1. Demonstrating that monitoring and punishing increase non-cooperative behavior in a social dilemma game.
- Author
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Yoko Kitakaji and Susumu Ohnuma
- Subjects
DILEMMA ,NONCOOPERATIVE games (Mathematics) ,INDUSTRIAL waste management ,INFORMATION sharing ,MUTUALISM ,SANCTIONS (Social sciences) - Abstract
This research demonstrated the negative influence of monitoring and punishing during a social dilemma game, taking the illegal dumping of industrial waste as an example. The first study manipulated three conditions: a producing-industries monitoring condition (PIM), an administrative monitoring condition (ADM), and a control condition (no monitoring). The results showed that non-cooperative behavior was more frequent in the PIM condition than in the control condition. The second study had three conditions: a punishing condition (PC), a monitoring condition (MC), and a control condition (no monitoring, no punishing). The results indicated that non-cooperative behavior was observed the most in the PC, and the least in the control condition. Furthermore, information regarding other players' costs and benefits was shared the most in the control conditions in both studies. The results suggest that sanctions prevent people from sharing information, which decreases expectations of mutual cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
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