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This article is a comparative analysis between Charles Taylor's and Martin Heidegger's philosophy focusing on three main terms: mine-ness, other and world. It is a search for similarities and differences between these terms. In the view of results, mine-ness appears to be the most similar aspect of these two philosophies. It is a core term used for describing both Dasein and self. Close similarities have been marked for the "world" as well. These parallels are based on philosophers understanding of this word, of what it means to "self" and how this includes "others". The article is divided into three parts, each dedicated to one of the main themes of this work. Concluding, although there are some similarities and differences between Taylor's and Heidegger's philosophies and that there is a significant time gap between the main works concerning discussed in this article issues, what makes them most alike is how still up-to-date these philosophies are.

In the contemporary philosophy secularism is broadly discussed. However, the problem is far more complex than it may seem at the first glance. For secularism is not only state’s separation from religion, but also a number of other postulates and presumptions which are often forgotten. Charles Taylor presents his theory of secularism in the book Secularism and Freedom of Conscience where he distinguishes two groups of postulates of secularism. In this article I will focus myself on five matters concerning the postulate of neutrality towards religion, which arises on the grounds of Taylor concept, but also transcend it. Reflections on the state’s neutrality towards religion also constitute a ground to ask about the sense of secularism and its real application in public life.

O texto reconstrói o argumento de Taylor, segundo o qual a definição negativa de liberdade como ausência de impedimentos não conhece dos obstáculos internos à liberdade. Segundo ele, o reconhecimento de impedimentos internos é fundamental caso se quiser considerar como relevante o valor da autorrealização, o qual se constitui, deveras, em um valor fundamental do próprio liberalismo. Desse modo, ainda segundo Taylor, verifica-se uma inconsistência na posição liberal que aceita a liberdade negativa e ao mesmo tempo se mostra comprometida com o valor da autorrealização. Tentar-se-á demonstrar, no presente estudo, que a proposta de Taylor de tratamento da liberdade positiva conduz justamente aos problemas apontados por Berlin em relação à mesma.

In this article, I analyze the issue of subjectivity in the form in which it appears in Charles Taylor’s and Richard Rorty’s writings. Positions of these philosophers aregenerally regarded as contradictory. I will, however, argued that the position on subjectivity represented by Rorty finds its complementation in Taylor’s concept. To do this, I will show firstly that both Rorty and Taylor use the category of contingency, presenting some common thesis about subjectivity. This way I will show that the location of the category of subjectivity and the scope of its use in each of them concept is closely related to the understanding of objectivity accepted by each of them. This will allow then to reconstruct the concept of subjectivity presented by Taylor and Rorty. Next, in the conclusion, I will present such a summary of those two standpoints, which will include justification of the thesis of their complementarity.

The paper examines one possible argument against restricting the display of religious icons in Romanian public schools. Opponents of this decision claim that cult objects affirm something essential about our cultural identity and therefore that using legal instruments to protect this identity is justified.Using a differential analysis of two models of identity recognition, Charles Taylor’s and Axel Honneth’s, this paper argues that the legal protection of cultural identity is compatible with value pluralism but only if its defense is justified in the terms provided by Honneth’s theory of identity recognition. However, the argument in favor of displaying icons in Romanian public schools, unlike the argument against wearing the Islamic veil in French public schools, cannot be justified in these terms.

Pese a la mala reputación que siempre ha tenido Hegel en materia de respeto a los derechos individuales, su concepción de la libertad ha demostrado poseer una insospechada y permanente actualidad. Ello se debe, a mi modo de ver, al nivel de complejidad en que Hegel nos ha dejado planteado el problema de la libertad. Desarrollaré aquí esta tesis, según la cual la libertad es concebida simultáneamente como un conjunto y como un proceso de determinaciones de la voluntad. Para ilustrarla, me valdré de dos ejemplos concretos. En primer lugar, para mostrar la relevancia de la estructura objetiva de las determinaciones de la libertad, tomaré como ejemplo el debate entre comunitaristas y liberales en la ética y la filosofía política recientes, tratando de explicar por qué ambas posiciones nos remiten en cierto modo a un nivel de menor complejidad que el que nos es presentado por Hegel. En segundo lugar, para mostrar la actualidad de la concepción de la libertad como experiencia progresiva de adquisición de sus determinaciones, tomaré como ejemplo la interpretación que ofrece Axel Honneth en su libro Leiden an Unbestimmtheit. Espero poder poner así de manifiesto la directa o indirecta contribución de Hegel a los debates actuales en torno a la libertad.