Search

The article starts with the observation of A. F. Chalmers, philosopher of science, that there is neither a common concept of science, nor a common concept of scientific method which could be applied for every scientific branch in every stage of its evolution. The uncertainty of the definition of modern science could be indicated as the first problem in the discussion on the scientific character of law. The second problem arises when one tries to define the concepts of legal science and jurisprudence. The author of the article states that these concepts represent different approaches towards legal research: legal science focuses on value- neutral criteria, ideas, characteristics, considers legal norms as objectively existing social facts. Jurisprudence, in its turn, analyzes legal practice ant its methods “from the inside”, emphasizes legal knowledge, reasonableness, just decisions. According to some European legal scholars whose thoughts are discussed in the article, it is reasonable to indicate the specific branches of theoretical legal sciences, such as, for example, general theory of law, philosophy of law, history of law, law sociology, law and economics, law epistemology, law methodology, law and artificial intelligence studies, as well as general jurisprudential discourse. A definition of the object of legal science, as another source of uncertainty, is analyzed in the second part of the article. The question of the object of legal science is identical to the question of the nature of law. It is well known that discussions on this issue have been indeed frequent and no conclusion has yet been reached. Nine definitions of law are discussed in this part: law as a system of legally binding norms, law as a social practice, law as a product of legal doctrine, law as an ideal construction, law as an institutional fact, law divided into the input law and the output law, law as a moral imperative of a particular society, etc. Finally, some remarks on legal methodology are made. The traditional legal attitude which concentrates on the methods of interpretation of law is considered to be too narrow. The importance of argumentation, hermeneutics, coherence theories, together with logic and analysis for jurisprudence is stressed. Besides the abovementioned issues, the diversity of the approaches to legal methodology is regarded as another factor determining the complexity of the scientific character of legal science and jurisprudence. Konferencijos pavadinimu pasėjus tam tikrą abejonę teisės mokslu kaip reiškiniu („Kaip galimas teisės mokslas?“), o šio straipsnio pavadinimu teisės mokslo bei jurisprudencijos moksliškumą įvardijus problema , tikslinga būtų pradėti nuo pačių pirminių sąvokų analizės – ką turime omenyje sakydami teisės mokslas? jurisprudencija? moksliškumas? Ar jurisprudencijos ir teisės teorijos, teisės filosofijos sąvokos laikytinos sinonimais, ar kiekviena iš jų reiškia skirtingą teisės tyrimo būdą, metodologiją, požiūrį į teisę? Ar moksliškumą tapatiname su tiesos nustatymu, ar renkamės pliuralistinę mokslo sampratą, o gal apsiribojame „mokslinių“ metodų, „patikimos“ metodologijos paieška? Straipsnyje atkreipiamas dėmesys į tai, kad egzistuoja mažiausiai dvi skirtingos požiūrių į teisės tyrinėjimus kryptys – sąlyginai jas galime įvardyti moksline ir jurisprudencine kryptimis. Konstatuojamas teisės mokslo objekto sampratos nevienareikšmiškumas, lemiantis ir paties teisės mokslo daugialypiškumą. Pastabomis apie jurisprudencijos metodologiją parodoma, kad metodo klausimas teisėje taip pat problemiškas.