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Copyright of Ideas y Valores is the property of Universidad Nacional de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

It has been suggested in the philosophy of mind that, contrasting with pure physical states, conscious states are those in which there is something that is like to be. Conscious states have a phenomenology. Assuming an intuitive distinction between sensory and cognitive conscious experiences, over the last years a debate has been established around the question about the phenomenal nature of our cognitive states, especially, our own thoughts. This has been called the cognitive phenomenology debate. A proper examination of the debate cannot be separated from a critical analysis of the ways in which we draw conclusions about the phenomenal components of our conscious lives. This paper examines some of the most fundamental problems deriving from the two main argumentative strategies used in the debate, namely, introspective reports and phenomenal contrasts. After analyzing how these strategies might support certain positions within the debate, the article explores how some aspects of the phenomenology of mathematical reasoning could enlighten the discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Praxis Filosófica is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article forms part of a series of reflections rooted in the experience of movement in the practice of dance. The proposal is to think of the body as a place of expression using key concepts of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy to discuss the expressive body from the perspective of its gesturality and its relationship with the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

El autor alude a los moldes veteromecánicos sobre los que ha sido construida la ciencia desde el Iluminismo hasta hoy, también las ciencias humanas. Desde la visión mecánica no solo resultaba un Deus ex machina sino, igualmente, un Homo extra machinam: no hay lugar para el ser humano en el mundo newtoniano. Este viejo paradigma científico ha cambiado hoy bajo las aportaciones de la física del siglo XX, pero en sede de filosofía práctica, aquel antiguo materialismo trata de proseguir su vida impertérritamente. Frente a él, un jurista advierte una pluralidad de formas, y comprueba que los argumentos que hay que dar a un ladrón vulgar, a un policía corrupto o a un conductor que conduce sin prudencia son necesariamente distintos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article does not try to "rethink" the theory of Antonio Gramsci to redefine his concepts and give some examples of them to match theory with reality, as does the pseudo-science. On the contrary, I want "unthinking" to put his theory trial to see the validity of the concepts, making a critical reflection in order to bring something new to a work that has been widely studied by critics and commentators, and respond where the validity of classical thinking to analyze contemporary phenomena is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Discusiones Filosóficas is the property of Universidad de Caldas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Calidad en la Educación is the property of Consejo Nacional de Educacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Estudios de Filosofía is the property of Universidad de Antioquia, Instituto de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the indigenous Maya distinction between two types of human bodies: a carnal body, shared with animals, and a specifically human phenomenic body. This distinction, in turn, is equivalent to the indigenous distinction between two souls: a soul in a human shape and a soul in a non-human shape, generally of an animal species. The parallelism between bodies and souls leads me to propose a reorganization of the Mesoamerican concept of person in terms of a quaternary model which remains essentially binary (body/soul), yet permits the integration of elements which are different to each other, like the two bodies and the two souls, and yet mutually necessary to make up the person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims at showing that the context of the current discussions about the nature of qualia gives a new perspective to understand Wittgenstein's statements in relation to certain subjective experiences that may be present in our linguistic performances. It is argued that on the basis of the concept of the experience of meaning, Wittgenstein identifies these experiences as qualitative features that may accompany our use of words and propositions. These features are the manifestation that we are conscious of the meaning of having a language and allow us to make certain uses of words that Wittgenstein identifies with the notion of secondary meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Endoxa is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Representationalism about qualia is the theory that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on its representational properties. A common worry about representationalism is that it has problems in explaining painful sensations. In this paper I review some important objections to Michael Tye's PANIC theory as a representationalist account of pain. I then go on to suggest that the PANIC account has the potential to answer those objections, if the "P" in PANIC -- that stands for "poised", that is, apt for the production of beliefs and desires -- is understood as being involved in the determination of content. I show that this alternative proposal emerges naturally from a particular way of unpacking Tye's normative notion of "optimal conditions" of representation, where optimal conditions are the conditions prevalent during the natural selection of the representational device. Then, from this perspective, I introduce the notions of indicative and imperative representations. Pains, it will turn out, are both indicative and imperative. Finally, I give an answer to the main objections to Tye's original proposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I present an objection to the Kripke-Chalmers version of the conceivability argument against physicalism. I also assess the prospects of this physicalist response in the light of two further difficulties: the epistemology of modality and the property dualism argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este artículo, que pretende definir un marco conceptual y filosófico coherente para la psiquiatría, plantea dos preguntas importantes: ¿cómo se interrelacionan la mente y el cerebro? y ¿cómo pueden integrarse las múltiples perspectivas explicativas de la enfermedad psiquiátrica? Se proponen y argumentan ocho propuestas: 1) la psiquiatría se basa, indefectiblemente, en experiencias mentales vividas en primera persona; 2} el dualismo esencial cartesiano esfalso; 3) el epifenomenalismo es falso; 4) ambas causalidades, cerebro-mente y mente-cerebro, son reales; 5) la etiología de los trastornos psiquiátricos es compleja y ya no se producirán descubrimientos "tipo espiroqueta" que expliquen su origen en términos simples; 6) el pluralismo explicativo es preferible a las explicaciones monásticas, sobre todo el reduccionismo biológico; 7) la psiquiatría debe superar la "batalla de paradigmas" precientífica para aceptar la complejidad y apoyar modelos explicativos empíricamente rigurosos y pluralistas, y 8) la psiquiatría debería esforzarse por alcanzar un "reduccionismo incompleto" ambicionando una "integración gradual" que explique las vías etiológicas complejas que conducen, paso a paso, a la enfermedad. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

El artículo se centra en la revista "La Ventana", que busca nuevas vías de reflexión y acercamiento a los fenómenos en el entorno social.