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Abstract: This paper continues the program initiated in [5], towards a derivation system for security protocols. The general idea is that complex protocols can be formally derived, starting from basic security components, using a sequence of refinements and transformations, just like logical proofs are derived starting from axioms, using proof rules and transformations. The claim is that in practice, many protocols are already derived in such a way, but informally. Capturing this practice in a suitable formalism turns out to be a considerable task. The present paper proposes rules for composing security protocols from given security components. In general, security protocols are, of course, not compositional: information revealed by one may interfere with the security of the other. However, annotating protocol steps by pre- and post-conditions, allows secure sequential composition. Establishing that protocol components satisfy each other’s invariants allows more general forms of composition, ensuring that the individually secure sub-protocols will not interact insecurely in the composite protocol. The applicability of the method is demonstrated on modular derivations of two standard protocols, together with their simple security properties. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper serves to bring three independent but important areas of computer science to a common meeting point: Formal Concept Analysis (FCA), Chu Spaces, and Domain Theory (DT). Each area is given a perspective or reformulation that is conducive to the flow of ideas and to the exploration of cross-disciplinary connections. Among other results, we show that the notion of states in Scott’s information system corresponds precisely to that of formal concepts in FCA with respect to all finite Chu spaces, and the entailment relation corresponds to “association rules”. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]