Search

Mingli tan 名理探 (Investigation of Name-Patterns) is the first Chinese work dedicated to introducing Aristotelian logic. It was largely forgotten after being published in the 1630s, only rediscovered more than two centuries later, and then considered by modern academia more or less a failed project. However, through the lens of mingli, the key term to translate ‘logic’ in the book, this paper argues that despite the scarce readership and influence of Mingli tan, its translation practice should not be deemed as a failure. Instead, it is a work that reveals how translators can intervene with conceptual paradigms creatively and meaningfully. This paper provides a thorough examination of mingli, a culturally loaded term, by contextualizing it in the late Ming (1582‒1644), a time of significant Sino-European cultural contacts. In doing so, it sheds light on the neglected philosophical value carried by the term through translation, and highlights the translator—Li Zhizao李之藻 (1565‒1630)—and his pioneering effort in infusing it with a novel Aristotelian and Christian sense. Mingli is also examined in the broader intellectual history. Through an investigation into its traces in later Chinese translations of ‘logic’ starting from the 19th century until the 1980s, this study reveals a line of changes in the Chinese reception of logic suggested by the shift from the use of mingli to the phonetic translation luoji 逻辑 to denote logic, indicating that mingli can serve as a meaningful clue to track the transition of Chinese thought from traditional to modern paradigms.

This paper introduces a method of doing and teaching East Asian philosophy transculturally. The method underlies a pedagogy that has proven successful with students from diverse international backgrounds studying primarily in English, which suggests its potential for the wider scholarly community. The method centres on the practice, or gongfu, of doing philosophy with classical Chinese texts. The gongfu approach emphasizes the skill of interpreting and analysing texts within the context of the traditional works themselves. We have found that this skills-based approach to analysis bears much philosophical fruit. It does so, moreover, without subordinating the texts, their ideas, and their arguments to other more academically predominant frameworks. Or in more positive terms, it allows and encourages students to critically philosophize with the early Confucian and Daoist texts on their own terms, and to then creatively bring those unique insights and perspectives to bear on contemporary life. This paper first introduces the gongfu approach to doing and teaching Chinese philosophy and its distinctive characteristics. It then contextualizes the value of this method through critically examining the nature of Chinese philosophy and how we can do Chinese philosophy in English. (How Chinese is it, and in what ways?) Throughout I offer short case studies from our program. I conclude by highlighting its promise as a mode (or valuable component) of transcultural philosophizing and briefly reflect on some reservations one might have.

Zia Nai-zin 謝乃壬, Xie Fu-ya or Hsieh Fu-yah 謝扶雅 (1892–1991), a remarkable Chinese Christian philosopher, theologian, and translator, developed his unique philosophy of “in-ism” (唯中論) from the 1960s to 1980s to indigenize Christianity into the ideal “Chinese Christianity” (中華基督教). Zia declared that the essence of Confucianism is the concept of Zhong 中 (neutrality, avoidance of extremes) and compared the Confucian teaching of the Unity of Heaven and Humans (天人合一) with the Christian Christology, which argues that Jesus Christ is the unity of divinity and humanity. Zia further stated that New Confucians emphasize the Way of Humans over the Way of Heaven, while the Christian doctrine of incarnation balanced both divinity and humanity and achieved the Unity of Heaven and Humans. While Zia’s reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Mean is controversial, following the recently developed method of sublation, this paper aims to evaluate whether Zia’s Christian reinterpretation of Zhongyong 中庸 has successfully sublated Confucianism and Christianity. I argue that although Zia’s interpretation of Zhongyong contains certain philological flaws, overall he successfully produced new insights enriching both Christianity and Confucianism by grounding both on the same ontological ground of Zhong.

In this article, I will introduce and describe my current research work, which centres on re-interpreting Chinese philosophy by implementing an innovative approach suitable for transcultural philosophical comparisons. To commence this undertaking, I was compelled to address certain issues, leading me to seek a novel methodology for transcultural research. This article will begin by briefly addressing the still existing general problems of transcultural philosophical comparisons. I will then examine the recent and current landscape of research in the field of Chinese comparative philosophy, with a specific focus on emerging paradigms referred to as “post-comparative” approaches. In the latter part of this paper, building upon a concise overview of my previous research findings, I will elucidate the current stage of development of the method of sublation. Furthermore, I will provide a theoretical framework outlining the subsequent phases of investigation.

We propose Li Zehou’s idea of “Western Learning for Substance, Chinese Learning for Function” (Xi ti Zhong yong 西體中用) as an interpretative framework for two distinct theories: Sungmoon Kim’s political theory of public reason Confucianism and Yan Lianke’s literary theory of mythorealism. This paper aims to show that Xi ti Zhong yong can provide a unified explanatory framework for these two apparently distinct theories. Second, we show that Xi ti Zhong yong can be applied even more broadly to other phenomena occurring in contemporary discourses on China. In particular, we show that it provides new interpretative perspectives in political philosophy and literary theory.

That artificial intelligence (AI), algorithms, and related technologies could use a few good booster shots of “humanism” is widely apparent. In both program code and implementation, AI and algorithms have been accused of harbouring deep-seated flaws that conflict with human values. They are prime examples of the skew towards white, Western, men and demonstrate the bankruptcy in the face of neoliberalist, profit- and market-oriented social paradigms that this special issue seeks to address. Currently, computer scientists and AI researchers who are looking to remedy these problems are often in favour of more data, more powerful machines, more complex algorithms—in short, that we should fix problems with AI by building better AI. In this view human beings and the world can be modelled in code—our lives, interactions, society, and our very selves can be broken down into data points which can be assessed by highly advanced technologies. When these scientists and researchers seek to broaden their approach they often look to philosophy. However, the philosophy they look to is overwhelmingly Anglo-analytic, which views the world in extremely similar ways. Both AI and Anglo-analytic philosophy argue for solutions to humanistic problems which are essentially mathematical. They share in seeing important concepts, such as persons, emotions, agency, and ethics, as mechanistic, atomistic, and calculable. In this paper I will argue that Classical Chinese philosophy offer insightful resources for addressing the humanist problems in AI. Rather than arguing for mathematical solutions, or envisioning persons, emotions, agency, and ethics, as other rigid, atomistic, and mechanistic approaches, Chinese philosophy emphasizes transformation, interrelatedness, and correlative developments. Accordingly, it offers tools for appreciating the world, society, and ourselves as spontaneous, complex, and full of tension. AI can be programmed and used in ways that do not reduce the complexity and conflict in the world, but provide us instead with tools to make sense of it—tools that are humanistic in nature. To this end, Chinese philosophy can be a helpful collaborative partner.

This article will focus on the interpretation of a key concept in Chinese Neo-Confucianism of the Ming dynasty, namely that of xing 性. The concept is commonly translated as “nature” in Western languages, but this text will point out that there is a gap between the meaning of the Western concept “nature” and the Chinese concept 性. The main contribution of this paper is therefore to suggest a new method of interpreting Chinese philosophical concepts that bridges this gap. The method takes its inspiration from the hermeneutic theory of F. Schleiermacher. It consists, firstly, in re-placing the concept in its historical context—i.e. in the original “language area” where it assumes a meaning; secondly, in identifying the conceptual network which surrounds it, and thirdly, in determining the meaning of the concept in question by its relations to other concepts within the network. The end product of such a method is what we call the “semantic dictionary” of a concept. This article will give an example of how part of the meaning of 性 can be determined by its relations to another key Neo-Confucian concept, li 理.

In this explorative paper, I propose that relatively recent trends in Western continental philosophy can provide a much more commensurate access to Chinese philosophy than found in most mainstream Western philosophy. More specifically, I argue that three prominent European philosophical approaches to interpretation can offer meaningful parallels to classical Confucian views of interpretation. These are Paul Ricoeur’s term “distanciation”, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophy of hermeneutics and, finally, Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive notion of “différance”. While the last two approaches have had their internal clashes, I see them in this specific case as mutually reinforcing by stimulating the continuous reinterpretation of tradition, advancing the view that Western and Chinese philosophies cannot be reduced to the other in conceptual terms, and stipulating that a finalized meaning or interpretation of each is a priori unattainable. In this way, they provide a future opening for—and even integration of—a Chinese-Western philosophical dialogue.

The history of pizza is shrouded in mystery. Competing interpretations of the exact origin, development, and even etymology are as diverse as pizzas themselves. What is certain, however, is that from various types of flatbread meals popular among soldiers and poor workers emerged some standards. Certain experts were then able to refine the process and carefully combine ingredients. The key to this tradition, as well as its popularity around the world, is found in the core elements developed by such pizzaiolos. But this has all changed, and contemporary pizza is no longer topped with whatever just happens to be available, as in the flatbreads of old. Nor does it have to adhere to the standards set forth by experts on taste. Today there are Hawaiian, chocolate, and even fruit pizzas. There are pizzas with cauliflower crust, smashed chicken “bread” and pizzas topped with 24 karat gold. And perhaps most importantly, customized pizzas—pizzas that are designed by the consumer with no regard for anything but their own momentary desires. We think this represents a twofold problem, in terms of both approach and of carrying on tradition, and also think comparative philosophy is just like pizza. In this paper we will thus address these problems through proposing a conception of the trans-cultural that is linked to the art of pizza. Moreover, we expand the scope of diversification to include methodology. Based on methodological insights derived from Chinese tradition and contemporary Chinese scholarship, we argue that comparative philosophy as an art (poiesis) could be a welcome alternative which involves: respect for authority (tradition), trust in tested methods and recipes as conditions for creativity and originality, recognition of the philosophical import of style (form is content) and the significance of inspiration and mastery of skills.

This paper traces the history of comparative philosophy and points to a transition toward post-comparative philosophy. It is argued that, theoretically speaking, comparative philosophy was created by making a distinction between Western and non-Western philosophy and then re-entering this distinction into one of its sides, namely non-Western philosophy. Historically speaking, comparative philosophy was preceded by Orientalist academic disciplines such as Indology and Sinology founded in the 19th century, as well as by the establishment of disciplines like “Chinese Philosophy” in non-Western countries. With the emergence of the field of comparative philosophy in the 20th century, two camps developed: one focusing on difference and the other on sameness. Post-comparative philosophy, it is argued, moves beyond difference and sameness and engages in diverse philosophical endeavours by employing sources from various traditions without constituting a specific field based on culturalist distinctions.

This study examined how Taiwanese philosophy has been received and researched in South Korea since its start to the present day. It takes the form of a survey, classifying the articles about Taiwanese philosophy which were published in South Korea over the years from 1994 to 2018 by the theme. It selected nine philosophers whose influence was profound in Taiwanese philosophy and observed the currents in the scholarship on each philosopher. The names of the selected philosophers are: Fang Thomé H., Hu Shi, Huang Chun-chieh, Lin Yutang, Liu Shuxian (Liu Shu-hsien), Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi (Tang Chun-I), Xu Fuguan, Yu Yingshi (Yu Ying-shih). Sixty-one related papers were summarized and reviewed, and each of them was classified by the publication date, author, language, publisher and keywords. The survey revealed the limitations in Asian philosophy scholarship with regard to Taiwanese philosophy in South Korea, in terms of both quantity and quality. The survey also suggested a possible solution to these limitations and directions for scholars in the future. The study thus serves as a foundation that can boost discussion and the balanced development of South Korean philosophy studies, as well as of Asian philosophy in general.

In the previous issue of Asian Studies (May 2020), Vytis Silius published a paper entitled Diversifying Academic Philosophy: The Post-Comparative Turn and Transculturalism, in which he dealt with some basic, significant and hitherto still unsolved questions regarding the so-called “post-comparative shift” in Chinese and intercultural philosophy.