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Copyright of Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Diseño y Comunicación is the property of Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Diseno y Comunicacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Informacion Comercial Espanola Revista de Economia is the property of S.G.E.E.I.P.C., Secretaria de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista MAD is the property of Revista MAD and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Artnodes is the property of Universitat Oberta de Catalunya and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Semestre Económico is the property of Sello Editorial de la Universidad de Medellin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Retos: Nuevas Perspectivas de Educación Física, Deporte y Recreación is the property of Federacion Espanola de Asociaciones de Docentes de Educacion Fisica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In recent years, some authors have warned of the increasingly widespread use of risk management techniques by financial institutions, arguing that this can cause the market to become more unstable. To analyse these claims, we present a model based on evolutionary game theory of a financial market, where part of the investors use the VaR technique to manage their risk. We study the evolution of this market through simulation, and we confirm that the use of risk management models can induce instability regimes in the market, characterised by sudden changes in the asset price and sharp increases in the volatility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article applies game theory in the company under study, in order to optimize the competitive strategy with respect to its main competitor in the bicycle and motorcycle market. Once the problem is defined, the zero-sum matrix between the competitors is established, then the model is processed using the corresponding mathematical model and the strategy that allows the best positioning in the market is selected. In addition, it is proven that, eventually, if the competitive strategic decisions are modified, it affects, in turn, the decision-making of rival companies, consequently in the strategic decision of the company taken as a case study. The objective of the study is to explain how game theory helps decision making through the application of tools and factors that determine the degree of importance in the organization. This research is quantitative, allowing the use of systematic processes to study the problem. This study has an explanatory scope, since it tries to establish the causes, the environment and the consequences, in this case, related to aspects of competitiveness linked to the company under study, applying game theory. The result of the investigation indicates that the implementation of game theory in the Motocentro company will help to achieve more sales of articles for bicycles and motorcycles, depending on the value assigned to the strategies established by the company. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mexican Journal of Economics & Finance / Revista Mexicana de Economia y Finanzas is the property of Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article analyzes the election of the governorship of the State of Mexico in 2023 from the game theory perspective, highlighting the existence of players who seek to maximize their utility. Game theory is used as a methodological tool to analyze the strategies of the main actors in the election. The electoral results are mentioned, emphasizing the rise of the Morena party in the State of Mexico. It also mentions an incident of a fight between PRI and PRD militants during a political event in Mexico. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Lúdica Pedagógica is the property of Universidad Pedaggica Nacional and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cuestiones de Filosofia is the property of Universidad Pedagogica y Tecnologica de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Mediterranean Journal of Communication / Revista Mediterránea de Comunicación is the property of Revista Mediterranea de Comunicacion / Mediterranean Journal of Communication and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Kavilando is the property of Kavilando and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In competitive environments, the design and election of strategies demand considered three potential sources of uncertainty: risks derived from self-actions, risks emerged from states of nature and risks derived from competitors´ decisions. The Real Options Theory analyses the first two risks, but doesn´t incorporate the uncertainty derived from competitors´ actions. For that, the Games Theory must be added to the model. Its develops a numerical model of Games Theory and Multinomial Real Options for value sequential preemption strategies and join venture. In addition, for the agreement a penalty calculator model is developed, an analytic tool for calculating monetary compensations facing contractual defaults. The strategies pure and mixed are selected with Nash equilibrium and valued with multinomial real options model. The theoretical framework exposes the binomial and multinomial model for valuing non correlation technological and markets risk. Also, Game Theory´ basic elements and resolutions forms are developed. Next, using the cases methodology, the model is applied for valuing preemption and join venture strategies cases. The obtained results are showed in extensive and matrix form. Finally, for inducing cooperative behaviors and agreement´s observance, the pecuniary fine valuation is exposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Diseño y Comunicación is the property of Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Diseno y Comunicacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The document presents a pedagogical experience based on gamification in creating a favorable environment for the learning of undergraduate students. The main objective is to devise a strategy grounded on game theory that promotes participation, motivation, and fun in teaching and learning cognitive skills in higher education. The research aimed at Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia students uses a descriptive qualitative method to analyze a sample of 290 students in the fifth and sixth semesters of the BA in Basic Primary Education. The results show a significant level of motivation in the educational setting and become an innovative reference for an educational strategy whose fundamental structure is based on gamification to develop pedagogical potential. The future graduate will acquire disciplinary skills from their training and axiological and procedural competencies to foster teaching and learning processes and break traditionality in the classroom. In addition, the use of technology as a mediator for developing an innovative educational model in higher education is proven. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Poética Medieval is the property of Instituto Universitario de Investigacion en Estudios Medievales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of EconoQuantum is the property of Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Retos, Revista de Ciencias Administrativas y Económicas is the property of Universidad Politecnica Salesiana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Colombian law used to provide that parents had to register children with their fathers' last names as the first one. In November 2019, Colombian Constitutional Court held that such rule was against the equal treatment of genders, allowing parents to register a child either with the father's or the mother's surname. This research, based on a game-theoretical approach as well as on models of the economic analysis of family law, applies such notions, lege lata, to the new rules allowing parents to bargain over property rights on their children's last names, focusing on married parents or in those who live together under similar arrangements. The paper also models such bargaining as both a battle of the sexes and a chicken game. Such approach offers new insights not only as to new case law's effects but also, and more generally, regarding the economic analysis of marriage and other family law issues. The text concludes that the bargaining over children's last names may be very complex not due to legal reasons but because of economic grounds such as a bilateral monopoly between parents and the fact that a last name is an indivisible object that is not traded in a traditional market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to model plural nominal concordance errors for a Spanish corpus of four learners of Spanish as a foreign language: SONIA (level A1/A2), NATI (level B1), JAKO (level B2), MIRKA (level C1). In the framework of dynamical systems, it is postulated that "correct" and "incorrect" concordances constitute stable discrete attractors to which the continuous flow of the system converges in three simple simulation models: Lokta-Volterra, coordination game (evolutionary games theory), gradient ascent. As a result, the models better approximate the global error pattern than the session pattern. In the latter, the model based on Lokta-Volterra offers better performance for SONIA, NATI and JAKO. MIRKA obtains the worst performance in all the models, but its error decreases with the gradient ascent model. It is concluded that learning patterns are self-organized and emerge from the dynamics of concordance microsystems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The beef cattle production model is characterized by being a process of sequential stages until the finished animal is achieved. Currently, the valuation of decisions under contexts typical of the activity is linear, static and simplistic. Due to the above, in the present work a commercial decision model is analyzed and valued, considering market risks, technological risks, values of flexibility and interdependence of commercials strategies. A multinomial model is proposed, using exotic real options of the rainbow type. Likewise, the articulation between both players is incorporated through the framework of game theory, reaching equilibrium. In the study, real models were used in cases of livestock in the Pampas region (Argentina), at values of March 2022. As a result, a prisoner's dilemma can be reached, determining what decision to make, incorporating flexibility in payments and the interdependence between the players. It can be concluded about the potential, simplicity and advantages of developing and applying a model of real options games in livestock complexes, valuing the strategic flexibility of decisions and strategic interdependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Kavilando is the property of Kavilando and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Scripta is the property of Scripta and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contaduría y Administración is the property of Facultad de Contaduria y Administracion-Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A systematic review of the specialized literature was carried out with the meta-synthesis method to know the theoretical and empirical trends that can be found in the scientific literature about game learning analytics. The search was carried out in 17 databases and 153 results were obtained. After applying certain exclusion criteria, 17 scientific research articles were admitted for analysis. The information was classified in design, validation, and implementation trends. The design findings suggest a tendency to simulate real environments to validate, not only serious play, but also the learning obtained by applying preand post-test measurements. A varied implementation was observed between educational purposes, training, or support for people with disabilities. Likewise, predesigned games and author's games with individual interactions were used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fundamental concepts of mean field game theory are presented in a simple way, showing that this can be seen as an ingenious coupling between the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equations for the treatment of complex systems with a number of very large agents. The concept of equilibrium for this type of games and some applications of this theory in different fields are also presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos del CILHA is the property of Universidad Nacional de Cuyo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Colombiana de Ciencias Sociales is the property of Fondo Editorial Fundacion Universitaria Luis Amigo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Ciencia Administrativa is the property of Universidad Veracruzana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales is the property of Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Capitalism is a non-mechanistic universe that expands globally from the constant increase in the speed of production promoting a development of social chaos. Chaos, encouraged by capitalism and its production, is built from a series of strategies in which the participants evolve in the game from the knowledge of the rules that transform their role in this economic system. This game poses a problem based on the fact that a minority of the participants condition the participation of a majority of the participants who have incomplete information about the game. This majority, clearly not knowing the rules of the game, and conditioned by the growth of production, observe how, in their environment, the reality in which they live is surrounded by social uncertainty. A problem and uncertainty that is reflected in the concentration of power of large cross-border companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas is the property of Centro de Investigacao e Estudos de Sociologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When selecting and designing strategies in competitive environments, three potential sources of uncertainty must be taken into account: risks deriving from self-actions, risks emerging from states of nature and risks present in competitors' decisions. That is why a numerical model that considers one's competitors' actions is needed to develop value strategies, joint venture design and penalty analysis. This paper proposes a simple numerical Game Theory and Real Options model with multiple sources of underlying risk. The first part sets forth the mathematical basis of the model, illustrating its function with case valuations related to strategies where there is no collaborative agreement. Cooperation strategies and default monetary penalties are then valued, and finally the main conclusions are drawn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This research focuses on valuing an investment project through the Theory of Real Options Games (ROG), this approach allows extending the standard valuation analysis including flexibility and uncertainty scenarios in market structures such as monopoly and oligopoly, given the importance of making decision in investment projects, there is a need to identify strategies with tools to overcome the limitations of traditional methods based on the discounted cash flow model (DCF), analysing the impact that may exist on investment when incorporating the actions of other market participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of ESTOA: Revista de la Facultad de Arquitectura y Urbanismo de la Universidad de Cuenca is the property of ESTOA Revista de la Facultad de Arquitectura y Urbanismo de la Universidad de Cuenca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Mercados y Negocios is the property of Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Divulgaciones Matematicas is the property of Universidad del Zulia, Facultad Experimental de Ciencias and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is an organization based in Washington, United States belonging to the World Bank, whose objective is the support to resolve conflicts between States. Three South American countries, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, at certain times have decided to leave this organism. This paper aims to determine the best strategy to follow for these countries to make the most convenient decision about to leave or not this organization. The solution of this problem is done by applying neutrosophic games. Game Theory is used to solve conflict situations among different parties. In this paper, neutrosophic games are non-cooperative, in normal form, two players and zero sum games. In addition, evaluations are carried out with linguistic terms associated with neutrosophic sets, where indeterminacy is part of the calculations and this is the reason for including neutrosophic sets in modeling this problem. Obviously, in a dispute there is uncertainty and also lack of information, contradictions among the parties, inconsistencies, and other phenomena which justify the use of neutrosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows the analysis of the capacity carried out in a HetNet, it proposes an adaptation of an algorithm of power control and spectrum allocation based on game theory. For this, users and base stations are randomly arranged within a simulation scenario, then the behavior is analyzed in terms of capacity proposed for voice and voice and data services. The results obtained are compared using the same simulation parameters with the ideal power control algorithm for the previously defined services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In public spaces, citizens face decisions that involve selfish or social cooperation behaviors, that affects the quality of urban life. What makes that their decision benefit the social group instead their individual benefit only? This article explores the dilemmas that individuals meet in the urban environment from the experimental model of game theory. Participated 80 people who had to decide, in pairs, between a responsible urban behavior (CUR, Spanish acronym) versus an uncivic behavior. Participants were distributed by random into four groups, consisting of 20 couples each one (on average). Each individual had to choose to act cooperatively or selfishly depending on their partner's decision to get the maximum benefit from the situation. Groups differed according the amount of benefits associated to reciprocity, high medium or nothing (altruism) and its concrete or abstract value. The results showed that the decision to opt for a CUR depends mostly on the magnitude of the benefit and the probability of receiving reciprocity, and to a lesser extent on altruism or the type of CUR involved in the situation. Findings are discussed based on their implications for citizen cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]