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The article analyses the relation between public opinion and public discussion (déliberation) in Rousseau’s work. Some contemporary theorists regard Rousseau as a thinker who rejects the necessity of public debate in political decision-making and deplore the lack of discussion in the process by which the general will is formed. To clarify Rousseau’s position regarding this problem the article explores two paths. First, it analyses the concepts of “general” and “particular” as they relate to interest and will, and the terms used by Rousseau to express the political process: délibération, opiner, voter. The second part reveals how Rousseau understands (public) opinion as an expression of our self-love and why he condemns the creation of particular societies within a political body. In conclusion, we show in what sense déliberation is for Rousseau a necessary condition for the democratic process.

Berlin has made the famous distinction between negative and positive liberty. For many liberals, negative liberty is modern individual liberty manifested in markets, while interference by the State is a form of positive liberty. Berlin was also repelled by Rousseau’s concept of the general will, which he considered as a form of collectivist holism. The paper argues that this philosophy is a mistaken interpretation of Berlin’s two concepts of liberty and of Rousseau’s general will. In a simple model of individual and collective choice under conditions of bounded rationality, it is shown that positive and negative liberty are interdependent. The collective choices made under positive liberty can be modeled as the stochastic version of Rousseau’s general will, provided that liberal democracy enables the conditions of free public deliberation. In that case, the individual freedom cherished by Berlin is compatible with positive liberty.

This article aims to consider the concept of personality proposed by the prominent exponent of Russian neo-Kantianism Sergey Hessen and its philosophical and legal content. The frame of reference used to achieve this aim is determined by the personality-culture-the general will-the state coordinates. The author compares Hessen’s ideas with Bogdan Kistyakovsky’s legal concept. Hessen distinguished between several layers of meaning in the notion of culture — civilizedness, level of education, and civic virtue. He stressed that the personality and culture existed in a dialectical relationship. Hessen emphasised the primacy of personal freedom and the need to distinguish between freedom and power of choice. Acts of choice are random and unpredictable — they do not have a solid foundation, whereas acts of freedom are a prerequisite for creativity — an integral characteristic of personality. The creative essence of personality suggests individuality and uniqueness of each person. Personality has a historical dimension. In analysing the problem of the relationship between a person and society, Hessen considered Rousseau’s concept of general will. Hessen proposed a dynamic understanding of general will as a continuous process of establishing and re-establishing that involves the general population. Hessen counterposed law against the notions of nature and morality and interpreted law as an insufficient but necessary prerequisite for harmonizing relations in a society. Hessen developed an original understanding of the ideal of state organisation — a democratic state that incorporates the principles of liberalism and socialism.

The period between 1670 and 1740 is considered a time of “crisis of Christian rationalism” (A. McKenna) or a time of “skepticism” (V.Cousin), since the Christian apologetics, trapped between Protestantism and the Rationalism, are gradually reduced to a row of inefficient and traditional “proofs” for the existence and kindness of God. In 1680, Nicolas Malebranche publishes the Treatise on Nature and Grace, following to explain the way in which God granted His grace to all mankind. In order to fight the skeptical thesis according to which God takes not directly part in this world, Malebranche refers the action of God to the concept of “general/divine will”. If such a theory is useful at a certain metaphysical level in explaining the presence of the evil in the world (God does not create but allows the evil), it raises some anthropological issues, especially concerning the nature of the human free will. If anything in the world emerges as a direct consequence of God’s “general will”, how can be conceived a real free human will? The theory of God’s general will generates an unexpected anthropological consequence (the dissolution of the human free will) that Malebranche tries to hide it by inventing the concept of “inclination of the will”: God does not interfere (by causation) with the human will, but He influences it (by inclination). Is it philosophically defensible? The aim of the article is to analyze some philosophical and methodological difficulties related to the new Malebranchist concept of “inclination of human will” in order to prove that the passage from the occasionalist theory of general will to an inquiry about the human will is quite problematic.

- On theoretical and social constitution of modern education. Reflections with reference to Jan Amos Comenius and Jean-Jacques Rousseau - This article draws on Comenius and Rousseau to examine the theoretical and social constitution of education. Specifically, we analyze the tensions between the Comenius' pansophy and his theory of education in the Early Mod-ern Age as well as between Rousseau's theory of common will and his theory of negative education. The article demonstrates that while both Comenius and Rousseau are important for contemporary discussions of the structure of pedagogical action, neither Comenius' pansophy nor Rousseau's idea of common will are sufficient to ground these discussions.

The article opens discussing philosopher Michel Foucault's claim that "police power must bear 'over everything'" that happens and how this notion is reflected in the archives of police states, including notation in, registration of, and constituting files about individuals into columnar and tabular forms. Such "ignoble" archives transform and devalue each individual into a "case." Walter Benjamin's thesis is then examined, which applies a "ghostly" character to the modern police techniques of control and surveillance. The usage of "lettres de cachet" in the French absolutist regimes is said to show how the will of the monarch is exercised in the guise of serving the people.

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In this paper, I apply the perspective of political ethics to business ethics. I argue that the concept of democratic legitimacy has much appeal for the evaluation of economic arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]