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Prof. Loris Sturlese is a leading representative of the philosophical-historical research of the Latin Middle Ages, particularly German philosophy between 800 and 1340. He has extensive international research experience and founded the research center CETEFIL at the University of Lecce. Sturlese has published a series of studies and critical editions, specializing in German medieval philosophy. The text describes the complex and exciting work of the author in researching previously unpublished sources on Bertoldo di Moosburg, Ulrico di Strasburgo, and Dietrich di Freiberg. The author emphasizes the importance of critical editions and mentions the challenges involved in creating such editions. The article also describes the changes in philosophy and the language of philosophy over time, emphasizing the importance of teaching and institutions such as libraries, universities, and academies for the dissemination and maintenance of the "philosophy community." The author also describes his decision to move from Munich to Lecce and establish a research group that has contributed to the de-occidentalization of medieval philosophy. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the concept of philia (φιλία, friendship) in the works of ancient Greek philosopher Aristoteles (Aristotle), particularly in the book "Nikomachische Ethik" (Nicomachean Ethics). The author particularly emphasizes the sociological and political dimensions of friendship and their relevance to Aristotle's understanding of the functioning and political culture of the Greek city-state, the polis. The extant research on Aristotle's political philosophy is also critically evaluated.

The article provides information on a research about the patterns of philosophizing in Slovakia. It states that the author considers receptivity, manifested in accepting the streams and concepts of philosophy in Europe, as its predominating feature. Meanwhile, it states that not all forms of receptivity are to be tagged as plagiarism or imitativeness. Moreover, it highlights the creative modification, application, and reinterpretations of philosophizing in Slovakia.

Many incompatibilists and compatibilists agree that freedom is a precondition of moral responsibility. Many incompatibilists acknowledge that certain varieties of freedom are compatible with determinism. The dissent concerns the question of whether such compatibilist freedoms suffice for moral responsibility. The debate is stuck in a stalemate. I try to show that the stalemate can be overcome by approaching the question not in terms of freedom, but of responsibility. To call an agent morally responsible for an event is to claim that (i) a relation holds between her and the event which makes it possible to (ii) judge her morally in the light of the event. I argue that the relevant relations are causal ones, relations compatible with determinism. The moral assessment of an agent is in turn determined by the quality offer will. The question as to the quality of a will does not depend on its causal history, and so a fortiori is independent of whether this history unfolded in a determined way or not. Hence, both of the constitutive elements of moral responsibility (i&ii) are compatible with determinism. This compatibilist result can be reformulated in terms of freedom, thus overcoming the stalemate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]