In the present paper it is my intention to assess some central arguments on which are recently founded David Charles' interpretations about the so called Aristotle's nominal definition, its commitments and scopes, in connection with the scientifically successful enquiry of Posterior Analytics. On one hand, I discuss two issues on his arguments. One concerns the deduced consequences from his thesis related to Aristotle's (analytically separable) three-stage view of scientific enquiry. This consequences states his position about semantic depth of names. The other concerns an argument which —according to Charles— accounts for Aristotle's position about what is worth definition (horismós). On the other hand, 1 point out a certain unsuitability of the interpretation of an evidence (93a 30-6), presented in favour of the interpretation of another passage (93b 30-3), according to which in B 10 Aristotle set out one's three-stage view of scientific enquiry which has, in the first stage, a nominal definition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]