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Purpose: This study aims to analyze how the moral hazard of the majority shareholder results in financial constrainsts for Brazilian companies listed on Brazil, Bolsa and Balcão (B3). Method: we used the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to compare the cash flow sensitivity of cash for firms that have high control deviations control, presenting high moral hazard (constraints), with companies that have low control deviations, presenting low moral hazard (no restrictions). Originality/Relevance: The originality of the research resides in the evidence that the deviation of shareholding control can be understood as a source of credit restriction, putting in check a particular and idiosyncratic source in emerging markets such as Brazil. Results: our first result evidenced that, in historical terms, the control deviation declined significantly. On the other hand, the results reveal that the moral hazard of the majority shareholder, represented by the deviation of control, results in financial restrictions of Brazilian companies listed on B3. Theoretical/methodological/practical contributions: the main implication of the research is to reveal idiosyncratic sources of credit in Brazil, since the majority shareholder control deviation (MSCD) reflects the weak legal protection for minority shareholders and creditors (civil law). This research helps capital market investors in countries with weak legal protections to choose companies that are concerned about governance issues, as well as companies to understand that such deviations can be harmful to corporate debt.

The present paper aims to verify whether the most financially restricted companies use their cash flow for investment or for cash holdings. To this end, the cash flow sensitivity of investment as well as the cash flow sensitivity of cash for Brazilian publicly traded companies through the Threshold method is tested, given its classification in restricted and unrestricted companies. In this context, the models of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1984) and Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) were applied, using as structural breaks the Dividends Paid, Total Assets, Z-score and KZ-index. The result of the analysis was not clear in relation to which behavior is predominant in Brazilian companies. Using the Total Asset as a Threshold, the model that was most representative was the one referring to investments in capital goods. But, considering the Z-score as a Threshold, the most representative model indicates that companies use more Cash Flow results for cash holdings. Dividends and KZ-index were not significant in the analysis.

A literatura prediz duas principais formas de mitigar os conflitos de agência que surgem pela separação do controle e da propriedade, porém não aponta qual seria o mais apropriado. Assim, o presente estudo buscou identificar a eficiência dos mecanismos de governança corporativa, em se tratando de compensação aos executivos (incentivos explícitos e implícitos) e monitoramento (conselho de administração), na resolução dos conflitos de agência, entre os executivos principais e os acionistas de empresas de capital aberto brasileiras. Para isso, foram aplicados modelos dinâmicos de regressão linear múltipla, estimados pelo Método dos Momentos Generalizados Sistêmico (GMM-Sys), em um painel de dados não balanceado para 42 empresas, de 1999 a 2016. Identificou-se que o monitoramento é o meio mais eficiente para mitigar os problemas de agência, em que os conselheiros são agentes ativos no processo de verificação das ações dos executivos, gerando resultados consistentes que afetam positivamente o desempenho. Este estudo coloca à prova a prerrogativa de que o conselho de administração é “figurativo” no Brasil, tendo um desempenho significativo no monitoramento.