1. Un análisis de teoría de juegos del sistema español de financiación regional.
- Author
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Federico Geli, José and Quilis, Enrique M.
- Subjects
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PUBLIC finance , *GAME theory , *FISCAL policy , *MORAL hazard , *FEDERAL budgets , *FEDERAL government , *ECONOMIC policy - Abstract
Recent history has shown the inherent instability of the Spanish Regional Financing System. This system is key to the design of a fiscal framework aimed at ensuring budgetary stability, debt sustainability and transparency. In this paper we examine issues related to moral hazard and deficit bias from a game theory perspective. We combine classical concepts from game theory (Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection) with concepts derived from refinements (theory of moves) aimed at introducing dynamic elements in the normal-form game, rendering it more suitable for the study of repeated, recurrent interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
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