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This essay investigates the way in which Wolff takes an interest in the hypothesis of an emendatio of the prima philosophia from Leibniz’s incitement in De primae philosophiae emendatione, et de notione substantiae (1694) to re-found metaphysics. This makes it possible, secondly, to examine the way in which Wolff takes Johannes Clauberg’s ontology as a model, even though it represents in his view only a failed attempt at that same emendatio. Through the analysis of the texts, this article considers the possibility of a new reading of the ‘failure’ attributed by Wolff to Clauberg, which would consist in his having ‘emended’ first philosophy by expelling it from the domain of ontology and finally identifying it with Cartesian prima philosophia.

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This article aims to give an overview of the issues involving Aristotle's astronomy, going through three domains: the epistemological, the mathematical and the ontological. With the analysis of Aristotle's main texts in which astronomy plays a role, we also aim to show its connection with philosophy first. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Synesis is the property of Synesis and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present reflection intends to approach, from an ontological point of view, the notion of clear and distinct in Cartesian thought, more specifically in the scope of Meditations on First Philosophy, although in the course of the study other works will provide support. Taking the same negative path as Meditations, we will investigate in the beginning what is not clear and distinct so that, in the next moment, we observe more sharply what is. Because we understand that the clear and distinct is the only criterion able to provide the subject with the discernment of truth through the verification of evidence, we also understand that it can be one of the nuclear concepts of the modern metaphysics inaugurated by Descartes. To shed light on the subject, we will use some notes by Heidegger about Cartesian thought exposed in the second volume of his work Nietzsche, in which the German thinker will problematize about the cogitate with a profound and innovating look. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]