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Copyright of Revista Chilena de Derecho is the property of Revista Chilena de Derecho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper studies local governments' decisions on public debt under the Financial Discipline Law for States and Municipalities (ldfem in Spanish) in Mexico. It implies distinguishing economic and political factors and their relevance within ldfem's legal framework that defines norms and limitations for Mexican subnational governments. Based on municipal data for 2017-2019, our results prove that political variables significantly impact municipal debt. This paper highlights the elections' proximity and the incumbent mayor's electoral support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research on electoral accountability after corruption scandals has focused on the punishment of the incumbent party. The literature consensus is that scandals damage the incumbent party's electoral performance, but only mildly. However, the literature has not inquired the damage corruption scandals might do to the established parties' electoral performance, aside from the incumbent party's. Using time-series cross-sectional data from the Mexican states, I suggest that corruption scandals, besides possibly harming the incumbent party's electoral performance, might damage the established parties' electoral performance. Corruption scandals therefore could have an anti-establishment effect, not only an anti-incumbent effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Analecta Política is the property of Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Informacion Comercial Espanola Revista de Economia is the property of S.G.E.E.I.P.C., Secretaria de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyses the vacancies and appointments of bishops in Castile in the period between the death of Philip the Fair in September 1506 and the return of Ferdinand the Catholic from Naples in August 1507. During that year, the Royal Council and the Aragonese monarch arbitrated measures to defend the Royal Patronage after Queen Juana had refused to select people to cover the vacant seats, which were disputed by nobles, clergymen and courtiers. Nevertheless, Pope Julius II demanded the appointment of the incumbents who had died in Curia. New documentation sheds light on this unique situation in the Castilian Church, which Ferdinand had to resolve in order to regain the government. He was able to achieve this with the help of Archbishop Cisneros, who was in favor of electing bishops “who were good before the eyes of God and before the eyes of the people”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Trayectorias is the property of Universidad Autonoma de Nuevo Leon and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política is the property of Instituto de Ciencia Politica (Universidad de la Republica de Uruguay) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia Política is the property of Revista Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia Política and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Austral Comunicacion is the property of Austral Comunicacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Economica (00130419) is the property of Universidad Nacional de La Plata and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this study we are going to discuss and analyze new documents about the silversmith Juan de Arfe and his work in the monstrance of the cathedral of Ávila. The file, which has been kept in the Diocesan Archive of Ávila, is composed of a copy of the contract, correspondence sent by Arfe to the church's incumbents, payment and power letters, and also the complete appraisal of the monstrance. Furthermore, through these documents, we can know some of the names of the skilled who worked for Arfe and the details of the monstrance creating process. All of this will allow us to increase our knowledge about the artist's first masterpiece. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the primaries have been popularized as the mechanism for selecting candidates more open and participatory, often generate the opposite effect, strengthening the personalization of politics and not the institutionalization of parties. We study the primaries of Chile made by the coalition of center-left (Concertation) to choose their candidates for mayor in 2012. We argue, first, forcing major electoral candidate incumbent, reduced turnout. Secondly, that the voter turnout in the general election was almost identical between communes where were and were not primary. Thirdly, that primaries improved eligibility mainly on the challengers. In consequence, the primaries did not stimulate turnout, but contributed to the success of the candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electoral preferences radically changed between 1994 and 2012. Based on surveys taken from voters as they left the polling place, this article analyzes the relationship between the voter's perception of change in the economic situation and preference for the incumbent party in this period. Economic retrospective vote is one feature of voter's behavior widely present, of a small magnitude and almost constant in all elections, except in moments of big economic changes. The effect of economic perceptions on the vote for the incumbent party is of a limited magnitude, because voter's party identification mediates this relationship between perceptions and vote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a significant trend in Latin America of extending term limits for the presidency in order to allow reelection. There is also evidence that incumbency advantage matters of those presidents seeking reelection in different countries tipically win their electoral bids. Based on a dataset of 137 elections in 18 countries in Latina America, this paper describes the evolution of different reelection schemes since the transition to democracy, reports the success rates for presidential incumbents and estimates the impact of incumbency on electoral margins controlling for institutional and economic variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This thesis has two main objectives: (i) to analyze empirically, using data from municipal elections in Guatemala for the period 1999-2011, the effect of incumbency on the probability of being reelected and (ii) to explore the possible cause of the effects obtained from the estimations. To do this, a regression discontinuity estimation strategy is implemented exploiting the inherent discontinuity in the system of simple majority voting. Paradoxically, the findings show that far from being an advantage, incumbency seems to be an electoral disadvantage. The result extends to political parties. In the second part, the results are mixed, but suggest that elections seem to play an accountability role, but also are an important mechanism to discover the type (or quality) of politicians. This work is an important contribution to the limited literature on the dynamics of local elections in Guatemala and opens the door to future research issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a prolific debate in contemporary political science involving the determinants of candidates' vote share. Incumbency has been identified as one of the strongest explanatory variables, hence in some contexts this condition may translate, for candidates hoping to win their reelection, a substantive advantage in comparison to challengers, even in highly partisan scenarios. However, this apparent advantage has been questioned in contexts where the level of consolidation of political and party system is still limited, concluding that in such contexts incumbency has a harmful effect upon these candidates. This research constitutes the very first effort to tackle this topic in the Peruvian political context. Therefore, we propose a methodological model suitable for the assessment of electoral performance of candidates in two instances: when these candidates are still not incumbents and, afterwards, when they become so. According to the latest findings regarding this topic, we prove Peruvian results to be similar to those from the group of countries where incumbency is conceived as a disadvantage for candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to what an important part of the theory says, campaign expenditure has a significant effect on the electoral success of incumbents in the House of Representatives elections of 2005 in Chile. Moreover, electoral performance of expenditure is greater for those candidates with more than one period in office. Campaign expenditure not only adds to the ''incumbency advantages'' of incumbents, but multiplies their effect on electoral performance. Secondly, it is assessed that incumbents who won in 2001 by greater margins in their coalition tend to show greater campaign expenditures (contrary to what was expected). On one hand, this fact is coherent with the idea that candidates tend to perceive that their expenses multiply their qualities and do not present diminishing returns. This behavior is also reinforced by rationale of the public campaign financing, which reimburses money according to votes attained and makes, as theory suggests that the decision to spend be influenced by the expectations of getting a greater subsidy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Ars Boni et Aequi is the property of Universidad Bernardo O'Higgins, Facultad de Derecho y Comunicacion Social and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)