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This paper aims to examine the functional utility of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for regional stability after the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan. The instability in Afghanistan may become a serious regional challenge for the SCO to seek an acceptable solution. The study addresses the question that how the SCO members are dealing with the emerging crisis in Afghanistan. Hence, the prospective role of the SCO in building consensus among member states is unravelled with a conceptual framework, based on two theories of international relations namely regional security complex and functional cooperation theory. These theories provide a conceptual understanding that the interests of states, belonging to a general geographical region, are integrated and their mutual cooperation is more durable than the states outside the region. Subsequently, the study explored the role of the SCO in maintaining regional security and traced its efforts for stability. To explore the complexities within the SCO while managing the nascent government of the Taliban (forbidden in Russia) in Afghanistan, qualitative data has been collected. The data includes government websites, official statements and documents, books, research articles and newspapers, published in different countries. It is found that the worsening security situation in Afghanistan is a common threat to all the members of the SCO, so consensus is required to promote practical measures including the development of Afghanistan. Therefore, the SCO is focusing on addressing the immediate and tangible consequences of the Taliban’s takeover after the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan and supporting regional states to adopt functional cooperation to reconstruct Afghanistan.

The article deals with the emergence and transformation of the political economy of power and governance in Afghanistan after the Operation Enduring Freedom and until the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. The author uses political economy approach rooted in institutional theory, particularly its idea of fragile limited access orders. The research shows that such an order emerged in Afghanistan after 2001. Its stability and equilibrium were conditional on several factors. First, a substantial amount of financial and military aid was required to support patronage networks and administrative rent that ensured loyalty to the government. The government co-opted some powerful agents of periphery thus aiding the stability of increasingly de-centralized system that originated during the years of civil war. Ex-warlords took positions in formal administration and ensured that the periphery stayed loyal to the government in exchange for retaining their autonomy and access to administrative rent. The insurgency threat helped foster cooperation and limited predatory behavior of the system’s agents. After 2014 as a result of the partial troops withdrawal and their more limited mandate in Afghanistan, reduced foreign aid and the 2014 presidential elections crisis the factors mentioned were no longer at play supporting the equilibrium. The external support decreased; center-periphery relations turned sour amid a growing insurgency threat. This resulted in a disequilibrium, and the system collapsed which allowed the Taliban to retake power in Afghanistan in August 2021.

The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in the middle of 2021 has put at stake and turned to shock the world community. The world, which was fighting COVID-19, faced more concerns about the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. It became not only a concern of Middle East countries, but it raised questions in Europe too. While the Middle East countries were anxious about security issues in the region, Europe was anxious about the mass migration of refugees. Russia, the country which is crucially interested in stable peace in the Middle East, and China, which is cooperating with Afghanistan in the economic sector, began negotiations with the Taliban government to stabilize the situation peacefully after the withdrawal of American troops.The article analyzes the changes in US policy in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of troops in August 2021. The withdrawal of the US military contingent from Afghanistan has changed the balance of power in Central Asia, which, on the one hand, creates new risks to international security, and on the other hand, opens up new opportunities for interested players in the international arena in the region. In the new conditions, the United States is forced to restructure its policy towards Afghanistan and change its security strategy in accordance with the new balance of forces in the region. The findings of the study relate to the actual interests of the United States in the field of security in Afghanistan and in the Central Asian region as a whole.

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The problems with the Iranian-Afghan water issue are the result of the demarcation of the border between the two countries caused by external interference at different historical periods. Over the past 150 years, four agreements have been signed between Iran and Afghanistan on the use of water from border rivers, but they have never been fully implemented. The issue of water resources is a very sensitive for Iran and Afghanistan. Over the years, the emergence of complex environmental, agricultural, economic, social, legal, security, political and military factors has exacerbated the situation. Out of geopolitical interests, Great Britain and Russia divided the territories of Iran and Afghanistan into zones of influence in 1907, essentially depriving these countries of their sovereignty. In this situation, the settlement of border disputes between Iran and Afghanistan was entrusted to a third party, namely Great Britain, Turkey and the United States. Since the aforementioned countries were guided by their own interests when drawing the border between Iran and Afghanistan, as a result of the demarcation between the sides, it was not possible to find a solution to the water use of the Helmand River that would satisfy both Iran and Afghanistan. Iran and Afghanistan, as sovereign states, first began direct talks to resolve the water issue at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1973, the first and the only contract still in force was signed. In order to fully resolve the water issue between Iran and Afghanistan, it is essential to create an atmosphere of mutual trust between the two sides. The security, socio-economic and environmental factors that have emerged over the last two decades have hindered the formation of such an atmosphere. Attempts by the Iranian and Afghan authorities to find a comprehensive solution to the problem after the Islamic Revolution have failed. The water issue is now so complicated that it can only be resolved through political will. However, since both sides cannot but consider the socio-economic situation of the population and social pressures when making a political decision, they will be more inclined to make populist decisions in order to avoid aggravation of the internal situation. The hydropolitical policy directions pursued by Iran and Afghanistan indicate that the sides will also continue to use the water factor as a tool of pressure in the near future. Evaluating the statements of the Iranian military-political management on the water issue, it can be stated that the water issue has long ceased to be a merely ecological and agricultural one. Given the ethno-religious picture of the Sistan-Baluchestan province of Iran and the challenges threatening the province (terrorism, separatism), Iranian security forces are extremely sensitive to the water issue. Afghanistan is a strategically significant neighbor for Iran. The water issue is the possible factor that puts Iran in a serious dilemma. On the one hand, Tehran cannot jeopardize bilateral relations due to socio-economic problems in Sistan-Baluchestan, but on the other hand, failure to resolve the water issue can exacerbate the already tense situation in the province, leading to border clashes, which, in turn, could escalate into a large-scale conflict. Regular armed clashes on the Iranian-Afghan border since the formation of the Taliban interim government in Afghanistan, as well as the fact that Afghanistan’s neighboring countries have not formally recognized the Taliban authorities, make it almost impossible to reach definite agreements. Iran, despite tough public statements, will continue to pursue a cautious policy towards the Taliban in its real politics. If it puts pressure on the Taliban over water issue, the Taliban will simply block the flow of the Hirmand River into Iran, as they did in the 1990s. In that case, Iran will have to resort to tough measures to solve the problem, which, however, is not in Iran’s strategic interests. The fact that Iran considers the matter of reviewing the contract of 1973 while taking into account the needs of the people of the Hirmand River Basin is unrealistic and it will never be acceptable for Afghanistan. The demand for water on both sides will increase. The Hirmand River is not physically able to meet the demand of both sides. Mutual pressure can only ensure short-term solutions. Consequently, the water issue can be resolved comprehensively only through reciprocal concessions (Iran can either pay for uninterrupted, regulated water supply with oil or not charge transit money from Afghanistan) and by signing a new agreement based on this compromise.

This paper examines the Taliban vision of an Islamic polity posing a challenge to neighboring Central and South Asian states as well as more distant ones in Eurasia and the Middle East. As a potential magnet for militants across these regions, Taliban Islam represents an alternative to forms of piety and legal practice in states that have signifi cant Muslim populations and where each government claims some degree of religious legitimation and control over Islamic authority and interpretation. Author claims the Taliban ideology poses a dilemma to regional actors, too, in that it makes all parties who might cooperate with the movement vulnerable to criticism based on human rights discourse. At the same time, the presence of the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) has permitted the movement the opportunity to seek to reframe its international standing and its relationship to violence. The Taliban have adapted their critique of ISKP to the claim that they share a counterterrorism mission with other governments, an assertion that allows the movement and its partners to defl ect criticism from various quarters and normalize relations with other states. Author concludes that, seeking international support, the Taliban have adapted their ideological claims to position the movement simultaneously as a competitor to other visions of militant jihadist politics and as a counterterrorist force laying the groundwork for the legitimation of their place in a rapidly evolving global order.

The article analyses the prospects of a new migration crisis in the European Union. Referring the statistics of displaced persons within Afghanistan and the neighboring countries, the author predicts potential threat of an emergency migration influx to Europe. The factors are proposed that can cause a significant outflow of population from the country, but at the same time obstacles preventing a large number of Afghan asylum seekers from reaching the borders of the European Union: external pressure on the Taliban government to maintain control over emigration, remoteness from Europe and the excessive cost of travel, EU measures to strengthen the external border. The author concludes that there is a small probability of new large-scale migration crisis in the short term but does not exclude it in the long term if the plans of the European Union and the international community to assign responsibility for Afghan refugees to neighboring countries are not implemented. In the meantime, the author notes, the plans of the European Union are criticized by both MEPs and human rights.

The article focuses on two international political aspects of the radical changes in the situation in Afghanistan after the seizure of power there by the Taliban: the problem of legalizing the new government through its recognition by other states, first, and Ankara’s intensified efforts to establish «special relations» with the Taliban, second. The attempts of the latter to achieve their recognition on the world stage have at the moment not led to the desired result for them. Neither the «collective West», nor Russia, China and the countries of the Middle East and Central Asia are in a hurry to recognize the government of the group classified by the UN as a terrorist organization. At the same time, the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan is becoming more and more obvious. The world community is looking for ways to provide assistance to the population of this country. At the same time, Russia (the «Moscow format») and Turkey have noticeably stepped up their diplomatic efforts. The article examines the main motives of Ankara, which, according to the author, perceives the problem of Afghanistan not only from the perspective of bilateral relations with it, but also in the broader context of rivalry between the leading states of the Middle East region. The author emphasizes that the Taliban and the Turkish leader RT Erdogan are linked by a common ideological platform –Islamism. At the same time, Erdogan seeks to present himself in the eyes of NATO partners as a mediator between the alliance and the Taliban government.

In late 2001 Russia supported the International anti terrorist coalition’s activity aimed at toppling Al Qaida being backed by the Taliban regime. The Interim Administration of Afghanistan based on decisions of the Bonn international conference, had been formed. Simultaneously, the Embassy resumed its activity and a new Ambassador had been confirmed by the International Committees of both Chambers of the Federal Assembly. At the meeting in Kremlin President Putin outlined urgent priorities of Russia’s policy in Afghanistan aimed at reestablishing and strengthening of ties with that nation at the new, post Taliban stage of its history. Besides urgent political issues, launching of Embassy’ s everyday administrative and life activity let alone the recovery of the Embassy’s compound, were among the priorities, with destroyed national infrastructure as well as economy in Kabul and all over the country.

The US has prolonged its stay in Afghanistan with the security situation remaining far from improving. The indefatigable demand for resources to maintain counter-insurgency operations was a major debate in 2016 US Presidential elections with a demand for an earlier withdrawal from America’s trillion dollars plus war effort. Russians having sensed the weakening of the US infl uence warmed upto the idea of new Afghan situation involving Taliban and their masters, the Pakistan army. Russia had experienced vulnerabilities of Islamisation in Central Asia and Caucasus, and the ISIS brand radicalisation added to the fear of political destabilisation of Central Asian states. The Islamic State showed up in Afghanistan and Pakistan as ISIS-Khorasan branch. Russia needed Pakistan as an ally to fi ght Daesh’s presence on its southern periphery. However, there remained many intertwined security challenges that complicate the South Asian geopolitics, especially, the Af-Pak region. Russia’s Taliban policy might be the hitherto unused leverage that it might be using in order to strike balance all along the shatter belt.

The US has prolonged its stay in Afghanistan with the security situation remaining far from improving. The indefatigable demand for resources to maintain counter-insurgency operations was a major debate in 2016 US Presidential elections with a demand for an earlier withdrawal from America’s Trillion dollars plus war effort. Russians having sensed the weakening of the US influence warmed upto the idea of new Afghan situation involving Taliban and their masters, the Pakistan army. Russia had experienced vulnerabilities of Islamisation in Central Asia and Caucasus, and the ISIS brand radicalisation added to the fear of political destabilisation of Central Asian states. The Islamic State showed up in Afghanistan and Pakistan as ISIS-Khorasan branch. Russia needed Pakistan as an ally to fight Daesh’s presence on its southern periphery. However, there remained many intertwined security challenges that complicate the South Asian geopolitics, especially, the Af-Pak region. Russia’s Taliban policy might be the hitherto unused leverage that it might be using in order to strike balance all along the shatterbelt.

The article describes the possibilities of SCO expansion and its transformation from regional to global structure. The SCO development strategy and actual needs of organization are analyzed.The main attention is paid to Afghanistan and Iran. The ways of overcoming disproportions between political and economic activities within SCO are submitted for consideration.

In the article provides an analysis of the situation in Afghanistan in advance of the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the country and contains a forecast of possible developments in the next period. The author considers that critical importance for the future of Afghanistan has its integration into the world economy.