Search

Several philosophers have noted that metaphysical naturalism has been an assumption shared by the members of the scientific community involved in the research concerning the origin of life. It is a consequence of this presupposition that the emergence of life should have been very probable under the physical and chemical conditions in the primitive Earth. The state of the research on the origin of life, though, is very far from having a convincing naturalist hypothesis in the terms sought after. The attitude of the researchers and some philosophers has been to suppose that these failures are not reason to think that some other naturalist hypothesis won't work. Here, an epistemological reconstruction of this attitude in Bayesian terms is offered. It is argued that the insulation of metaphysical naturalism from disconfirmation is not rational, and would become an obstacle to the advancement of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mirai. Estudios Japoneses is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Sophia, Colección de Filosofía de la Educación is the property of Universidad Politecnica Salesiana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines the behaviour of the affirmative operator sipi in a corpus composed of messages extracted from the social network Twitter. Through the analysis of its syntactic peculiarities and its particular pragmatic-discursive values -with the tools of metaoperational grammar- an attempt is made, on the one hand, to deny its consideration as a mere colloquial variant of the adverb of polarity itself and, on the other, to position it within a general mechanism of "unfolding" or "splitting" of affirmation and negation basic operators that in different languages gives rise to elements of discursive closure and confirmatory value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anuario Argentino de Derecho Canónico is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Studia Histórica: Historia Moderna is the property of Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Some key points in the recent discussion concerning three central concepts for general philosophy of science are addressed: (i) failures in the covering-law notion of explanation; (ii) differences among Hempelian, hypothetico-deductive and Bayesian confirmation concerning some well-known paradoxes, and (iii) the prospects for "experimental" realism, also labelled as "entity-realism". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anuario Argentino de Derecho Canónico is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper describes the functions of the discourse marker en efecto. The main aim is to prove the hypothesis of frequently en efecto, works either as a modal marker or as a connective of confirmation, that is, it acts of a different way spite of sharing the same core meaning. However, this point is obscure in the literature, in which even it is mixed examples of other functions less frequent in the explanations. With the aim of proving this proposal, I have analyzed several traits of each distinguished function on the basis of corpus data. Therefore, we raise the study of corpus from a polifunctional point of view (paradigmatic and syntagmatic). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval is the property of Sociedad Espanola de Filosofia Medieval and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There are different Bayesian measures to calculate the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis h in relation to an experimental result e (where degree of confirmation is understood as an increment in probability). Firstly, we try to identify the basic dis-agreement among those measures and, also, in which situations it does matter. We claim that the crucial point here is whether the evidential support which e gives to h depends on h's prior probability or not. Then, we argue a negative answer to this question and, because of this, we favour the measure Sr(= log[p(h\e) /p (h)]). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present revision, it will be argued that two prestigious but incompatible linguistic theories (the generative and the systemic-functional) have been able to disconfirm and confirm some particular hypotheses from the basis of different pieces of empirical evidence. The particular confirmations of one theory or the other, are never conclusive, among other things, because there are apparently crucial experiences whose effects seem to favor (or contradict) one of the two theories considered. Both the generative and the systemic-functional theory are (like the rest of scientific theories) under-determined by the available evidence, however, this fact has not been an unavoidable obstacle for their development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two mature and renowned linguistic theories --the generative and the functional-- hold incompatible hypotheses. In spite of that, both have made successful confirmations. Given that in science there are no crucial refutations, incompatibility does not pose an insurmountable problem to the development of linguistics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]