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The early termination of Public-Private Partnerships (ppp) usually occurs at any time during the life of the project, causing large costs for the parties. Specifically, the toll road concessions are exposed to high demand risk. Usually, highway concession contracts incorporate a compensation mechanism in case of early termination. However, the traditional techniques of the Discounted Cash Flow (dcf) used to value infrastructure projects do not capture the irreversibility of the investment, the uncertainty and the mechanisms of compensation for risk that allow taking actions to the parties involved in a concession contract. The early termination of a toll road concession can be valued as the concessionaire's right to abandon the execution of the project. The objective of this document is to assess the mechanism of early termination of a toll road concession as a contingent asset, implementing the theory of real options, where the value of the abandonment option depends on the risk of demand. The valuation methodology is applied to a real case study of the Program of the Fourth Generation of Highway Concessions (4G) by Colombian Government. The valuation of early termination mechanisms can help to understand ex-ante the risks faced by the public and private parties of a highway concession contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]