Search

Este artigo discute a relação entre ética e estética na filosofia de Jean-François Lyotard. Influenciado por Wittgenstein, Lyotard argumenta que a cultura contemporânea é caracterizada por vários jogos de linguagem localmente legitimados, o que impossibilitaria o uso de uma linguagem universal e unificadora. De acordo com Lyotard, metanarrativas tais como a autonomia do sujeito oprimiriam a diversidade. Por causa disso, as metanarrativas deveriam ser substituídas pelos vários jogos. Assim, o artigo também pretende mostrar que essa caracterização de pós-modernidade abrange uma posição ética cética e relativista que torna impraticável uma análise crítica da cultura. Uma das consequências disso é a associação entre a filosofia pós-moderna e a defesa das sociedades capitalistas. [This paper discusses the relation between ethics and aesthetics in the philosophy of Jean-François Lyotard. Influenced by Wittgenstein, Lyotard argues that contemporary culture is characterized by several locally legitimated language games, which would precludes the use of a universal and unifying language. According to Lyotard, metanarratives such as the autonomous subject could oppress diversity. Because of this, the metanarratives should be replaced by several games. The paper also intends to show that this characterization of postmodernity embraces a skeptical and relativist ethic conception that makes impractical a critical analysis of culture. One consequence of this is the link between postmodern philosophy and defense of capitalist societies.]

This paper discusses Rudolf Carnap’s 1929 conferences at the Bauhaus school of art, design and architecture in the context of Otto Neurath’s utopianism. The conferences enable us to understand Carnap’s proposals of logical construction as part of some modernist cultural movements of Central Europe in early 20th Century. Utopias play a significant role in Neurath’s Philosophy of Social Science, as they can be compared to models of social technology. Carnap’s conferences aim at showing that the Bauhaus shared a world-conception with the Vienna Circle, group of which Carnap and Neurath were members. This paper argues that this common world-conception can be understood as a utopia, as a proposal of intervention in society, and that Carnap’s conferences were an invitation to join such utopia. This paper not only performs an exercise of historical reconstruction of Philosophy of Science, but it also shows reflexions on some problems of Social Science and technology. [Neste artigo se discutem as conferências de Rudolf Carnap, em 1929, na Bauhaus, escola de arte, design e arquitetura, no contexto do utopianismo de Otto Neurath. As conferências nos permitem compreender as propostas de Carnap relativas à construção lógica como parte de alguns movimentos culturais modernistas na Europa Central do início do século XX. Utopias desempenham um papel significativo na filosofia das ciências sociais de Neurath, sendo comparáveis a modelos de tecnologia social. As conferências de Carnap objetivam mostrar que a Bauhaus e o Círculo de Viena, grupo de que Carnap e Neurath eram membros, compartilhavam uma concepção de mundo. Argumenta-se neste artigo que essa compartilhada concepção de mundo pode ser entendida como uma utopia, como uma proposta de intervenção na sociedade, e que as conferências de Carnap foram um convite para integração a essa utopia. O artigo não realiza apenas um exercício de reconstrução histórica da filosofia da ciência, mas também apresenta reflexões acerca de alguns problemas de ciências e tecnologias sociais.]

A critical social theory for what and whom? This question is the key for this paper in order to problematize relationships and the dependence relating sociological theory, political praxis and strong institutionalism. The paper’s central argument is that the Western sociological tradition in the 20th century assumed a systemic understanding of society as epistemological-political basis of its constitution, legitimation and political influence, which led to strong institutionalism, that is, the correlation and self-justification between social sciences and political institutions, so that scientifical-political institutions become overlapped in relation to political praxis of social movements, as neutral and impartial regarding class struggle, depoliticizing social systems’ constitution, legitimation and evolution. The paper’s second central argument is that a critical social theory for the constitution and crisis of contemporary Western modernization must abandon the defense of and connection with strong institutionalism, supporting social movements in their epistemological-political criticism to social systems’ technicization and autonomization. [uma teoria social crítica para quê/para quem? Esta questão é a chave-de-leitura que o artigo usa com o objetivo de problematizar as relações e a dependência entre teoria sociológica, práxis política e institucionalismo forte. O argumento central do artigo consiste em que a tradição sociológica ocidental no século XX assumiu uma compreensão sistêmica de sociedade enquanto base epistemológico-política para sua constituição, legitimação e influência política, o que levou ao institucionalismo forte, isto é, à correlação e à autojustificação entre ciências sociais e instituições políticas, de modo que instituições científico-políticas tornam-se sobrepostas à práxis política dos movimentos sociais, bem como neutras e imparciais em relação às lutas de classe, despolitizando a constituição, a legitimação e a evolução dos sistemas sociais. Assim, o segundo argumento central do artigo consiste em que uma teoria social crítica para o estudo da constituição e da crise da modernização ocidental contemporânea deve abandonar sua defesa e sua conexão com o institucionalismo forte, auxiliando movimentos sociais em sua crítica epistemológico-política à tecnicização e à autonomização dos sistemas sociais]

In this paper, I put under scrutiny the arguments put forward by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VI.9. The paper has two main parts. In the first, I examine the NE VI.9’s first part where Aristotle develops the concept of good deliberation, offering its definition in 1142b27-28. In the second, I examine the connection between good deliberation and phronesis, and, then, discuss the vexata quæstio about if the lines 1142b31-33 might be read as introducing the claim that phronesis provides moral ends. [Neste artigo, analiso pormenorizadamente os argumentos apresentados por Aristóteles em Ética a Nicômaco (EN) VI.9. O artigo é dividido em duas partes principais. Na primeira, abordo a primeira parte de EN VI.9 onde Aristóteles desenvolve a noção de boa deliberação, culminando com a apresentação da sua definição em 1142b27-28. Na segunda, abordo a conexão entre boa deliberação e phronesis e discuto a vexata quaestio de se as linhas 1142b31-33 podem ser lidas como introduzindo a tese de que a phronesis fornece os fins morais]

This paper retraces two crucial displacements in the history of the notion of the “performative” in Derrida’s thought, and the effects of this notion in his attempt to rethink the contours of ethical and political action, and of the “subject” of this action. First, Judith Butler’s distinctive appropriation of the notion of “iterability” employed by Derrida to describe the performative force of writing, and of language in general. And second, Derrida’s own re-modulation of the notion of the “performative”, in his late reflections on the aporetic structure of “decision” through which he attempts to reflect on the breach between “justice” and “normativity”. Through an examination of the differences at stake in these two possible trajectories for thinking the “performativity” of language and selfhood the paper tries to show, first, the connection between Derrida’s early analysis of “writing” and his late reflections on the gap between “justice” and normativity; and second, it attempts in a rather preliminary way to understand why Derrida, in his attempt to re-think ethical and political action in this way, re-opens a certain “religious” register constitutive of this action, a register, we suggest, connected to the problem of affectivity.

This paper retraces two crucial displacements in the history of the notion of the “performative” in Derrida’s thought, and the effects of this notion in his attempt to rethink the contours of ethical and political action, and of the “subject” of this action. First, Judith Butler’s distinctive appropriation of the notion of “iterability” employed by Derrida to describe the performative force of writing, and of language in general. And second, Derrida’s own re-modulation of the notion of the “performative”, in his late reflections on the aporetic structure of “decision” through which he attempts to reflect on the breach between “justice” and “normativity”. Through an examination of the differences at stake in these two possible trajectories for thinking the “performativity” of language and selfhood the paper tries to show, first, the connection between Derrida’s early analysis of “writing” and his late reflections on the gap between “justice” and normativity; and second, it attempts in a rather preliminary way to understand why Derrida, in his attempt to re-think ethical and political action in this way, re-opens a certain “religious” register constitutive of this action, a register, we suggest, connected to the problem of affectivity.

Fabian Freyenhagen, muito recentemente, propôs a tese de que a Teoria Crítica estaria condenada a deixar de fundamentar seus critérios de julgamento da sociedade. Para ele, Horkheimer teria, em seu famoso ensaio “Teoria Tradicional e Teoria Crítica”, publicado há oitenta anos, fundado uma ortodoxia teórico-crítica impermeável a programas de fundamentação. Neste artigo, trata-se de contrapor à tese de Freyenhagen uma interpretação diferente de “Teoria Tradicional e Teoria Crítica”, uma que não exclui, de antemão e definitivamente, a necessidade teórico-crítica de fundamentação. Além disso, trata-se de delinear três razões pelas quais a Teoria Crítica pode vir a requerer que seus critérios sejam fundamentados. [Fabian Freyenhagen, in a very recent essay, sustains the thesis that Critical Theory would be condemned to refrain from justifying its criteria of judgement of society. According to him, Horkheimer, in his famous essay “Traditional and Critical Theory”, published eighty years ago, would have established a critical-theoretical orthodoxy impermeable to any programme of justification. In this paper, I object to Freyenhagen’s thesis by articulating a different interpretation of “Traditional and Critical Theory”, one that does not exclude the critical-theoretical need for justification. Furthermore, I outline three reasons why Critical Theory might require justification.]

In this paper, I intend to evaluate if Michael Smith’s account in support of a substantive convergence among agents’ idealized desires is compelling enough to show us that such agreement would be possible. Smith claims that moral argument tends to elicit moral agreement among agents’ opinions and that this gives us a reason to believe that there would be a convergence in desires under conditions of full rationality. He maintains that the best explanation of that historical tendency is our substantive convergence upon a set of extremely unobvious a priori moral truths. However, I think he fails to provide us with any convincing reason to expect that a substantive convergence would be attained. I argue Smith’s consensus on moral issues is less probable than disagreement if there is no normative standard for the correctness of the desires we would want ourselves to have in conditions of full rationality. If my argument succeeds it follows that Smith’s account is a sort of error theory of normative reasons, rather than a realistic one. [Neste artigo, pretendo avaliar se a abordagem de Michael Smith apoiando uma convergência substantiva entre os desejos idealizados dos agentes é convincente a ponto de nos mostrar que tal acordo seria possível. Smith afirma que a discussão moral tende a gerar acordo moral entre as opiniões dos agentes e que isso nos dá uma boa razão para acreditarmos que haverá uma convergência em desejos sob condições de racionalidade plena. Ele defende que a melhor explicação dessa tendência histórica é nossa convergência substantiva a respeito de um conjunto de verdades morais a priori pouco óbvias. Contudo, penso que ele falha em oferecer qualquer razão convincente para esperarmos que uma convergência substantiva seria alcançada. Argumento que o consenso de Smith sobre questões morais é menos provável do que o desacordo caso não haja nenhum padrão normativo de correção dos desejos que esperaríamos ter em condições de racionalidade plena. Se meu argumento é bem-sucedido, segue-se que a abordagem de Smith é um tipo teoria do erro de razões normativas, ao invés de um tipo de teoria realista.]

Neste artigo, abordamos o problema do “silêncio epistemológico” de Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) após 1953. Bachelard era um escritor prolífico: entre 1927 e 1953, concluiu 13 livros sobre epistemologia – cerca de um livro a cada 14 meses. Todavia, em certo momento deixou de publicar obras sobre o tema, embora tivesse continuado a escrever sobre a imaginação poética. Michel Vadée e Olival Freire notam o problema e indicam caminhos possíveis, mas deixam sua solução em aberto. Mais especificamente, Freire sugere que a questão pode estar relacionada a uma importante tomada de posição de Louis de Broglie, que, em 1952, rompe com a interpretação de Copenhagen (adotada por Bachelard), propondo uma teoria que admite uma solução não probabilista para a teoria quântica. Essa reviravolta por parte do mais importante físico francês pode ter abalado o espírito de Bachelard. Acreditamos ter encontrado, em um artigo de Bachelard publicado em 1957, elementos que permitem resolver a questão. [In this paper, we address the problem of Gaston Bachelard’s (1884-1962) “epistemological silence” after 1953. Bachelard was a prolific writer: between 1927 and 1953, he completed 13 books on epistemology ‒ about one book every 14 months. However, at one point he stopped publishing works on the subject, although he continued to write about the poetic imagination. Michel Vadée and Olival Freire note the problem and point out possible paths, but leave their solution open. More specifically, Freire suggests that the issue may be related to an important position taken by Louis de Broglie, who, in 1952, breaks with the Copenhagen interpretation (adopted by Bachelard), proposing a theory that admits a non-probabilistic solution for Quantum theory. This turnaround by the most important French physicist may have shaken Bachelard's spirit. We believe we have found, in an article by Bachelard published in 1957, elements that allow us to resolve the issue.]

Este trabalho tem como objetivo fornecer uma aplicação do hexágono lógico aos conceitos metafísicos de razão e de causalidade. Após uma breve apresentação da abordagem de Blanché, passa-se à construção das estruturas geométricas. Primeiramente, são apresentadas duas tríades – razão lógica, acaso, causa; razão, não-causa, non sequitur. Em seguida, apresenta-se o hexágono lógico como a díade das duas primeiras estruturas. Conclui-se que o hexágono lógico é uma estrutura capaz de organizar sistematicamente os conceitos de razão e de causalidade. [This paper aims to show an application of the logical hexagon to the metaphysical concepts of reason and causality. After a brief presentation of Blanché’s approach, we proceed to build the geometrical structures. First, we show two triads – logical reason, chance, cause; reason, non-cause, non sequitur. Then we present the logical hexagon as a dyad built out of the first two structures. We conclude that the logical hexagon is able to organize the concepts of reason and causality in a systematic way.]

Retomando uma leitura política e social da Carta a d’Alembert proposta por Bento Prado Jr. e Luiz Roberto Salinas Fortes, este artigo busca estender e desdobrar algumas importantes implicações desta tradição de leitura: investigar uma reflexão econômica e os desenvolvimentos de uma economia política associada aos espetáculos, conforme apresentada na Carta. Afinal, contestando uma específica concepção de espetáculo defendida pelos enciclopedistas, Rousseau, sublinhando o caráter político presente nos debates sobre a atividade teatral, incessantemente se atenta para o contexto social e econômico no qual uma peça se insere. Neste contexto, considerando-se ainda a oposição que a Carta apresenta contra etnocentrismo dos philosophes, pretendemos analisar como então é desenvolvida uma crítica à ociosidade – ou uma apologia ao trabalho – que tem em vista fortalecer os argumentos dirigidos contra o teatro parisiense. Exploraremos, portanto, os aspectos de economia política que compõem a argumentação de Rousseau ao longo do texto. [Resuming a political and social reading on the Letter to d’Alembert proposed by Bento Prado Jr. and Luiz Roberto Salinas Fortes, this paper aims to further important consequences carried out by this tradition: to analyze an economic reflection and the developments of political economy thoughts associated with the theatre, as presented in Rousseau’s Letter to d’Alembert. Challenging a specific conception of spectacles advocated by the encyclopedists, Rousseau, highlighting the political character present in the discussions on the theatrical activity, draws attention to the social context in which a play takes place. In this context, and considering the opposition that the Letter presents against the philosophes’ ethnocentrism, we aim to analyze how a critique of idleness – or a praise of labor – is developed, with a view to strengthen the arguments pointed against the Parisian theatre. Most of all, we will seek to highlight the political and economic aspects that make up Rousseau’s arguments.]

Apresenta-se a tese da ressemantização do conceito de fundamento em Adorno (1903–1969). Através de análise bibliográfica e teórica, pretende-se demonstrar como é possível pensar a fundamentação numa filosofia marcada, essencialmente, pelo fracasso do projeto iluminista recente. [This paper presents the thesis of the resemantization of the concept of foundation in Adorno (1903-1969). Through bibliographical and theoretical analysis, it is intended to demonstrate how it is possible to think the foundation in a philosophy marked, essentially, by the failure of recent Enlightenment project.]

O projeto da teoria crítica da sociedade tem sido definido de diferentes modos, a partir de sua gênese, de sua metodologia ou de sua história institucional. O presente artigo analisa cada uma destas possibilidades e sugere uma alternativa a elas, a saber, a de que a teoria crítica pode ser entendida como a tentativa de desdobrar um problema: o da divisão e da compartimentação do trabalho científico então em curso. Esta alternativa também permite compreender de outra forma a ruptura operada pela guinada epistêmica do final da década de 60. [The project of the critical theory of society has been defined in different ways: through the description of its genesis, of its methodology or of its institutional history. This paper analyzes each of these possibilities and suggests an alternative to them, namely, that critical theory can be understood as the attempt to deal with a problem: that of the ongoing division and compartmentalization of scientific work. This alternative also makes it possible to understand in another way the rupture operated by the epistemic turn of the late 1960s.]

Dans cet article, j’analyse les idées principales de la théorie de la démocratie délibérative de Jürgen Habermas. Le philosophe allemand développe une conception procédurale et discursive de la légitimité démocratique selon lequel une décision est légitime et juste seulement dans la mesure où elle est fondée sur des raisons publiques résultant d'un processus de délibération inclusive et équitable, à laquelle tous les les citoyens peuvent participer et dans lequel ils sont en condition de coopérer librement. Cette conception de la démocratie est présenté comme une alternative aux conceptions républicaines traditionnelles de la démocratie, qui postulent un intérêt général transcendant de représentants élus par rapport aux points de vue des citoyens ordinaires, et les conceptions libérales, qui construisent cumulativement l'intérêt général comme simple addition ou négociation entre les différents intérêts. Notre thèse principale est que la légitimité démocratique dépend d'un processus de formation de la volonté (non pas d’une volonté pré-formé, c’est à dire anterieur à le débat public).[In this paper, I analyze the main ideias of the Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative theory of democracy. The german philosopher develops a procedural and discursive notion of democratic legitimity according to which the decision is legitimate and therefore correct only in the moment that it is grounded on public reasons which are resulting of an inclusive and fair procedure of deliberation, to which all citizens can participante and in which they cooperate freely. Such notion of democracy appears as an alternative to traditional republican notions of democracy which postulate a general interest of the elects ones regarding to the interests of the common citizens, as an alternative to the liberal notions of democracy which construct in a cumulative way the general interest as a simple addition or negotiation among different particular interests. Our main argument is that democratic legitimity depends of a formative process of the will (and not of the pre-formed wills which are previous to the public debate.]

Este ensayo atiende al momento seguramente más ambicioso de la historia de la filosofía: la conversión, en el seno del Idealismo Alemán del modus exponendi de aquélla, primero en Crítica (Kant), luego en Doctrina (Fichte), en Sistema (Schelling), y finalmente en Ciencia (Hegel), al mismo tiempo que, en el modus componendi, la Metafísica se transfigura en Lógica. Ello supone, contra una interpretación manualística ya apenas seguida, no abandono o menosprecio por parte de Hegel de las ciencias experimentales, sino al contrario: una minuciosa utilización de las mismas como origen, condición y material de elaboración del propio desarrollo lógico, de manera que, mientras el plano de la exposición (el methodus) permanece relativamente fijo, el de la composición, mediado por la Realphilosophie, se modifica y altera al ritmo de las teorías y los acontecimientos del día de los hombres, como si su “peso” fuera dejando una huella en el reino lógico de las sombras. [This paper examines the probably most ambitious moment of the history of philosophy: the transformation, at the center of the German Idealism, of Philosophy into Critique (Kant), Doctrine (Fichte), System (Schelling) and finally Science (Hegel), as regards the philosophical modus exponendi, and simultaneously the transfiguration of Metaphysics into Logic, in its modus componendi. Rejecting the old-fashioned handbook interpretations, I claim these transformations do not make Hegel neglect or contempt the experimental sciences. On the contrary, they prove he meticulously used the experimental sciences as origin, condition and elaboration material of the logical development, so that while the exposition level (methodus) remains relatively firm, the composition level, mediated by the Realphilosophie, is modified and altered according to the human theories and the human daily events, as if its "weight" left its traces in the logical realm of shadows.]

This paper will focus on the issue of whether it is plausible to think about a human right to be assisted in dying. The right to be assisted in dying cannot be considered just a right of non-interference. It is better understood as a claim right because it demands assistance and positive actions. I will argue that the principles of individual autonomy and Kant’s notion of dignity taken independently cannot be considered plausible justification for the human right to be assisted in dying. Griffin’s personhood account points out that principles of liberty, minimum provision and autonomy must be taken together to justify human rights. Based on his theory, I will argue that a person with a terminal disease who was aware of her imminent death or who suffered from an intractable, incurable, irreversible disease may waive the right to life and choose death. Therefore, the right to life would not restrict the human right to be assisted in dying and a state that allowed the practice of assisted dying would not be disrespecting the human right to life. This article will defend that the personhood account is able to protect vulnerable people from making decisions under pressure and avoid the slippery slope objection.

In this paper, I propose a general model for the rational resolution of disputes about logic, and discuss a number of its features. These include its dispensing with a traditional notion of the a priori in logic, and some objections to which this might give rise.

Many authors have hoped to understand the indicative conditional construction in everyday language by means of what are usually called conditional probabilities. Other authors have hoped to make sense of conditional probabilities in terms of the absolute probabilities of conditional statements. Although all such hopes were disappointed by the triviality theorems of Lewis (1976), there have been copious subsequent attempts both to rescue CCCP (the conditional construal of conditional probability) and to extend and to intensify the arguments against it. In this paper it will be shown that triviality is avoidable if the probability function is replaced by an alternative generalization of the deducibility relation, the measure of deductive dependence of Miller and Popper (1986). It will be suggested further that this alternative way of orchestrating conditionals is nicely in harmony with the test proposed in Ramsey (1931), and also with the idea that it is not the truth value of a conditional statement that is of primary concern but its assertability or acceptability.

In this paper, I propose a general model for the rational resolution of disputes about logic, and discuss a number of its features. These include its dispensing with a traditional notion of the a priori in logic, and some objections to which this might give rise.

In this paper we investigate the relations between possibility, imagination and conception. We develop a theory according to which these three notions are compatible but independent. This means in particular that none of these notions reduces to another one and that there are things which are: (1) imaginable but neither possible nor conceivable; (2) conceivable but neither possible nor imaginable; (3) possible but neither imaginable nor conceivable. We first explain our methodology: structuralism, equilibrium between norm and description, prototypical examples. And then we proceed.

Many authors have hoped to understand the indicative conditional construction in everyday language by means of what are usually called conditional probabilities. Other authors have hoped to make sense of conditional probabilities in terms of the absolute probabilities of conditional statements. Although all such hopes were disappointed by the triviality theorems of Lewis (1976), there have been copious subsequent attempts both to rescue CCCP (the conditional construal of conditional probability) and to extend and to intensify the arguments against it. In this paper it will be shown that triviality is avoidable if the probability function is replaced by an alternative generalization of the deducibility relation, the measure of deductive dependence of Miller and Popper (1986). It will be suggested further that this alternative way of orchestrating conditionals is nicely in harmony with the test proposed in Ramsey (1931), and also with the idea that it is not the truth value of a conditional statement that is of primary concern but its assertability or acceptability.

In this paper we investigate the relations between possibility, imagination and conception. We develop a theory according to which these three notions are compatible but independent. This means in particular that none of these notions reduces to another one and that there are things which are: (1) imaginable but neither possible nor conceivable; (2) conceivable but neither possible nor imaginable; (3) possible but neither imaginable nor conceivable. We first explain our methodology: structuralism, equilibrium between norm and description, prototypical examples. And then we proceed.

In the debate between literalism and contextualism in semantics, Kent Bach’s project is often taken to stand on the latter side of the divide. In this paper I argue this is a misleading assumption and justify it by contrasting Bach’s assessment of the theoretical eliminability of minimal propositions arguably expressed by well-formed sentences with standard minimalist views, and by further contrasting his account of the division of interpretative processes ascribable to the semantics and pragmatics of a language with a parallel analysis carried out by the most radical opponent to semantic minimalism, i.e., by occasionalism. If my analysis proves right, the sum of its conclusions amounts to a refusal of Bach’s main dichotomies.

In the debate between literalism and contextualism in semantics, Kent Bach’s project is often taken to stand on the latter side of the divide. In this paper I argue this is a misleading assumption and justify it by contrasting Bach’s assessment of the theoretical eliminability of minimal propositions arguably expressed by well-formed sentences with standard minimalist views, and by further contrasting his account of the division of interpretative processes ascribable to the semantics and pragmatics of a language with a parallel analysis carried out by the most radical opponent to semantic minimalism, i.e., by occasionalism. If my analysis proves right, the sum of its conclusions amounts to a refusal of Bach’s main dichotomies.

In this paper, I intend to outline a moral concept which could be the bases for an immanent theory of values which is sustained by the economy of feelings involved in the moral confrontation characteristic of the social life of animals possessing a complex nervous system, as is particularly the case with certain species of mammals, including homo sapiens. What gives a moral dimension to these feelings is the way in which they interfere with and determine the mutual behaviour of individuals within a group, and it is through this process that values are devised, sustained and transmitted. The route I will take is as follows: I will begin by discussing the problem of normativity, on the basis of an updating of the naturalist fallacy by way of the genetic fallacy, and from the point of view of a theory of value. This means that I will not approach the issue directly via the problem of duty, but by showing that it is connected to, and better understood within, a perspective of value. The choice in a moral theory of the measure of what is good in it has fundamental implications for the concept of duty, which is at the heart of of any discussion concerning normativity. This connection shall be clarified. I will then dispute the thesis that the individual (in the civil and legal sense attributed to the term by the Enlightenment) is an adequate starting-point for practical philosophy, and criticise the limits which tradition has placed on what can be considered moral whilst, by the same token, criticising classical contractualist concepts of morality which has been the bases for the majority of moral approaches in contemporary philosophy including for naturalistic ones.

Since before we can remember, humanity aims to overcome its biological limitations; such a goal has certainly played a key role in the advent of technique. However, despite the benefits that technique may bring, the people who make use of it will inevitably be under risk of harm. Even though human technical wisdom consists in attaining the best result without compromising anybody’s safety, misuses are always a possibility in the horizon. Nowadays, technology can be used for more than just improving human capacities, preserving and restoring health or promoting human well-being. It also enables us to overcome human limitations and reach way beyond our "natural design". That being said, what could possibly justify the fear for these new directions of biotechnology? Should medicine and health care change their traditional goals and begin searching for artificial improvements to wellness in human nature? In this paper, I will hereby present and briefly discuss the main topics of the contemporary issue of human enhancement: the therapy-enhancement distinction, the possibility of cognitive enhancements and better physical performances, the fight against senescence, the arguments for and against human eugenics, the search for perfection, the quest of moral enhancement, the problem of public priorities, and some questions on medical ethics. Then, finally, I will want to present some realist perspectives on the subject.

In this paper, I intend to outline a moral concept whichcould be the bases for an immanent theory of values which issustained by the economy of feelings involved in the moralconfrontation characteristic of the social life of animals possessing acomplex nervous system, as is particularly the case with certainspecies of mammals, including homo sapiens. What gives a moraldimension to these feelings is the way in which they interfere with and determine the mutual behaviour of individuals within a group, and it is through this process that values are devised, sustained and transmitted. The route I will take is as follows: I will begin by discussing the problem of normativity, on the basis of an updating of the naturalist fallacy by way of the genetic fallacy, and from the point of view of a theory of value. This means that I will not approach the issue directly via the problem of duty, but by showing that it is connected to, and better understood within, a perspective of value. The choice in a moral theory of the measure of what is good in it has fundamental implications for the concept of duty, which is at the heart of of any discussion concerning normativity. This connection shall be clarified. I will then dispute the thesis that the individual (in the civil and legal sense attributed to the term by the Enlightenment) is an adequate starting-point for practical philosophy, and criticise the limits which tradition has placed on what can be considered moral whilst, by the same token, criticising classical contractualist concepts of morality which has been the bases for the majority of moral approaches in contemporary philosophy including for naturalistic ones.

Since before we can remember, humanity aims toovercome its biological limitations; such a goal has certainly playeda key role in the advent of technique. However, despite the benefitsthat technique may bring, the people who make use of it willinevitably be under risk of harm. Even though human technicalwisdom consists in attaining the best result without compromisinganybody’s safety, misuses are always a possibility in the horizon.Nowadays, technology can be used for more than just improvinghuman capacities, preserving and restoring health or promoting human well-being. It also enables us to overcome human limitations and reach way beyond our "natural design". That being said, what could possibly justify the fear for these new directions of biotechnology? Should medicine and health care change their traditional goals and begin searching for artificial improvements to wellness in human nature? In this paper, I will hereby present and briefly discuss the main topics of the contemporary issue of human enhancement: the therapy-enhancement distinction, the possibility of cognitive enhancements and better physical performances, the fight against senescence, the arguments for and against human eugenics, the search for perfection, the quest of moral enhancement, the problem of public priorities, and some questions on medical ethics. Then, finally, I will want to present some realist perspectives on the subject.

Assuming that there is a "neuroscientific turn" in moral philosophy, I will be discussing in this paper how neurophilosophy could shed light on the normative problems raised by a naturalistic project of ethical and social research, particularly related to the question of the articulation between the biological evolution of human species and the social and historical evolution of society and social groups. Taking a critical approach to naturalism and normative theories, I argue that there is a neurophenomenological deficit in naturalism (particularly in the versions of naturalism that follow the program of a naturalized epistemology) and in the normative theories (particularly in the critical theory) and I put forward a version of social constructivism that combines the neuroscientific and neurophilosophical models of Antonio Damasio and Jesse Prinz.

Assuming that there is a "neuroscientific turn" in moral philosophy, I will be discussing in this paper how neurophilosophy could shed light on the normative problems raised by a naturalistic project of ethical and social research, particularly related to the question of the articulation between the biological evolution of human species and the social and historical evolution of society and social groups. Taking a critical approach to naturalism and normative theories, I argue that there is a neurophenomenological deficit in naturalism (particularly in the versions of naturalism that follow the program of a naturalized epistemology) and in the normative theories (particularly in the critical theory) and I put forward a version of social constructivism that combines the neuroscientific and neurophilosophical models of Antonio Damasio and Jesse Prinz.