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Abstract Truthmaking (2023), by Jamin Asay, is part of the “Elements in Metaphysics” series, published by the Cambridge University Press. The book is an excellent brief introduction to truthmaking theory: accessible, clear, and enjoyable, covering the most fundamental problems of the field. One of the highlights of the book is the chapter on truthmakers for truths concerning social constructions. It successfully shows that truthmaking theory is not only related to abstract metaphysical problems but is also tied to central puzzles in ethics and political philosophy (more specifically philosophies of race and gender).

Abstract In the literature, there are several claims about the centrality of a pro- cess ontology. It has often proved difficult, however, to understand what a process is supposed to be, and what the central difference to thing-based ontologies amounts to. It would be useful to see what an abstract account of this difference consists in. This paper provides a sketch of what logic we should use for a process-based ontology, and argues that intuitionistic logic, and smooth infinitesimal analysis, provide a useful basis for process ontology. A brief sketch of probability for processes is made.

Abstract A critical review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s Two Arguments for the Identity of Indiscernibles.

Abstract According to a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, the causal role of human consciousness in the measuring process is called upon to solve a foundational problem called the “measurement problem.” Traditionally, this interpretation is tied up with the metaphysics of substance dualism. As such, this interpretation of quantum mechanics inherits the dualist’s mind-body problem. Our working hypothesis is that a process-based approach to the consciousness causes collapse interpretation (CCCI) -leaning on Whitehead’s solution to the mind-body problem- offers a better metaphysical understanding of consciousness and its role in interpreting quantum mechanics. This article is the kickoff for such a research program in the metaphysics of science.

Abstract I describe the key features of pure process realism-realism about the processes that are identified by experimental dynamics structured by scientific models-showing that the view meets criteria for scientific realism. I argue that process realism resolves many of the worries of the antirealist, including the problems of idealization, underdetermination, contextuality, multiplicity, and the pessimistic meta-induction. I show this resolution in the context of a contentious model from physics: the Bohr model of the atom. I then generalize from this discussion to a collection of upshots and constraints on process realism as a view, in order to further distinguish it from orthodox, substance-paradigmatic- or thing-realism. Therefore, pure process realism is shown to be a form of realism compatible with empiricism.

Abstract Process aspects are prevalent in many domains of reality, and consciousness is no exception. Nevertheless, while the processual approach implicitly underlies the theories of consciousness, an explicit statement of the question is scarcely found in the literature. This paper tries to bridge this gap. Here, I argue that conscious experience fulfils all the requirements for a processual analysis: it is complex, functionally/causally determined, and has a temporal basis. Then, I revisit an old concept, self-transformative processes, which refers to processes that change themselves. These processes are very common. A stretched bow is the classical Heraclitean example. However, it is easy to misunderstand what self-transformativeness is. To provide a well-formed description, I characterize self-transformative processes in terms of composition (using a non-classic mereology) and in terms of functionality (by developing the concept of self-modulating variables). Finally, I apply self-transformative processes to explain consciousness. Traces of self-transformativeness can be found in many theories of consciousness, particularly when they are stressed about their internal mechanisms. Here, I focus on Integrated Information Theory as a paradigmatic example of a mathematically well-described theory, and I demonstrate that quantitative self-transformativeness is a requirement at the very core of the integration of the information.

Abstract In a previous paper in this journal, Jennifer Frey presented three arguments against New-Kantian approaches. This paper briefly reiterates these arguments and shows why New-Kantian positions do not succumb to them. Most noteworthy, such positions are formal and not substantive. They care little about the question whether people pursue the same goods and instead stress the role of procedure in explicating rationality and consent in explicating the good. By stressing this distinction between formal and substantive approaches, this paper also provides a hint to the contentious topic of how Kantians can deal with cultural diversity, historicity, and plurality in ethics. It finishes with some questions to the author of the previous paper: do non-formal approaches imply that peace can only exist within similarity?

Abstract This article discusses Rik Peels's response to Williams's argument against voluntary belief. Williams argues that voluntary beliefs must be acquired independently of truth-considerations, so they cannot count as beliefs after all, since beliefs aim at truth. Peels attempted to reply by showing that in cases of self-fulfilling beliefs, a belief can indeed be voluntarily acquired in conditions which retain the necessary truth-orientation. But even if we make two crucial concessions to Peels’s proposal, his argument ultimately fails. The first concession is that beliefs can be weakly voluntary-namely, we can acquire them at will though we do not preserve them at will but on the basis of evidence. Conceding this, however, only lands us in the “acquisition problem”: how a belief can be acquired qua belief when we still do not think we have justification for it. This leads us to the second concession: that knowing in advance that a certain belief is self-fulfilling provides us with such a justification. However, this concession lands us in the ultimate obstacle: that, precisely because such a justification is available both before and at the moment of forming the belief, the cognitive perspective of the subject is identical at both moments, which obscures what it even means to say that at a certain moment she started to have a belief.

Abstract Dung’s argumentation frameworks are formalisms widely used to model interaction among arguments. Although their study has been profusely developed in the field of Artificial Intelligence, it is not common to see its treatment among those less connected to computer science within the logical-philosophical community. In this paper we propose to bring to that audience a proof-theory for argument justification based on tableaux, very similar to those the Logic students are familiar with. The tableaux enable to calculate whether an argument or subset of arguments are accepted or rejected in accordance to Dung’s preferred and grounded extension-based semantics. Soundness and completeness results regarding those semantics are provided.

Abstract In this discussion note, I aim to reconstruct and assess Korsgaard's recent attempt to extend her regress argument. I begin, in section 1, with a brief recapitulation of the regress argument. Then, in section 2, I turn to the extension. I argue that the extension does not work because Korsgaard cannot rule out the possibility--a possibility for which there is both empirical evidence and argumentative pressure coming directly from the original regress--that we value animality in ourselves qua animality of rational beings.

Abstract According to Streumer and Wodak, a particular type of formal objection to normative error theory fails because it rests on a questionable assumption about the logical duality of the normative concepts of permissibility and impermissibility. In this discussion, we argue that there is an error in their indictment; as such, the formal objection to normative error theory might still prevail.

Abstract Quasi-truth (a.k.a. pragmatic truth or partial truth) is typically advanced as a framework accounting for incompleteness and uncertainty in the actual practices of science. Also, it is said to be useful for accommodating cases of inconsistency in science without leading to triviality. In this paper, we argue that the formalism available does not deliver all that is promised. We examine the standard account of quasi-truth in the literature, advanced by da Costa and collaborators in many places, and argue that it cannot legitimately account for incompleteness in science. We shall claim that it conflates paraconsistency and paracompleteness. It also cannot properly account for inconsistencies, because no direct contradiction of the form S ∧ ¬S can be quasi-true according to the framework; contradictions simply have no place in the formalism. Finally, we advance an alternative interpretation of the formalism in terms of dealing with distinct contexts where incompatible information is dealt with. This does not save the original program, but seems to make better sense of the apparatus.

Abstract This paper investigates the question “when is a logic more expressive than another?” In order to approach it, “logic” is understood in the model-theoretic sense and, contrary to other proposals in the literature, it is argued that relative expressiveness between logics is best framed with respect to the notion of expressing properties of models, a notion that can be captured precisely in various ways. It is shown that each precise rendering can give rise to a formal condition for relative expressiveness that has appeared in the literature. Five such conditions are exposed, tested for some properties and compared to each other. As the formal conditions for relative expressiveness have various levels of stringency, some results on lifting some conditions to stricter ones are explored. Finally, a discussion on the properties of these formal conditions is presented. Special attention is given to notion of meaning equivalence, and how one may consider that it holds or not, depending on the weight attributed to logical and non-logical constants in expressiveness comparisons.

Abstract It is often claimed that the theory of function levels proposed by Frege in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik anticipates the hierarchy of types that underlies Church’s simple theory of types. This claim roughly states that Frege presupposes a type of functions in the sense of simple type theory in the expository language of Grundgesetze. However, this view makes it hard to accommodate function names of two arguments and view functions as incomplete entities. I propose and defend an alternative interpretation of first-level function names in Grundgesetze into simple type-theoretic open terms rather than into closed terms of a function type. This interpretation offers a still unhistorical but more faithful type-theoretic approximation of Frege’s theory of levels and can be naturally extended to accommodate second-level functions. It is made possible by two key observations that Frege’s Roman markers behave essentially like open terms and that Frege lacks a clear criterion for distinguishing between Roman markers and function names.

Abstract Philosophy of language has been witnessing for the last fifteen years or so, if not a turn, at least the rising of a new trend, with its usual methods applied to new non-semantic phenomena linked to language use in the context of politics, and with new methods arising from the distinctive features of the new subject matter. Among these phenomena, dogwhistles have taken somewhat of a center stage (other phenomena include ethnic slurs, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, propaganda and gender-inclusive language, among others). This special issue is devoted to their study. In this brief introduction, we seek to succinctly review the key aspects of the phenomenon. First, we present some intuitive examples; second, we put forward a preliminary characterization of dogwhistles; then we discuss some of the main issues raised by these examples, as well as some basic notions found in the literature. We close by presenting an overview of the articles to be found in the current issue.

Abstract Politicians select their words meticulously, never losing sight of their ultimate communicative goal. Sometimes, their objective may be that of not being fully understood by a large portion of the audience. They can achieve this by means of dogwhistles; linguistic expressions that, in addition to their literal meaning, convey a concealed message to a specific sub-group of the audience. This paper focuses on the distinction between overt and covert dogwhistles introduced by J. Saul (2018). I argue that, even if the distinction successfully captures a genuine divide within the category of dogwhistles, the account proposed by Saul to explain the distinction is unsatisfactory. In response to this state of affairs, I illustrate how the distinction between overt and covert dogwhistle can be refined and illuminated by incorporating it into the 'Simple Theory' of dogwhistles advanced by J. Khoo (2017).

Abstract One of the characteristics of what has been called “dogwhistle politics” is the presence of a rhetoric that targets minority groups implicitly. For example, terms like ‘illegals’ and ‘illegal immigrants’, used to target Latin-Americans, have come to permeate the American political discourse as well as everyday conversations. Here I focus on how such expressions, which I call illegality frame code words (IFCW, for short), can be countered by recalcitrant hearers. I begin with the assumption that IFCWs are racial code words, conversational devices that convey implicit racial appeals while allowing for deniability. I then discuss how the existence of an Illegality Frame in the American Immigration debate supports their deniability. Lastly, I discuss how recalcitrant hearers can counter utterances that contain them. In particular, I propose reframing as an adequate strategy. In reframing, agents take control of the goals or the QUD (question under discussion) of the conversation to exclude certain topics from the common ground and include others. The idea is to “change the conversation” to neutralize problematic moves. This maneuver is advantageous not only because it helps to hinder veiled discriminatory practices, but also because it affords control over “the terms of the conversation”.

Abstract In this essay I defend the view that dogwhistling is a a speech act performed with a narrative-evoking perlocutionary effect in the so-called target audience. What is evoked is a certain kind of narrative, previously endorsed by the relevant audience, which endows its members with the use of some linguistic expressions (and some non-linguistic representations) with non-conventional, derived meanings. In the dogwhistling scenarios, those derived meanings are recovered and put to work by means of different mechanisms, which has an impact on the emotional and practical attitudes of the target audience. The covert message is thus inferred as the product of the recovered meanings at work and their emotional and practical impacts on the audience in the new contexts of use, which determines a new pragmatic meaning dimension for the expressions in play. Although the phenomenon has been frequently analyzed in connection with examples of political discourse, it is common to cinematographic and literary intertextual references, and, more generally, to all those occasions in which communication relies on the narrative dependance of linguistic use.

Abstract This paper offers a novel argument for fatalism: if one accepts the logical possibility of fatalism, one must accept that fatalism is true. This argument has a similar structure to the ‘knowability paradox’, which proves that if every truth can be known by someone, then every truth is known by someone. In this paper, what I mean by ‘fatalism’ is that whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Existing arguments for fatalism assume that the principle of bivalence holds even for future propositions, that past truths are necessarily true, and/or that possible propositions never change into impossible propositions. However, my argument does not assume such premises. It assumes only the logical possibility of fatalism. Here, what I mean by ‘fatalism is logically possible’ is that there is at least one possible world where whatever happens now was determined to happen now in the past. Since this assumption is weak (thus is plausible), I believe it to be much stronger than the existing arguments for fatalism. In addition, I also show that what will happen in the future is determined now.

Abstract It is not always considered that the discussion about the objective or subjective nature of beauty occurred partly in natural history, within the framework of the Darwinian revolution. The approaches of many pre-Darwinian naturalists assumed the existence of absolute standards of beauty. This idea was a presupposition in some versions of the great chain of being and in the idea that beauty was an objective characteristic of creation that could explain the possession of many traits of organisms. In this paper I will show how Darwin explicitly confronted both views throughout his work.

Abstract In recent years, scholars have vividly debated over the definition and features of dogwhistles. As Jennifer Saul has widely argued in her works, political dogwhistles are powerful tools of manipulation. However, the current debate still lacks a convincing definition of dogwhistles, which sometimes are treated like spy codes while, at other times, they are labelled as instances of hate speech, as in Santana (2019). Instead, I propose a definition of dogwhistles that is based on the analysis of the audience design of utterances. I claim that dogwhistles are speech acts designed to secretly change the conversational role of a subset of the audience. Furthermore, they qualify as forms of disguisement - and not concealment, as claimed by the received view - that violate two important conversational responsibilities of the speaker (Clark and Carlson 1992).

Abstract Contemporary views of truth-directedness endorse what I shall call the Common-Element Argument. According to this argument, there is something in common between judgment and other attitudes like assumption and imagination: they all regard their contents as true. Since this regarding-as-true feature is not distinctive of judgment - the argument goes - it can’t explain its truth-directedness. On this ground, theorists have been motivated to endorse an inflationary view that tries to capture truth-directedness by appealing to some further feature: intentions, second-order representations, sub-personal mechanisms, or subjugation to norms are the most discussed candidates for fulfilling this role. In this paper I will argue that the Common-Element Argument is unsound. It rests on a false premise, namely that there is some common element such as a regarding-as-true component between judgment and other cognitive attitudes. I shall reject Velleman’s and Railton’s defenses of the Common-Element-Argument. Then I will discuss three influential inflationary accounts of truth-directedness: Railton’s account, Velleman’s teleological account, and Shah and Velleman’s conceptualist account. I shall argue that they all face a phenomenological and an explanatory challenge. Finally, I shall sketch a deflationary view of truth-directedness that evades these challenges.

Abstract In 1909, Peirce recorded in a few pages of his logic notebook some experiments with matrices for three-valued propositional logic. These notes are today recognized as one of the first attempts to create non-classical formal systems. However, besides the articles published by Turquette in the 1970s and 1980s, very little progress has been made toward a comprehensive understanding of the formal aspects of Peirce's triadic logic (as he called it). This paper aims to propose a new approach to Peirce's matrices for three-valued propositional logic. We suggested that his logical matrices give rise to three different systems, one of them - which we called P3 - is an original and non-explosive logic. Besides that, we will show that the P3 system can easily be transformed into paraconsistent and paracomplete calculi, adding to it, respectively, unary operators of consistency and intuitionistic negation. We conclude with a discussion about philosophical motivations.

Abstract Fichte’s ambitious project in the Foundations of Natural Right is to provide an a priori deduction of the concept of right independently from morality. So far, interpretations of Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right have persistently fallen into one of two rough categories: either they (re)interpret the normative necessity of right in terms of moral or quasi-moral normativity or they interpret right’s normative necessity in terms of hypothetical imperatives. However, each of these interpretations faces significant exegetical difficulties. By contrast, I argue that we can understand the normative necessity of right in terms of conceptual necessity. On this view, right does not tell us what ought to be done, but instead tells us what we are doing and have done. Not only does this provide for a promising philosophical account of the non-moral normativity of right, but also provides a compelling reading of Fichte’s text in both the deduction of the concept of right in the Foundations of Natural Right as well as his discussion of the application of the concept of right and coercion.

Abstract A formal, speaker-based definition for the linguistic trope known as a ‘dogwhistle’ is provided. This definition is supported by an 11-part typological model for distinguishing dogwhistles from similar linguistic tropes (i.e., puns, innuendo, inside jokes) and other speech acts. The model is applied to many data examples from a variety of sources. The model allows for data input, filtering against the criteria, and classification of the speech act as a dogwhistle or not. Additionally, the model can highlight how well the data example adheres to certain criteria. This informs interpretations about whether the speech act is a successfully constructed dogwhistle as well as provide possible reasons for failed dogwhistles. This analysis deepens our understanding of political and social discourse and the ways it can be manipulated for personal gains, resulting in new insight that helps dismantle strategic racism (Haney-López, 2014) and other threats to democracy.

Abstract In this brief note, I offer some considerations to the effect of arguing (i) that Duffley's criticism to formal semantics is based on a dogma about the proper nature of the linguistic sing, and (ii) that, even when I agree with the general spirit of his realizational theory of meaning, an explicit theory of how syntax affects meanings realization is missing.

Abstract In this paper I critically address some ideas presented in Patrick Duffley’s book Linguistic Meaning Meets Linguistic Form. Duffley adopts the semiological principle that linguistic signs have stable meanings. I argue that this principle leads Duffley to an artificial description of the meaning of the preposition for, in attempting to avoid the charge of polysemy. Another issue is that the principle is not consistently followed throughout the book, such as in Duffley’s analysis of the meaning of start, or in his acceptance of words with encyclopedic meanings. I also point out that the proposed meaning of start and the view that the meaning of some words is encyclopedic have problems of their own.

Abstract I argue that Duffley’s sign-based semantics and embodied semantics may be mutually beneficial if we conceive them as a semantic theory and as a foundational theory, respectively. First, I describe embodied semantics as a research program that conceives the foundations of meaning in terms of embodied simulation. Afterwards, I draw attention to three points (the analysis of FOR, verbs of positive and negative recall, and causative verbs) where Duffley’s semantics could find support in such a foundational theory. Finally, I suggest that two pressing challenges currently on the agenda of embodied semantics (abstract language and sentence-level simulations) could be met by Duffley’s theory.

Abstract The enactivist position adopted by Figueiredo and Cuffari is argued to represent a return to a form of behaviorism which denies that mental content is constitutive of the meaning of linguistic signs in favour of the view that language is first and foremost a physical activity based on shared practices of bodily behaviour. This view is shown to be highly problematic, as it is unable to account for the fact that certain mental experiences have characteristic qualia that cannot be reduced to practices of bodily behaviour, nor for the fact that children’s linguistic abilities are radically underdetermined by the verbal behaviour to which they are exposed in the short period in which they develop these abilities. The Wittgensteinian view of ‘meaning as use’ adopted in the paper is subjected to a reductio ad absurdum, as it basically entails that there are no pots, but only uses of pots. The nature of the human mind, as attested to by quantum theory, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem and natural language itself are argued to demonstrate that it cannot be reduced to the purely material level.

Abstract In reply to the claim that syntax is not taken into account in Linguistic Meaning Meets Linguistic Form, I show that local syntactic analysis has been implemented in the treatment of aspectual verbs and verbs of positive and negative recall, where the syntactic function of the -ing form as direct object of the main verb is put into relation with the main verb’s meaning as the basis for the inferences drawn concerning the temporal relation between the main verb’s event and that expressed by the complement. I argue that I have also developed new tools of syntactic analysis for the to-infinitive, demonstrating that it is not the direct object of the main verb, but rather a goal- or result-specifier, and showing how this accounts for the fact that its event is always understood to be somehow subsequent to that of the main verb. Regarding the applicability of formal semantics to natural language, I argue that the absolute priority accorded to the truth-functional dimension of language by this type of semantics leads to the artificial separation of use-conditions from truth-conditions, with the former being treated as an additional interpretational function added on to the truth-functional one. Contra the autonomous syntax claim that our desire to express meaning is to a great extent independent of the means we use to express those meanings, it is argued that how we perceive the world in our experience is influenced by our system of linguistic representation.

Abstract In this paper we suggest that Duffley’s sign-based semantics rests on two main claims: a methodological one and an ontological one. The methodological one is the analysis of corpora and the ontological one is the postulate of mental content. By adopting a linguistic enactivist perspective with a Wittgensteinian twist, we endorse Duffley’s methodological claim and suggest that a sign-based semantics doesn’t have to rely on mental content if it takes into account the conception of meaningful material engagement in cognitive archeology and its development into sign-using as an enactive capacity.

Abstract My notion of stable word meaning could correspond either to the root-node or the whole of a neurally-organized package and acknowledge that linguistic processing is largely holistic. The existence of words as context-free entities is not just a “cognitive idealization” however but a necessity, as otherwise speakers would have to make up their words on the spot. Holistic language processing undermines a sequential processing paradigm (first linguistic, then pragmatic). However, my model is only sequential in that linguistic-semantic units pre-exist their use and does not entail that a whole sentence must be assembled before pragmatic processing starts. The authors falsely suggest that I do not endorse a distinction between semantics and pragmatics. While I do argue that this distinction cannot be based on the sentence/utterance distinction, I hold that a clear dividing-line can be drawn between semiologically-signified and non-semiologically-signified content. I disagree that “even highly abstract, monosemic words like any should be seen as embodied, ” so that the mental process of random selection must be construed “in (complex) sensorimotor terms”. While one can form an image of someone picking out an apple from a basket, one cannot argue that one must do so in order to use any.

Abstract The aim of this commentary is to underpin Duffley’s notion of a stable mental content that corresponds to the literal word meaning with a computationally plausible cognitive theory. Our approach is to investigate what these stable contents could be according to the so-called Predictive Processing architecture. We argue that recent advances in cognitive science can make at least two contributions to the debate. First, they can provide some underpinning of Duffley's ideas of a stable linguistic meaning associated with the sign. Second, they provide resources to understand how the semiological principle is compatible with a dynamic and flexible notion of "meaning".

Abstract In this introduction we present Patrick Duffley's book Linguistic Meaning meets Linguistic Form, as well as the contributions that each scholar has brought into the debate on linguistic meaning and form. They deal with semantic and foundational issues regarding a sign-based approach to meaning.

Abstract This study offers an innovative, sign-based analysis of English self pronouns (myself, yourself, herself, etc.). While rejecting the traditional characterization of these forms as reflexive pronouns, the study borrows from the tradition by analyzing these forms as a kind of emphatic pronoun. The forms’ distribution can be explained by positing that they are semantic signals deployed by speakers to meet communicative goals. Speakers choose between self and simple pronouns when the additional meaning of self forms, INSISTENCE ON AN ENTITY(S), will steer hearers in particular interpretive directions. This approach has led to the discovery that reflexive uses of self pronouns are an instantiation of the general tendency to use these forms for unexpected messages, including those in which a single referent is playing more than one role at one time. The presence of such a role conflict accounts not only for reflexive uses, but also for the appearance of self pronouns in picture noun phrases, logophoric contexts, and other previously unexplained exceptions to the structural reflexivity account.

Abstract Sign-based semantics and embodied semantics are argued to be mutually beneficial to one another. However, while the body does shape our cognitive activities to a great extent, this does not entail that cognition can be reduced to sensorimotor simulation, i.e that the mind can be reduced to the body. Language itself bears testimony to this, as the mind is construed in ordinary discourse as having the incredible capacity of being free to travel beyond the limits of present time and current spatial location. Nagel has argued famously that mind is a fundamental datum of nature that the materialist version of evolutionary biology is unable to account for, as consciousness has an essentially subjective character to it, a ‘what it is like for the conscious organism itself’ aspect, that cannot be reduced to the matter of which the organism is constituted. Two modern scientific developments refute the contention that the human mind can be explained as a purely material machine: quantum theory in physics and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem in mathematics. Just because the mind works through the body does not entail that the mind can be reduced to the body.

Abstract Stern’s Columbia School Theory contribution on English self-pronouns provides a wonderful illustration of the explanatory power of an approach that refuses to be taken in by a priori grammatical categories like reflexivity, which have the unfortunate consequence of giving the analyst the impression that he or she already knows all about the semantics of the form under study before looking at real usage, and attempts rather to uncover the semantic content of the linguistic sign -self based on careful observation and deep reflection on what might explain the way this sign is used in English. Stern shows that a purely syntactic account is unable to account for the fact that self-pronouns occur not only in syntactically reflexive environments, but also in non-reflexive ones, and conversely that simple pronouns also appear in both types of contexts. A faint glimmer of the structuralist origins of Columbia School Theory shows through in one case however.

Abstract Anselm’s original argument for the existence of God seems to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it is not easy to see what, if anything, is wrong with it; on the other, it seems incredible that the existence of a being like God could be proved entirely a priori. This paper presents a diagnosis of what seems to be wrong with Anselm’s original reasoning. The diagnosis is general enough to be of use elsewhere, and it is this: conceptual possibilities are inferential dead-ends, not free inference tickets to prove any substantial claim. It remains to be seen if other versions of Anselm’s original insight, both contemporary and not, fall into the same conceptual possibility trap.

Abstract In this paper I try to answer four basic questions: (1) How the concept of God is to be represented? (2) Are there any logical principles governing it? (3) If so, what kind of logic lies behind them? (4) Can there be a logic of the concept of God? I address them by presenting a formal-logical account to the concept of God. I take it as a methodological desideratum that this should be done within the simplest existing logical formalism. I start with first-order logic (FOL) with identity, and then show that its simplest modal extension (SQML, or the simplest quantified modal logic) is enough for us to formalize a minimally satisfactory theory of the concept of God. I focus exclusively on the monotheistic concept of God.

Abstract Two of the most important outcomes of The Contradictory Christ include: (i) identifying Christ as an unproblematically contradictory being as well as (ii) laying the foundations of an investigation of the logical consequences of the existence of Christ, qua contradictory, within a particular 'theory'. In light of the enormous relevance of Beall’s The contradictory Christ for the study of inconsistency, my main concern here is to explore the effect of some methodological choices behind Beall’s proposal -this in order to recognize in more detail the scope of Beall’s contribution. To do so, I will focus on three main questions: 1. What is required for the identification of a contradiction? 2. How can we recognize a true contradiction from either an apparent or a temporal contradiction? 3. If we identify a true contradiction within a theory, where can we actually go from there?

Abstract My interest is in the relationship between the contemporary account of the epistemology of religious belief, known as quasi-fideism, and the sceptical fideism that has been so important, historically, in motivating fideistic ideas. I argue that we can profitably construe quasi-fideism along sceptical fideist lines, in that it is a proposal that is naturally understood as both arising within the context of a sceptical investigation and as exhibiting core features that it shares with Pyrrhonian scepticism. Moreover, I suggest that sceptical fideism, properly rendered, is inclined towards the kind of restricted fideism that is essential to quasi-fideism.

Abstract According to The Evidentialist problem of Evil, the existence of disproportionate, prima facie gratuitous evil and suffering in the world is enough evidence against the existence of the Omnipotent, Perfectly Loving, Omniscient God of Classical Theism. A contemporary way of dealing with this argument is Skeptical Theism , for which the very fact that there is an huge amount of evil that looks gratuitous to us does not mean that we can reasonably believe whether this evil is indeed gratuitous or not . In this paper, I present and discuss a number of influential criticisms against this view according to which a proponent of Skeptical Theism will be forced to accept a number of unpalatable skeptical conclusions. I argue that this is not the case.

Abstract In this paper, we discuss a family of arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the theistic God. We introduce three member of this family: Grim’s Divine Liar Paradox, Milne’s Paradox and our own Divine Curry. They can be seen as theological counterparts of well-known semantic paradoxes. We argue that the very simple dialetheist response to these paradoxes doesn’t work well and then introduce our own response based on a framework that we call Logic of Impossible Truths (LIT). LIT is a non-dialetheist paraconsistent logic designed to represent divine ominiscience and to preserve the transparency of the truth predicate and which semantics rests on the concept of situation. Since some rules of classical logic are not valid in LIT, we are in a position to block the derivation of the paradoxes. Thus, LIT offers a way out of the dilemma of accepting that there are true contradictions (dialetheism) or giving up the idea that there is an all-powerful, omniscient and perfectly good being (atheism).

Abstract One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake.

Abstract In a recent paper, Jc Beall and A. J. Cotnoir proposed a bi-modal solution to the fundamental problem of Christology - the problem of reconciling the apparent contradiction implied by Christ’s divine and human natures. According to their solution, the contradiction could be resolved if one takes Christ’s dual nature as implying two different theological modal notions: one ranging over divine possibilities and the other over human possibilities. As a riposte, I argue that as novel and ingenious as Beall and Cotnoir’s solution may be, it still fails to account for the very crux of the fundamental problem, viz., the true (modal) proposition about Christ being God-incarnate.

Abstract I argue that an ontological pluralist strategy that relies on category-relative properties is immune to all the particular criticisms Beall wields in his book against other strategies for recovering the consistency of the immutability of the incarnated god.

Abstract J.M. Bocheński (1902-1995) together with J. Salamucha, B. Sobociński, and J.F. Drewnowski formed the so-called Cracow Circle in the 30s of the previous century. Its main aim was to utilize contemporary logic in theology and philosophy of God. The first work in this area was Salamucha’s formal analysis of the prima via, published in 1934. The article was reviewed by Bocheński, who provided a number of remarks concerning Salamucha’s analysis. At that time he did not decide to conduct a holistic research into the prima via. That was done by him only at the end of his life as part of the logical analysis of the quinque viae. This paper aims at presenting Bocheński’s unpublished formal analysis of the prima via from 1953 and proving that it constitutes a valuable completion of his published formal analyses, which come from the 1980s and 1990s. Above all, they provide a more insightful analysis of the notion of movement in the prima via, as well as the form of axiom expressing the lack of regress into infinity. In the formalizations of 1953 there are also interesting analyses concerning the ancestral closure of three-argument relations.

Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.

Abstract In this paper, I present a proposal for a Formal Natural Theology. The approach employed for this task is through a first-order theory, in which fundamental concepts such as divine, necessary, and supreme beings, are formally introduced, which allow obtaining the theorems of existence and uniqueness of a divine being, according to the perspective of classical theism.

Abstract The complex relations between Christianity and science seem to present a critical point in evolutionary theory, especially for the challenges it poses to the doctrine of original sin. I investigate the precise senses in which evolution threatens (or not) the Augustinian/Reformed formulation of original sin, analyzing each of the six tenets of the doctrine vis a vis nine evolutionary claims, as well as the supposed clash between the narratives of evolution and Christianity. I show that the threat is less impressive than it is usually assumed, and I highlight where the conflict really lies. I defend that it is possible to remain faithful to the core of the doctrine of original sin and to accept the reliability of evolution as a scientific theory. I present three scenarios for “Adam and Eve” and interpret them using two different models. I favor the understanding of Adam and Eve as the whole initial human bottleneck viewed through the lens of a multilevel model.