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The study proposes an analysis of the representations of “innovation” in the work of the Romanian literary critic E. Lovinescu (1881-1943). The history of ideas noted that his work articulates two figures of change in literature, one of a political nature, of the “revolution”, the other of biological inspiration, of the “mutation”. What seems important to me to emphasize is, on the one hand, the difference in content between the two metaphors, on the other hand, their unequal distribution in relation to the interpretation of the history of Romanian literature. The reflection I propose tries to place the competitive relationship between politics and biology in a sociological context, correlating the metaphors of change with the condition of Romanian culture and with its limited capacities to promote and institutionalize innovation, specific to an emerging culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biopolitics maintains its meaning of politicization of the body. Suspected that it is not politics in a traditional way (due to the lack of discrepancy between reality and discourse), exposed as an exaggerated and excessive model, biopolitics is revealing itself in the evidence which establish that: the biopolitical thinking = simulated scientific thinking; biopolitics = politicization of the social matter, rebiologizing, according to Carl Schmitt's criteria, politics. Accepting biological argument as unassailable foundation of theorising identity, politically convolved (starting point for political rights and obligations), Romanian Transylvanian eugenicists have implemented an inclusive model, biologising national identity. Considering the entropic characteristic of eugenics, translated in a biopolitical fashion, the desiderate had in view the historical mission to reject the past by the appeal to an alternative political order, based on the rebirth/reinvention of the ethnic community. Romanian biopolitics of the '30s and '40s remains focused inwards, articulating only particularising replies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the pressure dictated by Western modernity movements, life finally enters within strategic (long term) relationships circuit. The present study establishes that, bio-politics and bio-power denounces the paradigm of politicization of the biological life. Foucault's late writings confirm the subordination of biopolitics to the technologies of power, which integrate / reduce life to biological continuity of the species, to the objectification of individual body or investigation of self-techniques, that would allow (beyond the corset of the institutional), the (re) affirmation of subjectivity as a force or a form of resistance. The present reactivation of the bio model establishes that we cannot evade Foucault's view, in which, the biology-meeting -- politics confirms that, none of the terms no longer retains its original meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Nations Universal declaration of human rights (1984) has centered the assertion of human dignity and freedom as innate (not acquired) qualities in the logic of citizenship itself; this claim has been made not only in philosophical and religious terms, but also in political terms. Affirming that all men born free and equal for what concerns their dignity means to affirm actually that dignity is an ontological attribute, an intrinsic quality (and therefore inalienable) of the human being, beyond sex, health and social standing differences. The use of the notion of person as synonym of the qualities of adult risks to crush this gain of politics. The liberal biopolitics risks to be a source of discriminations among men when it adopts a concept of person different from that of human being. According to this view, the anthropological dualism peculiar to the Platonism lives again. Hannah Arendt, Evas Kittay and Martha Nussabaum's thesis allow us to underline the human person characteristics as both subject and bodily being, according to the Thomas Aquinas's intuition. If we think again human person as human being, it is possible to safeguard the everybody rights and particularly to defend those phases of human life in which human person is exposed, for the phases of the development or for the illness, to the dependence. Only in this way justice could be thought including all the phases of the existence, also those marked by disability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]