Search

The interests of the Chilean engineer and philosopher Manuel Atria Ramírez cover a variety of subjects and disciplines, but most of his published work focuses on philosophy of mathematics and physics. After a first phase of youth, of evident Thomistic inclination, his mature thought shows the influence of the great epistemological schools that thrive during the first half of the 20th century. Beyond illustrating the reception that was given in those years in the Latin American academic scene to the new European philosophical tendencies, we think that the concise expository style of the author and his deep understanding of mathematical physics and its history, have the merit to pose with freshness and originality the question referring to the ultimate foundation of mathematics, and its connection with reality. In this article we present and analyze the fundamental lines of Professor Atria`s philosophy of mathematics and physics, as well as those questions open for further research.

Comparing Nietzsche’s moral psychology and the social intuitionist approach to moral judgment proposed by Jonathan Haidt, this paper reveals remarkable similarities between the two models. It also clarifies what implications Nietzsche drew from his description of human psychology and the perspective changes these entail for understanding ourselves as “moral beings”.

Recent developments in experimental research on decision-making have received attention from moral philosophers trying to explain classical moral dilemmas. The class of cognitive illusions known as framing effects have received particular attention because they appear to play a role in explaining the famous trolley-problem. Some philosophers maintain that cognitive illusions such as framing effects seriously undermine classical point of views in moral philosophy such as normative ethics and moral intuitionism. This essay investigates whether, in light of empirical research on framing effects, we can still maintain an intuitionist point of view, and what the available data imply in general for moral philosophy.

In this paper I register disagreement with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer on three significant issues. First, Sidgwick does not give utilitarianism the advantage over Rossian pluralistic intuitionism. Both views are still very much in the running. Second, his dualism survives their evolutionary argument. The egoist principle is no more or less vulnerable to debunking than the principle of impartial benevolence. Third, though his view on pleasure is not entirely clear, Sidgwick is best understood to be offering a traditional 'feeling- tone' account of pleasure, rather than a view which gives a significant role to the 'apprehension' of the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]