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The article discusses the question of whether professionally critical statements can lead to a violation of professional duties. It is pointed out that certain pharmacies must be closed on certain days and therefore are unable to dispense medication. This could lead to a violation of the duty to be available for service. It is also mentioned that similar regulations exist in other federal states and that the Higher Regional Court of Cologne has allowed the appeal to clarify this question at the highest court level. The text deals with the rules of the professional code for dentists and their application. According to the professional code, dentists must practice their profession conscientiously and in accordance with the principles of medical ethics. They must show collegial behavior and must not make unfounded statements about colleagues. Expert opinions must be neutral and carefully prepared. The clauses of dental professional law can provide a sufficient basis for professional disciplinary sanctions. It is stated that the statements of the dentist are protected as expressions of opinion and do not constitute professional misconduct. The text deals with the fundamental right to freedom of expression and its limits. It is pointed out that freedom of expression exists independently of its justification or usefulness. The fundamental right to freedom of expression finds its limit in general laws, including professional regulations. When interpreting and applying these restrictive provisions, a balance must be struck between the importance of freedom of expression and the legal interest that is to be protected. It is emphasized that the correct interpretation of a statement is essential for its legal assessment. The text provides concrete examples of statements by an expert in relation to the medical treatment of patients. The present passage contains various statements and evaluations regarding treatment plans and expert opinions in the field of dentistry. It is criticized that the treatment plans are incomprehensible and not supported by sufficient findings. The OBI Foundation is described as esoteric and profit-oriented. It also refers to the statements of the expert who recommended alternative therapies and criticized the destruction of the patient's teeth through an invasive procedure. It is emphasized that the statements were made in the context of the dispute about the matter and do not constitute defamation. The balance between the legal interests of freedom of expression and the protection of the patient's health is considered decisive. It is pointed out that the expert was acting on behalf of insurance companies and uncovered serious treatment errors. It also refers to the patient's right to information about alternative treatment options. The article deals with various aspects of medical treatment and the disclosure of treatment errors. It is emphasized that doctors are legally obliged to record all relevant measures and results in the patient's medical record. The disclosure of treatment errors serves to protect the patient and ensure quality in healthcare. It is also pointed out that experts who are commissioned to examine a treatment are also obliged to disclose errors. The freedom of expression of the experts outweighs in most cases and justifies the publication of critical evaluations. It is also noted that [Extracted from the article]

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On July 8th, 2024, the Supreme Court of India ruled on a case challenging the movie "Aankh Micholi" for allegedly reinforcing harmful stereotypes about disabilities. The Court declared that “disabling humor” which demeans persons with disabilities would not be fully protected as freedom of speech. While the judgment provided an in-depth analysis of creative freedom and the rights of persons with disabilities, it stopped short of issuing binding directives, thus lacking the teeth necessary to effect meaningful change in how disabilities are portrayed in media.

The article discusses freedom of speech for doctors and their suitability for the profession. It emphasizes that freedom of expression is an important right that must be interpreted in accordance with the law. A specialist in psychiatry and psychology has published a book in which he compares the sense of justice in the Holy Scriptures with the ideological positions of National Socialism. The Medical Association has decided that the statements in the book are covered by freedom of speech and do not violate the ethical principles of the medical professional code. The professional court has rejected the request for a professional court procedure as there are no specific facts indicating a violation of professional duties. [Extracted from the article]

Propaganda; İngiltere’nin eski başbakanlarından Thatcher’in anlatımı ile “terörizmin oksijenidir”. Devletin siyasal aygıtlarına, hukuk düzenine yönelik yıkıcı ideolojisini, siyasal amacını, fikirlerini; gerçekleştirdiği sembolik şiddet eylemlerinin arkasına yerleştiren terör örgütü; korkutarak uyuşturduğu kitlelerin zihinlerine bu yolla erişmeyi ve onları dönüştürmeyi hedefler. Ne var ki, terör örgütünün elinde muazzam bir silah olan propaganda, ifade hürriyetinin bir tezahürü/görünüm şekli olarak da değerlendirilir. İfade hürriyeti ise bütün hürriyetlerin özü ve ön koşulu olarak kabul edildiği için hukuksal müdahale ve kısıtlamadan olabildiğince korunmak istenir. Üstelik, salt bir düşünce açıklaması olarak, ifadenin herhangi bir suça vücut vermeyeceğine ilişkin kuvvetli bir eğilim de mevcuttur. Gerçekten, bu yaklaşıma göre en yıkıcı fikir ya da düşünce açıklaması dahi serbest tartışma ortamında panzehrini bulacak, böylece hukuksal bir müdahaleye ihtiyaç da kalmayacaktır. İfade hürriyetinin bir türevi olarak görülen propaganda fiilleri için de benzer değerlendirme sık sık yapılır. Oysa, haklar ve yükümlülüklerin karşılıklığı temelinde şekillenmiş olan modern hukuk düzenlerinde, hiçbir hak ve hürriyet sınırsız kabul edilmez. Dolayısıyla ifade hürriyetinin de sınırlarının olacağı tabiidir. Yaygın kabulün aksine basit bir düşünce açıklamasından daha fazla anlam içeren propaganda filleri için bu sınır evleviyetle mevcuttur. Ancak sağlıklı bir değerlendirme için ifade ile propaganda arasındaki sınırın belirginleştirilmesine ve propagandanın terörizmde oynadığı rolün anlaşılmasına ihtiyaç bulunmaktadır.

The article deals with the professional requirements for medical opinions and the limits of freedom of expression regarding a doctor's "statement". It emphasizes that a medical opinion may only be issued after a thorough medical examination and must comply with specific quality standards in the field. The purpose of the opinion is to protect the patient from health damage and it is neither a contribution to public discourse nor part of scientific research or teaching. In a specific case, the Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeals have determined that medical opinions must meet the requirements of the Medical Practitioners Act and that issuing a medical opinion without prior examination constitutes a professional misconduct. [Extracted from the article]

In 2017 strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) became an important topic on the EU level. As a result, the EU adopted the anti-SLAPP Directive, which shall protect journalists from abusive lawsuits that do not serve justice but only the sinister aim of silencing free press. However, there is important litigation as well. In 2024 the Real Madrid Club de Fútbol vs Le Monde case addressed the problem of exorbitant damages targeting press and introducing a deterrent effect on freedom of speech in transnational cases. From a rule of law and, especially, freedom of the press angle, the case is of paramount importance as it forwards a simple but groundbreaking argument: two of EU law’s most fundamental principles, mutual recognition and freedom of speech, are a strong basis to fight SLAPPs.

The article deals with the topic of treatment examination within the framework of preventive detention. A treatment examination is not a conventional medical examination, but a comprehensive examination that takes place over a longer period of time and depends on the cooperation of the person concerned. Freedom of expression according to Article 5 of the Basic Law is fully guaranteed and does not prohibit any specific opinion as long as it respects the legal limits. The present decision of the Higher Regional Court of Hamm dated November 7, 2023 deals with the immediate appeal of an accused person. The treatment examination is not part of the prisoner's personal file and is kept separately. A comprehensive treatment examination must be carried out in order to create an execution plan. [Extracted from the article]

Die Bedeutung des Begriffs Labor hat sich in den letzten Jahren über den engen naturwissenschaftlichen Kontext hinaus erweitert. Als Metapher findet er auch in Bezug auf Bibliotheken Anwendung. Der Artikel diskutiert die Idee, Bibliotheken als Labore der Wissenschaft zu verstehen und zeichnet nach, wie sie sich in dieser Rolle entwickelt haben. Dabei wird betont, dass die Bibliothek nicht als Ort betrachtet werden sollte, an dem die Wissenschaft etwas Erforschbares findet, sondern als ein aktiver Teil des Forschungsprozesses. Entsprechend werden die Veränderungen in der Bibliothek insbesondere im Kontext der Digitalisierung beleuchtet, die sie zu einem Labor der Wissenschaft gemacht haben. Die Bibliothek spielt eine zentrale Rolle bei der Sammlung, Aufbereitung und Bereitstellung von Daten und Dokumenten für wissenschaftliche Forschung und Analyse. Sie fungiert auch als Filter und stellt sicher, dass qualitativ hochwertige und vertrauenswürdige Informationen zugänglich sind. Die Bibliothek wird als ein Ort der Demokratie und Meinungsfreiheit hervorgehoben, da sie Informationen unvoreingenommen sammelt und bereitstellt. Darüber hinaus wird die Bibliothek als eine wichtige Schnittstelle zur Außenwelt betrachtet, die es ermöglicht, Daten und Dokumente standardisiert zu teilen und zu vernetzen. Schließlich wird die Bibliothek als Analyseplattform betrachtet, die Text- und Datamining ermöglicht, um neue Erkenntnisse aus umfangreichen Daten- und Dokumentsammlungen zu gewinnen. In recent years, the meaning of the term laboratory has had an extension beyond the narrow context of the natural sciences. As a metaphor it is also applied to libraries. The article discusses the idea of libraries as research laboratories and traces their development in this role. It emphasizes that the library should not be seen as a place where scholars find something to research, but as an active part of the research process. Accordingly, the changes in the library are highlighted, especially in the context of digitization, which has turned it into a laboratory. The library plays a central role in collecting, processing, and making available data and documents for scholarly research and analysis. It also acts as a filter, ensuring that high quality and trustworthy information is accessible. The library is highlighted as a place of democracy and freedom of expression, as it collects and provides information without bias. The library is also seen as an important interface with the outside world, enabling data and documents to be shared and networked in a standardized way. Finally, the library is seen as an analytical platform, enabling text and data mining to gain new insights from large collections of data and documents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK has a comprehensive arsenal of counter-terror law. The Terrorism Act 2000, for example, outlaws the membership of a proscribed terror group, as per s.11; and support for a proscribed terror group, as per s.12. The legislation also criminalises the preparation of terror attacks, such as possession for terrorist purposes, as per s.57; and the collection of information, as per s.58. Following the 7/7 terror attacks in London in 2005 the UK passed the Terrorism Act 2006 outlawing, for example, the encouragement of terrorism, including the glorification of terrorism, as per s.1; and the dissemination of terrorist publications, as per s.2. But the UK’s existing counter-terror legislation does not seem to go far enough in deterring violent extremism that falls short of terrorism. In February 2021, therefore, the UK’s independent Commission on Countering Extremism suggested further legislative reform to this area. In the UK there is freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, Article 10(2) of the ECHR permits a necessary interference with speech on the grounds of the prevention of disorder and crime. Indeed, historically, liberalism, which underpins much of human rights law, has also permitted limitations on the freedom of expression. Are the Commission’s proposals to curtail further the free speech of extremists compliant with the jurisprudence on free speech and the philosophy of liberalism upon which much of the law of human rights is grounded? Without being able to assess the Commission’s suggested reforms within every element of free speech, this piece examines many of its important facets, such as the responsibility of the rights-holder, the speaker, and the certainty upon which the law limiting the free speech is authorised. The findings of this piece are that the proposals of the Commission respect the UK’s law on free speech and its related theories of liberalism.

In its judgment in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission 2022 2 BCLR 129 (CC), the Constitutional Court declared section 10(1) of the Equality Act unconstitutional and invalid to the narrow extent that section 10(1)(a) refers to the intention to be "hurtful". The prohibition on hate speech passed constitutional muster in all other respects. In addition, the court purposively interpreted aspects of the application of section 10(1) so as to limit its impact on the right to freedom of expression. This contribution firstly welcomes the court's reliance on the transformative goals of the Constitution and the Equality Act as its primary framework in interpreting section 10(1). The severance of section 10(1)(a) and the conjunctive reading of sections 10(1)(b) and (c) ("be harmful or to incite harm" and ʺpromote or propagate hatred" respectively) also seem sensible considering the court's broad definition of "harm". The article further emphasises that the terms of section 10 call for a proper consideration of context. In this regard, the court rightly considered the extreme homophobia in the society addressed by Mr Qwelane, the particular vulnerability of the target group and the real threat of devastating imminent consequences to conclude that Qwelane's words were clearly intended to "incite harm" and "propagate hatred". Yet the court's view that the speaker's subjective intention is irrelevant in performing the requisite objective reasonableness assessment from the ambit of section 10(1) is arguably less judicious, as is the categorical exclusion of expression in private. Ultimately, the objective case-by-case reasonableness inquiry under section 10(1) should be whether a reasonable person in the speaker's position should have refrained from making the impugned harmful discriminatory utterances. This inquiry involves a determination of wrongfulness based on the constitutional duty not to discriminate unfairly. It invokes all the aspects of the Equality Act's definition of discrimination as well as all the elements of fairness analysis set out in section 14 of the Equality Act. Factors to be considered include the value of the particular expression, and the extent of the (potential) harm to individual members of a protected group and to society as a whole, as well as justification considerations such as the respondent's legitimate and bona fide exercise of the right to freedom of expression and to privacy.

Copyright of KritV, CritQ, RCrit. Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft / Critical Quarterly for Legislation & Law / Revue critique trimestrielle de jurisprudence et de législation is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In terms of section 29(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), ''everyone has the right to basic education''. At the same time the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion, and the right to participate in the cultural life of his or her choice. Children's right to education versus their right to religion and culture is a highly debated topic in South Africa. The Constitution guarantees both the right to education and the right to religion and culture. In the culturally diverse South African environment the right to education and the child's right to participate in the cultural life of their choice may conflict with each other. The conflict referred to can mean that the child's right to participate in the cultural life of his or her choice might be sacrificed to the right to education. One such instance is the wearing of a headscarf in schools. The headscarf, also known as a hijab, is a traditional piece of clothing worn by Muslim women in accordance with their religious beliefs. The wearing of a headscarf in schools has become a contentious issue as it is seen by some as conflicting with the principles of education and the dress codes of schools. The government has a constitutional obligation to provide basic education to all children in the country. This right is seen as a crucial factor in ensuring that children can develop to their full potential. On the other hand, the right to religion and culture is equally important as it allows individuals to practice their religious beliefs and maintain their cultural identity. To evaluate discrimination against children in a culturally diverse classroom, it is mandatory to look at what the right to basic education entails and what obligations this right place on the state – more specifically on the Department of Basic Education – when it comes to promoting the right to basic education while protecting children's other constitutional rights. The government must adopt a balanced approach to ensure that both the right to education and the right to religion and culture are respected and protected. This study will investigate whether the state fulfils its obligation to protect the child's constitutional right to basic education without infringing on the child's right to religion and culture.

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of freedom of expression. However, they have also made it easier and faster than ever before to spread disinformation, misinformation, propaganda and fake news. Although these phenomena are not new, the impact they have had in recent years on political processes in democratic societies (e.g. the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Brexit) and on human behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic, has drawn attention to this issue. The aim of this paper is to highlight the problem of fake news as a human rights issue in the context of Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees freedom of expression. The paper provides a terminological and historical overview of the term fake news and related concepts. It also provides an overview of Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and clarifies the situations and conditions under which the restrictions on the freedom of expression are justified on the basis of Art. 10(2). The authors also provide an insight into the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

The article focuses on micro and macro trends for formation of certain jurisprudence patterns when dealing with specific fundamental and human rights issues. It mentions fundamental rights as a means of solving all societal "major conflicts", from climate protection to euthanasia and self-realization is being tried in European courts, and on the other hand the most basic human rights such as the right to life and health, but also freedom of expression.

The European Union (EU) constitutes an area of freedom, security and justice in which the citizens of the Union are to be guaranteed freedom of movement without internal borders. At the same time, it is emphasised that the prevention and combating of crime and thus internal security are also of great importance. A look at the provisions in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as well as the secondary legislation enacted by the Union shows, of course, a primacy of security over freedom. However, although Art. 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights grants a right to liberty and security, and the European Court of Justice has also derived a fundamental right to security from this, such a fundamental right is not to be recognised either in the member states or in the Union. On the other hand, security considerations justify encroachments on the freedoms of Union citizens, in particular insofar as the exercise of freedom is thereby secured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article informs about the legality of statements on rating platforms under data protection law disputes about statements from a data protection perspective. Topics include conflict between the general right of personality and freedom of expression, which was previously primarily resolved via civil and criminal law; and legal questions arise for private consulting practice on one hand and official enforcement practice for General Data Protection Regulation with processing of personal data.

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The aim of the paper hereto is to conduct analysis regarding the influence of the margin of appreciation doctrine on the solution of the collision between the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion within the Strasbourg system of human rights protection. The main research question focuses on the issue whether the margin of discretion equally affects both considered freedoms and how it impacts their conflict. The paper will rely on dogmatic analysis of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and selected judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the collision of the aforesaid freedoms. In this article, the author will also implement the historic method. The main thesis of the article is the primacy of the freedom of religion which causes illegitimate limitation of the freedom of expression due to lack of uniform European consensus regarding the qualification of the blasphemous speeches which constitutes a threat for legal certainty.

Today many western democracies limit freedom of expression where minorities of varying natures targeted by hatred. European Court of Human Rights sets a rather strict standard in which hate speech may not even qualify for a proportionality analysis under Article 17. Difference between the USA and rest of the world diminishes effectiveness of legal framework combating the hate speech. Most of the expression that would require legal sanctions in many western democracies are shielded by the freedom of expression in the USA. This outliner position of the US Supreme Court case law calls for an analysis. The most prominent and repeating argument against limitation of hate speech stems from the principle that government cannot remove certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace of ideas. Although the Supreme Court accepts that a few groups of well defined speech categories enjoy lesser protection, hate speech does not belong to any of them. According to the Supreme Court a clear and present danger shall be evident for speech to be restricted and the limitation must not be vague or over reaching. This paper analyzes milestone decisions of the Supreme Court regarding hate speech.

Copyright of KritV, CritQ, RCrit. Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft / Critical Quarterly for Legislation & Law / Revue critique trimestrielle de jurisprudence et de législation is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this contribution, I argue that every person's duty to respect others is central to section 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 ("the Equality Act"), otherwise known as the "hate speech" prohibition. This duty should therefore also be a central consideration in its interpretation. Related duties are those of the state to enact legislation, and of courts to interpret and apply the law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Our courts have in many instances considered the duty to respect others, as well as the state's and the courts' related duties, in the interpretation of socioeconomic rights and the development of the common law. In doing so, they have consistently employed the reasonableness standard. Therefore, references to relevant case law in various legal contexts provide the framework within which I examine legal duties in the context of unfair discrimination and, in particular, hate speech in terms of section 10(1) of the Equality Act. I examine the constitutional obligations of the state, the courts and private persons to promote respect for the dignity of others. I reiterate the state's specific obligation in terms of section 9(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, to enact legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination on the grounds listed in section 9(3). Finally, I relate these duties to the section 10(1) prohibition in the Equality Act. I apply the reasonableness standard to conclude that the prohibition gives due effect to the duties of the state and every person, and that the courts are duty-bound to interpret it accordingly. This conclusion refutes the Supreme Court of Appeal's ruling in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission ("Qwelane")[1] that the section 10(1) prohibition was vague, overbroad and, therefore, unjustifiably infringing the right to freedom of expression. [1] 2020 3 BCLR 334 (SCA).

The article discusses Germany Oberlandesgericht Munich court case dealing with the deletion of a post on Facebook. The court held that the user of a social media platform, which according to its intended purpose is to enable a general exchange of information and opinions, has access to the usage contract in conjunction with Bürgerliches Gesetzbuchand , a claim against the operator that a permissible expression of opinion posted by him is not removed from the platform.

This is a reply to a critique by Botha and Govindjee (2017 PELJ 1-32) of our interpretation of the hate speech provisions of the Equality Act (Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000) in Marais and Pretorius (2015 PELJ 901-942), in which we considered the constitutionality of section 10(1) of the Act, amongst other things. We address Botha and Govindjees' rejection of our view that hate speech is a form of unfair discrimination and that the most appropriate constitutional framework within which section 10(1) should be interpreted and assessed is sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution. We consider Botha and Govindjees' rejection of this point of departure, their opposing different interpretation of the role of the proviso in section 12 of the Act and, generally, their reasons for concluding that section 10(1) is unconstitutional. We maintain that Botha and Govindjee's proposals for reform unduly restrict the hate speech prohibition to cover exclusively expression that warrants criminalisation. In doing so, they fail to fully acknowledge the transformative obligation in terms of international law, the Constitution and the Equality Act, to prohibit and prevent unfair discrimination.

One of the most important indicators of a state ruled with democracy is that individuals who are able to express themselves freely. This freedom secured its position under the concept of freedom of expression in the law. Freedom of expression, which is an inseparable part of democracy, requires communication tools be free. There is no doubt that freedom of expression should be provided in the internet and internet-based social media, which are the most effective means of communication today. However, Turkey has a tradition as blocking access to widely-used social media. This measure, previously applied to the giant sites like YouTube and Twitter, is still applied to Wikipedia today. A number of points that should be followed in limiting the freedom of expression have been determined over the years. In this assessment, it is mainly investigated whether the conditions are met -which also known as the three-stage test- that the limitation is regulated by the law and it is confined to a legitimate purpose and that the democratic society order requires this measure. The precedents of the European Court of Human Rights, which makes a significant contribution to the determination of these criteria, will be the main reference in the study. Taking into consideration the Constitutional Court's Twitter decision, blocking access to Wikipedia will be examined.

The article informs about worldwide deletion obligations for illegal content on digital platforms before the Austrian Supreme Court and ways to remove violations of the right of expression in social media. Topics include Facebook decision open the door to censorship of online content on the basis of law after GlawischnigPiesczek applied for an injunction for violating to credit and defamatory; and Vienna Commercial Court found that the defendant was indisputably requested to delete the posting.

Protecting people against hate speech and racist slurs requires weighing up several fundamental rights. To maintain legitimacy in enforcing the legislative protection, a fine balance must be struck between the rights to equality and dignity on the one hand and freedom of speech on the other hand. An analysis of the legislative framework ousting hate speech and unfair discrimination on the basis of race and the manner in which the different relevant provisions have been applied by the courts shows that there are discrepancies that must be addressed. Despite the differences between the policy that facilitated the adoption of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, an alignment must be achieved in the starting point for an objective enquiry dealing with racism. To excuse serious cases of hate speech perpetrated by one population group while presuming that the other population group is racist from the outset does not promote South Africa's nation-building project. On the flipside, to address the unbalanced method of interpretation and implementation of the legislative provisions by adjusting the vantage point from which the assessment into whether an utterance is racist and derogatory is commenced would advance the constitutional value of non-racialism.

Due to the narrowing of the criminal law protection scope regarding honor and reputation, under the fifth amendment to the Criminal Code at the end of 2019, Severe Vilification was deleted which left noticeable illogicalities. Therefore, this research examines the reasons for this legislative intervention, to assess its justification. Due to the required scope of argumentation, this analysis builds on previously published work that has shown research on historical, positive, and comparative arguments. We are now exploring the Convention standards and positions of the European Court of Human Rights in the application of the criminal law mechanism in the field of protection of honor and reputation through two convention rights - freedom of expression and the right to privacy. The outcome shows that the provision of a criminal law mechanism for the protection of honor and reputation is in line with convention standards and that, given the equal value of both rights, their quality protection requires a balanced national solution. It is pointed out that the challenges of respecting the principle of proportionality lie equally in the field of civil law regarding determination of the amount of damages. Overall, the arguments previously published and those we present now indicate that the publicly available reasons for the deletion of Severe Vilification cannot present sufficient arguments for this legislative intervention. It is therefore argued that pro futuro regulation in this sensitive area should not be driven by sudden criminal cuts without careful expert and reasoned assessment and consensus on societal needs.