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Copyright of Ius et Praxis (07172877) is the property of Universidad de Talca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Verba Iuris is the property of Universidad Libre Bogota, Centre de Investigaciones Socio Juridicas de la Facultad de Derecho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista del Instituto Colombiano de Derecho Procesal is the property of Instituto Colombiano de Derecho Procesal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The ontological principle "that it is and that is impossible not to be" is universally accepted yet Hegel is the first to contradict it. However, this principle, which Aristotle refers to as the "strong dialectic," requires that "everything must be stated or denied." The word "it is" has all the strength of a statement because without a verb there can not be a statement. "Not to be" is a denial. When our intellect compares the statement with its denial, it becomes clear and one can distinguish which relates to reality. The contradictory position occurs when ("A is") and its negation ("A is not"), however the contradiction never truly exists in reality but only in diction. Modern philosophy changes this formula. Leibniz believes that identity is "everything is what it is" ("A is A"). He also believes that the contradiction principle is a statement that is either true or false. This contradiction is conceptual ("A is not not-A") and it is applied when judging whether a statement is "true (T)" or "false (F)." The difference in Leibniz and Aristotle's argument lies in what Aristotle opposes "to be" to "not to be" while Leibniz contradicts "T" to "not T (F)." While Hegel follows Leibniz's line of thought in that he believes that the contradiction "S" and "P" is actually "S is P." The latter is a result of the fact that the negation is inherent to our identity: "S is S" because "S is not P." Hegel believes this contradiction is at a conceptual level, thereby disregarding "not to be" as "is not." His contradiction theory disregards the ontological negation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new criminal procedure has incorporated the adversarial model to the criminal trial, in which for the first time the parties are in charge of incorporating evidence in trial. In this context the witness examination, including their impeachment, has been handed over to the parties through cross-examination, its role to filter witness and expert testimony. One of the phases of the cross-examination is impeachment, which requires the correct development of this stage in order for the new model of public trial to produce precise evidence that will decide the litigious issue. This article discusses the possibility of using, during crossexamination, information from an annulled trial in order to discredit the witnesses' statements in a subsequent trial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]