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This paper analyzes the protection of victims of forced migration from the perspective of the philosophy of law and international human rights law. On the one hand, it focuses on the origin and philosophical-legal foundations of human dignity and its practical requirements as a legal principle. Understood in this sense, dignity is considered as the foundation of the most basic human rights; and implies universally enforceable legal prerogatives in favor of all persons, by the mere fact of their human nature; and without considering exogenous factors, such as origin or nationality. Within this context, fundamental notions such as ius communcationis, or the right of sociability of human beings and hospitality, which entail a common use of the universal land within the comunitas orbis or universal community, are recovered. It is concluded that, despite the efforts and the many legal instruments that exist in this regard, and which are based on the dignity of the individual, the protection afforded to them in practice is not sufficient. The reason for this lies in several factors, in particular, in the fact that although human dignity can be considered as the basis for the recognition of human rights on equal terms, its scope is limited to the most fundamental rights, such as life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, but does not imply more specific rights such as freedom of movement or residence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the problematic aspects of the thesis that bases human rights on the dignity of the person are presented. Following the metaphysics of the person of Thomas Aquinas, the ontological consistency referred to in this term is studied. Then the ideological inspiration of both modern «human rights» and Kantian ballast dignity is reviewed. The elements of natural rights that still exist in modern human rights theory are based on human nature, not directly and exclusively in the ontological dignity of the person. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]