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Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While agreeing with Fischborn’s (2018) contention that, according to one traditional definition of compatibilism, my position should be classified as that of a libertarian incompatibilist, I argue here for a different view of compatibilism. This view involves, on the one hand, local probabilistic causation of decisions (rather than universal strict determinism) and, on the other, free will conceived as involving decisions generated by a decision-making process carried out by the brain, which consciously contemplates different alternatives and could in principle have been different from what it was, implying that the agent could in normal conditions have done otherwise in the same circumstances. After discussing different views of causation (including determinism) and of free will, I make a revision of some passages from my earlier work, quoted by Fischborn. I conclude that what is crucial in the question of (in) compatibilism is the (in)compatibility between freedom of decisions and natural causation of human actions. According to this looser and, I argue, more pertinent view of compatibilism, I maintain my previous classification of my position on the matter as compatibilist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.

In the last twenty-five years, several authors have raised problems to the thesis that privileged self-knowledge is compatible with content externalism. In particular, the ‘slow-switching’ argument, which was originally put forth by Paul Boghossian (1989), aims to show that there is no satisfactory account of how we can have privileged knowledge about our own thoughts given content externalism. Though many philosophers have found ways to block the argument, no one has worried to address a major worry that Boghossian had when he presented the argument, which is to understand under which conditions privileged self-knowledge is possible given content externalism. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis of why the ‘slow-switching’ argument fails and I show how the diagnosis enables us to provide a partial response to Boghossian’s worry.

Abstract: One of the most complex issues in St. Augustine's philosophical-religious doctrine is that of the relationship between human free will and divine grace / predestination. This problem has its main expression in the controversy with the Pelagians / semi-Pelagians, who, each in their own way, believed that there is an incompatibility between the two terms. They sought to annul one of the poles of the question, arguing that the human being is free. In addition, they state that original sin in no way damaged human free will, and that, consequently, the latter can achieve perfection / salvation by his own merits, without the help of divine grace. Augustine, on the contrary, says that with original sin the “first nature” of man was damaged. Thus, human being needs the help of divine grace to be able to perform good actions (merits), but Augustine claimed, there is no incompatibility there, conversely, for him, what the human being has lost was the full freedom he enjoyed before sin. Now human being has only free will that grace will restore, giving him back his full freedom. Likewise, he argues, predestination does not nullify free will, determining man's destiny. Thus, first, man is a being created by God for himself, with no determinants for evil, and, second, as much as damaged he may be, he is keeps something of his first condition, even the tiniest one. Thus, human being is capable of say no to God's call. These questions will reverberate in the philosophical-religious discourses about the problem in Modernity / Contemporaneity, mainly in Protestant circles, which have intertwined themselves, each in their own way, between the so-called incompatibilities and compatibilities. Both seeking to substantiate their positions, often in St. Augustine. Something that he would not always agree with. Here's what we'll look at in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes' work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the term "compatibilism" as it is usual in the contemporary literature on free will, i.e., as the thesis that free will can exist even if determinism is true. Moreover, the conception of free will Gomes proposes actually has an incompatibilist commitment. I argue that, more than a mere terminological point, acknowledging the incompatibilist aspect of Gomes' view motivates important questions about the details of the view and helps to reveal a limitation of his defense of the existence of free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jonathan Edwards' treatise on free will has been the subject of recent debate on whether its content is reformed or not. After evaluating the opinions in this debate, the article summarizes the main emphases of the Reformed tradition previous to Edwards, as well as the context in which Edwards wrote his treatise, in order to gather sufficient information to analyze Edwards' work and advance an opinion about the tenor of his anthropology. In conclusion, the author raises some of Edwards' arguments that can be useful in current debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims to discuss Locke's compatibilism, that is, the lokean thesis that freedom is compatible with the natural necessity. To this end, it is analized the chapter Of The Power (XXI, book II of the An Essay concerning Human Understanding), in which Locke clarifies the concepts of freedom and will. Although Locke, at times, involves himself with the incongruent thesis on compatibilism, he is a compatibilist. The impression that Locke would defend incompatibilists' theories ends up being abandoned when we analyze carefully his general argument about will and freedom. Locke literally defends that the volunteer does not differ from the necessary. As a compatibilist, Locke maintains that will is not free. Thus, the free man can not be the one that is free to want. A man regarded as a free agent is the one that has freedom of action, not freedom of will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

RESUMEN Según el incompatibilismo sobre el libre albedrío, la existencia de decisiones y acciones libres sería metafísicamente imposible en un mundo determinista. Las teorías de ciertos filósofos incompatibilistas están en conflicto con ideas generales sobre la naturaleza en un sentido más fuerte: postulan un concepto de libertad que tampoco es posible bajo una concepción naturalista de las acciones. Describo aquí una posición incompatibilista acorde con el naturalismo, renunciando a una suposición compartida por la mayoría de los incompatibilistas: que la indeterminación es relevante para el libre albedrío porque contribuye al control y/o a la autoría del agente respecto a sus acciones.