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"Kant's Aesthetics and the Problem of Aesthetic Judgement in Music". This paper reconstructs the place of music in the division of the arts proposed by Kant in his third Critique, focusing on the aspects that make music an art difficult to characterise. For this purpose, it exposes the foundations that allow situating music at the highest levels of Kant's incipient system of the arts, as well as the reasons that allow placing it on the lowest ones. In addition, the paper approaches the problem of the pendular place of music as a beautiful art and as an agreeable art, recovering and contrasting different passages of Kant's Critique of Judgement. To complement this last aim, readings from different thinkers are reviewed, considering, on the one hand, those who claim that Kant characterises music as a beautiful art, and, on the other hand, those who claim that he characterises it as a mere agreeable art. Finally, this paper presents the conclusions that allow to understand that music's double possibility, as a beautiful and as agreeable art, depends on the ways in which the subject relates to music. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Some Reflections on the Ethical-legal Parallel in Kant's Religion". The aim of this paper is to contribute to understanding the ethical-legal parallel drawn in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. I will analyze the similarities, differences and the analogy among the ethical state of nature, the exeundum and the community, on the one side, and the juridical state of nature, the exeundum and the community, on the other. I will argue that moral progress, understood as overcoming radical evil, requires a complement between the ethical and legalpolitical spheres, given that each area provides a different approach and a different community solution within the same public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we aim to look into French philosopher Gilles Deleuze's work in order to see whether there is such a thing as a 'reversal of Kantianism', parallel to his more well-known reversal of Platonism. To this end, we will propose, firstly, to read in the key of reversal the movements made by Deleuze regarding intensity and extension, on the one hand, and the paradox of inner sense, on the other. Then, we will analyze why Kant had already accomplished two great reversals, regarding the classical conception of both time and law, and consequently, we will develop the Deleuzean conception of Nietzschean eternal return as a simultaneous reversal of both aspects. Finally, we will inquire about the tropos of the aforementioned reversal, calling on the concepts of humor and irony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to investigate the meaning and function that culture plays as an existential activity in the work of Kant, driving special attention to the Critique of Judgment and to the materials furnished by the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, having as key goal the survey of its anthropological and social sources. From this perspective, I intend first to argue that the Kantian analysis of life and the intrinsic nihilism recognized in it largely explain the origin of the concept of culture in Kant, basically understood as a set of practices that allow human beings to extract some teleological performance from time passing. Secondly, I will discuss the phenomenon of entertainment as an anthropological key subject to deepen in the necessity of the advent of culture in human society. Both purposes belong to what I consider a Kantian genealogy of culture, adequate for the interpretation of the link between the theoretical and practical use of reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Husserl's Appropriation of the Categorical Imperative". Husserl's attempts to elaborate a formal ethics analogous to logic reaches its highest point in the formulation of a superior formal law of practice, i.e., the categorical imperative, considered by him to be the central problem in ethics. Such formulation constitutes the main core of a system that, at its most fundamental level, aims to determine the formal laws of correct action. In this framework, the aim of the paper is to determine the precise meaning, function and scope of the Husserlian appropriation of the categorical imperative and its relationship with its main reference in the elaboration of a formal ethics: Kantian ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Incursion of the Sublime in Ethics according the Kantian Precritical Period". The main objective of this paper is to investigate the originality of the kantian treatment of the sublime. We will study the version corresponding to the pre-critical period, in order to point out that even in this period Kant distances himself from the dominant mode of analysis, represented by Edmund Burke's work. We think that the novelty of the kantian approach lies in the close link established between the sublime and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the section "Private right" of Kant's Doctrine of Right. I propose that the analysis of "the external mine and thine", which takes place in this section, has the function of proving that there is a kind of subjective right related to the possession of external objects of choice: the acquired rights. These rights, as well as the innate right, require for their effective exercise the foundation of a state legislated by the general will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the section "Private right" of Kant's Doctrine of Right. I propose that the analysis of "the external mine and thine", which takes place in this section, has the function of proving that there is a kind of subjective right related to the possession of external objects of choice: the acquired rights. These rights, as well as the innate right, require for their effective exercise the foundation of a state legislated by the general will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between the two kinds of schemata of the ideas of reason introduced by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. On the one hand, Kant holds that the schemata of reason are principles, rules or procedures (those of homogeneity, specification and continuity). On the other hand, Kant states that those schemata are objects in the idea or imaginary objects (those of the soul, the world and God). I call the first schemata "dynamic", and the second ones, "static". In the first place, I hold that the three dynamic schemata are applied jointly to each one of the static schemata. In the second place, I state that the application of the dynamic schemata to the static schema of the idea of God is a condition of the application of those dynamic schemata to the two other static schemata. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between the two kinds of schemata of the ideas of reason introduced by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. On the one hand, Kant holds that the schemata of reason are principles, rules or procedures (those of homogeneity, specification and continuity). On the other hand, Kant states that those schemata are objects in the idea or imaginary objects (those of the soul, the world and God). I call the first schemata "dynamic", and the second ones, "static". In the first place, I hold that the three dynamic schemata are applied jointly to each one of the static schemata. In the second place, I state that the application of the dynamic schemata to the static schema of the idea of God is a condition of the application of those dynamic schemata to the two other static schemata. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Mathematics, synthetic unity and constitutive a priori". Starting from the emphasis about the kantian idea of the originary synthetic unity of apperception like the basic function on which rest the production of all synthetic judgment, in this paper I defend the idea of constitutive a priori of experience under the form of a similar synthetic principle but essentially formal, namely, the concept of transformation and group of transformations. To the same time, I try to show that Kant himself inspired, for articulate his own position, on mathematics, especially on synthetic geometry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Where Is Kant's Objective Deduction?". The preface to the first edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is marked by a distinction between objective and subjective sides of the transcendental deduction. The objective side alone is said to be essential to Kant's main purpose and is also said to retain its full strength even if the subjective side is not found to be convincing. The thesis of this paper is twofold. First, that the most prominent accounts of this distinction in the literature are all subject to insuperable objections. Second, that the meat of the objective side is not to be found in the chapter explicitly devoted to the transcendental deduction but rather in the second chapter of the Analytic of Principles. What this implies is that a portion of the text frequently held to be the very heart of the Critique is said in the preface to the first edition to be inessential. We must therefore ask whether it is and be prepared to justify any divergence from the position espoused by Kant himself in 1781. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]