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Who can fight against climate change and global warming? Who ought to fight? What is the role of the human rights-based climate change litigation? The paper tries to answer these questions, having as a starting point the definition of a “minimum content” of the fight against climate change and global warming. Acting against climate change and global warming firstly means carrying out a global collective action involving actors (individuals, States, enterprises, generations) with diffe rent levels of awareness and responsibility. Given the above, the paper focuses on the “climate legal obligation” whose source is rooted in the International (United Nations Framework Con vention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement) and EU climate law, with the aim to point out the legal duties of every single State. Consequently, the paper underlines how the climate obligation specifically requires the adoption of mitigation measures in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, moving from the Dutch Urgenda case, the paper points out the role of the human rights-based climate change litigation in the global fight against climate crisis.

The moral evaluation of actions that disregard climate change, in individual as well as public ethics, is complex. A clear moral judgment itself is difficult to reach in both contexts, as we are far from paradigm moral cases where specific people provoke harm to easily identifiable others. However, for people to seriously engage in climate change mitigation, it has to be clear why it is wrong not to do so. There is therefore a need to frame moral responsibility for anti-environmen-tal behavior using language and concepts that are understandable to a broad public. This paper will argue that the concept of selfishness, properly construed, is the most appropriate tool for describing and morally evaluating human behavior that disregards climate change. A specific consequentialist definition of selfishness will be provided to this purpose. Some objections to framing the environmental decision in this way will be raised in public as well as individual ethics. In the public sphere, moral deliberations are complicated by the conflict between the rights of the present generation and those of future ones. In individual ethics, the inconsequentiality of individual emissions calls into question the very existence of a moral imperative to act pro-envi-ronmentally. The paper will thus investigate the grounds on which we can hold accountable pol-icy makers who refuse to take action on climate change, focusing on the concept of future dis-counting. With regard to the individual dimension, a proposal will be advanced on the basis of a non-superfluous causal contribution to collective-impact cases. In both contexts, the paper will eventually argue that anti-environmental actions can be defined as selfish according to the defini-tion provided.

This paper is a theoretical discussion about the how classical paradigms of international relations relate to new challenges in general. In particular, we are interested in how classical paradigms perceive and understand the extreme events described through climate changes in the framework of international policy. For this, we develop an argument that the joint impact of global agenda issues and the pursuit of traditional policy logic in globaliza-tion will only create “losers” in the long term. Nell’articolo l’autore svolge una discussione teorica su come i paradigmi classici delle relazioni internazionali si riferiscono alle nuove sfide in generale. In particolare, all’autore interessa capire come i paradigmi classici percepiscono e comprendono gli eventi estremi descritti attraverso i cambiamenti climatici nel quadro della politica internazionale. Per questo, sviluppiamo un argomento che l’impatto congiunto delle questioni di agenda glo-bale e l’impresa della logica politica tradizionale nella globalizzazione creerà solo “perdenti” a lungo termine.