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This paper, mainly wishes to point out some concepts and facts like "feminism" and “islamism” and its consequence as a social fact which is being revealed in societies. But before it, we are supposed to figure out what the essence of “fenimism” is. To not make an anachronic interpretation to social analysis, also this paper wishes to reveal the historical context of these concepts. So to say, we are rethinking the “feminism” and its “results” in practical way. The idea called “practical way”, which feminism is supposed to use merely it, is the fundement of this study. Because the feminism is practical movement in societies rather than theoretical or philosophical investigation or etc. As a consequence the practically valid dynamics in this country and society are interested in Islamic studies so called “Islamism”. The relation between Islamism and Feminism were been shown and also it were been shown that the feminism is a modern fact because of this relation. We endeavour to show that not purely “feminism” but “the fact that feminism is in this society” is modern. Feminism influenced publics with some reasonings all around the world. But those reasonings are not very philophical investigation or not the ideas which have theoretical ground.

A Discussion about the Problems of Institutionalization of Feminist Theory and the Gender Studies at the University of Vienna.

This paper focuses on the following question: how is philosophy of anything possible? Where lies the boundary of specialisation area beyond which the term ?philosophy? loses not only its strength, but also its meaning? When we talk about specific genre, for example, graphic art or sculpture we use the term ?philosophy? in a broader, metaphorical sense. Why then should philosophy of photography be any different? All of the abovementioned questions are discussed in the present article. Philosophy of photography is, indeed, a legitimate discipline, just as philosophy of language, philosophy of science and technology and philosophy of politics are.

By analyzing the feminist debates on Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author shows that feminist critics point to the need either to supplement or to replace Gadamer's philosophy with a greater sensitivity to the historical implications of women's experience. Thus, they are of the view either that Gadamer's philosophy has yet to come to terms with specific historical situations or that Gadamer's philosophy cannot come to terms with historical situatedness per se. The author contends that Gadamer's femi-nist critics do not locate the source of his residual transcendentalism where it should be located: in the account of aesthetic judgment as a "pure feeling" that underpins his entire philosophy. This has the effect, of appearing to preserve aesthetic judgment as "pure feeling" as an apparently innocent remedy, to which some of his feminist critics actually appeal in opposition to his transcendentalism. The author argues, to the contrary, that aesthetic judgment, as a "pure feeling," is at once too com-plicit in the tradition that feminists seek to engage with, traditionally too insubstantial to make a rich resource for a feminist critique of that tradition, and ultimately too traditionally male-centered to be easily coopted by a feminist philosopher.