose of this study is therefore to identify various positions represented in the debate, and to examine which consequences they have for how decisions are made and justified within an ethical framework. I argue that the strength of models that include practical concerns in ethical thinking is that they can contribute to our understanding of why ideals, norms and values differ between various social spheres, and how they change over time. Instead of taking the traditional position, where a basic assumption about the nature of moral questions is crucial to identify a reliable approach, it is possible to assess which approaches give reliable results and use these to identify the factors relevant to answer moral questions. I identify two main alternatives: a paradigmatic and a discursive way of treating moral issues. They address various aspects of human life and action, which means that they do not exclude, but rather enrich each other in the context of an overall debate. It seems possible that both types of studies can provide reasons for performing an action or accepting a theory, which can then be revised and give rise to new positions. From such a perspective, neither the image of man and the world, nor our standards, ideals and values are necessarily static, but can be revised and reconsidered within the context of a changing social, cultural and historical context.

The topic of this study is one specific area where the tension between instrumental rationality and value rationality becomes prominent: the question whether we have a rational responsibility for nature or not. Such a responsibility cannot be derived from instrumental reason, but it is argued that it can be derived from discourse ethics and communicative rationality. The study begins with an examination of Georg-Henrik von Wright's cultural criticism. It is argued that his subjectivist view of values limits reason to the realm of instrumental rationality. Horkheimer and Adorno's theory of instrumental reason is examined. They claim that instrumental reason, through the negative dialectics of the enlightenment, have created a vacuum with regard to values. Marcuse's anthropological solution to the problem of values, and his theory of an emancipatory science and technology, are examined and rejected as Utopian. The philosophy of Jürgen Habermas is examined, and it is shown how he solves the problem of his predecessors through the dual framework of work and interaction. His hypothesis of three knowledge- constitutive interests is analyzed, and it is concluded that a general theory of communication is needed in order to solve the problem of value rationality. It is shown how Habermas later theory of communicative rationality and discourse ethics overcomes the shortcomings of his earlier theory. It is argued, among other things, that his theory of communicative rationality is compatible with a correspondence theory of truth, ontological realism and epistemological fallibilism. Discourse ethics makes a rational discussion of values and norms possible. It is argued that it solves the problem of value rationality, but without providing a definition of the good or the right. It is shown that revisabilty is an important part of discourse ethics. This is manifested in the hypothetical status of discourse ethics, and in the revisability of the norms proposed. It is argued that we are in fact able to rationally propose a norm, which demands responsibility for nature within the framework of communicative rationality and discourse ethics, although such a norm must be the result of the outcome of a rational discourse and is itself, revisable. digitalisering@umu