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This contribution presents two perspectives: one based on AI expertise and the other on the importance of knowledge as human knowledge. The later focuses on the purpose of education by revisiting Alexander von Humboldt’s concept of Bildung as the main purpose of education. Resisting the shifting to radically pragmatic models of education, without Bildung, in recent decades, in the Global North which develops a system of disposable education that focuses on training a workforce for the market. Concerned by the production of disposable knowledge and assessments, with the sole goal of achieving good grades and securing employment, we see Generative AI, as mirroring this functionalist and economist vision of society, revealing strongly the limits of this paradigm. This article first explains how automatic learning, the foundation of generative AI, works. Second, we shall discuss human deep learning, as opposed to surface learning showing how it is required to develop as a person in the Bildung perspective. Third, we highlight this first intuition that AI reveals the functioning of our societies and move beyond, with an art of questioning in philosophy.

The research article investigates, in an evolutionary key, the theme of the protection of minors in the care relationship and in the adoption of the therapeutic choices that concern them. We proceed to a re-reading of the discipline on informed consent using the lens of the discernment ability of the minor person and, therefore, of the so-called best interest of the child, seeking a reasonable balance between the various interests involved.

Neglecting God’s love for humankind significantly decreases the role of faith in creating better relations among people. The responsibility of the faithful is to constantly witness the endlessness of God’s patience, which should also encourage mutual tolerance. This is extremely important because tolerance in human relations is often reduced to ideological propaganda and often is an enforced situation controlled by the majority. This then creates a tyranny of the majority over the minority, while sometimes the situation changes and creates a tyranny of the minority over the majority. The reason for this is the downgrading of humanity’s God-given freedom to mere human rights and responsibilities, which is actually our self-denial in the state of powerlessness. We have lost the theanthropic dynamic due to the unwillingness of self-proclaimed super-people to recognize humanity’s likeness to God; they think of themselves as self-sufficient, while the others are needed as long as they are ready to submit. Therefore, the self-proclaimed super-people turn out to be non-people, unable to recognize their tragic situation because of their need to dominate. All their actions are determined by their urge to possess others, which makes the ideas they preach senseless. Tolerance, as something that self-sufficient individuals enforce upon others, loses its true meaning since irresponsible people turn it into an instrument of extortion, forgetting that without responsible freedom, there is no real tolerance. In order to make our lives meaningful, we must emphasize God’s love for humankind and overcome all our dubious and self-centered ideas. That is the only way to understand and implement tolerance correctly as a societal necessity and a maximum of human goodness.

The issue of citizenship has been one of the main topics of political thinking since antiquity, when its origins were significantly shaped by classical philosophers, whose ideas are also important for modern thinking. Gradually, with the intensification of globalization many new conceptualizations of the classical concept of citizenship were formulated to address global challenges. These shift away from the basic view of the interconnectedness of citizenship with a specific territory and give humans a wider, global identity with an associated appeal to global responsibility. One such concept is environmental citizenship. This article is aimed at examining the historical development of citizenship, particularly in its republican and liberal versions, and its conceptualisation in the context of environmental problems that overcome national borders. The demands on citizens must be adapted to this reality. This article highlights the growing potential of environmental citizenship as one of the possible key factors for achieving a more sustainable world, which however requires the active involvement of nation-states.

As we enter the digital age, we realise that we are surrounded by machines that observe us, know our tastes, build our public image, judge who’s right and who’s wrong. This raises questions, especially as artificial intelligences process the tracks we leave in the infospace, identify our profile and seem to predict our future. More like a nightmare than a dystopia. The essay tries to reverse the perspective by considering some examples drawn from legal experience and asking whether the digital revolution is not rather hinting at a new era of responsibility

Throughout his career as a prosecutor, Fritz Bauer has always avoided looking back: from the capture of Eichmann to the Auschwitz trial he was never guided by intentions of revenge, nor was he ever satisfied with arresting those who were guilty; if anything, his intention was to promote democracy by educating the population, and to trigger reflections and debates around the problem of responsibility. Such an attitude emerges clearly from his writings, as well as from numerous public speeches, and interviews. From his first works, the very first one published when he was still in exile in Sweden, his Marxist-socialist vision stands out: the problem is not Hitler, it is the society that promoted him. And therefore it is this society that has to be changed. Of course, by preparing new cases aimed at past mistakes, but primarily through a deep self-analysis.

After her visit to Germany in 1949/50 Hannah Arendt wrote the essay The Aftermath of Nazi-Rule. Report of Germany (1950) in which she collects her reflections on post-war German society. Starting from this analysis, the present article aims to investigate the causes of the inexplicable indifference to Nazi crimes that Arendt observes in the German people. While Arendt emphasizes the inability to think (and feel) provoked by the regime, A. and M. Mitscherlich focus on the failure to process the traumatic ‘loss of the Führer’. In both cases, a mechanism of reality distortion gets triggered, resulting in the repression of the past and the denial of one’s own guilt and responsibility. The studies by Bar-On, Pohl and Welzer (et al.) show how these repression processes are also active in later generations, even today, representing a threat to a successful reworking of the past, to the preservation of collective memory and to the recognition of one’s own responsibility not only for the past, but also for the present and future.

This article investigates the nature of an ‘Ethics of Responsibility’ (ER) as well as its significance for the broader research project dealt with, namely ‘Morality in History’. The article starts off with a conceptual analysis of the notions of ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’, followed by an exposition of Alasdair MacIntyre’s formulation of the ‘anomaly’ of current-day moral theory. This leads to a comprehensive analysis of MacIntyre’s argument as to why the Enlightenment project was, according to him, doomed to failure and a return to Aristotle is essentially called for. Consequently, the approach known as the ER is introduced, drawing on the work of Hans Jonas, Emmanuel Levinas, Richard Niehbur, Richard Bernstein, William Schweiker and Aristotle. The following concepts are analysed and integrated into the framework of the ER, namely accountability (Schwecker), reciprocity (Levinas), fallibility (Van Niekerk), futurity (Jonas), the dialectic between normativity and applications (Bernstein) and phronesis (Aristotle). Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: The article argues that the theoretical model of an ‘ethics of responsibility’ contributes significantly to reflection on the ‘origins of morality’. The ‘anomaly’ of current-day moral theory is analysed This is followed by a comprehensive exposition of the ER. This model of ethical conceptualisation bestows even more clarity on the intra- and interdisciplinary implications of the article, as a model is developed, drawing on the work of Jonas, Levinas, Schweiker and others, that utilises the insights of Aristotle and thereby transcends the approaches to moral reasoning of Modernity.

This paper will analyze the concept of the meaning of life in Frank Capra’s film It’s a Wonderful Life (1946) from a logotherapy aspect and with the support of Catholic theory. Namely, the film depicts how George Bailey, faced with a major life difficulty, self-transcends himself and discovers meaning through work and deeds, love, and the attitude toward unavoidable suffering. The notions of the responsibility of every human being to their life and God, the uniqueness of every individual and the specific tasks life sets before them, and the acceptance of one’s own position will also be examined with regard to Bailey’s actualization of the meaning of life. The paper will conclude by identifying the effect this film has on its viewers due to the way it tackles the topic of the meaning of life, which makes it suitable for a therapeutic method cinematherapy, used in logotherapy.

The article analyzes how, during the separate waves (the 1st, 2nd, and the 4th) of the coronavirus pandemic, participants of a study (overall n = 1356) assessed the government-imposed restrictions, prohibitions, liabilities and penalties for non-compliance with said restrictions, the perceived fairness of the behavior of other people during the pandemic, and the changes of their assessments during the coronavirus pandemic. Obtained evidence suggests that during the Covid-19 pandemic (from the 1st to the 4th wave) the participants of the study assessed the non-compliance with restrictions and prohibitions more and more forgivingly.

The topic of the scientific work is relevant both in international and national legislation. The minimum age of criminal liability is the limit from which the state begins to implement its repressive measures against minors. Therefore, it is important to regulate the minimum age in such a way that it is in harmony with the bio-psycho-social condition of the minor and to achieve the goals of criminal law, in terms of analyzing the committed crime, and at the same time, the main goal of punishment in juvenile justice, such as resocialization-rehabilitation, is achievable. The article analyzes from which age the actions committed in the person of a person are analyzed, which should be directly related to the establishment of the minimum age limit. In addition, international approaches are compared with national legislation. It is worth noting that in the reality of Georgia, such an important institution as referral has been implemented, which does not leave minors under the minimum age, who have committed deviant actions, unresponsive. In the paper, the issues determining the criminal liability of a minor are discussed logically, after which the national legislation and international approaches are discussed. It is shown how important it is to correctly perceive/analyze the mentioned issue for the development of juvenile justice, and as a conclusion, the conformity of national approaches with internationally recognized best practice is shown, especially with the existence of such an important institution as – referral, thus, on the one hand, the state does not leave devi- ant cases without a response. The behavior, on the other hand, is prevented in the future by resocialization-rehabilitation of the minor.

Heidegger approaches the problem of evil in an unusual way. He disregards its moral connotations, intending to analyze it as a purely ontological problem intertwined with the concept of nothingness and the forgetfulness of being. A problem with this approach that is frequently commented upon is that it omits the aspect of human responsibility, as it portrays humans merely as passive recipients of fate. The aim of this study is to show that in his 1936 Schelling-Lecture Heidegger approaches the problem of evil in a more complex manner: on the one hand, he portrays evil as a necessary part of being; on the other hand, he leaves a certain space for decision making. This dimension, mostly overlooked in the literature, is highlighted in the study by means of three main steps: 1) analyzing the relevant paragraphs of Heidegger’s Schelling-Lecture; 2) identifying the inconsistencies that emerge in these paragraphs; and 3) offering a coherent interpretation of evil as a real possibility of human freedom.

Probably the motto that supports this article reveals very clearly that to ensure human rights there must be some foundations that are based on some values that are so natural in themselves that no doctrine is needed to explain them. The basic imperative that arises is that once there is a human being, he/she must enjoy the same rights as another human being, even if both are separated by a fence, a field, or a river. The division of the population that took place in 1992 on the territory of the Republic of Moldova has led to different developments in terms of respect for human rights. Being in the same area, in the same jurisdiction the population woke up with a different legacy that the country’s Constitution grants. Apparently, an act that was to be applied universally throughout the state remains inapplicable for 11% of its territory. The author identified at least 5 different stages that marked a distinct behavior of the authorities, external factors as well as the general population that determined a certain turn in the field of respect or non-respect of human rights in the Transnistrian area of the Republic of Moldova. Even if the separation by years is not very accurate, the author tried to delimit each period by a series of significant events in the field of human rights, which set the tone for a new evolution or involution in the field of human rights. This division is important to know what were the errors of the authorities, the circumstances that existed and were not capitalized, or in general what was the understanding of the population about certain phenomena.

We examine the realization of the umbrella promise to assume national responsibility for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Three case studies are used to illustrate how Finland delivers on the promise to take care of its own nuclear waste – a promise that has greatly contributed to the legitimacy of nuclear power in Finland. The article shows how this promise is being challenged by new competitors, business visionaries, and the public. The case studies illustrate the tensions between those who made the promise and the actors who interpret and mobilize the promise for varying purposes and under changing circumstances. We investigate techno-scientific promises by looking at debates about (1) the idea of a national solution, (2) the limitations that the promise of a national solution places on international business opportunities in the waste sector, and (3) the challenges related to credibility and spatial requirements in managing waste from small modular reactors.

On the occasion of Bruno Latour's death on October 9, 2022, this article deals with the political value of actor-network theory (ANT). It reviews current literature on the topic as well as a TV interview with Latour, which was produced in October 2021 and aired on the European public service channel Arte in May 2022. The text shows that Latour does not develop a political grand theory, but rather a political ethics based on post-structuralist approaches from the 1980s. By deepening our understanding of the everyday interplay between humans and things, ANT laid the methodological ground to build new concepts and institutions better suited to cope with the social and political issues raised by the ecological crisis.

Every culture and every professional group are characterized by a system and hierarchy of values. Man is oriented towards a world of values: we can recognize, classify and fulfill them. This is also a teacher’s role. It is extremely difficult to educate young generations without presenting to them those values that serve an individual’s development and determine their perception of what is important in life. Values learned and experienced can be applied to real life; moreover, they make a teacher’s work more meaningful.

The problem of self-forgiveness can arise when a person discovers his or her own weaknesses and limitations. As a result, the anxiety that he or she feels becomes either a consequence of the harms done to other people their suffering or regret because of their own faults and imperfections. Therapists often point out that the feeling of guilt is not only painful or fruitless, but it can also be seen as a chance for a change and recovery. However, this approach requires the difficulty of understanding, settling with oneself and taking responsibility for what has become the cause of internal accusation, so that unprocessed guilt would not lead to breakdowns, self-rejection, contempt. Therefore, in the conducted research students of pedagogy and students of Third Age Universities, were asked about their opinions on: What it is and how they assess forgiving oneself? It was considered that the obtained data and possible differences between adults, however, representing two different age groups, would allow the selection of categories of guidelines or restrictions explaining attitudes towards the issues discussed. In the declarations of future teachers and reflections of people who followed the hardships of life experiences, an assessment of the process was noted that allows freeing from the burden of one’s own negligence and making wrong decisions.

In such a peculiar time as the one we are living in now due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, our perception of risk and uncertainty have exponentially grown. The media have changed their lexicon, redefining some of their keywords, and have taken ad hoc communication strategies. Such a new communication narrative requires an ethical reflection, which should spur us to move along the pivotal principles of behaving “well” in a social context where everyone’s behavior takes on paramount importance, as it can make all the difference in lessening and/or expanding the risk of contagion; misinformation can also do likewise. It goes without saying that this means values and principles such as awareness, (joint) responsibility, and trust, which may strengthen the relationship among individuals (experts and ordinary citizens), institutions, and media for a new sense of community built on mutual solidarity. “Good” communication, built on such concepts, can with regard to the contemporary individualistic atomism crucially contribute to an increase in awareness and extend a true sense of support for the sake of public welfare in our taking care for ourselves as well as for others not only as individuals, but above all as a community.

The article represents a preliminary attempt at a discussion of some of the fundamental questions, with which humanity finds itself confronted during the still ongoing pandemic of the COVID-19 disease. Although it is at the moment almost impossible to assess the entirety of consequences that have been caused by the incision of the crisis connected with the swift spreading of the novel coronavirus, the measures introduced with the intention of its containment give rise to the problem of individual freedoms and the criteria, which can establish the legitimacy of (political) decisions regarding their permissible limitation. If the pandemic in an essential manner shows that human dignity is denoted by the tension between freedom and safety, it perhaps at the same time and in contrast to the well-established emancipatory comprehension also enables a solidary conceptualization of freedom with regard to other human beings and their plight.

In Die Schuldfrage (The Question of German Guilt), Jaspers sketches out a concept of metaphysical guilt that is fundamental to every other concept of guilt. Guilt is one of the constituents of human existence. Metaphysical guilt had emerged in such a limit situation when one was a witness to murder but was unable to help the victim. The survivor must live with inner shame because of a missing manifestation of solidarity for the affected person. We could find a similar approach developed in Levinas’ ethics of responsibility that seems even more demanding. Levinas suggests the reader comprehend the conscience of guilt not primarily as a result of the freedom to act or to refrain from acting. Culpability is already part of an infinite and incalculable responsibility for the other. One cannot stay indifferent to the suffering of the mortal being. The paper points out the role of unconditional culpability and responsibility in Jaspers’ and Levinas’ thinking and shows a refusal of self-justification as its intersection.

The safeguarding of minors and of vulnerable adult persons is an intrinsic aspect of the mission that the Lord has entrusted the Church and it is the responsibility of all the faithful to fulfil it, whatever capacity they hold in the Church. Unfortunately, it is not possible to eradicate child abuse entirely as it is a human reality, but much can be done by creating a culture of safe space and safe relationships within the Church and beyond. The Catholic Church, as the oldest and biggest institution in the world and with its religious and moral values, has a special responsibility in preventing any kind of abuse, in protecting the most vulnerable, and furthermore, in Safeguarding; in creating safe spaces and safe relationships. Listening to victims and survivors of abuse who have been harmed in the Church or outside, is key for being and acting in a responsible, accountable, and transparent way. This is the cornerstone for credibility and for promoting the faith.

The paper focuses on violence, claiming that it is not action, but silence and inaction that become “murderous”, given that we are forced into a permanent and impossible process of choosing between responsibility for the other and the possibility of responding to a call for help. Still, this position is not final and the author offers certain alternative strategies, such as rebellion, goodness, critique and shame.

The article addresses the concept of responsibility in relation to the possible existence of a good society and well-being. The framework for understanding the concept is built upon the heritage of Aristotle’s considerations of eudaimonía, while it draws also on MacIntyre’s ethics of virtue and his communitarian ideas. In the context of contemporary social transformations, responsibility is intertwined with the concept of reflexivity, which refers not only to individual’s inner dialogue, but also to relations between people. In that regard, the focus is, on the one hand, on individuals’ consciousness and self-awareness conditioning their understanding of social relations and structures, and, on the other hand, on their interactions as well as the role of intersubjectivity in attaching meaning to their actions. Interpretations, considerations, and discussion in the article ensue from the hermeneutic analysis of the narratives of youth in Slovenia, who are claiming to be the most responsible.

Global structural injustices are harms caused by structural processes, involving multiple individuals, acting across more than one state. Young develops the concept of ‘political responsibility,’ to allocate responsibility for structural injustice. In this paper, I am going to argue that when considering the climate crisis Young’s model needs to be adapted— to have agency as a basis for allocating political responsibility instead of contribution. This is a more intuitive way to allocate responsibility for the climate crisis given its nature as a threshold problem, and the subtle structural positions occupied by the individuals involved.

Between the Human and the Animal - The author of the contribution begins with Umberto Eco’s answer to the question: “Why philosophy?” which points to the distinction between human and animal. Based on Heidegger’s lectures entitled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, where the question: “What is world?” is answered through the famous three theses about the “world-less-ness” of the stone, of the animal as being “poor-of-world,” and of the human being as the “creator of world,” the author gives a detailed analysis, accompanied with a critical reflection in defense of Heidegger’s position against Derrida’s critique of “anthropocentrism” and “Cartesianism.” In the final part, the author connects the conception of human-animal with the contemporary issue of ethics and responsibility with the aid of Nancy’s philosophy.

The German Protestant theologian Dorothee Sölle, who came with the central ideas of relationship and reciprocity in the context of feminist liberation theology, accentuates what is known as the mysticism democratisation project. Within the framework of the project of the democratisation of mysticism, mystical sensitivity as a human constant that all people have without difference is thematised. In order to emphasise the equality and relationship between man and God as well as between man and others, she perceives mysticism as resistance: resistance against injustice and oppression in the world. According to Sölle, mysticism cannot be an elitist matter for a few people, nor should it be solely aimed at contemplation; it is necessarily related to the social, everyday reality of people, where the connection with God can be found. However, mysticism in terms of resistance against injustice and oppression is subject to objections because of the consequent politicisation and instrumentalisation of mysticism, which in turn may result in the secularisation of the mystical experience.

In 2020 the World Health Organization declared the global pandemic and thus the greatest crisis in the last decades. Crisis is, first of all, danger, risk, and then opportunity. Every crisis is a permanent challenge for human intelligence and existence, and therefore anthropological constant. A question about crisis is also a question about a human. Crisis is also the media constant and source of the permanent media interest. There is no unique view of defining crisis. From crisis definitions we point out: lack of planning, undesirability, searching for answers and vulnerability. The two latter terms also contain the opportunity for successful media crisis communication. There arises a question: “Can media change crisis and neutralize its possible harmful effects through the concepts of responsibility and trust?” From the ethical point of view crisis invites us to think intensively about the human that media bring us closer in the time of social distance.

This article examines two versions of the proportionality constraint in just war theory, one minimalist, prohibiting almost no military acts, and one maximalist, prohibiting pretty much everything. I argue that neither one meets the needs of the theory and that they should be supplemented and modified by an ethic of responsibility.

The issue of euthanasia presents a contact area of ethics, law, and politics. This text provides a contribution to the expert public debate on the introduction of euthanasia into Serbian legislation. It does so first by clarifies the term - euthanasia (as a right to die with dignity). Further, it considers the obligations of other persons that arise from this right and the conditions under which they present a restriction on personality rights. By citing examples from the fields of ethics and law, the text states that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is in fact a product of inadequate deliberation during the implementation of this differentiation.

The article analyzes how, during the 1st wave of the coronavirus pandemic, participants of a study (n = 331) assessed the government-imposed restrictions, prohibitions, liabilities and penalties for non-compliance with said restrictions, and the perceived fairness of the behavior of other people during the pandemic. The article also studies the relationships among these assessments, including the related well-being and sociodemographic characteristics.

The article aims to summarize the main features of Elena Pulcini’s social philosophy, starting with her latest work entitled Between care and justice. Passions as social resources. Empathy, compassion and indignation are just some of the moral sentiments that show the limits of the anthropological model of homo oeconomicus; at the same time, these sentiments are at the center of a new theoretical paradigm that combines care and justice in order to avoid the partiality of unilateral ethical-political models: just as justice can become unfair, if careless, care work can easily assume the unrecognizable semblances of exploitative relationships when conceived and practiced regardless of a fair material and symbolic recognition of its performances. The intellectual testament of Elena Pulcini is as an urgent invitation to overcome the widespread emotional illiteracy and proposes a promising strategy to face the challenges due to the space-time distance of the Other in the global age.

The paper discusses the contribution that the neuroscience of action can offer to the legal understanding of action control and responsibility in the case of adult individuals. In particular, we address the issues that follow. What are the cognitive capacities that agents must display in order to be held liable to punishment in criminal law? Is the legal model of liability to punishment compatible with a scientifically informed understanding of voluntary behaviour? To what extent should the law take into account people’s subjective feelings about their own actions? As a result of our analyses, we indicate some areas where the contribution of the neuroscience of action to the law is potentially relevant. We focus on the subjectivity mechanisms of action control, specifically the requirement that the agent must violate the law voluntarily in order to be held responsible, and on the factors that modulate the wrongdoer’s experience of agency. Overall, we advocate more cross-disciplinary work, aimed to bridge the gap between conceptual boundaries, on the theme of responsibility for actions.

Despite the widely held view that a metaphysical reflection on morality and fundamental principles does not help much, the goal of the article is to shed light on the source of moral discourse that necessarily begins with a metaphysical analysis of human acts. The method used by the author in the analysis of the act is analytical-ontological, and, moreover, it is shown to be the key one here. Thus, the first part of the analysis has provided great insights that undeniably reveal that human acts can be classified into two basic groups: the so-called transient (transitive) actions on the one side, and immanent (inner) on the other side. The fundamental characteristic of both types of actions, or acts, is change, whether it is singing, drawing, swimming (transient) or thinking, wanting, anger (immanent). The above examples show that one state of reality has moved or changed to another. The presented analysis served as the background for reflection on the concepts of sin and guilt, which through their complexity and quality necessarily fall into one of the presented types of action. Murder, theft, and adultery as transient, and hatred, greed, and lust as immanent transgressions, i.e. sins, also have as a consequence – as well as actions in general – a change, especially in the internal and then, consequently, also in the external area. The experience of sin is necessarily linked with the experience of guilt. The article, therefore, ends with a reflection on the phenomenology of guilt as an internal act. At the beginning it manifests itself as taking responsibility and, in the end, as repentance, which together with forgiveness, ultimately gives full meaning to guilt.

Based on the theoretical grounds presented in the first part of the work, we intend to analyze the way in which evaluation of professional performances in a public institution from Oradea municipality is carried out, both in terms of the management and of employee representatives. The main objectives of the study were to identify the relevant aspects of the professional performance evaluation process, to highlight the perception of management and employees representatives on the usefulness of this process, and to identify suggestions for improving the evaluation activity of professional performance in the institution. Therefore, we performed a qualitative research, a sociological investigation based interviews, and the research tool used was the interview guide, structured on 2 dimensions. The first dimension of the interview guide analyzed data on the procedure for the evaluation of professional performance within the institution, and the second dimension followed the perception of staff on the usefulness of the performance evaluation procedure and the identification of suggestions for improving it. The results of the research revealed that the institution undergoing the research performs the evaluation activity of the employees' professional performances, and the most important stages are the completion of the professional performance evaluation report, the interview and the countersigning of the report. The evaluation is based on a form concluded pursuant to law no.188 / 1999, and among the performance criteria are: the capacity to implement, the ability to solve problems efficiently, the ability to assume responsibilities, the ability to self-improve and to value the acquired experience, ability to analyze and synthesize, creativity and spirit of initiative, planning ability and strategic action, ability to work independently, ability to work in a team, skills in the management of assigned resources. Moreover, most employees claimed that they are satisfied with the way in which the performance evaluation activity is carried out in the institution in which they operate, assigning positive reference to this activity.

The paper analyzes Hannah Arendt’s report of the trial in which Adolf Eichmann was condemned for his responsibility in the Shoah. From the observation of the phenomenon and the phenomenology of the “Eichmann case” two problems, above all, emerge requiring philosophical investigation of a specifically moral nature. These problems concern, on the one hand, the banality of evil and, on the other hand, the relevance of human responsibility. Finally, the paper develops the idea of responsibility even for what we are not directly responsible, and justifies the ethical character of this attitude.

This paper deals in detail with the concept and the most important characteristics of international organizations as subjects of international law. Aware of the fact that a lot has already been written about this sui generis subject of international law, we will try to contribute to an even better understanding of this complex concept in a study carried out with the method of functional analysis and induction. This will be done by emphasizing the importance of constitutive elements, subjectivity, responsibilities, jurisdiction, and supranationalism of international organizations. We will also propose, as an expression of freedom of scientific thought, some de lege ferenda solutions related to the work of officials in international organizations, all with the aim of further progressive development of international law. In particular, the synthetic and comparative method will support a set of hypotheses and emphasize the supranationalism of international organizations, exemplified by the practice of the EU functioning.

Sartre and Nizan, politique of words The aim of this article is to discuss and compare the main points of Nizan’s and Sartre’s views of committed literature. Discarding the claim to be objective and neutral, Nizan states that to abstain is to make a choice. Therefore, he critiques the intellectuals to be guilty of an abdication of responsibility. In his writings (specially Antoine Bloyé [1933], The Trojan Horse [1935], The Conspiracy [1938]) Nizan posed some questions, which became crucial for the postwar debates on the engagement of the intellectual. These questions constitute a central aspect of Sartre’s writings after World War II, where Sartre criticizes writers who had not taken a stance against oppression and delineates the axes of a theory of committed literature. As a result of the comparative analysis between the two authors, it is shown that Sartre articulates an important point that Nizan have missed, namely that there is a praxis, which is specific to literature and that we should part from it in order to understand commitment. Thus, at the difference of Nizan, Sartre points out that the liberating dimension of literary criticism should not be too quickly confused with armed criticism.

The modern civil epoch is founded on logocentric image of the world, the meaning of which is derived from the high level of confidence in human spiritual abilities. Logocentrism, in other words, represents the view that the principle of understanding is the basis of man's world but also the universe as a whole. Homocentrism, on the other hand, as a modern worldview is based on antique vision of man as an individual being among other natural beings. Such an understanding comes from the belief that the ultimate basis of the man’s world is not determined by nature, god, necessity or chance, but that man, as a free individual, with his powers is the basis of human historic world. The results of scientific achievements and observations, although primarily inclined towards the progress and achievement of the highest human values, particularly due to the aforementioned freedom and the possibility of choice, can have negative or even dramatic consequences. H. Marcuse in one of his stages even believed that the scientific and technical process almost completely got out of hand in terms of human control, and that the dilemma whether our planet will survive or perish will be decided by coincidence. Closer to the truth, in the author's opinion, is the view that, regardless of all its ambivalence, scientific achievements are still under the control of man, and that in different modes that control can be more efficient and more differentiated in the future. The author thinks that in the era of rapid strengthening of social and technological effects of science, it is necessary to (bio) ethically codify the issue of social responsibility of scientists which, in order to be adequately internalized, must be an integral part of their upbringing and education from the earliest days. It is very important that scientists in their perceptions and insights, which especially in the area of humanities have a character of value judgments, do not go below the achieved civilization standards of ethical and moral culture and that they reflect on different topics with due caution and awareness of the dilemmas they may encounter in their professional work. That is why the question of their responsibility is crucial, it is the essential question of their actions, and not an incidental question that can be but not necessarily linked to what is happening in the field of science and technology. Corresponding interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach, as well as awareness of essential compatibility of scientific freedom and responsibility, finally, should result in a different and more sophisticated attitude of scientists themselves towards the possibilities of their own discipline and significance of its effects.

The culture of dialogue is an important process and a great challenge for practical theology, especially in our post-conflict societies. Reconciliation is possible only when responsibility and optimism overcome pessimism, anarchy, and nihilism. It is important to recognize and face religious nationalism that creates identity of resistance, while encouraging the culture of peace that creates the identity of salvation.

Television has now become the most important means of creating public opinion. The fundamental truth that each of us has to know is that tele-viewers are opinion-makers and not simple consumers, and television creates public opinion just to the extent that the public creates television. However, it is known that the public is often much more competent than those who create messages on their behalf.

This paper presents the reconstruction of circumstances and events in Rogatica and its surroundings in 1941 on the basis of two sources that have not been used in historical literature devoted to developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1941 to 1945. The author follows the main thread of the narrative of the respective sources, links their notices with the information and statements of other complementary sources and literature and brings a picture of life of a small East-Bosnian city, which, due to its geographical location, ethnic composition of the population, historical heritage and other causes and circumstances, suffered extremely difficult days of fear, destruction, violence and crime in the first year of the Second World War in the occupied Yugoslavia.

The quest for and the discovery of the meaning of life, so basic to human existence, play a fundamental role in the process of self‑ discovery, that is, in the examination of our own identity, subjectivity and the “self ”. Underlying this quest are not merely vague approximations to what man is, but clear fundamental dimensions of humanity: freedom and responsibility. Etty Hillesum and Victor Frankl, take different perspectives on the meaning of life of a person who experiences himself, the world, others and God in the face of war and extreme circumstances (Etty perished in Auschwitz, Frankl survived the concentration camps). However, they both point to the universal trait of the utmost engagement of the will and the assumption of responsibility for one’s life, despite the inevitability of death and the prevalent “cultural hibernation”. In both analyses, freedom appears as a response to reality, to the here and now. That response, as such, means taking responsibility for reality and its shape. Hence it an important question to ask would be what it means to take control of one’s destiny. Is it an obligation, a task, life’s demand, or perhaps just submission to what life may bring? Freedom, which is constantly threatened, must fight for itself. This happens owing to the will to live, which first evokes meaning and then the obligation of taking responsibility for oneself, for others, and even for God himself. The Person and the Challenges Volume 7 (2017) Number 1, p. 77–97 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/pch.1982

Ethik ist ein zentraler Inhalt von religiöser Bildung, die Beschäftigung mit der ‚Ethik der Nächstheit‘ von Emmanuel Lévinas kann ein wertvoller Beitrag im Bildungsprozess sein. Vor dem Hintergrund des Holocaust entwirft Lévinas eine Haltung der Verantwortung, die das übliche Verständnis von Verantwortung sprengt: Der Mensch ist durch seine ‚absolute Passivität‘ in letzter Konsequenz sogar für die Verfolgung verantwortlich, die er erleidet, er trägt eine Verantwortung ohne Freiheit, er ist stets in der Geiselhaft seines Gegenüber. Zum Verständnis dieses Denkansatzes ist die Beschäftigung mit der Bibel unerlässlich, daher ist die Auseinandersetzung mit dem jüdischen Philosophen aus Litauen im Kontext von religiöser Bildung bzw. im Rahmen eines konfessionellen Religionsunterrichts adäquat beheimatet. Ethics as First Philosophy – Ethics of the Other. Emmanuel Lévinas in religious education – A plea for a denominational pedagogy for religion Ethics are a central topic in religious education. To look at Emmanuel Lévinas‘ ‚ethics of the other‘ can proof a valuable contribution in the educational process. Against the backdrop of the holocaust Lévinas devised an attitude of responsibility that bursts the usual understanding of responsibility: ultimately man is - through his absolute passivity - responsible for the persecution he suffers, he bears a responsibility without freedom, and he is invariably held hostage by his opposite. To understand this approach the study of the bible is essential, the engagement with the Jewish philosopher from Lithuania in the context of religious education and within the scope of denominational religion classes respectively is therefore adequate.

In ihrer Theorie globaler Gerechtigkeit hat Iris Marion Young ein Modell von Verantwortung erarbeitet, das sich nicht vergangenheitsorientiert mit der Haftung Einzelner befasst, sondern mit der in sozialen Verbindungen geteilten Verantwortung, der es sich künftig zu stellen gelte. Dieses Modell hat allerdings einen Haken: Wenn diese Verantwortlichkeit schon aus dem Eingebundensein in soziale Strukturen erwächst, kann jede Einzelne sich damit aus der Affäre ziehen, dass sie zwar verantwortlich in, nicht aber für diese Strukturen ist. Wenn man den verschiedenen Verantwortungsmodellen unterschiedliche Pflichten zuordnet (der individuellen Haftungsverantwortung die Pflicht, vergangenes Unrecht wiedergutzumachen, und der geteilten Verantwortung die Pflicht, künftig gemeinsam hervorgerufenes Unrecht zu vermeiden), bleibt eine Frage offen: Gibt es eigentlich eine Pflicht, die geteilte (von außen zugeschriebene) Verantwortung auch zu übernehmen? Warum soll sich jemand verantwortlich erklären für die Effekte von Strukturen, die er sich gar nicht ausgesucht hat? An dieser Stelle bringt Thomas Nagels Idee politischer Verantwortung weiter: Nagel zufolge sind wir für politische Maßnahmen auch dann verantwortlich, wenn wir sie uns nicht im Einzelnen ausgesucht haben, solange sie in unserem Namen geschehen. Dieses Argument des liberalen Nationalismus lässt sich auf die globale politische Ökonomie übertragen: auch dort nämlich geschehen die meisten Dinge in unserem Namen. Da die Grammatik der „Verpflichtung“ in nationaler Politik und globaler politischer Ökonomie Parallelen aufweist, sollten wir auch in Letzterer unsere Verantwortung übernehmen.

Bu çalısmada, Gazâli’nin insan özgürlüğüne iliskin görüsleri değerlendi- rilmistir. Konu özellikle Allah-insan iliskisi bağlamında irdelenmistir. Bu bağ- lamda konunun Tanrısal boyutu ilahi irade ve kudret sıfatları üzerinden ele alı- nırken; insani boyutu insanın iradesi, sorumluluğu ve kendi eylemleri üzerinde etkisinin olup olmadığı çerçevesinde tartısılmıstır

Constructivist (constructionist) epistemologies focus on ethics as a system of values in the mind—even when previously co-constructed in a social context—against which social agents compare the actions that they mentally plan before performing them. This approach is problematic, as it forces a wedge between thought and action, body and mind, universal and practical ethics, and thought and affect. In this contribution, I develop a transactional approach to ethics that cannot be developed within constructionism. In a once-occurrent world, every act is ethical because it has consequences for the agent (who affects and is also affected), and the world as a whole. However, whereas many in the social sciences continue to articulate a theory of action and thus the practical nature of ethics in terms of the individual's act, in this contribution I show that the act always already is spread across people and things and, thus, is an integral and constitutive part of a transaction. This utterly relational take on human behavior thus undermines approaches to ethics that are based on the individual as unit of analysis. Most controversially perhaps, I exhibit how those who may feel hurt by the actions (talk) of others are themselves agents affecting those others and, thus, answerable. This approach is illustrated in the context of power-knowledge, which is the result of an always ongoing, only once-occurrent situated and situational struggle rather than something a priori distributed between people.

ABOUT MATERIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ARISTOTLE It may seem that Aristotle considers the problem of responsibility from perspective of formal responsibility. It should, however, to bear in mind that practical philosophy of Aristotle has teleological dimension. The human being has the task to do which consist of fulfill the proper function of the man. Thus, he is responsible for entrusted role. In this sense, material responsibility is also present in ethical considerations of Aristotle. The article is devoted to demonstrating that talking about material responsibility in Aristotle is not unfounded.

The recovery of the problem of meaning and intellectual life in terms of responsibility are, as I try to argue, two questions from which the proposal of the Husserl’s phenomenology can be reconstructed. A proposal that aims to revitalize the horizons of reason (on which depends the true meaning of human existence) that is, the philosophy that nurtured the West and why it's so classic and so genuine, so traditional and so contemporary too.

Free will is usually defined by three conditions: (1) the ability to do otherwise; (2) control of one’s own choices; (3) responsiveness to reasons. The compatibility of free will with determinism lies at the heart of the philosophical debate at the metaphysical level. This debate, while being increasingly refined, has not yet reached a conclusion. Recently, neuroscience and empirical psychology have tried to settle the problem of free will with a series of experiments that go in the direction of so-called illusionism: free will as the conscious control of our behavior cannot exist, being a mere illusion. But even in this case, the experimental results are challenged at various levels. Considering that in most moral and legal systems, the subject’s liability derives from their freedom, the usefulness of preserving the concept of freedom – which incidentally responds to a very strong commonsensical intuition – suggests the need for an operational solution. This could be done by resorting to the concepts of capacity and cognitive control, which are measured by a set of well-established neuropsychological tests. Our preliminary proposal is to create an index, the first step towards a specific quantification and measurement of free will, to be used especially in ethical and legal contexts. Theoretical premises, practical difficulties and objections to this approach are also discussed and addressed.

Ideas in literature are immersed into a huge mass of non-conceptual discourses; take very often a metaphoric form; they are in many texts entrusted to fictional persons, to imaginary characters; they have a specific, and even paradoxical, form of responsibility. These features of ideas in literature, making them a privileged object of study in intellectual history, are exemplified by Théophile Gautier’s novel Mademoiselle de Maupin, more precisely by its preface, considered to be a manifesto of Art for Art’s Sake doctrine.