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In light of the chaotic scenario that exists in Colombian case law regarding civil liability for damages caused by medical services, this article presents an analytical and critical overview of the positions adopted by Colombian jurisprudence (in ordinary and administrative litigation) in regards to medical liability, in order to take a personal position in this matter. To this end, the following items are analyzed: (i) traditional elements that result in civil liability, (ii) the nature of medical liability: contractual or tort liability, (iii) and the controversial issue of the burden of proof, both in terms of fault (or wrongful services) and in terms of the chain of causation between negligence and damages. In the end, it is accepted that while the elements shaping traditional medical liability do not oblige the application of any evidentiary theory in particular, the constitutional principle of equity does require applying the theory of the "dynamic burdens of proof" when proving the fault, as well as lightening the burden of proof on the causal bond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ordinary and arbitral precedents have contributed important criteria to understand the commercial agency contract, highlighting the stability and independence that characterize it and distinguish it from other contracts. However, controversy persists regarding indemnity, a special form of protection established in favor of the agent to avoid abusive and unexpected termination of the agency. This figure is unrenounceable, its value can be brought to the date of payment and, despite the criticism, the parties are entitled to agree on forms of early payment of that obligation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The continuing changes in the system of guarantees in selection processes for public contracts, at a legal and regulatory level, have brought about significant jurisprudential and doctrinal shifts in relation to this insurance, a private law contract interlaced with elements of public policy. But, unlike the performance guarantee, not much has been written regarding the offer-reliability guarantee, which justifies making an analytical study, case law and regulatory-wise, regarding the concept, nature, classification and regime of this type of insurance --whether the provisions governing the insurance contract in the Commercial Code, or special rules of the administrative regulations are applicable--, its essential elements, its value, the claim and the prescription of the insurance contract. All of the above is meant to reveal the properties of this contract, as well as to identify which of the precedents and doctrinal pronouncements relating to the performance guarantee are applicable to it, given its particular nature, the presence of a public entity and the moment of its constitution, as a condition enabling the selection process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In United States, for nearly a century "resale price maintenance" was considered a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. However, in the ruling Leegin Creative Products, Inc. V. PSKS, Inc. (June 28, 2007), the Supreme Court shifted from the per se illegality to a scrutiny under the rule of reason, which is "the traditional system of analysis" under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Now the courts must analyze each case to weigh the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of the practice in question. This shift forces us to study the practical impact of the decision in the United States and reassess doctrines that for this purpose had been taken elsewhere who had taken the Americans by model, such as Colombia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Statute of the Lawyer (DL 196/71) regulates the conduct of this professional, laying the foundations for a behavior that accords with the dignity of the law and the probity in its exercise within a social function. The student-body legal offices are based upon the social function and art. 229 of the Constitution, which authorizes the legislator to determine the cases in which the access to justice will not require representation of a lawyer. On the other hand, articles 31 and 33 of the Statute, questioned as to harm the right to the technical defense in penal matters, were found to comply with the Constitution because only those cases of certain complexity demand representation of a lawyer, whereas others will be favored by the speed in the performances. As far as the ethics of the lawyer is concerned, there are four bios or lives that can be assumed in the activity of the litigant: 1) Justice Bios: the lawyer must only demand, before the judge, what by justice corresponds, may it be favourable to its defendant or not. Under this view, they demand for extended functions for the judge so that he rules in justice; 2) utilitarian Bios: the lawyer's only professional goal is to win cases, satisfying his ego and monetary aims, marginalizing --or crushing-- all ethical concepts. DL 196 of 1971 tries to resist this tendency consecrating the professional duties of the lawyer and the faults, but it has not been obtained to a great extent. 3) legal Bios: it is the idolatry and, thus, subordination to the text of the law 4) prudent Bios: it harmonizes and hierarchizes all that is valuable of the previous ones. This is the one that persecutes the Statute of the Lawyer, but the Colombian lawyer has degenerated into the utilitarian one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ruling of the International Court of Justice on the "Case concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)" is crucial in the international arena, inasmuch as it contains the first jurisdictional analysis on the international responsibility of a State of the crime of Genocide. In addition, it sheds lights on the issue of the rights and obligations that result from the Convention against Genocide, and that of obligations of means like the prevention of Genocide. Only a contextualized study of the ruling reveals the Court's peculiar use of concepts: this Tribunal resorts to concepts like "total control" to discard the configuration of the crime in opportunities in which, according to the elements of the genocide previously delineated by the international doctrine and jurisprudence, was undeniably perpetrated. However, we cannot ignore that the Court has advanced in extending the reach to the obligations derived from the Convention against Genocide. Therefore, though much is still to be done, the ruling is a hint of innovation that will probably lead, when the state-of-the-art allows it, to something closer to justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]