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The concept of Eurasia is one of the most important elements of geopolitics, dating back to the beginning of the last century, and whose development owes much to the works of geographers and political thinkers alike. Nevertheless, although comprising a big portion of the planet’s political space, this region suffers from a relative ‘organizational gap’, especially if compared with neighboring regions such as Western Europe and Southeast Asia for instance. This paper contends that the lack of an overarching political arrangement in Eurasia owes much to particular aspects of the Russia-China relationship, which encompasses Great Power aspirations and competing organizational schemesin the region. Different views about Eurasia itself, associated with a quest for leadership in regional institution-building, put both Russia and China on competitive tracks, essentially obstructing the formation of a broad political design in the broader continent. To substantiate our point, the present work applies certain concepts from historical institutionalism, whose mechanisms enabled a thorough evaluation of patterns of inception, continuation, and change of political institutions, alliances and principles affecting the Sino-Russian relationship over time, as well as its effects on Eurasia’s ‘organizational gap’ per se.

The charge of Russophobia has been made increasingly frequently against Western critics of Russia in the last few years. Much of this criticism has been made by Russian media and commentators rather than by high officials of the Russian state. There have been several studies of this media use of accusations of Russophobia and it has generally been asserted that the charge of Russophobia is part of a concerted propaganda effort by the Russian state. There has, however, been little examination of the use of Russophobia by top Russian politicians. This article examines the use of Russophobia by President Vladimir Putin as well as by top officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in communiques of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It finds that there has been only minor changes in the allegations of Russophobia by senior Russian politicians. The article looks at why Russophobia became a more prevalent accusation in Russian politics generally and at why there has been a difference in the accusations of Russophobia made by the media and in official political discourse. Negli ultimi anni l’accusa di russofobia è stata assunta sempre più frequentemente contro i critici occidentali della Russia. Gran parte di questa critica è stata formulata dai media e dai commentatori russi piuttosto che dagli alti funzionari dello Stato russo. Ci sono stati diversi studi sull’uso da parte dei media delle accuse di russofobia ed è stato generalmente affermato che l’accusa di russofobia fa parte di uno sforzo di propaganda concertato da parte dello Stato russo. C’è stato, tuttavia, un piccolo esame dell’uso della russofobia da parte dei migliori politici russi. Questo articolo esamina l’uso della russofobia da parte del presidente Vladimir Putin, nonché da alti funzionari del Ministero degli Affari esteri e nei comunicati di questo dicastero. Si ritiene che ci siano stati solo piccoli cambiamenti nelle accuse di russofobia da parte di alti politici russi. L’articolo esamina il motivo per cui la russofobia è diventata un’accusa più diffusa nella politica russa in generale e perché c’è stata una differenza nelle accuse della russofobia avanzate dai media e nel discorso politico ufficiale. Parole chiave: Russofobia, politica estera russa, Putin, discorso politico ufficiale russo

Abstract This article assesses the normative resistance to Responsibility to Protect adopted by Brazil and Russia against the backdrop of their international identities and self-assigned roles in a changing global order. Drawing upon the framework of Bloomsfield’s norm dynamics role spectrum, it argues that while the ambiguous Russian role regarding this principle represents an example of ‘norm antipreneurship’, particularities of Brazil’s resistance are better grasped by a new category left unaccounted for by this model, which this study portrays as ‘contesting entrepreneur’.

This article examines Russia's discursive reaction to sanctions imposed by the West during the Ukrainian crisis. By portraying sanctions as a new form of containment, the Kremlin has been able to rally public opinion behind a narrative framing the crisis as the consequence of Western hegemonic ambitions against resurgent Russia. Further, withstanding and countering Western sanctions has been presented as a test of Russia's ability to remain a Great Power. As a consequence, even if sanctions were to be lifted, Moscow's relationship with the West would remain deeply problematic. Russia's foreign policy is therefore likely to remain assertive in the years to come.